Abstract

‘When the winds of change blow, some build walls and others build windmills’ – an old Chinese proverb aptly summarises the current debates on climate change in the post-Kyoto space. Sanguinely, the developing countries of the world are more enthusiastic and persuasive in adopting and abiding by a policy of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ to combat the impacts of climate change. The raison d'ětre behind this stimulus is the awareness that they are the more vulnerable and critical to the effects of climate change. Economic backwardness and the lack of technological sophistication hinder any advance to mitigate the effects of climate change.
However, most developing countries are now voluntarily reducing their carbon intensity and implementing other measures to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). This is the theme of David Held et al.'s edited book Climate Governance in the Developing World. The volume has three sections. Part I covers Asia's response to climate governance and deals with China, India, Indonesia and South Korea. Part II covers the Latin American countries Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica. Part III deals with countries of Africa, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa. The authors have their own reasons to justify the selection of these countries. For example, they mention that China, India, Brazil and Indonesia are major emitters and account for 50 per cent of the developing world's total emissions. Argentina, Egypt, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea are middle-range producers of GHGs. Finally, Costa Rica, Ethiopia and Mozambique are minor emitters, but their commitments to becoming ‘carbon neutral’ and ‘carbon free’ (p. 4) in the near future are interesting and encouraging. Above all, the selection of these countries as case studies was determined either by their having already undertaken NAMAs (nationally appropriate mitigation actions) or their commitment towards taking action on climate change (p. 5).
The chapter on China's policy towards climate governance summarises the efforts and initiatives taken by Beijing and recognises the fact that China occupies a critical position in regard to global climate governance (p. 46). The authors suggest that international and domestic pressure on Beijing yielded a positive response as China agreed at COP13 to discuss NAMAs (p. 43). Nonetheless, the book is uncertain about the gloomy future of climate governance in China and argues that success will depend on improvements in domestic governance capacity (p. 48).
Aaron Atteridge in his chapter ‘Evolution of Climate Policy in India’ emphasises that India's climate policy is a top-down process which is very little influenced by states or non-governmental actors (p. 58). He also significantly points out that Indian climate diplomacy was driven by the bureaucracy. However, with Jairam Ramesh at the helm of the Ministry of Environment it has now shifted to the political sphere (p. 61). Nevertheless, Atteridge over-emphasises the fact that ‘social and economic priorities over climate policy’, ‘limited financial and technical capacity’ and the ‘concept of equity’ in climate negotiations (p. 57) have determined the scope and direction of India's global climate policy, as these are applicable to all developing countries.
Democratizing Global Climate Governance, edited by Hayley Stevenson and John Dryzek, highlights how the US government is paralysed on climate change, and hostage to the over-representation of fossil-fuel-producing states in the US Senate and the power of big oil money in Washington (p. 3). These two books, read together, give insights into how developing countries are struggling to secure their interests from these industrialised nations in terms of climate governance. Hence there is resistance from both sides, with each side trying to maximise their respective interests. Stevenson and Dryzek thus seek to offer an approach for solving this dilemma. The book presents a deliberative-system approach to analyse and subsequently improve climate governance. The theoretically sturdy and empirical arguments put forward are convincing. The authors feel that ‘public space’ needs to be strengthened, since it is here that ideas and critique are generated (p. 8). Although public space is crowded and busy, nonetheless a great deal of action occurs in the form of monologues (p. 42), and the democratisation of global climate governance is possible even in the absence of centralised and effective global agreement (p. 59).
Stevenson and Dryzek emphasise the role played by ‘empowered space’ in global climate governance and highlight the UNFCCC negotiations therein. They also recognise the importance of networked forms of governance, showcasing the success stories of the Clean Technology Fund, Clean Technology Initiatives and the Verified Carbon Standard. Above all, the authors stress that accountability is intrinsic to the success of deliberative global climate governance, whether in public space or empowered space.
The two books under review complement each other. Stevenson and Dryzek's idea of a deliberative approach to climate governance could be applied to developing countries’ climate governance for increasing the effectiveness and greater participation of ‘other actors’ within these countries. Held et al.'s Climate Governance in the Developing World illustrates the initiatives taken by developing countries, breaking the myth that they are unwilling to move forward. Both books are timely interventions in the field of climate governance, where there is a need to break the impasse between the developed and developing nations.
These two books are essential reading for students, scholars and policy makers seeking to understand the tussles and gridlock on climate negotiations and how to surmount the stalemate.
