Abstract
Irregular warfare ascribes different terminologies: ‘low-intensity conflict', ‘wars of national liberation', ‘hybrid warfare', ‘guerrilla warfare’ and, more recently, in the language of General Rupert Smith, ‘war amongst the people'. For the media, these act like buzzwords. For the academic, these represent concept traps whose meanings often eschew the mundane academic debate. However, the two books under review provide an extraordinary account of the idea and evolution of ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘guerrilla warfare', respectively.
Both books provide an historical account of non-conventional warfare and they start from the assumption that guerrilla and hybrid warfare represent the real forms of conventional warfare. Although an underlying feature in Murray and Mansoor's book, it is Boot who makes this very clear: ‘[G]uerrilla warfare is as old as mankind. Conventional warfare is, by contrast, a relatively recent invention’ (p. 9). His argument ties together the relatively recent development of nation-states and the equally historically novel use of armies. With these clarifications, the books move on to defining their subject of analysis.
It is important to note that neither book develops a novel theory of irregular warfare. Rather, this is understood as having at its centre the main goal of achieving political change through the use of force. The aim of irregular warfare is to obtain total control of the armed forces, population and territory, as well as to erode the opponent's power, strength, influence and will. As a struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and control over particular geographical regions, irregular warfare is analysed as being, in essence, a protracted insurrectional act carried out through the use of limited resources. For Boot, irregular warfare assumes various asymmetric strategies and tactics that range from tribal engagement in combat and various criminal activities to the use of locally manufactured explosives, subversion, coercion, attrition and exhaustion. This is why Invisible Armies ‘covers both terrorists and guerrillas; leaving either one out would present a distorted picture’ (p. xxii). Against the background of increased interdependence and globalisation, these threats have become flexible, adaptable and networked, especially through the use of the internet, which represents a particular and significantly intricate form of warfare in itself, and as a result, the twenty-first-century security environment has added to the list of irregular threats the phenomenon of cyber-warfare.
Murray and Mansoor address irregular warfare in the light of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare'. Their starting point is taking a stand in the ‘unsuccessful’ new wars debate, made in a quiet and extremely elegant manner: ‘[W]ar in the twenty-first century has been and will remain a complex phenomenon, but its essence has not and will not change’ (p. 1). And it is this sense of clarity, precision and conciseness that follows all the cases throughout the book. Hybridisation is a process by which the warring activity is carried out by a joint conventional and non-conventional effort. There is significant emphasis on the fact that ‘hybrid war does not change the nature of war; it merely changes the way forces engage in its conflict’ (p. 3).
The cases used to instruct on the evolution of guerrilla and hybrid warfare provide a panoramic view of war narratives. They are pluri-vocal, engaging and, more importantly, demonstrate a culturally educational function that highlights the historicism of irregular warfare. The use of ‘epic’ in the title of Boot's book is representative. Because the examples walk the reader through the historical maze of conflict irregularity, both books seem to bear the mark of Boccaccian storytelling. Truly remarkable is Richard Hart Sinnreich's account of the Peninsular War. In the form of a drama with five acts, the confrontation between the Spanish, the French, the Portuguese and the British comes to life just like Goya's painting ‘Dos de Mayo’ (‘;The Second of May 1808’). The use of irregularity is presented analytically and comprehensively with a clear emphasis on the strategic and tactical implications of irregular troops. Boot also examines this case with a stronger accent of the events surrounding Zaragoza. His accounts are shorter and less detailed than is the case with Murray and Mansoor's edited volume. This is because one is a rich gathering of episodes of hybrid warfare, whereas the other is an all-encompassing chronicle of irregular warfare. Both subjects, however, are considered at length and treated in an in-depth manner.
From Cestius Gallus’ defeat against the lightly armed Jewish fighters, to the struggles of the Athenians against the Aetolians, to the miscalculations of Napoleon, to the many encounters of the British Army with various irregular combatants, to Vietman and to Castro's comeback, both books stand as masterfully written accounts of irregular warfare that assumes, as demonstrated, a combination of effective use of space, time and popular support.