Abstract
Introduction
In the midst of economic, scientific, and technological developments, international law has been evolving in a manner which requires the management of different fields of discipline and international cooperation to address cross-border challenges. Common concern of humankind/mankind (CCH) is one such concept in international law that has been developing in the context of the need to protect the Earth's atmosphere. When it was introduced, it was expected that CCH would create a common conventional regime on equitable sharing of responsibilities with respect to the environment. To date, however, it has neither been recognized as an obligation that states owe to the international community as a whole (erga omnes obligation) nor accepted as customary international law.
Nevertheless, whilst there are still doubts about its legal meaning, CCH was included in the preamble of the international Paris Agreement treaty on climate change adopted in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). The International Law Commission (Commission), a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) expert body mandated to work on the codification and progressive development of international law, also included the concept in its work on the topic of the Protection of the Atmosphere. This Viewpoint seeks to analyze and clarify the legal meaning of CCH and its consideration in the Commission. It is composed of two parts. Part I discusses the development of the term in treaties and state practice vis-à-vis the concept of common heritage of humankind/mankind (CHM), with which it is often compared. Part II then considers the debate and adoption of the CCH concept in the work of the Commission on Protection of the Atmosphere.
Part I. Concepts in Treaties and State Practice
Common Heritage of Humankind/Mankind
Origin
It is unclear where and when the idea behind CHM was first introduced in the legal realm (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 332). Perhaps it could be “traced to ancient times” or linked to notions of “common patrimony” and “le patrimoine de l'humanité” advanced in the 1800s (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 332). It might be rooted in “Christian theology, Islamic law, African customary law, Asian non-theist tradition and pre-Christian Roman law” (Taylor, 2016, p. 319). Nevertheless, references to the concept are prominent in various fields of international law as these now stand.
The law of the sea, however, is the field most associated with the concept because it is the legal basis of the regime governing the maritime zone covering the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil, which falls outside the limits of national jurisdiction (Area) and its resources. Arvid Pardo is often the one to whom the establishment of this regime in the law of the sea is attributed (Segura-Serrano, 2006, p. 233). In 1967, whilst serving as the ambassador of Malta to the United Nations (UN), he delivered a speech before the UNGA proposing the international regulation of the sea based on CHM. The UNGA issued Resolution 2749 (XXV) in 1970 (UN, 1970) to adopt his proposal and Resolution 3281 (XXIX) in 1974 (UN, 1974) to reiterate the declaration. At last, in 1982, it was captured in Article 136 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)/Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) (UN, 1982). Earlier this year, it was referenced in Article 5, paragraph (b) of the new international legally binding instrument under the UNCLOS/LOSC on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) (UN, 2023). Indeed, the proposal from Malta has become one of the pillars of the law of the sea.
Meaning
The appeal of CHM seems to lie in its creation of a sense of trusteeship (Borgese, 1998, pp. 117–118). From the law of the sea, where it is considered to have been “established [with] a more advanced mechanism[,]” three elements of CHM have been identified: 1.) peaceful use, 2.) non-appropriation, and 3.) benefit of humankind as a whole (Tanaka, 2019, pp. 217–220). On one hand, the first element pinpoints what states should do: States should use the Area for peaceful purposes such as, but not limited to, the conduct of marine scientific research (UN, 1982, Articles 141 and 143[1]). On the other hand, the second element puts a name to the actions that states should not do: States should not claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over the Area or its resources (UN, 1982, Article 137[1]). States and persons, whether natural or juridical, should not appropriate the Area or its resources (UN, 1982, Article 137[1]). And actions to this effect, regardless of which state or person performs them, should not be recognized (UN, 1982, Article 137[1]).
The reason behind these allowed and prohibited acts is elaborated in the third element, which clarifies that the purpose of these rules is to vest rights over the Area and its resources upon humankind as a whole (UN, 1982, Articles 137[2], 140[1], 149). This makes clear that CHM seeks to equalize the position of states and people with regard to the Area and its resources. Whether the states involved are coastal, land-locked, developed, or developing, or the people in question independent or without a self-governing status, should be of no moment (UN, 1982, Article 140[1]).
To achieve this, regulation is entrusted upon an intergovernmental body called the International Seabed Authority (Authority). The Authority was established with the precise aim of acting on behalf of humankind as a whole (UN, 1982, Article 137[2]). It is meant to oversee and control all activities in the Area, ensuring the equitable sharing of economic benefits derived from them as well as cooperation in promoting transfer of technology and scientific knowledge (UN, 1982, Articles 153[1], 140[2], 144[2]). The regime governing the Area is therefore a new common management regime set up for the benefit of humankind. It deviates from the traditional legal framework that focuses on the sovereignty and sole benefit of states, at least insofar as the Area is concerned.
All of this was considered inspiring when the idea was brought up relative to the establishment of a new international economic order (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 334). It could even be argued that CHM was thus elevated to an international norm from which no derogation is permitted (jus cogens norm) (Borgese, 1998, p. 117). The LOSC itself has an express provision stating that there shall be no amendments to the basic principle relating to CHM and no agreements in derogation thereof (UN, 1982, Article 311[6]). The Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS/LOSC (Implementation Agreement) further bolsters this because, whilst it introduced modifications to the composition and function of the Authority in favor of commercial exploitation interests (Taylor, 2018, p. 306), it nevertheless reaffirmed that the Area and its resources remain covered under CHM (UN, 1994, second preambular paragraph).
The practical application of CHM has been further concretized through jurisprudence. In 2011, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an advisory opinion on Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area where it explained the legal implications of CHM (ITLOS, 2011, p. 10). These include: 1.) the consideration that environmental impact assessments (EIAs) should be included in the system of consultations and prior notifications under the LOSC with respect to resource deposits in the Area (ITLOS, 2011, para. 148, p. 51); 2.) the argument that the Authority may make a claim for compensable damage to the Area and its resources constituting CHM on behalf of humankind (ITLOS, 2011, para. 180, p. 59); and 3.) the view that national measures should be kept under review to ensure that they meet current standards and the contractors, if any, meet their obligations effectively without detriment to CHM (ITLOS, 2011, para. 222, p. 69).
Issues
Despite this inspiring background and concrete application, however, CHM does have its flaws. Pardo himself thought that the CHM regime in the law of the sea was “little short of a disaster” (Pardo, 1983, p. 499). He criticized it because
[t]he … Authority plays no role whatsoever in the determination of the limits of the international seabed; the competence of the Authority is limited strictly to the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources; [and] the decision-making procedures of the Council of the Authority… are such as to render unlikely appropriate and timely decisions on important questions. (Pardo, 1983, p. 499)
Years later, the regime continued to be viewed as unsound with Borgese criticizing its foundations as well as the changes introduced through the Implementation Agreement (Borgese, 1998, pp. 112–113). Hesitation in adopting CHM can be seen within international environmental law in particular where “CHM is deemed to be applicable … although … the concept of [CCH] is preferred” (Segura-Serrano, 2006, p. 235). Significantly, the association of CHM with socialism (Segura-Serrano, 2006, p. 236) and distributive justice (Noyes, 2012, p. 451) stands in its path toward wide acceptance and use.
Common Concern of Humankind/Mankind
Origin
Appearing to be some form of compromise, CCH emerged in international environmental law (Segura-Serrano, 2006, p. 235; Taylor, 2016, pp. 315–316) before the UNCLOS/LOSC even entered into force. In 1988, the UNGA welcomed another initiative from Malta to include climate conservation as part of CHM, but in the end, it opted to issue Resolution 43/53 recognizing climate change as CCH instead (UN, 1988). The concept was later adopted in 1992 under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (UN, 1992a) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UN, 1992b), resulting in CCH regimes within these laws (Taylor, 2016, pp. 315–316). The concept is now linked to various subjects of international law such as desertification, plant genetic resources, mercury, the responsibility to protect, and exchange rate policies (Cottier & Ahmad, 2021, p. 20; Weiss, 2013, pp. 70–77). With respect to climate change law in particular, states reaffirmed the CCH regime within it through the 2015 Paris Agreement (UN, 2015) and 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact (UN, 2021).
Meaning
This reference to CCH over CHM is more than just a simple “semantic variation” (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 340). The shift toward CCH was arrived at through an intentional and thoughtful process. It will be recalled that Malta made a clear proposal to declare climate conservation as CHM. Whilst some states agreed with this in general terms, an issue was raised regarding the appropriateness of CHM since sharing natural resources or dealing exclusively with areas lying outside national jurisdiction is not applicable in that particular context. Developing states expressed the opinion that imposing the same responsibility for the protection of the environment upon all states is unfair and inequitable; it would entail setting hard standards for protecting the atmosphere that would limit the economic and social development priorities and policies of developing states (Desai & Sidhu, 2019, pp. 155–156; Stoll, 2016, p. 135).
The words “common concern” are reminiscent of the term first introduced in the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development entitled Our Common Future. In it, the Chairperson Gro Harlem Brundtland wrote that national roles were set aside for “common concern for the planet and the interlocked ecological and economic threats … which … people, institutions, and governments now grapple [with]” (UN, 1987, p. 14). The use of the term, in addition to addressing fears relating to the protection of “sovereign resources rights” (Stoll, 2016, p. 135), has been said to place “primary focus on the causes of problems and conflicts, the preventive character of regimes of protection and the general obligation of due diligence” (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 347). In other words, it aims to look at international cooperation to avoid catastrophic effects from some matters of importance.
Elements of this concept, as it has developed since its first introduction in 1988, have been identified:
[F]irst, the concentration of the concept—devoid of proprietary connotations—in truly fundamental questions for all humankind, pursuant to the notion of commonness; second, the necessary engagement, in the treatment of such questions of common interest, of all countries, all societies and all the social segments within the countries and the societies; third, … the long-term temporal dimension (underlying the term humanity), to encompass both the present and future generations; fourth, the emphasis on the element of protection, on the basis of consideration of humanity and of ordre public, transcending reciprocity; fifth, the attention primarily to the causes of the problems (both for their prevention and for the responses to be given); and sixth, the equitable sharing of responsibilities as an instrumental principle in the application of the concept of common concern of mankind. (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 351)
The term has been described as a “diplomatic masterpiece” because, “[o]n … one hand, it captures the spirit of a common endeavor … [but, on the other hand,] fears [relating to sovereign resources rights] were accommodated” (Stoll, 2016, p. 135). “[W]hat was kept in mind was not the sharing of resources or benefits, but rather of responsibilities” (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 351). This makes sense when one considers that certain matters require more state regulation in the domestic sphere rather than the assertion of state entitlements against other states.
Issues
Nevertheless, “[c]ommentary suggests that the legal ramifications of ‘common concern’ are imprecise” (Taylor, 2016, p. 316). To the best of the knowledge of the authors, to date, there has been no case before an international court or tribunal that clarifies the implications of CCH. Notably, however, after the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference, two campaigns were launched to seek an advisory opinion on climate change, including the implication of CCH, from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ITLOS, respectively.
It has been pointed out, however, that there are cases where “the same principles that motivate ‘common concern’ in an environmental context have risen to the status of customary international law” (Bowling et al., 2016, p. 7). For instance, the focus on causes of environmental problems with the aim of preventing them has been captured in the affirmation of the international custom to conduct an EIA. In the Pulp Mills case (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay [Argentina v. Uruguay], 2010), the ICJ dealt with the breach of an international agreement relative to the unilateral authorization of the construction of two pulp mills on a shared watercourse. The ICJ pointed out that there is
a practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among [s]tates that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an [EIA] where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context. (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay [Argentina v. Uruguay], 2010, para. 204, p. 83)
The importance of this practice has even been reiterated in two joined ICJ cases (Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area [Costa Rica v. Nicaragua] and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River [Nicaragua v. Costa Rica], 2015) where it was made clear that the possible existence of an exception under domestic law cannot operate against the international custom.
As another example, the ICJ has emphasized the existence of international customary law considering the temporal dimension of endeavors involving the environment. One such case revolves around the construction and operation of a system of locks in the Danube River which, over time, met with public disapproval due to concern about the preservation of the environment (Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project [Hungary/Slovakia], 1997). In its judgment, the ICJ found that Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate in good faith to pursue their joint investment whilst also taking into account its possible effects on present and future generations (Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project [Hungary/Slovakia], 1997, para. 140, pp. 74, 78). The development of CCH as a concept under international environmental law might just lead to the needed “articulation of dedicated environmental rules” (Stephens, 2009, p. 123).
This brief review of the development of CCH vis-à-vis CHM highlights the context within which the Commission worked on the codification and progressive development of international law relative to Protection of the Atmosphere.
Part II. The International Law Commission and the Concept of CCH in the Protection of the Atmosphere
Mandate
The Commission is an expert body of the UNGA and its mandate is the progressive development and its codification of international law (Charter of the UN, 1945, Article 13[1][a]; Statute of the International Law Commission, 1947, Article 1[1]). Whilst it used to focus on the production of draft conventions, this role has in fact been reduced (Azaria, 2020, p. 172; Batura et al., 2021) for several reasons: first, the number of subjects suitable for codification by convention has declined; second, the preparation of draft text for negotiation may hinder the work of other study groups and international organizations that possess the credibility to speak on specific topics; third, the appearance of new challenges involving scientific and technical implications may complicate the pure legal work of the Commission; and fourth, states tend to use soft law instead of entering into new commitments that restrain their sovereignty or sovereign rights.
Since 1998, the Commission has thus changed its policy and focused on producing outputs in the form of nonbinding guidance and selecting topics beyond traditional matters. In particular, when considering the possible inclusion of new topics in its Long-Term Programme of Work, the Commission considers the following:
The topic should reflect the needs of States in respect of the progressive development and codification of international law; The topic should be sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of State practice to permit progressive development and codification: The topic is concrete and feasible for progressive development and codification.
In this regard, in the selection of new topics, the Commission should not restrict itself to traditional topics, but could also consider those that reflect new developments in international law and pressing concerns of the international community as a whole… (UN, 1997, para. 238, p. 72).
Selection of the Topic on Protection of the Atmosphere
In this context, in 2011, the Commission adopted two proposals concerning environmental protection—a domain that the Commission left largely behind. Protection of the Atmosphere was proposed by Shinya Murase. In his syllabus, Murase stated that “[t]he atmosphere … is the planet's largest single natural resource, and it is indispensable for the survival of humankind” (UN, 2011, Annex II, para. 1). He further noted that “[t]here is no convention at present that covers the whole range of environmental problems of the atmosphere in a comprehensive and systematic manner… [so] the Commission can make a significant contribution by codifying and progressively developing the relevant legal principles and rules” in this domain (UN, 2011, Annex II, para. 1). According to Murase, “[t]here are at least five concepts that may be considered relevant to the legal status of the atmosphere: airspace, shared or common natural resources, common property, common heritage, and common concern (common interest)” (UN, 2011, Annex II, para. 18). Murase wished that this work would “lay the groundwork for a future convention covering substantive issues” (UN, 2011, Annex II, para. 26), including the possible consideration of the atmosphere as a common concern.
The 2013 Understanding on the Topic of the Protection of the Atmosphere
Murase's proposal, however, was made at the same time the United Nations Climate Change Conference was being held to reach agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Since the Commission has no authority to create law, the possibility of the work preventing the ongoing negotiation processes or directly engaging political aspects relative to climate change was considered. As such, at its 3,197th meeting in 2013, the Commission decided to include Protection of the Atmosphere in its Programme of Work with the understanding for Murase that:
[W]ork on the topic will proceed in a manner so as not to interfere with relevant political negotiations, including on climate change, ozone depletion and long- range transboundary air pollution. The topic will not deal with, but is also without prejudice to, questions such as liability of States and their nationals, the polluter-pays principle, the precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibilities and the transfer of funds and technology to developing countries, including intellectual property rights;
[T]he topic will also not deal with specifie substances, such as black carbon, tropospheric ozone and other dual-impact substances, which are the subject of negotiations among States. The project will not seek to "fill" gaps in the treaty regimes;
[Q]uestions relating to outer space, including its delimitation, are not part of the topic;
[T]he outcome of work on the topic will be draft guidelines that do not seek to impose on current treaty regimes[’] legal rules or legal principles not already contained therein. (UN, 2013, para. 168, p. 78)
It is clear that most legal concepts and substantial issues for the Protection of the Atmosphere were excluded or restrained from the research and discussion by this understanding. This obstruction limited the output produced by Murase as Special Rapporteur and harmed the Commission's collegiate output for promoting the negotiation for a new convention on Protection of the Atmosphere (Mayer, 2019). Moreover, the output of the work is in the form of draft guidelines, not draft articles or conclusions.
Common Heritage, Common Concern, and Pressing Concern on the Topic of the Protection of the Atmosphere
The draft guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere deal with various aspects of the topic such as the definition of the atmosphere, the application of the CCH concept in this domain, and human activities that introduce deleterious substances or energy into the atmosphere or alter its composition. For the purpose of this Viewpoint, only the exchange on the CCH concept in the work of the Commission will be examined.
In this respect, it is relevant to note that the Special Rapporteur made a distinction between airspace and atmosphere. The former refers to a domain whilst the latter refers to a natural resource that flows through national boundaries. On one hand, the legal rules governing airspace foster an area-based approach. On the other hand, the legal status of the atmosphere is based on a functional non-territorial approach. As such, a collective management of atmospheric problems under the CHM would, in effect, restrain rights and obligations of states within their own airspace. The protection of the atmosphere must thus be based on the cooperation of states under CCH.
Based on this argument, the issuance of Resolution 43/53 (UN, 1988) and the preamble of the UNFCCC (UN, 1992b), the Special Rapporteur first proposed a draft guideline indicating that “[t]he atmosphere is a natural resource essential for sustaining life on earth, human health and welfare, and aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems; hence, its protection is a common concern of humankind” (Murase, 2014, para. 90, p. 274). At the 66th session of the Commission, however, several members expressed opposition for various reasons: 1.) “the draft guideline did not seem to have anything to do with the legal status of the atmosphere” (UN, 2014, para. 106, p. 139), 2.) CCH was neither clear nor established in international law (UN, 2014, para. 106, p. 139), and 3.) the relationship between CCH and erga omnes obligations needed further clarification (UN, 2014, para. 107, p. 139).
Later on, at the UNGA Sixth Committee 69th session meetings, the views on the topic were divided. Some delegations shared the Special Rapporteur's view on the importance and timeliness of the project (Murase, 2015, para. 5, p. 193) whilst others echoed the concerns raised in the Commission (Murase, 2015, para. 28, p. 200). In addition, it was noted that “it was not the protection of the atmosphere, but rather its deteriorating condition, that constituted ‘the common concern of humankind’” (Murase, 2015, para. 28, p. 200).
To address the concerns raised, the Special Rapporteur proposed a minimal revision to the draft guideline to be more specific in referring to the degradation of atmospheric conditions as the subject of CCH (Murase, 2015, para. 39). At the Commission, however, an agreement was reached to move the reference to the CCH concept from a draft guideline to the preamble (Murase, 2016, para. 3, pp. 203-204). Further, the Drafting Committee of the Commission recommended that CCH be removed and instead replaced with the term “pressing concern of the international community as a whole” (Murase, 2016, para. 3, p. 2)—a concept that has no legal meaning but which is a consideration for the selection of topics for the Long-Term Programme of Work of the Commission. This revision was intended to serve as a compromise.
In the midst of all of this, the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC was adopted and it contained an express acknowledgment of climate change as CCH (UN, 2015). The Special Rapporteur thus noted this as one of the recent developments for the consideration of the Commission (Murase, 2016, para. 10, p. 5). At the UNGA Sixth Committee 71st session, Poland proposed that the draft guideline indicate that
[i]n this context, it should be noted that not only is the Paris Agreement acknowledging in the Preamble that climate change is a common concern of humankind, but also that ambient air quality is a common concern of humankind, according to [World Health Organization] Ambient Air Quality Standards and Guidelines. This clearly shows the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans and the protection of biodiversity. (UN, 2016, para. 55, p. 8)
Thereafter, at the UNGA Sixth Committee 72nd session, Indonesia stated that it believed CCH should be included in the preamble of the draft guidelines (UN, 2017, para. 128, pp. 18-19).
The first reading of the entire draft guidelines was concluded at that point and the Special Rapporteur, returning to the consideration of the legal status of the atmosphere, directed the attention of the Commission to comments/observations received from the European Union, the Nordic countries, Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Iran, Japan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam (Murase, 2020, para. 24, pp. 9-10). These comments/observations agreed that CCH would be the more appropriate concept for application (Murase, 2020, para. 24, pp. 9-10). The Special Rapporteur also pointed out that no state favored the use of the term “pressing concern” (Murase, 2020, para. 31, p. 12). As such, he recommended the return of the reference to CCH in the preamble of the draft guidelines and the removal of the term “pressing concern of the international community as a whole” (Murase, 2020, para. 31, p. 12).
During their 72nd session in 2021, the Commission adopted the draft guidelines, together with its preamble, on the Protection of the Atmosphere. In one of its preambular paragraphs, it provides that it considers “atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation … [as] a common concern of humankind” (UN, 2021, p. 13). The commentaries on this portion of the final outcome states:
The phrase as used in this preambular paragraph reflects a concern of the international community that all may be affected by atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation, as defined in the draft guidelines. It is recalled that the expression has commonly been used in the field of environmental law, even though doctrine is divided on its scope, content, and consequences. It is understood that the expression identifies a problem, that requires cooperation from the entire international community, while at the same time that its inclusion does not create, as such, rights and obligations, and, in particular, that it does not entail erga omnes obligations in the context of the draft guidelines. (UN, 2021, pp. 15-16)
In sum, the term CCH came back to the preamble of the draft guidelines because, in December 2015, the Paris Agreement adopted the language of common concern. Its placement as a preambular paragraph instead of as a guideline reflects the Commission's prudence not to trigger any “rights and obligations [from this expression of the CCH], and, in particular, that it does not entail erga omnes obligations in the context of the draft guidelines” (UN, 2021, pp. 15-16). The contribution of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission is therefore the adoption of the definition of the atmosphere, the definition of substantial components of the atmosphere related to its protection, such as atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation, and the recognition that the protection of the atmosphere from atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation falls under CCH.
Conclusion
Common concern is a concept in development. Even though CCH has been adopted in three main conventions on climate change and biodiversity, its normative content has remained unclear in the international law relating to the atmosphere. The fact that it has been in preambles but not in main articles of the UNFCCC or its Paris Agreement demonstrates that it has not been accepted as a legal principle. However, it can be considered as a basis to trigger a collective response and to supplement the general obligation of states to cooperate with each other for the prevention of degradation of atmospheric conditions. At the present stage, climate change and deteriorating atmospheric conditions are matters of common concern. A legal rule cannot be deduced. It must be supported in state practice and sufficiently established in international law.
The topic of the Protection of the Atmosphere is addressed in this time of political negotiations on environmental issues. The Commission appears to be stuck in the portions of codification and progressive development of the CCH concept. On the one hand, the issue of the protection of the atmosphere belongs to international negotiation. On the other hand, in keeping with its tradition, the Commission displays a great deal of caution in making a new rule that is beyond its mandate. The 2013 understanding restrained the Commission in this trap. The Commission cannot clarify the normative content of the CCH concept when its analyses were detached from the consideration of the main principles relevant to the protection of the environment. However, the Commission gives a correct response to the expectations of the Sixth Committee delegations.
The Commission has made a relevant contribution in the adoption of a definition of the atmosphere, a definition of substantial components of the atmosphere related to its protection, and the recognition that the protection of the atmosphere from atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation as CCH.
The work of the Commission further opens the opportunity to exchange views on the development of the concept of common concern of humankind/mankind.