Abstract
Background:
Mainstream environmental nongovernmental organizations and grassroots environmental justice (EJ) groups have consistently faced challenges cooperating effectively. An especially important problem for grassroots EJ groups in these partnerships is maintaining autonomy while still securing the resources necessary to pursue their goals. While challenges to self-determination are widely recognized by EJ activists and scholars, little work examines how these unfavorable outcomes can be avoided. This case fromthe Chicagoland area contributes to a deeper understanding of autonomy maintenance.
Theoretical Framing:
Understandings of autonomy are currently underdeveloped in the EJ literature. I use social movement theory and examine this case to understand autonomy as determined by procedure rather than outcome, asking what factors allowed a grassroots group to maintain autonomy when working with a mainstream environmental organization.
Methods:
I process trace a partnership between a mainstream environmental organization and a grassroots EJ group to understand the factors involved in the maintenance of local autonomy in this type of relationship.
Case Results:
Factors such as the grassroots EJ group strategically considering who to partner with, the mainstream group centering community needs and pursuing funding that is not mutually exclusive, and both groups focusing on a clearly shared mission facilitated autonomy maintenance.
Conclusion:
Understanding the factors involved in the maintenance of local autonomy in this case may provide some insight about best practices for amplifying grassroots voices in similar coalitions. This will be important as EJ coalitions continue to expand, and grassroots EJ actors increasingly receive funding from various sources.
INTRODUCTION
Since the formally recognized beginning of the environmental justice (EJ) movement in the 1980s, there has been a well-known rift between mainstream environmental organizations, such as the “Group of 10,” and grassroots EJ actors. 1 However, as these groups convened at The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991, and the public became more familiar with the notion of EJ, mainstream environmental organizations were pressed to incorporate EJ issues into their frameworks for action.2,3 Despite remaining tensions, this spurred a partial alliance between mainstream environmental organizations and grassroots EJ groups.
As many grassroots EJ groups are overburdened and under-resourced, these partnerships with mainstream environmental organizations are often vital for them to secure the funding and professional resources necessary to remain viable and advance their cause. Still, many individuals remain critical of these partnerships.4,5 Arrangements where grassroots groups rely on larger, more institutionally powerful actors to advance their cause lead to concerns about local autonomy. It can be difficult for grassroots groups to preserve self-determination and remain authentic voices of the local communities they represent when they are beholden to the interests of larger groups. With these complexities in mind, grassroots EJ actors debate the best way to proceed. While much recent work explores the relationship and conflicts between these actors,6,7,8 little work documents strategies to minimize the issues in this type of relationship. Thus, this article investigates actions that grassroots EJ groups and mainstream environmental nongovernmental organizations who work together can take to allow grassroots EJ groups to better maintain autonomy.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Conceptualizing autonomy
In the EJ literature, there is surprisingly little discussion of the definition of “autonomy” and thus how partners can work to maintain it. To empirically examine autonomy, scholars have often focused on channeling: an indirect process of neutralization of grassroots groups or social movement organizations through funding from more powerful actors. 9 Here, receiving funding from foundations compels grassroots groups to pursue activities or broaden/narrow their issue focus in ways they otherwise would not have. This causes the movement to prioritize and evolve in line with foundation priorities, 10 ultimately resulting in movements shifting to demand less radical change. In addition, some existing work focuses on the idea of co-optation, where more institutionally-oriented actors seek to work with or fund movements to intentionally moderate their goals by incorporating their agendas symbolically without attempting to achieve related substantive change.11,12,13 Critically, both perspectives identify movement actors as nonautonomous when their agendas change or they no longer engage in contentious action. However, while funding or other relationships can certainly redirect movement activity,14,15 it is not obvious that grassroots groups should be classified as nonautonomous simply because their strategies or goals change.
This observation raises a key concern about prior EJ research: While autonomy, or self-determination, is a central concern in the EJ Movement,16,17 there is no well-theorized understanding of what autonomy actually means. Although scholars such as Bullard, 18 Sandler and Pezzullo, 19 and Schlosberg 20 have discussed the importance of diverse and autonomous groups in maintaining a strong and well-functioning EJ movement, they lack a clear definition of autonomy. Broader social movement work resists an overly simplistic notion of autonomy by borrowing from the social relations perspective which understands less powerful groups as having agency and not being bound to lose self-determination when working with more powerful actors. 21 Additional work has begun to move away from the “autonomy—co-optation divide”22,23,24 by explaining that the perspective of co-optation ignores the agency of grassroots groups, assumes they are unknowledgeable, and fails to recognize the tradeoffs they make when considering survival needs of movements. 25 Other understandings of autonomy describe social movement actors as having agency when holding firm on their goals and also when making changes on their own accord. 26
In sum, automatically equating changing tactics or goals with co-optation or channeling ignores the possibility that groups can learn or grow, making strategic changes voluntarily and eagerly. A more accurate understanding of autonomy in the EJ literature should thus center on self-determination rather than outcomes, focusing on how free groups are to make decisions for themselves, regardless of whether those decisions entail a change in agenda. To classify a group as (non)autonomous, we must understand the nature of the procedure in which any changes took place and the extent to which a group had agency in their decisions and in making any changes.
Processes of autonomy maintenance and loss
Social movement scholars identify a few important specific causes of local autonomy loss, such as perception of threat from movements by powerful actors.27,28 This perception of threat is usually fueled by incompatibilities in tactics and long-term goals. 29 Sometimes this leads to outright repression by more powerful actors, and other times to more subtle forms, like channeling. 30 These accounts of autonomy loss pertain specifically to social movements and the state, rather than autonomy loss in partnerships between large NGOs and local groups. However, we often see similar concerns when actors with different amounts of power collaborate, 31 and because grassroots groups often feel compelled to maintain collaborations to ensure organizational survival, these relationships can parallel those of social movements and the state.
Still, scholars such as McCarthy 32 assert that loss of autonomy is not inevitable when working with more powerful actors. Relatedly, work in the EJ and coalition-building literatures discusses some factors that allow for diverse coalitions to thrive. While these pieces do not examine autonomy maintenance specifically, or do so in the context of different types of partnerships, they can provide insight into how local autonomy is maintained in coalitions between grassroots EJ groups and mainstream environmental organizations. McCarthy considers the agency of funders and environmental groups in working together to maintain autonomy, drawing attention to the role each of the partners can play in building respect for autonomy by establishing practices of open communication and transparency. The broader coalition-building literature points to the importance of building collective identity in and across diverse movements. These pieces point to factors such as establishing norms of inclusivity, explicitly acknowledging difference, and rallying around shared threat.33,34,35 Based on this work, I examine if these factors and others help to explain autonomy maintenance in partnerships.
CASE STUDY DESIGN
In this study, I ask what actions a grassroots EJ group and a mainstream environmental organization have taken to enable the grassroots EJ group to maintain a significant degree of autonomy while partnering. This question was constructed through community-engaged research, and I use process tracing to answer it. By identifying causal process observations, I am able to understand the role of any factors and behaviors in contributing to an autonomous outcome. This case includes a partnership between a prominent mainstream environmental organization and a grassroots EJ organization in the Greater Chicagoland Area. The grassroots EJ group, which I will refer to as “Grassroots for a Just Future (GJF),” formed in the Fall of 2019 in response to local EJ issues that a previous campaign did not completely rectify. GJF began to work with their mainstream environmental partner, who I will refer to as “Environment for All (E4A),” in early spring of 2020, relatively soon after their formation. At the time of interviewing, nine members were part of GJF’s active leadership network, and they primarily engaged with one main point of contact from E4A regarding this partnership and its goals.
I gathered data from the groups’ websites, news articles, and special reports and conducted five semi-structured interviews with grassroots EJ members, using purposive sampling. I have kept the identity of interviewees and groups confidential to ensure the protection of any individuals who may be critical of the partnership as well as the preservation of the partnership. Prior to this study, I received Institutional Review Board approval through Purdue University.
CASE STUDY RESULTS
There were several key events both prior to the formation of this partnership and during these partners’ fight for the cleanup of coal ash that provide insight into the processes surrounding local autonomy maintenance. This partnership emerged when the lead organizer of GJF was put in contact with a regional worker of E4A, who had previously worked on the issue of coal ash in this community. Since E4A’s main means of achieving environmental goals is through litigation, the regional worker felt that their organization could be helpful. Beyond the legal resources that E4A could provide, GJF also sought a partnership with them to establish themselves and gain the technical, communication, and scientific resources that a well-established and well-funded organization could offer. Thus, a partnership with this group could be of use for GJF to not only survive but also to increase their impact. All five GJF members I interviewed alluded to this, with some directly stating that E4A had been vital to them securing resources that enabled them to launch initiatives or host events. Members specifically commented on the professional expertise and assistance of employees in the grant writing process. This partnership therefore proved to be invaluable.
Despite this power differential that could lead to undue influence of GJF, grassroots EJ members deeply considered this possibility and took steps to prevent it before even entering a partnership with any groups. Specifically, they intentionally entered a partnership with E4A because they were well aware of their many similarities, believing this would be an uncomplicated and non-contentious partnership where they would not be viewed as a potential threat to be subverted. This became clear as grassroots members discussed their own prior adverse experiences with elite environmental partners and also their efforts to clearly define their groups’ values and goals and only pursue partnerships and initiatives aligned with those.
More specifically, some members of GJF were involved in area EJ efforts in the past, prior to their group being formed. During 2017–2018, a different mainstream environmental organization was involved with their efforts to promptly decommission a coal-generating station, pushing toward a just transition to clean energy. However, when the electric generating company announced it would decommission its plant in 2028, the mainstream organization claimed a victory and mostly divested from the community. The founding member of GJF acknowledged these difficulties with the past environmental organization, explaining how they “had to be careful in terms of the way we push in our public image,” since they did not see eye-to-eye on everything and the group worried that GJF could undermine their legitimacy.
However, the same interviewee stated that their experience with E4A was vastly different from collaborations with the previous mainstream environmental organization. The same interviewee noted that “…past experiences and continual issues within the sort of NGO–grassroots struggle never really materialized within our relationship with [E4A]…” Their in-depth conversations about differences in their past collaboration versus this one evidence the intentionality GJF made in taking precautions moving forward.
Additionally, another interviewee from GJF explained that they were very clear about their needs from the beginning of the partnership. This same member, along with two others, noted the importance of putting forth a clear mission, knowing the needs of community members and not losing sight of them, having a strong sense of political clarity, knowing what they really want to achieve, and understanding if new initiatives are aligned with their vision. They explained, “We really have, I think, a clear sense of our own personal politics and what we’re trying to get out of the work…” They also said, “If you know, in very clear terms, what you’re trying to achieve, then you can always approach everything through that lens.”
If this were a partnership formed with little thought, we might expect that these groups frame environmental issues quite differently or take different policy positions. Instead, on their websites we see that these partners appear to be closely aligned in their pursuit of justice, with E4A even being in resounding agreement with many grassroots EJ groups (including GJF) that the Inflation Reduction Act announced at the time of the partnership performed insufficiently on dimensions of justice in several ways, such as allowing for carbon capture technologies and additional oil and gas leasing in frontline communities. Because several members of GJF were familiar with challenges in partnerships, they pursued a partnership with their guard up, paying careful attention to their own vision and if E4A fit into that vision. These precautions directly translated into a partnership where the larger group posed much less risk to the smaller group than in other relationships like this one.
In addition to precautions taken on the part of GJF to ensure local autonomy maintenance, E4A was also an active agent in this process. More specifically, E4A centered community needs and goals. This in turn made the outcomes desired by the community primarily important to E4A, too. The more an elite group is in consensus with the community, the less need there would be for them to override a grassroots group.
The historic involvement of E4A’s primary point of contact in the area exemplifies how they centered the community. Both grassroots interviewees and local reporting indicate that E4A had a “long history” around this community before the grassroots EJ group had been formed. Specifically, the primary point of contact at E4A had become aware of environmental issues in this area beginning in 2000–2002, as unsafe levels of metals such as boron and manganese were found in this small community’s water, leading to its designation as a Superfund Alternative Site. When environmental agencies determined that coal ash being disposed of at a nearby landfill was responsible for contamination of drinking water, the employee became heavily invested in sharing residents’ stories. From 2003 on, the community has demanded extensive remediation in this area, with E4A being involved in several attempts. Their involvement heavily increased in the years following a 2014 determination regarding toxic metals present in the community’s soil. E4A’s involvement carried on through these years, consistently releasing updated reports and speaking to the press about the issue.
Their focus on the issue of coal ash that residents had been concerned with for a very long time, even before GJF existed, illustrates the centering of community needs. If this were not the case, I might have observed E4A taking on other less immediate issues in the area, such as lake water quality or emissions more generally. I also notably found no evidence of community displeasure with E4A’s involvement. Instead, I observed deep connections between some community members and the representative of E4A who had worked there long-term, such as articles addressing their work with specific residents. The director of GJF noted, “They’ve always asked us ‘What do you need? How can we be helpful?’ And rather than putting their name out there, trying to make it so that they’re putting themselves before us or again making it so it’s like a branding thing, it’s always been, ‘What can we do to really be able to support your work on the ground?’”
Another GJF member explained that when the representative of E4A they work with saw that this company was creating environmental issues again, they wanted to work with GJF to tackle them, saying, “They really understand the area, they’ve had that experience. And so I think that’s why they’ve been so supportive of having us, you know, push as hard as we want and to be able to think about what’s most effective. And they’ve never tried to water down our approach.” If E4A had not been making an intentional effort to center community needs, it seems unlikely they would have assigned a representative to the case that had such a rich involvement in the area.
This evidence exhibits how centering community allowed the outcomes valued by GJF to become similarly important for E4A. Having a representative of E4A who worked closely with the community led to strong consensus with the community, meaning there was also little impulse to override GJF. In fact, a GJF member elaborated that when the Environmental Protection Agency exempted inactive landfills and buried coal ash from a 2022 clean-up rule, E4A actually deferred to them about decisions related to local matters surrounding the coal ash campaign. The same member mentioned that when E4A had suggested a possible channel for action that GJF did not feel ready for, communication allowed E4A to comprehend how GJF better understood the context and had a larger stake in the issue. They, in turn, were able to accept GJF’s desires.
Even once partnered, it was possible for differences to arise between E4A and GJF, leading E4A to perceive GJF’s vision as competing or counterproductive to their own and thus a threat to be combatted. It is highly unlikely two groups are similar in every regard. For example, in the Summer of 2021, GJF organized a film screening about the impacts of coal ash, sponsored by E4A. The screening was intended to be a space designated for community building. Given that E4A’s preferred tactic is litigation, it would be unsurprising if E4A saw this screening as a waste of resources that could be better used for other types of action. Yet, we instead saw E4A direct GJF to specific funding sources that could be used for the film screening. In fact, GJF members vehemently noted that this screening could not have happened without E4A’s assistance in finding the resources to put it on, explaining they were foundational in this process. One member of GJF shared some comments that were particularly illustrative of their partner’s approach. They described the relationship as “non-transactional,” explaining that E4A did not divert ideas but rather collaborated around them.
In considering why this unwavering collaboration was the case, a member of GJF offered a particularly helpful account. They spoke to E4A’s willingness to sponsor the event, noting that because E4A is a national organization, they are not engaged in the struggle for limited local resources in the area, so there is little sense of competition. Thus, this pursuit of funding that is not mutually exclusive seems to be invaluable in allowing E4A to see GJF’s approaches that vary from their own as non-threatening. This comment illustrates how, though a larger group may want to redirect a smaller group whose goals or methods could be counterintuitive to their own, by pursuing funding that the groups do not have to compete for, this impulse dissolves.
Finally, both groups’ focus on the particular mission at hand, an “easy” area of collaboration, contributed to local autonomy being maintained here. Coal ash served as a focal point in this partnership, enabling partners to focus on something they indisputably agreed upon, even when their overall agendas did not always match. One can see consistent collaboration around this issue throughout the course of the partnership, including in 2020 when the groups banded together to collect digital signatures on a petition to prevent the utility from excavating and relocating additional coal ash from their plant, leading to heightened air pollution during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ultimately, the action did not proceed. Similarly, in 2021, the partners, as well as some other various organizations, proceeded to co-create a large report specifically pertaining to coal ash. GJF also proceeded to work with their partner on advocating for coal ash cleanup in various sites, including locations near Lake Michigan and local groundwater supplies.
It was at least partly a strategic move on the part of GJF to heavily focus on the coal ash issue while partnering with E4A, whose main focus in the area was this issue. Importantly, though, grassroots EJ members mentioned they never felt restricted or pressured in their actions. Thus, the groups were always in consensus on this issue and working on it together. There was little room for disagreement on such a clearly focused issue, meaning there was no identifiable incentive for E4A to water down GJF’s approaches.
Notably, GJF also worked on individual initiatives, such as the broader goal of a “just transition,” mutual aid, utility rate hikes, and rejecting placement of pipelines near the Great Lakes, but E4A took a hands-off approach on these issues, not particularly concerning themselves with them. Even when GJF took part in several direct-action initiatives a short time before the interviews and told E4A about these initiatives, the group did not attempt to intervene or stand in the way. Similarly, though GJF did communicate about these initiatives, no evidence suggests that they tried to involve E4A in these broader endeavors. Thus, there was little room for disagreement or for E4A to perceive any of GJF’s agenda as truly threatening to their credibility or organizational survival.
Because of these factors highlighted above, GJF avoided a partnership that could be much more difficult and often centered around areas of disagreement, and E4A ultimately had no ulterior motive to impose on GJF while partnering. In preserving local autonomy, both E4A and GJF played a role, and different factors became important at different points in the partnership. For GJF, it was vital that they remain wary and carefully consider how their partners’ visions compared with their own to ensure a more compatible partnership. On the part of E4A, it was vital they centered community needs and goals, actually bringing their own perspectives more in line with those of the grassroots actors. However, it also became important to acknowledge that differences may present themselves once these partnerships are formed, despite such precautions. In these cases, rather than threatening local autonomy, it became important to acknowledge difference and find ways to accommodate it. For E4A, this meant pursuing funding that was not mutually exclusive, so both groups could have access to funding to pursue their vision using their desired methods. For both groups, it meant rallying around a clear commonality and focusing on that, even while allowing individual differences to persist.
CONCLUSION
Importantly, my findings reveal that both partners had agency in this largely autonomous outcome. More specifically, I find that GJF had taken precautions to ensure they would not partner with an environmental organization that would find them threatening, posing a risk for co-optation. Additionally, action was taken on the part of E4A. They made an intentional effort to center community needs and pursued funding that was not mutually exclusive. Finally, both groups focused on the specific mission at hand, an “easy” area of collaboration. These actions meant that the partners were largely similar, and when interests or tactics did diverge, they were able to overcome them.
This study adds to the repression, coalition-building, and EJ literatures by examining how grassroots autonomy can be preserved in EJ coalitions where power differentials are present. Importantly, while partners were quite aligned in this case, several of the factors uncovered in this study may also be able to exist in relationships where partners are not so compatible, allowing for the preservation of local autonomy even in partnerships that are more contentious. For example, partners might always be capable of intentionally focusing on shared short-term goals, even while allowing differences to persist. If this is true, focusing on shared immediate visions could potentially help to overcome perceived threats due to groups’ overarching differences, allowing local autonomy to be maintained even in partnerships that would typically be very contentious.
Despite these findings, the study has several limitations. First, autonomy is not constant, so the degree to which a group is autonomous will shift. Future studies should take this temporal component seriously and observe longer-lasting partnerships. In addition, interviews are always subject to social desirability bias. However, I have little reason to believe that respondents were not being forthright about any attempts at repression by their elite partner, given that interviews and group names remained confidential, and criticism of mainstream environmental organizations is common in these spaces. Future research should observe partnerships where groups are less similar yet still maintain local autonomy. This would allow us to understand better why elite groups do not attempt to dilute grassroots agendas despite incompatibility, as well as how grassroots EJ groups evade these threats when they do occur. The factors identified here could be used as a starting point to begin exploring these other contexts.
Both mainstream environmental groups and grassroots EJ groups can benefit from the factors identified here by remaining cognizant of these findings when attempting to pursue partnerships with one another. Increasingly, we see the necessity of forming these partnerships, especially to pursue federal funding. These findings can therefore serve as one entry point for considering “best practices” in these partnerships. As grassroots voices are increasingly valued and sought after, it is important to identify tools that amplify these voices.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of the environmental justice organization featured in this article for generously sharing their time, experiences, knowledge, and perspectives, all of which were invaluable to the development of this work. I also extend my thanks to the Smithsonian Institution, attendees of the Political Science Research Workshop at Purdue University’s Department of Political Science, and the members of my committee, each of whom have contributed to my research, including this publication. Please note that the views expressed in this piece do not reflect those of the Smithsonian Institution.
AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTIONS
K.K.: Conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, investigation, methodology, project administration, writing—original draft, writing—review and editing.
AUTHOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No competing financial interests exist.
FUNDING INFORMATION
No funding was received for this article.
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