Vatican Council II, “Gaudium et Spes”, n. 51, note 14.
2.
Documentum Syntheticum de Moralitate Regulationis Nativitatum, in The Birth-Control Debate, ed. HoytRobert (Kansas City, Mo: National Catholic Reporter, 1969), p. 69.
3.
By “conjugal acts which by intention are infertile” the authors of this document mean marital acts chosen during the wife's infertile period, or the regulation of birth by periodic abstinence. Revisionist theologians claim that there is no moral difference between “artificial” contraception and “natural” contraception or regulation of conception by periodic abstinence. See, for instance, KosnikAnthonyHuman Sexuality: New Directions in American Catholic thought (New York: Paulist Press, 1977), pp. 114, 293, 295. For a critique of this way of understanding regulation of conception by periodic abstinence, see Ronald Lawler, OFM Cap., Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., and William E. May, Catholic Sexual Ethics: A Summary, Explanation, and Defense (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1985), pp. 167-170; Germain Grisez, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., John M. Finnis, and William E. May, “‘Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life': Toward a Clearer Understanding,” Thomist 52 (1988) pp. 365-426, especially pp. 399-408.
4.
Documentum Syntheticum …. in Hoyt. The Birth-Control Debate, p. 72.
5.
Documentum Syntheticum …. in Hoyt. The Birth-Control Debate, p. 75.
6.
On this see another report by the “majority” on the papal commission, entitled Schema Documenti de Responsabili Paternitate, in Hoyt, The Birth-Control Debate, pp. 88–90.
7.
“Humanae Vitae”, n. 4: “Cuius certe generis questionibus ab Ecclesiae Magisterio novam eamque altiorem considerationem postulabant circa principia moralis doctrinae de matrimonio, quae in lege naturali, divina Revelatione illustrata, nititur.”
8.
In note # 11 to n. 11 of “Humanae Vitae”, Pope Paul VI refers to the teaching of the following of his predecessors on this matter: Pius IX, “Qui Pluribus”, in Pii IX PM Acta. 1, 9-10; St. Pius X, “Singulari Quadam”, AAS 4 (1912) 658; Pius XI, “Casti Connubii”, AAS 22 (1930) 579-581; Pius XII, Allocution “Magnificate Dominum” to the Episcopate of the Catholic World, AAS 46 (1954) 671-672; John XXIII, “Mater et Magistra”, AAS 53 (1961) 457.
9.
See Vatican Council II, “Dignitatis Humanae”, n. 14; “Gaudium et Spes”, n. 51.
10.
“Humanae Vitae”, n. 4. Note that in this text Paul VI affirms that “naturalis quoque lex voluntatem Dei declarat, cuius utique fidelis observatio ad aeternam salutem est hominibus necessaria.”
11.
In note # 12 of “Humanae Vitae”, n. 11. Pope Paul VI refers to the teaching of Pius XI, “Casti Connubii”, AAS 22 (1930) 560, and Pius XII, “Address to Italian Union of Midwives,” AAS 45 (1951) 843.
12.
Here a passage from John Noonan's massive history of the issue of contraception, Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 6, is pertinent: “the propositions constituting a condemnation of contraception are … recurrent. Since the first clear mention of contraception by a Christian theologian … of the third century … the articulated judgment has been the same. In the world of the late Empire known to St. Jerome and St. Augustine, in the Ostragothic Aries of Bishop Caesarius and the Suevian Braga of Bishop Martin, in the Paris of St. Albert and St. Thomas, in the Renaissance Rome of Sixtus V and the Renaissance Milan of Charles Borromeo, in the Naples of St. Alphonsus Liguori and the Liege of Charles Billuart, in the Philadelphia of Bishop Kenrick, and in the Bombay of Cardinal Gracias, the teachers of the Church have taught without hesitation or variation that certain acts preventing conception are gravely sinful ….”
13.
“Humanae Vitae”, n. 11: “quilibet matrimonii usus ad vitam humanam procreandam per se distinatus permaneat.”
14.
“Humanae Vitae”, n. 11, n. 14: “Item … respuendus est actus qui, cum coniugale commercium vel praevidetur vel efficitur vel ad suos naturales exitus ducit, id tamquam finem obtinendum aut viam adhibendam intendat, ut procreatio impediatur.”
15.
In note #14 of “Humanae Vitae” Pope Paul refers to the following of his predecessors and Vatican Council II as condemning absolutely directly procured abortion: Catechismus Romanus Concilii Tridentini, Part II, Chapter VIII; Pius XI, “Casti Connubii”, AAS 22 (1930) 562-564; Pius XII, “Discorsi e Radiomessagi” 6 (1944) 191-192, AAS 43 (1951) 842-843, 857-859; John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, AAS 45 (1963) 259-260; Vatican Council II, Gaudium et Spes, n. 51.
16.
“Humanae Vitae”, n. 14: “Quareprimariis hisce principiis humanae et christianae doctrinae de matrimonio nixi, iterum debemus edicere, omnino respuendam esse, ut legitimum modum numeri liberorutn temperandi, directam generationis iam coeptae interruptionem, ac praesertim abortum directum, quamvis curationis causae factum.”
17.
“Humanae Vitae”, n. 14.
18.
“Humanae Vitae”,: “Neque vero, ad eos coniugales actus comprobandos ex industria fecunditate privatos, haec argumenta ut valida efferre licit: nempe, id malum eligendum esse, quod minus grave vidaetur insuper eosdem actus in unum quoddam coalescere cum actibus fecundis iam autem positis vel postea ponendis, atque adeo horum unam atque parem moralem bonitatem participare. Verum enimvero, si malum morale tolerare, quod minus grave sit, interdum licet, ut aliquod maius vitetur malum vet aliquod praestantius bonum promoveatur, numquam tamen licit, ne ob gravissimas quidem causas, facere mala ut evitant bona (cf. Rom 3.8), videlicet in id voluntatem conferre, quod ex propria natura moralem ordinem transgrediatur, atque idcirco homine indignum sit iudicandum, quamvis eo consilio fiat, ut singulorum hominum, domesticorum convictuum, aut humanae societatis bona defendantur vel provehantur.”
19.
See notes 8, 11, 15 above. Also see Vatican Council II, “Gaudium et Spes”, n. 27.
20.
See, for instance, CurranCharles“Moral Theology in Light of Humanae Vitae”, in his Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 29–58, at 30-32; Louis Janssens, “Considerations on Humanae Vitae”, Louvain Studies 2 (1969) 231-253, at 247-250.
21.
JanssensLouis“Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics,”Louvain Studies6 (1977) 207.
22.
JanssensLouis See also GulaRichardWhat Are They Saying About Moral Norms? (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), pp. 55–56; Timothy O'Connell, Principles for Catholic Morality (New York: Seabury, 1978), pp. 158-159.
23.
FuchsJosefChristian Ethics in a Secular Arena (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1984), p. 72.
24.
Janssens“Norms and Priorities. …”208.
25.
Janssens“Norms and Priorities. …”208.
26.
Janssens, 216. See also GulaWhat Are They Saying About Moral Norms?, p. 57.
27.
McCormickRichard A.Notes on Moral Theology 1965-1980 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 578–579.
28.
A typical illustration of the way revisionist theologians distinguish between “good” and “bad” as predicates proper to persons as moral beings and “right” and “wrong” as predicates proper to human actions is provided by Janssens, “Norms and Priorities ….” 209: “moral goodness and moral badness are finally determined by the goodness or badness of our disposition or attitude … [but] whether or not our actions are objectively suited to actualize our good dispositions is … a matter of knowledge and judgment … of rightness and wrongness. That is why we say that an action is morally right, whereas we qualify as morally wrong an action which is inappropriate for that purpose.”
29.
In his Human Values and Christian Morality (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), pp. 92-112 Josef Fuchs develops this point quite extenisvely in presenting his understanding of “basic freedom” or “fundamental option” as distinct form everyday free choices. An excellent critique of this aspect of revisionist thinking is given by BoyleJoseph M.Jr.“Freedom, the Human Person, and Human Action,” in Principles of Catholic Moral Life, ed. MayWilliam E. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), pp. 237–268.
30.
This is precisely the way Francis Sullivan, a systematic theologian in agreement with revisionist moral theologians, summarizes the thought of such authors as Charles Curran, Franz Böckle, Josef Fuchs, Bruno Schüller, Bernard Haring and others in his book, Magisterium: Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), pp. 150–151.
31.
FuchsJosef“The Absoluteness of Behavioral Moral Norms,” in his Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983), p. 145, This very influential essay originally appeared in Gregorianum 52 (1971) under the title “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms”. All citations from this essay will be taken from Personal Responsibility.
32.
FuchsJosef, p. 129.
33.
On this see FuchsJosef, pp. 126-127, where Fuchs says that “whatever leads to our unfolding, in the fullest and best sense of that word, is good.” See also, representative revisionist thought on this matter, Cornelius van der Poel, The Search for Human Values (New York: Newman, 1971), p. 57: “The question … is what kind of human self-realization is taking place and what is the interpersonal impact of this action.” See also van der MarckWilliamToward a Christian Ethic (New York: Newman, 1967), pp. 41–80, where he develops the idea that the criterion for establishing material norms is the question whether human actions build up or tear down community. If actions help to build up community, they are morally right; if they tear it down, they are morally wrong.
34.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility …. p. 133.
35.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility …, p. 124
36.
SullivanMagisterium, pp. 151–152. On this see also Fuchs, Personal Responsibility …, p. 140.
37.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility …. p. 142.
38.
On this see MaguireDanielDeath by Choice (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 99: “the principle (rule would be more exact), 'Do not rape a girl who is suffering from mental illness' imports an action that is so ghastly in its meaning and consequences that the principle would appear [emphasis added] to be absolute since no competing values could seem [emphasis added] to outweigh the harm such an action portends.” Nonetheless, this “rule” is still, theoretically, open to exceptions. See also Janssens “Norms and Priorities ….” 217.
39.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility …, pp. 140–142; Janssens, “Norms and Priorities.,” pp. 217-218; Richard McCormick, in “Ambiguity in Moral Choice” as reprinted in Doing Evil to Achieve Good (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), pp. 42-44.
40.
“Premoral” is the term used by Fuchs; “nonmoral” is preferred by Schuller, McCormick, and others; “ontic” is employed by Janssens and others.
41.
See above, note 2 and accompanying text.
42.
See above, notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
43.
SchüllerBruno“What Ethical Principles Are Universally Valid?”Theology Digest19 (March 1971) 24 (=“Zur Problematik allgemeinen ethischer Grundsätze,” Theologie und Philosophie 45 [1970] 4). McCormick's comment on Schuller here is of interest. McCormick writes: “Stated negatively, it [this principle] reads: put in a position where he will unavoidably cause evil, man must discover which is the worst evil and avoid it. Stated positively, this is its formulation: put before two concurring but mutually exclusive values, man should discover which must be preferred and act accordingly. These statements imply that a physical evil can be caused or permitted only if it is demanded by a proportionate good” (Notes on Moral Theology 1965-1980, p. 315).
44.
McCormick“Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” inDoing Evil to Achieve Good, p. 39. See also the collection of essays by Peter Knauer, Louis Janssens, Bruno Schüller, Josef Fuchs, Franz Scholz, Walter Jeffko, Albert Dilanni, Richard McCormick, and Charles Curran published in Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Teaching, ed. CurranCharles E., and McCormickRichard A. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) for similar articulations of the “preference principle”.
45.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility. … p. 138.
46.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility. …, p. 137.
47.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility. …, pp. 134–136. For an excellent critique, see Germain Grisez, “Moral Absolutes: A Critique of the View of Josef Fuchs, S. J.,” Anthropos (now Anthropotes): Rivista di Studi Sulla Persona e la Famiglia 1 (1983), 183-184.
48.
Fuchs. On the changeability of human nature see Fuchs, p. 126, where Fuchs refers to the study of E. Chiavacci, “La legge naturale ieri e oggi,” in FestorazziF.Nuove Prospettive di Morale Coniugale (Grescia, 1969), p. 65ff.
49.
For justification of abortion for “proportionate” or “commensurate” reasons by revisionists see CurranCharles E.New Perspectives in Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 190–191. Curran includes preventing “grave harm” to the “physical or psychological health” of the mother as a proportionate reason to justify killing the unborn. For mercy killing or euthanasia, see Daniel Maguire, Death by Choice.
50.
Contraception is described as an act of “fostering love responsibly toward generous fecundity” in the Documentum Syntheticum, p. 72. It is described as a “marriage-saving” or “marriage-stabilizing” act by McCormick, “A Commentary on the Commentaries,” in Doing Evil to Achieve Good, p. 241.
51.
On this see CurranNew Perspectives, p. 191.
52.
Revisionists such as Curran, Janssens, Fuchs, Maguire, and others repeatedly claim that St. Thomas denies that any material norms are absolute in the famous passage in Summa Theologiae 1-2, 94, 4 where he says: “lex naturae … quantum ad quaedam propria [praecepta], quae sunt quasi conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in pluribus … sed ut in paucioribus potest deficere” (cf. 1-2, 94, 5).
53.
Several revisionist theologians have argued that St. Thomas, when teaching that the precepts of the Decalogue are absolutely indispensable, even by God (Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 100, 8) was considering these precepts only as formal or tautological norms (e.g., thou shalt not kill unjustly) and not as material norms forbidding actions described nonevaluative language. See MilhavenJohn“Moral Absolutes in Thomas Aquinas,” inAbsolutes in Moral Theology?, ed. CurranCharles E. (Washington: Corpus, 1968), pp. 159–185; John Dedek, “Intrinsically Evil Acts: An Historical Study of the Mind of St. Thomas,” Thomist 43 (1979) 385-413; Franz Scholz, “Durch ethische Grunzsituationen aufgeworfene Normenproblemen,” Theologischpractische Quartalschrift 123(1975) 341-355 (English translation in Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Norms and Catholic Teaching).
54.
This is the principal point that Janssens seeks to develop in his influential essay, “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,”Louvain Studies4 (1972) 115–156.
55.
“Gaudium et Spes”, nn. 16, 33, 46.
56.
Thus, for example, Sullivan appeals to the texts of Vatican Council II listed in the previous note to justify the revisionist approach to material norms in his work, Magisterium, p. 155.
57.
Thus, for example, Sullivan appeals to the texts of Vatican Council II listed in the previous note to justify the revisionist approach to material norms in his work, Magisterium, pp. 151–152 (see above, note 36), See also Fuchs, Personal Responsibility …. p. 140.
58.
SullivanMagisterium, pp. 151–152.
59.
SullivanMagisterium, p. 152. Sullivan and others derive this notion of changing human nature primarily from Karl Rahner. See the latter's “Basic Observations on the Subject of the Changeable and Unchangeable Factors in the Church,” Theological Investigations 14 (1976) 14-15. See also Fuchs, Personal Responsibility …. p. 126.
60.
Fuchs, Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1984, p. 75; Personal Responsibility. … pp. 131, 139; McCormickNotes on Moral Theology 1965-1980, pp. 710–711.
ThomasSt., 18, 1: “quia de ratione boni est ipsa plenitudo essendi, si quidem alicui defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine, ne dicetur simpliciter bonum, sed secundum quid inquantum est ens …. Sic igitur dicendum quod omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse intantum habet de bonitate; inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala.”
64.
ThomasSt., 20, 1 and 2.
65.
FuchsPersonal Responsibility, … p. 129; cf. pp. 126-127 (see above, notes 32 and 33).
66.
Grisez“Moral Absolutes. …”172.
67.
Grisez“Moral Absolutes. …”, p. 170.
68.
See above, notes 48 and 59.
69.
“Gaudium et Spes”, n. 29; Lumen Gentium, n. 19.
70.
“Lumen Gentium”, n. 13.
71.
“Gaudium et Spes”, n. 29.
72.
“Lumen Gentium”, n. 13.
73.
ConneryJohn R.“Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making Changcd?”Theological Studies42 (1981) 232–250; Germain Grisez, “Against Consequentialism,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 23 (1978) 21-72; Grisez; The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), pp. 141-172; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 118-125; Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1983), pp. 86-105; John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 254-261; Servais Pinckaers, Ce qu'on ne peut jamais faire: La question des actes intrinsequements mauvais. Histoire et discussion (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1986); Bartholomew Kiely, “The Impracticality of Proportionalism,” Gregorianum 66 (1985) pp. 655-686.
74.
McCormick“Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” in Doing Evil to Achieve Good, p. 38.
75.
See works cited in note 73.
76.
In Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism, pp. 254-261, Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez show how the revisionist principle of proportionate good is incompatible with the reality of free choice. They note that this theory requires that “two conditions be met: (i) that a morally significant choice be made; and (ii) that the person making it be able to identify one option as offering unqualifiedly greater good or lesser evil. But these two conditions are incompatible, and in requiring that they be met simultaneously consequentialism [within which revisionist natural law theory fits] is incoherent” (p. 254). As they show, choice is possible only when there are two or more alternatives. But an alternative exists only when the good it promises is not available in other possibilities. Thus if condition (ii) is met, condition (i) cannot be and vice versa.
77.
McCormick“A Commentary on the Commentaries,” inDoing Evil to Achieve Good, p. 227; see also pp. 251-253.
78.
McCormick“A Commentary on the Commentaries,” inDoing Evil to Achieve Good, p. 227; see also pp. 251-253.
79.
For a brilliant critique showing that McCormick's position leads to absurdities, see Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics, pp. 99-105. McCormick. Finnis shows, argues that one acts wrongly in framing an innocent person to prevent a lynch mob from hanging a group of innocent persons not because one is willing to kill an innocent person and punish him for a crime he did not commit but rather because one is practicing “extortion” on the lynch mob by refusing to respect their freedom to change their minds — surely an absurd position.
80.
On this matter see D'ArcyEricHuman Acts: An Essay on Their Moral Evaluation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 18–25, where he shows that there is a propensity to redescribe actions in terms of their hoped-for or anticipated results and to do so in such a way that the nature of the act is concealed. This is precisely what revisionist theologians do in applying their principle of proportionality.
81.
Kiely“The Impracticality of Proportionalism,” pp. 655–666.
82.
KavkaGregory S.Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 24–28.
83.
ThomasSt.Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 94, 4 and 5. See above, note 52.
84.
Summa Theologiae, 2–2, 66, 5 and 6.
85.
Summa Theologiae, 110, 3c and ad 4.
86.
Summa Theologiae, 154, 2.
87.
Summa Theologiae, 154, 8.
88.
Summa Theologiae, 64, 6.
89.
De Malo, 15, 1, ad 5.
90.
Milhaven, Dedek, and Scholz make this claim. See above, note 53.
91.
LeePatrick“The Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His Modern Commentators.”Theological Studies42 (1981) pp. 431–432; Theo Belmans, “Saint Thomas et la notion de 'moindre mal morale',” Revue Thomiste 83 (1983) pp. 53-54; Belmans, Le sens objectif de l'agir humain (Citta del Vaticana: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980) pp. 62, 109-110, 117-119, 124, 162, 237.
92.
This is the argument set forth by Janssens. See note 54 above.
93.
See MayWilliam E.“Aquinas and Janssens on the Moral Meaning of Human Acts,”Thomist48 (1984) pp. 592–594; Lee, “Permanence of the Ten Commandments,” pp. 437-441; Belmans, “Saint Thomas et la notion de 'moindre mal morale',” pp. 41-44. Of particular relevance here is a text from In II Sent., d. 40, q. un., a. 2c and ad 2 and ad 3: “voluntas dupliciter considerari: vel secundum quod est intendens, prout in ultimum finem fertur; vel secundum quod est eligens, prout fertur in obiectum proximum, quod in finem ultimum fertur … Non autem bonitas voluntatis intendentis sufficit ad bonitatem actus; quia actus potest de se malus, qui nullo modo bene fieri potest. Si autem consideretur voluntas secundum quod est eligens, sic universaliter verum est quod a bonitate voluntatis dicitur actus bonus, et a malitia [voluntatis] malus …. Secundum voluntatem dicitur actus exterior bonus vel malus; sed non secundum voluntatem intendentem solum, sed secundum voluntatem eligentem … ad bonitatem rei non solum exigitur bonitas finis ultimi quem respicit voluntas intendens, sed etiam bonitas finis proximi, quem respicit voluntas eligens.” See also Summa Theologiae 1-2, 20, 2.
94.
See above, note 56, with appeals to “Gaudium et Spes”, nn. 16, 33, 46.
95.
“Gaudium et Spes”, n. 79.
96.
Summa Theologiae, n. 80.
97.
Summa Theologiae, n. 27.
98.
Summa Theologiae, nn. 27, 51, 79, 80; “Dignitatis Humanae”, n. 14.
99.
On this see Servais Pinckaers, “La question des actes intrinsequements mauvais et le proportionalisme,”Revue Thomiste82 (1982) 181–212; Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, pp. 154-155.
100.
FuchsHuman Values and Christian Morality, pp. 92–112, especially p. 96 ff.
101.
Fuchs See also Fuchs, Personal Responsibility, … p. 122.
102.
“Gaudium et Spes”, n. 39.
103.
“Apostolicam Actuositatem”, n. 5.
104.
See, for example, Vatican Council II, “Optatam Totius”, n. 16.
105.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 18, 3c; see also 1-2, 5, 2; 18, 8 and 9; Summa Contra Gentes, III, 9.
106.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 94, 2.
107.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 91, 2c and ad 3.
108.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 100, 1.
109.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 100, 8: “quorum non oportet editionem esse, nisi quod sunt scripta in ratione naturali quae per se nota”; cf. 100, 11.
110.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 94, 2.
111.
Summa Theologiae: “quia bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda.”
112.
Summa Theologiae: “quia bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda.”
113.
Summa Theologiae, 1–2, 58, 5: “ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem; virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis.”
