Abstract
At the moment America is buzzing with debates about moral foundationalism. What is it that makes us think rationally about some things and not about others? Why do we sometimes shoot from the hip whereas at other times we think long and hard about issues? Social psychology has provided a wealth of empirical material on these questions and scientists are currently in theory design mode.
Paul Clements bravely steps right into this debate, but approaches it from another angle. He argues that rational choice theory – i.e. the long-suffering utility-maximising straw man – produces impoverished analyses of the social world. Instead, the Rawlsian framework of justice may offer a more nuanced take on reality. In addition, Clements argues that the Rawlsian conception of social justice can act as an analytical framework to make sense of the world. There have been few applications of Rawls in the real world, yet Clements admirably exemplifies his methodological claim in three chapters discussing the Grameen bank in Bangladesh, the (sorry) state of Bihar in India and the politics of climate change.
I wonder, though, if he favours a Rawlsian conception of social justice simply because the conclusions of Rawls’ conception appeal to him. This is significant since Clements wants to see the Rawlsian conception as an analytical framework that can explain the social world. I can see two problems with juxtaposing Rawls to rational choice as a methodological device in applied political science. First, there is Sandel's criticism that Rawls’ original position uses a notion of the unencumbered individual that comes pretty close to the interest-led utility-maximising person that Clements wants to get away from. Second, and crucially, Rawls’ conception of justice has a strong normative thrust which we have to accept in order to come to the right judgement in the first place. In other words, Rawls does not offer us an analytical device to interpret the world but rather a normative mechanism that can guide us in building a better one.
Clements’ book is a welcome and thoughtful addition to the debate on how to analyse social agency, yet I cannot help thinking that the choice between rational choice and a Rawlsian conception of social justice in applied political science may compare apples with oranges. However, this thought-provoking book will undoubtedly spark lively discussions in postgraduate politics seminars.