Abstract
The European Commission's White Paper on Governance initiated a Europe-wide debate about the principles and practices of good policymaking. This article, which draws from the author's work with the team that prepared the White Paper, provides a first-hand examination of how the document was produced. Following a discussion about the meaning of governance, the article focuses on the timeline of events, the consultation procedures, and some of the challenges (linguistic, practical, and political) that arose. It concludes by placing the governance debate in the context of the ongoing European Convention and 2004 IGC.
On 25 July 2001 the European Commission published its long-awaited White Paper on Governance. While many academics and policy practitioners gave tepid responses to its proposals, the process of developing the White Paper launched a Europe-wide discussion about key issues such as institutional reform and the future of Europe. Thus, this article seeks to explain why this debate was initiated and how it unfolded inside the Commission. It begins by analysing several definitions of governance, differentiating between academic conceptions and the Commission's preferred emphasis. It then discusses the preparation of the White Paper, examining how the work was structured, who was consulted, and what challenges the Commission faced. Finally, the article considers the future of the governance debate through an examination of follow-up proposals and in the context of the European Convention's work in anticipation of an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in 2004.
What is governance?
As the White Paper bridges the academic and policy worlds in its handling of an evolving and complex topic, it is useful to explore how the word ‘governance’ is understood before considering the document's preparation and proposals. Governance became a buzz-word in the 1990s, first used by the World Bank in 1992 to stipulate criteria for development aid. One academic has identified at least six uses of the term, including the minimal state, corporate governance, new public management, good governance, a socio-cybernetic system, and self-organising networks (Rhodes, 1996). Most academics agree that governance is distinct from government; the former ‘refers to collective problem-solving in the public realm’, while the latter ‘refers us to the institutions and to the agents (personnel) who occupy key institutional roles and positions’ (Caporaso, 1996, p. 32). In other words, governance ‘signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’ (Rhodes, 1996, pp. 652–653).
While traditional understandings of government emphasise the territorially bound framework of the nation state, many academics are currently using governance to describe the increasingly permeable borders of states and the interaction between actors in different political jurisdictions. The conceptual framework of multi-level governance has, in particular, sought to focus attention on overlapping modes of governance: ‘Instead of the unambiguous allocation of decision-making responsibility between national and supranational government, we see the institutionalisation of contested spheres of influence across several tiers of government’ (Marks, 1993, pp. 401–402, original emphasis). Similarly, Ingeborg Tömmel (1998) suggested that co-operation between government tiers has replaced hierarchical relationships as policy competences are not clearly delineated.
The concept of governance has been particularly useful for describing the European Union's unique structure. Simon Hix's description of ‘new governance’ views the EU as more than an international organisation but as less than a state (Hix, 1998, p. 39). In this system the state does not dominate the policymaking process but increasingly involves multiple actors; their relationships are ‘non-hierarchical’ and ‘mutually dependent’, regulation is the primary governance function, and decisions are made by ‘problem-solving’ rather than bargaining. Similarly, Helen Wallace said modern governance in Western Europe ‘involves efforts to construct policy responses at a multiplicity of levels, from the global to the local’ (Wallace, 1996, pp. 11–12). Choices between national and trans-national policymaking are ‘played out as a function of the interplay of ideas, interests and institutions and focused on the choices made by a variety of actors about how to respond to an issue’ (ibid., p. 12). As a result, some analysts warn about the state's implied lack of control and the problematic legitimacy of the EU institutions (Kohler-Koch, 2001).
While academics focus on the numerous actors and jurisdictions involved in EU policymaking, the White Paper on Governance emphasised the Community Method (whereby the Commission plays a central role) and widely accepted principles of good practice in policymaking. The initial work programme defined governance as ‘rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards accountability, clarity, transparency, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness’ (European Commission, 2000, p. 4). The White Paper then tried to actualise these principles with a series of proposals – for itself, other EU institutions, Member States, subnational governments, and civil society. These fell into four broad categories:
improving citizens' involvement in shaping and implementing EU policy;
improving the quality and enforcement of EU legislation;
developing a more effective role in global governance; and
putting the concept of governance into practice by reforming EU institutions and working practices.
How was the White Paper prepared?
Much of the thinking behind the White Paper originated in the Forward Studies Unit, an in-house think-tank based in the Secretariat General and established by then-Commission president Jacques Delors. A series of workshops was held in the late 1990s on the topic of governance, resulting in the publication of an edited book entitled Evolution in Governance: What Lessons for the Commission? A First Assessment (1997). It contains insightful theoretical perspectives, provided an impetus for the wider governance initiative, and laid the groundwork for the White Paper. There was a growing recognition within the Commission about the need for reform, as citizens' disillusionment with EU policymaking was exemplified by low voter turnout in the European Parliament elections, the ‘no’ vote in the Irish referendum on the ratification of the Nice Treaty, and the institutional challenges caused by enlargement (European Commission, 2000). Public confidence in the EU institutions was particularly low following the resignation of the Santer Commission. It is worth remembering that the White Paper was prepared during a process of internal reform led by commissioner Neil Kinnock; the document's tendency to justify and enhance the Commission's role through the Community Method may reflect feelings of uncertainty amidst such change.
President Romano Prodi first proposed the idea for a White Paper in a speech to the European Parliament on 15 February 2000, when he identified governance as one of four strategic priorities for his term of office. He said the document would have two main tasks:
‘First, it will ask fundamental questions about what policies we need in a European Union of up to 30 members, and how such policies can best be delivered. Second, it will ask what institutions we need for the twenty-first century and propose a new division of labour between the Commission, the other institutions, the Member States and civil society.’ (Prodi, 2000)
He created high expectations for the White Paper by offering preliminary definitions of governance and setting the terms of the debate. In particular, he called for civic participation in all stages of the policymaking process and the removal of barriers between political tiers. In his speech he emphasised the need for ‘a new, more democratic form of partnership between the different levels of governance in Europe’ (ibid.).
The work programme for the White Paper was presented as a ‘staff working document’ (European Commission, 2000), highlighting that it was the work of civil servants in advance of final College approval. The Governance Team was based in the Secretariat General as a separate team directly answerable to President Prodi. It was not located in the Forward Studies Unit, although four of the team's nine members previously worked there; the others came from a range of Directorate Generals (DG) with varying degrees of experience in governance-related issues. Jérôme Vignon, a former French civil servant who established the Forward Studies Unit in 1989 and served as its director until 1998, headed the team. Each member was responsible for one or two working groups on related themes. Governance team meetings were held weekly to co-ordinate topics and prevent overlap between groups.
The work programme identified six themes, which were sub-divided into twelve working groups. The six themes were:
Broadening and enriching the public debate
Handling the preparation and implementation process
Improving the exercise of European responsibilities through decentralisation
Promoting coherence and co-operation in a networked Europe
Strengthening the Union's contribution to world governance
Strengthening the integration and strategic dimension of Union policies across the continent.
The twelve working groups were ‘piloted’ by senior Commission officials (predominantly Heads of Unit), while a rapporteur was appointed to take notes and draft the final report. Regular meetings among the ‘pilots’, rapporteurs, and governance team helped eliminate some duplication of effort and facilitate general conclusions. The working groups were composed of officials from DGs relevant to the subject under consideration, who participated via an arrangement whereby a percentage of their week was allocated to the project. Over 200 Commission officials were involved in the entire exercise (European Commission, 2001b). Most groups met once a fortnight for several hours. One of the biggest benefits of the exercise appears to be internal learning and exchange of information, as it was striking to observe how little officials knew about the subject or nature of the work being conducted by colleagues in other DGs. Even if it accomplishes little else, the White Paper was educational for those involved.
Who was consulted?
Consultation took place between December 2000 and April 2001. Views were elicited through restricted dialogue with working groups, structured hearings, and wide consultation by questionnaire; spontaneous reactions were conveyed through over 500 e-mails (European Commission, 2001b). The governance team identified five main categories of respondent, each of which held slightly differing conceptions of governance and illustrated the difficulty of rationalising such an amorphous concept (see Sloat, 2002ab). First, regional and local actors requested greater involvement, noted the contrast between political responsibility and active subsidiarity, and cited the cumbersome nature of EU institutions. Second, civil society bemoaned too numerous and dispersed consultations, raised the problem of administrative fragmentation, and encouraged the involvement of new players. Third, national parliaments desired a more direct role in EU affairs and feared the loss of their representative role in the pursuit of a more participatory democracy through greater civic consultation. The European Parliament (2001) reiterated this concern. Fourth, Member State governments emphasised their existing knowledge and willingness to co-operate with the EU, and explained that citizen participation is not an automatic result of decentralisation. Finally, citizens expressed the need for a greater understanding of the EU policy process and suggested that debates could be refocused geographically and thematically. Additional views of citizens in Member States and candidate countries were elicited through a survey in January 2001 (European Commission, 2001d), which revealed a general lack of knowledge about the EU's operation and geographically divergent attitudes toward the Union. Consultation mechanisms used by the working groups varied, ranging from panels of experts to individual hearings. For example, the group on ‘Decentralisation to National and Regional Levels’ held a one-day public hearing in March 2001 on the concepts of ‘proportionality’ and ‘subsidiarity’ with 400 participants from civic organisations and subnational governments. The group on ‘Linking the Territorial Levels’ sent a survey in January 2001 to regional networks, subnational authorities and local governments via their Brussels representation offices. Consultation by other groups seemed partially influenced by existing links between group members and those asked to give evidence. The governance team also held several ‘brown bag’ lunches with invited guests, who presented their views to the team and other interested working group members. The team made efforts to communicate the outcomes of these meetings and their general progress to the wider public via its website and regular newsletters; unfortunately, internal bureaucracy and translation often delayed their transmission.
What challenges arose?
The governance team faced numerous challenges during the preparation of the White Paper. The first involved linguistic difficulties, as the word ‘governance’ does not exist in any language other than English (European Commission, 2001c). The fact that the meaning of ‘governance’ is unclear even in English – it slipped into the vocabulary through political science literature and is indistinguishable from ‘government’ in the 1999 Oxford English dictionary – makes it that much harder to educate a non-Anglophone public about this already complicated concept (see Aziz, 2002). The governance team held several meetings with the translation service, who advised them either to use the English word in quotations as it is broadly understood, develop a neologism (e.g. gouvernance in French) to preserve the native language, or recycle existing but obsolete words (e.g. governamento in Italian). The composition of the governance team also created linguistic challenges, as none of the members were native English speakers (though the working groups had a more even geographical allocation). They were predominantly French and German, along with two Belgians, a Greek and a Spaniard. Although most were proficient in written and spoken English, they preferred to communicate in French. It could be argued that a distinctly French approach, which favours the Community method and regulation, permeates the final document.
The second challenge involved the practical co-ordination of such a large project. It is questionable whether twelve working groups were necessary to consider six themes, particularly as only four themes appeared in the final paper. Significant effort was expended delineating the tasks of each group and preventing their work from overlapping (e.g. two groups examined aspects of subnational participation while another two focused on the involvement of civic organisations). This task was further complicated by occasional conflict between the vision of a governance team member and a working group pilot, as each held distinct ideas about the remit of the topic. Outside observers identified other methodological failings of the White Paper's development. For example, a submission by the General Secretary of Cittadinanzattiva (Active Citizenship (2001)) to the governance team cites:
‘a top down approach, that has given priority to the administration [sic] point of view; a self-referent agenda, focused on the problems inside the institutions; a low knowledge of the concrete situation of the relationship between citizens – as individual and as NGOs – and the EU institutions (too many polls; too few [sic] direct knowledge); a process of consultation not taken seriously’ (Cittadinanzattiva, 2001).
In addition, the time allotted to the governance team for the completion of the project (under ten months) was too short to enable thorough consultation, serious consideration of proposals, and the preparation of a final report. This resulted in a rushed effort in early summer 2001 to meet the deadline.
The final challenge was political, as the EU institutions and Member States had vested interests in the White Paper's outcome. The European Parliament (2001) expressed concerns about the loss of its representative function if ‘undemocratic’ organisations were more closely involved, while the Committee of the Regions (2000ab) and the Economic and Social Committee (2002) emphasised their desire for a more active role in EU policymaking. The German länder called for a catalogue of competences, and British prime minister Tony Blair floated the idea of a third chamber composed of national parliamentarians. A Financial Times article on 3 May 2001 foreshadowed the White Paper's political difficulties (Norman, 2001), observing that the project's aims shifted from its original conception after Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister, launched a debate on the future of Europe that was formalised at the Nice Summit. The governance exercise, according to the article, revealed contrasting cultures within the Commission: the ‘utilitarians’ emphasised the need for the Commission to complete its tasks efficiently, which conflicted with Vignon's more academic and bureaucratic approach to producing the White Paper.
The utilitarians won in the end, as senior officials in the Secretariat General took over the writing of the White Paper during the final stages and made numerous revisions with an eye to political reactions. Jérôme Vignon and the governance team were surprised and frustrated by this move, as it undermined to an extent the consultative process established to prepare the paper. The Commission legal service was also heavily involved, examining the legal repercussions of White Paper commitments. The College of Commissioners had some difficulties reaching agreement on the document, requiring numerous rewrites in the final days and delaying by several hours the press conference announcing the paper's publication. Despite their initial enthusiasm for the project, European and national media provided limited coverage of the document; their tepid reactions are best summarised by a BBC report (2001), which lamented that ‘many of the proposals trumpeted and failed before’.
What is the next step?
Brussels shut down for its month-long holiday in August, and the White Paper was subsumed into the post-Nice process when work began again in September. The Commission's statement (2001e) at the Laeken European Council in December reiterated many White Paper themes, as did the Laeken Declaration (European Council, 2001); however, neither advanced the debate significantly. It is illustrative of the White Paper's limited impact, as well as the complexity of the questions, that they remain on the EU's political agenda. For example, Laeken raised the need to define and organise better the Union's competences – a political hot potato avoided in the White Paper. It also considered the creation of a ‘European public area’, seeking to increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the institutions, involve national parliaments more closely, and improve the efficiency of decision-making post-enlargement. Laeken's most significant contribution was the establishment of a convention to consider the future of Europe. Unlike the White Paper on Governance, the convention has the authority to consider treaty revisions and a possible constitution. Another key difference is the predominant role of politicians rather than civil servants in leading these discussions, as the Commission is only one of many participants. Members of civil society meet in a separate but parallel forum.
The White Paper continues to inspire debate across Europe, as one of its biggest achievements has been placing the ideas of good governance and better policy-making on the European agenda. Numerous civic organisations, regional governments and universities have held conferences on the subject and sent their reactions to the Commission. Although the team that drafted the White Paper has been disbanded and Jérôme Vignon remains sidelined, an official (previously uninvolved) in the Secretariat General has been given responsibility for its overall follow-up while some DGs are developing specific proposals (e.g. DG Environment is piloting ‘tripartite contracts’). On 5 June 2002 the Commission published ‘European Governance: Better Lawmaking’, the first set of follow-up proposals that aims to produce a basic legislative framework that is simpler, more effective, and better understood (European Commission, 2002a). It contains an action plan for simplifying and improving the regulatory environment, promoting a culture of dialogue and participation, and systematising impact assessment. During the summer the Commission took advice on proposed minimum standards of consultation. It published a communication on 11 December 2002 that seeks to improve the legislative process and the ‘committee system’, make regulatory agencies more accountable, and develop tripartite contracts (European Commission, 2002b). It also presented a report that analysed public responses to the White Paper and detailed progress on implementing its proposals (European Commission, 2002c).
In conclusion, the debate about good governance and institutional reform has dominated European discussions over recent years and seems likely to remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future. Although the questions have been clarified by various governance exercises, European leaders and Commission officials have yet to find satisfactory answers to the twin challenges posed by citizen dissatisfaction and impending enlargement. It is therefore essential that the convention considers the responses to the White Paper and finds solutions to the difficult issues it failed to resolve. Perhaps the convention's scale, the direct involvement of politicians, and the added pressure of enlargement in May 2004 will focus European minds away from yet another political ‘fudge’ and instead on real reform. The EU cannot afford to let the momentum of this timely and important debate on governance and Europe's future grind to a halt or remain unresolved.