Facing up to the Bear: Confronting Putin's Russia

Introduction

Many claim that the writing has been on the wall for several years: The Economist's Edward Lucas wrote an entire book about the ‘new Cold War’ in (2008). Some grew wary even earlier, after President Putin's state of the nation speech to the Russian Duma in April 2005, in which he labelled the collapse of the Soviet Union ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’ (Putin 2005), or when he threw down the gauntlet to the West at the Munich Security Conference of February 2007 (Putin 2007). By August 2008, after the Russian war against Georgia, with the subsequent occupation of Georgian territory, things should have been clear to even the most cautious Western observer. And yet, as Estonian President Toomas Ilves is well known for saying, Georgia in 2008 was a wake-up call for the West, but we have chosen to ‘hit the snooze button ever since’ (Ilves 2014). Mikheil Saakashvili gave an important speech to the UN General Assembly in 2013, at the end of his presidential term in Georgia. He warned of Russia's concrete plans for the dismemberment of Ukraine, of the dangers of the Kremlin's Eurasian Union project for the independence of states in the region, and of the improved quality of Russian propaganda. These warnings were not taken seriously at the time but in hindsight can only be called prophetic. It will be interesting to analyse why it took the blatant aggression against Ukraine, beginning in late February 2014, to get a reaction from the Western elites and the public more generally, and why, even then, the reaction to the obvious came so slowly and hesitantly.

Russia as a threat

First of all, old habits are hard to break. So is the tendency to see Russia as a strategic partner, which was so popular with Western European elites in the 2000s. Germany's Social Democrats had imagined a ‘modernisation partnership’ in which the EU would engage with Russia to help it to become more Western, gradually reinforcing the rule of law and pluralist democracy and Russia's ‘embedding’ into the global economy. In the imagination of Germany's Social Democrats and many other Western Europeans, this Russia would become increasingly cooperative on all issues of European and global security. It should have been clear years ago that this was not happening, quite the contrary.

The second reason was that Russia–-whether properly modernising or not–-was seen as a lucrative business partner for Western corporate elites, its lack of modernisation notwithstanding. Even at the end of March 2014, Siemens Chief Executive Officer Joe Kaeser talked about ‘temporary turbulences’ with Russia (by which he meant the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the destabilisation of Ukraine) (Spiegel Online 2014). The fact that Kaeser made a friendly visit to the Kremlin just after these events points to a larger problem: much of corporate Europe has not fully grasped the threats that Putin's corrupt authoritarianism represents to their own short-term business interests and, even more, to the long-term values upon which any functioning free economy and international order are built. This disconnect between part of European business and much of European politics was a major factor in the initial Western hesitation. It may yet come back to haunt us in future debates about dealing with Putin's Russia.

The third and most ominous factor hindering a proper response from the West was the different degrees of understanding that Putin met from Western political elites and public opinion. True enough, Russian influence in the media, especially social media, did a lot to influence Western decision-making, not least in Germany. However, not every German blogger reflecting this or that aspect of Kremlin propaganda is a troll on the payroll of Russian foreign intelligence. On both the left and the right, and deep into Germany's middle class, there is a genuine feeling that the West has somehow wronged Russia through NATO expansion and too much support for democracy and the rule of law in the former parts of the Soviet Union (Fried 2014). This feeling exists in many other EU member states as well, including France, Italy and Greece, to name but a few examples. But these views are slowly losing ground. The hope that Putin's Russia will at some point come around, as a result of moderate sanctions and the West's offer of a ‘face-saving way out’ (Gathmann 2014), has proven futile because Vladimir Putin does not want to ‘come around’ as the West defines it.

The fact remains that Russia today is a revisionist power (Lucas 2014a) that plans to reverse developments from the past 20 years which it believes should never have happened. In some important respects, above all its readiness to use force, it resembles a nineteenth-century power (Cooper 2004). It is threatening the right of its neighbouring nations to strive for the rule of law and basic human and civil rights, as well as the right to choose their alliances. It wants to weaken the West and its organisations, NATO and the EU, by playing member states off against one another and gaining influence within some key countries, not least Germany. Russia is using its new ‘hybrid warfare’ (Jones 2014) to deliberately blur the lines between military and paramilitary activity, covert operations and civilian political activism. It has built a more or less coherent ideology by blending ultra-conservative and religious elements with ideological leftovers from the Soviet Union and older times in Russia's history. Quite obviously, Russia still perceives itself as an empire that actually has margins, not borders (Saakashvili 2013). It is fundamentally antagonistic to the West and will remain so for a long time. Last but by no means least, Russia's government of today is a hazard, above all to its own people, depriving them of a politically sustainable and economically viable future.

What does Vladimir Putin want?

It may sound strange to personalise Russia's foreign policy to such a degree, but in fact Vladimir Putin has a degree of personal control over Russia's external strategies that is unparalleled, even in recent Russian history. Hence, President Putin's strategy and tactics have been a topic of intense debate throughout this continent. To keep the rest of the world guessing about his motives, goals and respective next steps has actually become a trademark of his approach. However, although there is much less transparency in Russia than in a democracy, there are nevertheless some indicators as to what Putin's strategic goals are (such as those found in his Kremlin speech of 18 March (Putin 2014), on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea).

One of Putin's priorities is obviously to hold on to, and further consolidate, his power in Russia for as long as possible. For the moment, with approval rates of around 80 %, he seems to be doing well. The fact that most Western pundits give his project a maximum of 10 years before it unravels, seems to bother him only marginally.

It also seems probable that he intends to go down in history as the ruler who restored Russia's global position, as well as some kind of territorial status quo ante, to contrast with the ‘disastrous’ collapse of the Soviet Union. As noted above, Ed Lucas considers Russia today as ‘a revisionist power’ (Lucas 2014b). In this context, Putin has postulated a Russian exceptionalism which finds its clearest expression in the country's role as the protector of Russian-speaking populations all over the former Soviet Union. In some cases this involves shifting borders by annexation or the creation of satrapies. At other times it is done by exercising a de facto power of veto over the decisions of neighbouring countries on crucial matters involving their political and economic systems, and also their alliances. (The most recent example of this is Russia's prevention, for at least a year and a half, of the full entry into force of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU). The Eurasian Union, the follow-up to the Eurasian Customs Union, plays a key role in this effort to control and dominate neighbours. ¹

As for Russia itself, Putin has brought into play elements of ideologies (such as Alexander Dugin's Eurasianism) (Snyder 2014) which combine neo-imperial ambitions and authoritarian state structures with an extreme form of social conservatism and a strongly orthodox religious element (Shevtsova 2014). What it is important to understand is that he is convinced that this system is superior to Western liberal democracy, which is not only unsuitable for Russia, but a thing of the past globally.

In order to achieve all this, that is, to consolidate power at home, enlarge Russia and control its neighbourhood, and push back the West, Russia's power elite has developed a series of instruments which may not be entirely new but contain innovative elements. The most spectacular one is hybrid warfare, also named new generation warfare. This is a complex succession of diplomacy, propaganda, secret operations, political activism and, in the end, use of paramilitary, and finally military, forces in undeclared aggression. The West has yet to find an appropriate response to this type of warfare. ² So far, these methods have only been fully applied in Ukraine (some would claim with important precursors in the riots and cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and in the war against Georgia in 2008) (Asmus 2009). However, there are good indications that more hybrid wars may be beginning, for example in Moldova (Voice of America 2014) and even in the Baltic States (Samadashvili 2014a), which would, of course, signal a massive escalation on Russia's part. Assisting hybrid warfare are cyber and information warfare, as well as the unprecedented stepping up of Russian attempts to influence Western political decision-making, both directly and via public opinion, while, at the same time, practically banning foreign NGOs in Russia itself. Taken together, Russia has developed instruments of power and aggression to which we are only just beginning to find an answer. Find it we must.

Last but not least, there are good reasons to assume that Putin wants to split, weaken and ultimately destroy NATO and the EU–-the backbones of Euro-Atlanticism and the core of the West. One of the political instruments he uses is a demonstration that the mutual solidarity enshrined in their respective treaties is utterly hollow. Hence, if he could demonstrate that, for example, Estonia's allies were not willing to fight (i.e. to kill and die) for that country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, he would have rendered NATO defunct and therefore obsolete. That would be a prize in itself for Putin, in addition to all the other attractive implications it would have for his revisionist schemes. What all this means for the West is that this confrontation is also about ourselves–-about the future of our freedom.

What can the West do?

Before analysing what should be done, one has to assess the West's performance to date. It's a truism that the West, too, has made mistakes along the way. The question is, of course, whether it has been too tolerant at the first signs of aggressiveness (especially in Georgia in 2008), or whether it has been treating Russia too harshly all along, from NATO expansion to missile defence, to overstepping the mark in Ukraine by offering it an Association Agreement in 2013. John Mearsheimer, one of Washington's most prolific self-appointed realists, has probably made the most comprehensive argument to this effect (Mearsheimer 2014), demanding that the West simply needs to accept Russia's great power role. The one question both sides of this debate can usually agree on is that the West was late in recognising that there was a problem.

The argument by Mearsheimer and other self-appointed realists is wrong on at least three important points. First, it notoriously overestimates anybody's ability to influence events in Russia itself. The idea that Putin's behaviour is the result of Western actions or inactions grossly neglects the limitations of foreign influence in Russia. Second, the claim that NATO should not have expanded habitually ignores the fact that it was Russia's neighbours themselves that kept knocking on NATO's door. With Russian rhetoric about a special zone of interest, then called the ‘near abroad’, already well underway, they had every reason to be worried about a resurgent Russia. The ‘realist’ school usually claims that Russia's fears of NATO expansion should have been taken seriously, implying that the very real fears of the Baltic States and others should have been ignored. That would have been morally untenable for the EU and NATO, which are built on the principle of sovereignty and the free choice of political systems and alliances. Third, leaving the Central and Eastern European countries in a kind of ‘neutral buffer zone’ or directly under Russian control would have meant going directly against the aspirations of the democrats in these countries–-which, if the West is supposed to stand for values, is equally morally unacceptable. It would also have produced the kind of instability in Central Europe which we are now seeing in Ukraine (Applebaum 2014).

But how should the West react? The first and most important thing to recognise in this context is that this confrontation will last for a long time and that the democracies of the West will have to muster extraordinary political will and stamina (The Economist 2014). Chess is a good metaphor here. Moreover, the point of departure for any long-term resilience from the West, and especially from the EU, will be a stronger economic performance. If growth remains tepid or the euro crisis returns, Russia will have a much better chance of weakening the West from inside, through protest movements and populist parties. Sustainable growth will also be needed to finance the necessary increases in defence expenditure, as well as the emergency assistance needed for economically precarious countries such as Ukraine. Losses in trade with Russia have to be made up for elsewhere. Hence completing the single market and bringing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations to a meaningful end are absolute preconditions for a successful contest with Russia. Energy independence is another crucial goal. Poland's government has made important proposals to that end. Sources have to be diversified, pipelines made capable of reverse-flow, and the sleazy practices of Gazprom and Lukoil have to meet with the full force of European and national law (Euractiv 2014). Last, but by no means least, the EU's Eastern Partnership Initiative must be fundamentally reformed. It should readjust its main focus from governments in the partner countries to civil society, putting much more emphasis on political activists and future leaders by using visa policies, supporting NGOs and forging political party ties (Samadashvili 2014b).

NATO needs to re-establish deterrence in view of Russian aggression. Certainly, the interpretation of Article 5 will have to be examined, and possibly adapted for situations in which attacks against member states may be well underway before the first Russian tank crosses the border. NATO is now at the beginning of a process of reviewing everything, from doctrine to force structure. One thing is clear: increasing defence spending (which is already happening in some member states) is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, ingredient. The decision at the Wales Summit in early September to develop a Readiness Action Plan is only the first step.

Conclusion

Two more strategic questions related to the long-term development of Russia itself have accompanied the debate on how to react to Russia's aggression. The first is whether Putin's decisions since the end of last year are actually signs of Russian strength or Russian weakness. Before the overt occupation of Crimea, the events surrounding the Euromaidan and Yanukovich's flight were interpreted by some observers as having ‘destroyed the myth of Russian strength’ (Dempsey 2014). This illusion was quickly refuted by events. From Crimea to eastern Ukraine, Russia emerged not only utterly ruthless but militarily stronger than almost anyone could have suspected in the West. Moreover, although the Russian economy is visibly suffering, Putin has neither become less popular nor changed his behaviour one bit. All this has led many in the West to use headlines such as Ed Lucas's now famous ‘Russia is Winning’ (Lucas 2014b). While it is certainly true that Russia looks to be achieving its goals at the moment, it would be a dangerous fallacy to overemphasise its strength, or the weakness of the West. It is right to fight complacency, but not at the cost of spreading defeatism. The West has the best chance of emerging victorious in this struggle, even if it looks like it is losing for the moment. This has happened many times before.

But there will be many dangerous waypoints before Russia finally changes. Many speculate that, after Putin, things can only get worse and that he is likely to be replaced by a true ‘national bolshevik’, or that Russia will break up like the Soviet Union did when it lost the Cold War. The argument connected to this is usually that accommodations should be sought with Putin (Romer 2014). However, this argument is weak. There are good reasons to assume that the siloviki (potentates in the secret services and the military) and the oligarchs, who form Putin's immediate entourage, will remain in power, even if Putin has to pay for the inevitable economic decline of Russia. Equally, a peaceful and democratic revolution in Russia, along the lines of the ‘colour revolutions’ of the 2000s, should never be ruled out (Motyl 2014). For this to happen, however, the West will have to face up to the bear, today and for a long time to come.