Abstract
In this short book Carolin Goerzig strives to challenge what she calls the ‘no-concessions doctrine’. This ‘doctrine’ is based on the argument that states must avoid negotiating and making concessions to terrorist groups because other terrorist groups multiply when they realise that terrorism succeeds in achieving political goals. Proponents of this ‘imperative’ have argued that there is a pattern in terrorist contagion (‘copycat behaviour’) that results from giving in to demands: conceding to terrorists serves to radicalise other terrorists. In some sections of the book (the Preface and Conclusions) the author also maintains that the ‘no-concessions doctrine’ encourages the study of terrorism ‘from a distance’ and produces distorting effects in research, but the question of the ethical and political problems in terrorism studies is not developed in the text.
The book aims to present and explain the variation in terrorist reactions. Goerzig proposes an analytical framework based on three main distinctions. The first analytical distinction is between ‘selective’ concessions that apply only to members of the terrorist organisation and ‘collective’ concessions with regard to the entire population. As for the relation between groups directly receiving concessions and reacting groups, the author presents a dichotomy between groups with ‘similar’ motivations, sharing a common enemy, on the one hand, and groups with ‘competitive’ motivations who are enemies of each other, on the other. Finally, the transformation of terrorist groups is qualified as a change in means or a change in ends.
The book attempts to analyse the impact of ‘selective’/‘collective’ concessions on other terrorist groups with ‘similar’/‘competitive’ motivations (in the same geographic area). Goerzig makes use of a qualitative comparative method, based on field interviews with members of terrorist organisations in four countries: Egypt, Israeli-Palestinian conflict area, Colombia and Turkey. In brief, the study questions the ‘no-concessions doctrine’ or, at least, it intends to offer a more complex picture: ‘concessions do not always lead to copycat phenomena and, if they do, it is not always terrorism that is copied’ (p. 9 and passim) – terrorist groups may imitate the act of renouncing violence and engaging in dialogue. In particular, the empirical evidence suggests that ‘selective’ concessions lead other terrorist groups to ‘innovate’ in means and ends, while ‘collective’ concessions lead other terrorist groups to copy means and ends.
Overall, Talking to Terrorists has both stimulating and highly contestable aspects. The book examines an important topic by means of appreciable fieldwork. Unfortunately, it relies upon a problematic analytical and theoretical framework and is undermined by a quite convoluted and repetitive style.