Moral License in Video Games: When Being Right Can Mean Doing Wrong

Abstract

Research on video game violence has found largely consistent evidence that violence in video games tends to be associated with an increase in antisocial behavior. However, this body of work has mostly ignored one prominent feature of many violent games: moral decision making. It is possible that the influence of video game violence could change when moral decisions are brought into the context. One way video games change behavior is through changes in players' self-perceptions, a process called identity simulation. In addition, a perspective called moral license predicts that these effects should not necessarily be consistent across behaviors, in that people should try to balance selfishness with keeping the moral high ground across many behaviors. Therefore, moral choices (or immoral choices) in a video game may predict less moral (or more moral) behaviors right after the game. However, later behavior may revert yet again, creating a cycle of pro- and antisocial behaviors. The present experiment asks participants to make moral choices in a video game, and then measures their behavior on two subsequent tasks. Results indicate that taking what participants perceive to be the more moral mind-set in the video game predicts more antisocial behavior on the first task, but more pro-social behavior on the next task. These results support identity simulation and moral license processes in a video game and moral behavior context, and indicate that there may be greater complexity in video game violence effects than previously understood.

Introduction

Research on video games has largely focused on video game violence.^1–4 Scholars have proposed various explanations of how in-game behavior influences actual behavior, including social learning,^5,6 norm activation,⁷ and contrast effects.⁸ Recent work has examined the influence of video games on self-perception—a process termed “identity simulation.”^9–11 This study examines how adoption of moral frameworks through identity simulation impacts subsequent behavior. Importantly, it offers alternative interpretations to previous research on video game violence, including moral license as an essential issue in video game effects research.

Identity simulation

The identity simulation perspective suggests that a game player can adopt the traits and attitudes of the controlled character.¹² Therefore, players can experience changes in self-concept, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors as a result of playing games through different characters.^9–11 Players embrace the characters' decisions and behaviors as their own. This not only has implications for immediate outcomes, but also for future gameplay, as players “try on” different personalities.

Moral decisions

Video games often allow players to make moral decisions within the narrative.^13–15 Two common moral approaches are deontology and utilitarianism. Deontology advocates individuals should be treated as ends as opposed to means.¹⁶ Utilitarianism proposes decisions should be made based on the greatest good for the greatest number.¹⁶ If during the process of making an ethical decision players experience identity simulation,^10,11 they may feel as if the characters' moral decisions are their own, just as players of shooting and racing games have reported stronger associations with those topics after game play.¹⁷ Thus, moral decisions made in video games could influence players' views of themselves and their morality, and this self-perception could impact real moral behaviors.

Deontology and utilitarianism

Importantly, deontology and utilitarianism may not be equally appealing. The conundrum of harming one to save many (utilitarianism) has been used countless times in moral dilemmas, such as the classic trolley problem.¹⁸ In the trolley problem, participants are presented with an opportunity to save multiple people who are about to be run over by a trolley, but to do so they must sacrifice one person (usually by switching the track or pushing said person).¹⁸ Research has found that the majority of people—up to 90%—choose the deontological option, refusing to sacrifice one life to save the group.^18,19 Other work has found that some people view utilitarianism as not rooted in morality at all, and would not consider it an option for informing moral decisions.²⁰ So, what happens when people are asked to make moral choices based on utilitarianism, and how might it influence their future behavior?

Moral license

One framework to predict future moral behavior from past behavior is moral license.^21,22 In moral licensing, prior moral behavior may “license” less moral behavior later, while prior immorality may encourage subsequent moral behavior.^21,22 This means that morality is not constant, but an ever-shifting process where people try to maintain an overall moral quality while sometimes behaving selfishly.^21,23

Moral license has not been thoroughly tested in a video game context. Moral license research frequently examines behavior such as political correctness and consumerism.^22–25 However, if identity simulation through moral choices as a video game character can serve to establish (or reduce) moral credentials, then moral license processes may occur based on simulated behavior as well.

The present study

Participants in the present study made a moral decision in a video game, followed by two behavioral tasks. Participants were instructed to take on a deontological or utilitarian mind-set during gameplay. The game asks participants to choose between saving one person or allowing him to suffer for the greater good, in this case, aiding the war effort. It was predicted that the mind-set that participants were instructed to take would influence the decision they make.

H1: Participants with a deontological mind-set will be more likely to save the person than those with a utilitarian mind-set.

Again, choices based on deontology and utilitarianism may not be equally appealing. Past research indicates that people widely prefer to save the one life, and often view utilitarianism as immoral or amoral.^18–20 Therefore, it was expected that participants would generally indicate that saving the one life was the more moral option. However, identity simulation would predict that participants who make the utilitarian choice should internalize that mindset.^9–11 If this is the case, then participants who make the utilitarian choice should indicate that the utilitarian choice is as moral, or possibly more moral, than those who make the deontological choice.

H2: Participants will perceive their in-game decision as the more moral decision.

If moral license processes are influenced by identity simulation of video game character behavior, then perception of in-game behavior should predict behavior on a second task. In particular, when participants take the mind-set of deontology—saving the single life—they should feel that their morality was affirmed. This licenses them to enact more antisocial behavior in the form of retaliation on the next task. Research has found evidence for retaliatory behaviors in response to loud blasts of noise.²⁶

H3: A higher moral assessment of the deontological game decision will predict more retaliation.

However, moral license does not stop at one behavior. Once participants have acted more aggressively in the first task, they may feel the need to reaffirm their moral credentials. Therefore, it was expected that these participants would act more pro-socially in a second behavioral task.

H4: More aggressive behavior in the first task will be associated with more generous behavior on the second task.

However, not all participants were simply given orders. Perceived choice was manipulated by asking half the participants whether they would be willing to take on a mind-set. Perceived choice may influence identity simulation processes, and consequently the relationship between in-game decisions and behavior. The role of choice in identity simulation has not yet been tested, so the following research question is offered:

RQ1: Will perceived choice influence outcomes?

Method

Participants

Participants were 84 undergraduates (median age=21 years, 78% male). Analyses controlled for sex due to the overrepresentation of males.

Procedure

The experiment had a 2×2 (instructions: utilitarian vs. deontological×perceived choice: low vs. high) between-subjects design using random assignment. Participants were recruited for a study about whether shooting-based games can improve reaction time. Participants sat in individual rooms and rated their gaming skills (for the cover story) and moral identity²⁷ (8 items; M=9.15, SD=1.34, Cronbach's α=0.90). Moral identity was used as a covariate to reduce the likelihood that importance of morality to the self may have influenced results. Participants were told that the game was selected because it is easy to play but allowed for the story aspects to be controlled. It was explained that the game could be played with two different mind-sets: that you must win against the enemy at any cost (utilitarian), or that you must save as many individual lives as possible (deontological). Perceived choice was manipulated by assigning participants to that mind-set (low choice) or by asking whether they would be willing to use the mind-set (high choice, no participant refusals—a common outcome²⁶).

Game play

Participants played approximately 20 minutes of Mass Effect 2 as an avatar that matched their sex. The experimenter said, “Today you'll be playing part of a mission from Mass Effect 2. This game is about Commander Shepard, who is in charge of the war against a machine race called ‘Geth.’ Shepard was tasked with discovering what is happening with a rogue AI that has taken over a base. Shepard discovers that the problem is not an AI, but an autistic man named David, who is a savant who can control the Geth. David has been plugged into the base computers by his scientist brother due to this ability. David is plugged in against his will, and his brother has killed everyone on the base to keep him hooked to the machine. You will take control of Shepard and finish the mission.”

In the game, participants shoot Geth as they traverse a series of hallways. Once they reach the computer where David is trapped, they must shoot it apart. Upon winning, the mainframe falls away revealing a naked David, with scientific tubes protruding from his body. The brother who imprisoned David appears, apologizing and requesting to complete the project to help the war effort. The participant must decide: leave David in dire circumstances to help the war (utilitarian choice), or take David away, harming the war effort but saving David (deontological choice). After the decision, the experimenter played a video depicting the consequences. Participants who left David discovered that David died shortly after Shepard left. Participants that took David saw David thanking Shepard for saving him.

Retaliation

The experimenter reiterated the cover story about shooting games and reaction times, explaining that participants would play a game with another participant (actually a computer, in a task called a noise blast^28,29). They were told to compete with the other person to be fastest at clicking a square when it appeared. Whoever was faster would be rewarded with money ($0.00–0.50, $0.05 increments), while whoever was slower would hear an uncomfortable blast of noise (60–105 decibels, 5 decibel increments). Importantly, participants set the noise and reward levels for their “partner,” and their “partner” set levels for them.

The target behavior was the difference between the first and second trials for noise and reward. The noise blast task is rigged so that participants always “lost” the first trial, and were blasted with the loudest noise. After this, participants always win and lose 12 times each, with noise and reward randomly set by the “partner.” Because of the possibility that this could encourage a tit-for-tat strategy that could wash out effects across all trials, the most useful are the first and second trials. Specifically, the difference between the first two trials indicates retaliation for the initial loud blast and no reward.²¹ The measures for noise (M=3.05, SD=2.95) and reward (M=1.07, SD=3.08) were created such that positive scores indicated retaliation.

Post-test

Participants indicated the decision they perceived as more moral (1=“leaving David was more moral” to 11=“saving David was more moral”; M=8.83, SD=2.12). Participants were then told that as thanks for their participation, they were being entered to win one of five $25 gift cards. They had the opportunity to pledge any amount of that $25, should they win, to the Red Cross (M=11.26, SD=9.14). Participants entered demographic information before being debriefed.

Results

Coefficients are unstandardized. An analysis of covariance controlling for instructions, sex, and moral identity found no significant difference between the high (M=6.97, SD=2.65) and low perceived choice (M=5.91, SD=3.72) conditions on the choice manipulation check, F(1, 79)=1.93, p=0.18. Therefore, choice was dropped as a predictor but was included as a covariate in further analyses. RQ1 asked whether perceived choice would influence outcomes; these results suggest it does not.

A one-sample t test examined the assumption that participants would view the deontological choice as the more moral choice. The scale mean of 5 (“both were equally moral”) was compared to the sample mean of 8.83. Participants viewed the deontological choice as the more moral choice, replicating previous research, t(76)=15.76, p<0.001.

H1 predicted that the instructions would influence the in-game decisions participants made regarding David. Logistic regression was used due to the dichotomous variable. The first step included the covariates, and did not predict the outcome better than the null model, Negelkerke R²=0.03, χ²(3)=2.15, p=0.54. The second step added decision instructions, which was a significant increase in variance explained in decision made, Nagelkerke R²=0.11, χ²(1)=5.00, p<0.05. Deontological mind-set participants were significantly more likely to take David with them than utilitarian mind-set participants, b=1.17, exp(b)=3.22, Wald=4.63, p<0.05. H1 was supported.

H2 predicted that the decision participants made would influence the choice they perceived as moral. H3 predicted that moral perception would predict noise blast behavior, and H4 predicted that noise blast behavior would predict donation behavior. These were tested as sequential mediation models.³⁰ Model 1 used reward retaliation as the second mediator (Table 1). Although the assumption check indicated that participants overall rated the deontological choice as more moral, decision made significantly predicted moral perception, such that participants who left David were less likely to say saving him was completely the more moral choice, R²=0.08, F(5, 73)=1.35, b=1.33, t(73)=2.23, p<0.05. However, it should be noted that only three participants actually indicated that the utilitarian choice was more moral than the deontological choice.

Table 1.

Table of Results for the Sequential Mediation Model with Reward Retaliation

	Moral perception b	Reward retaliation b	Charity donation b
Decision made	1.33^*	0.04	−1.66
Moral perception	—	0.36^*	0.35
Reward retaliation	—	—	0.69^**
Choice condition	−0.59	−1.19^**	1.76
Decision instructions	0.16	−0.52	3.15
Participant sex	−0.10	0.75	0.97
Moral identity	−0.08	−0.26	0.74

^*p<0.05; ^**p<0.10.

Moral perception significantly predicted reward retaliation, such that those who saw saving David as more moral were more likely to retaliate by decreasing reward levels on the second trial, R²=0.14, F(6, 72)=2.02, b=0.36, t(72)=2.22, p<0.05. Reward retaliation marginally predicted donation behavior, such that the more participants retaliated, the more they pledged to donate to charity, R²=0.09, F(7, 71)=1.05, b=0.69, t(71)=1.80, p<0.08. The indirect effect of decision made on donation behavior through the mediators was not significant at the 95% confidence level, b=0.33 (95% CI −0.001, 1.38), but was marginally significant at the 90% confidence level (90% CI 0.04, 1.01). The direct effect of decision on donation was not significant, b=–1.66, t(71)=−0.60, p=0.55.

Model 2 used noise retaliation as the second mediator (Table 2). The effect of decision made on moral perception was the same as in model 1. Moral perception did not significantly predict noise retaliation, R²=0.07, F(6, 72)=0.87, b=0.23, t(72)=1.35, p=0.18. Noise retaliation did significantly predict donation behavior; the more participants retaliated, the more they pledged to donate, R²=0.10, F(7, 71)=1.17, b=0.72, t(71)=2.01, p<0.05. The indirect effect of decision made on donation behavior through the mediators was not significant, b=0.22 (95% CI −0.04, 1.19), nor marginal (90% CI −0.002, 1.12). The direct effect of decision on donation was not significant, b=−1.47, t(71)=−0.54, p=0.54. Based on these models, H2 is supported, and H3 and H4 are partially supported.

Table 2.

Table of Results for the Sequential Mediation Model with Noise Retaliation

	Moral perception b	Noise retaliation b	Charity donation b
Decision made	1.33^*	−0.32	−1.40
Moral perception	—	0.23	0.43
Noise retaliation	—	—	0.73^*
Choice condition	−0.59	1.15	0.10
Decision instructions	0.16	−0.07	2.84
Participant sex	−0.10	−0.94	2.17
Moral identity	−0.01	0.19	0.43

^*p<0.05.

Discussion

The present study examined how people make and interpret moral behaviors in video games, and how in-game behaviors influence real-world behavior. Moral choices available to players were either deontological or utilitarian. Players tended to see the deontological option as the more moral one, replicating previous work.^18–20 Participants who enacted the utilitarian behavior in the game saw the utilitarian version as more moral. Importantly, it did not matter that their decision was determined by the experimenter; participants still internalized the mind-set and perceived it as more moral. This indicates that identity simulation^9–11 may work to influence moral self-perceptions. Participants who had engaged in the more conventionally “moral” behavior in the game^18–20 may have felt more strongly that they had the moral high ground, so were more likely to retaliate against another participant who had blasted them with noise by reducing the reward the other participant received. Participants who had engaged in the less conventionally “moral” behavior shifted their view of this behavior to be slightly more moral, but still tended to view the choices as either equally moral or the deontological behavior as relatively more moral. Regardless, these participants were less likely to retaliate by reducing reward levels. Additionally, neither group changed how loud a noise they blasted their partner with, but the more they retaliated (with reward or noise), the more money they pledged to charity on a second task. While it is believed that participants internalized the moral mind-set from the game, participants may have felt the need to justify their in-game actions. Importantly, either explanation involves the character's behavior being internalized, and the participant acting in a manner that is consistent with moral license.

Importantly, these results indicate that people may see identity simulation through moral behavior in video games as a sufficient way to fulfill their moral quota. This reveals a potentially important role for media in predicting moral behavior. If mediated behavior acts as a sufficient substitute for actual behavior, then moral license processes may occur more frequently than previously expected.

These results also provide more information for how video games influence behavior. Participants played a violent video game, which research indicates should have increased aggression.^2,3 However, aggression was not uniformly affected, with some participants becoming more aggressive and others less. In addition, any effects were short-lived, as behavior reversed in the second task such that those who were aggressive in the first task became more generous on the second, and vice versa. These nuances indicate a complex relationship between games and moral behavior, and future research on video game violence should consider these issues.

Limitations and future research

A limitation of this study is that moral perception did not affect noise retaliation. However, both noise and reward retaliation predicted donation behavior (reward marginally). One possible explanation for why moral perception did not influence noise retaliation is that decreasing reward felt like the more acceptable way of retaliating without losing as many moral credentials. Reducing reward is not quite as extreme as increasing the intensity of an uncomfortable noise. This was not explicitly tested. However, one piece of support for this explanation is that retaliation using noise was more strongly associated with an increase in later pro-social behavior than was reward retaliation. If participants thought reward retaliation was not as “bad” as noise retaliation, then they would not have needed to increase their donation behavior as much in order to reaffirm their moral credentials. Future research may wish to examine the role of type and extremity of behavior.

In addition, it is possible that participants preferred the deontological option of saving David simply because his suffering was proximate and the distal threat of war paled in comparison. However, previous work that lacked this distance issue has consistently found a deontological preference.^18,19 Nevertheless, this is a possible confound.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that the adoption of different mind-sets can impact players' real-world behavior. These changes provide evidence for moral license¹⁹ as a theoretically important perspective in video games and moral behavior research, with identity simulation^9–11 as one possible mechanism. Importantly, the cycle of moral license and behavior is a fast-moving one, where in-game behavior predicted the opposite behavior in the first subsequent real-world task, but by the next task, people had reverted to their original behavior. The effects of violent video games that contain simulation of moral behaviors is therefore not cut-and-dried, but instead a complex process with outcomes depending on gameplay experiences and perceptions.

Footnotes

Author Disclosure Statement

No competing financial interests exist.

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