The very practice of interpreting Constitutional provisions in light of standards of review can itself be challenged. There is nothing in the Constitution which authorizes or even suggests that its clauses are to be construed by means of such devices. The entire theoretical fabric of standards of review is judge-made.
4.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
5.
For other examples see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Harris vs. McRae, 448 U.S. 197 (1980).
6.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, U.S. 510 (1925).
7.
For other examples see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8.
Roe at 153.
9.
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
10.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11.
Although the Court itself points to this distinction between Griswold and Roe, it fails to explain why Griswold is legally relevant despite that difference.
12.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
13.
This point is made by John T. Noonan in his book A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies, (The Free Press, 1979), p. 12.
