The New Public Diplomacy: Britain and Canada Compared

The Impact of Interacting Changes on Diplomacy

Diplomacy has been subject to and continues to undergo a series of changes and challenges as we enter the 21^st century due to the impact of a number of factors that mutually reinforce each other. These technological, economic, political and social changes can be summarised as follows. First, economic, financial and information globalisation have produced increasingly porous state boundaries. Second is the ‘information revolution’, the development and rapid expansion of information and communication technologies such as computer processing, digitilisation, the Internet, direct broadcast satellites and cable systems, resulting in a sharp reduction in the costs and a massive increase in the capabilities of international communications, and an increased ability to share and to access information. Third is the use of these technologies by the media, the proliferation of media outlets and demand for instant news with a 24-hour news cycle, and the internationalisation of the mass media. Fourth is the increasing ability of citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), from transnational pressure groups to transnational terrorist organisations, to access and use these information and communications technologies, and the increased ability to share information with like-minded citizens and groups. Fifth is the development of increasingly critical citizens in democratic states, who are more politically assertive a) as individuals, and b) through NGOs and transnational advocacy or issue networks, resulting in an increased need to gain popular support for policy (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Deibert 2000). Sixth, the development of issues (e.g. global warming, international crime, transnational terrorist networks, refugees and migration) and promulgation of norms and values (e.g. democracy and human rights) that diplomacy must deal with are increasingly complex and transnational in nature. These cross-cut traditional diplomatic modes of thinking and the divide between domestic and international politics and policies. Last is the end of the cold war and the shifting focus from state security to human security, with international concern over ‘co-operative security issues’—such as weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of small arms, and peacekeeping—which require multilateral decision-making and involve lobbying domestic and foreign audiences as well as governments.

These changes are affecting the ways in which governments conduct their diplomacy, with the search for a new paradigm of diplomacy where public communication ‘is not an afterthought but at the heart of our diplomatic strategies’ (Leonard and Alakeson 2000, 4). They have provided new opportunities for citizen participation as members of the public are developing new competencies for global engagement through the use of information and communication technology and access to the media on a number of foreign policy issues. As the Centre for Strategic and International Studies report on Reinventing Diplomacy notes, ‘Nations once connected by foreign ministries and traders are now linked through millions of individuals by fiber optics, satellite, wireless, and cable in a complex network without central control’. It argues that the Internet ‘will become the central nervous system of international relations’. Thus, ‘networking is increasingly overtaking hierarchy and bureaucracy as a primary mode of organization and communication’ (Fulton, Burt and Robinson 1998, x). Information is no longer restricted to a policy-making elite, and there has been a ‘power shift’ away from states to non-governmental organisations (Matthews 1997).

This has implications for foreign policy and diplomacy. In an information society, ‘soft’ power assets such as legitimacy, public opinion and ‘the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want’ (Keohane and Nye 1998, 86) become increasingly important relative to ‘hard’ power military and economic resources. Information power can increasingly counter raw military power, and ‘asymmetry’ in conflict can allow smaller players to compete with larger ones (Rothkopf 1998). Thus, communication with the public needs to be at the heart of foreign policy in order for it to be effective and to resolve foreign policy issues. One recent example of the need to create common perceptions and to build consensus in order to implement foreign policy was the Kosovo conflict. While NATO had massive military superiority over the Serbs, NATO leaders were concerned that they were losing the battle for public opinion as the conflict dragged on, and that the alliance would crumble as public support ebbed away (Vickers 2000). Kosovo demonstrated the importance of building coalitions amongst overseas publics through diplomacy, and of providing persuasive information on the reasons for the use of force. For example, following the NATO intervention in Kosovo, research was carried out on public opinion in Russia. It was found that in Russia ‘favourability’ towards Britain had fallen by as much as 49 per cent (British Council 1999a), an issue of concern to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Another recent example of the need to create common perceptions and to build consensus was the response to the September 11^th attacks, when the US was at pains to build and maintain an international coalition in its war against terrorism. Thus, states cannot pursue foreign policy as autonomous units, and they increasingly seek to protect and project their security interests through multilateral organisations and coalitions. This requires a common understanding of the importance of public affairs and public diplomacy as an aspect of foreign policy, and the co-ordination of their respective mechanisms and apparatuses for dealing with the media and domestic and overseas public opinion.

These changes also impact on issues of governance, as citizen participation becomes an increasingly important issue in foreign policy and diplomacy. Information and communication technologies provide opportunities for many-to-many communication rather than traditional hierarchical, linear, one-to-many communications, and diplomacy is undergoing a shift from small to large audiences. There is an increased acceptance by governments that citizens have a role to play in diplomacy as states seek to enhance their reputation and to export their values though attraction rather than coercion. Information and communication technologies have facilitated the participation in foreign affairs and global issues by NGOs and transnational issue groups in a lobbying role, making it harder for governments to control information and its distribution. This produces a ‘changed diplomatic environment’ in which policies are made (Leonard and Alakeson 2000, 2), as states compete with NGOs to communicate information to the public and thus shape world public opinion. This was demonstrated by the protests in Seattle against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in November and December 1999. Here transnational issue groups were able to use the Internet and new media to organise and to communicate their message, and to confront states in a battle for public opinion through traditional media as they generated worldwide publicity. This exacerbated existing tensions within the WTO and produced a changed climate of opinion with the result that the WTO was unable to reach agreement at Seattle. What was surprising in this situation was that the WTO and the US seemed unprepared for the events that unfolded, even though the traditional media had run numerous stories in the run-up to Seattle on how these groups were using the Internet to organise and mobilise their protests.

This process of producing a changed climate of public opinion and hence a changed diplomatic environment was also demonstrated by the high-profile success of the International Committee to Ban Land Mines. This was an umbrella organisation composed of over 1,000 NGOs from over 60 countries, which co-ordinated a worldwide publicity campaign to mobilise international public opinion to compel reluctant states to ratify the Ottawa treaty to ban landmines in 1996. The Ottawa Process, as it became known, also demonstrated the ability of governments—in this case the Canadian government in particular—and global civil society to work together in the conduct of international diplomacy (Cameron 1999). A Canadian government observer noted that technological developments such as email clearly played a role in the rapid mobilisation on this scale, and that ‘without civil society the landmines treaty would not have been signed’. ³ Another example was the co-ordinated campaign led by NGOs to influence public opinion in target countries in the run-up to the Rome negotiations leading to the development of a statute for an international criminal court. These events demonstrated the ability of transnational issue groups to operate outside of the normal channels of state-centric diplomacy.

As a consequence of these changes, it is becoming increasingly difficult for governments to keep diplomacy confined to a government activity. The public dimension of diplomacy is increasingly including an active, rather than a passive, public, as smaller groups and NGOs, ‘once sideline players in world affairs, are utilising accessible, inexpensive, and interactive communications systems to develop a level of effective co-ordination once only available to states, corporations, and other large organisations’ (Metzl 1999, 179). The public dimension ‘includes not only public opinion, which has long been recognized as essential, but also public consultation, involvement, and action’ (Fulton, Burt and Robinson 1998, 2). However, the public dimension of diplomacy is increasing in different ways in different countries, which this article highlights through a comparison of Canada and Britain.

The Public Dimension of Diplomacy in Canada

The ability of NGOs and citizen groups to help or hinder foreign policy through diplomacy has been recognised by successive Canadian Liberal governments, which have pioneered new forms of dialogue with citizens in the development of foreign policy with systematic outreach programmes whereby citizens have the opportunity to have an input into foreign policy and diplomacy, rather than just being the passive recipients of information on it. Thus, foreign policy has been presented to some extent as a legitimate part of the public domain. The question facing governments is: ‘In a world of public diplomacy where citizens are aware of what's at stake for them, how do you get them engaged and get their support for public policy initiatives?’. ⁴ This has been facilitated in recent years by the work of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. Based within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), this centre aims to ‘work inside the system with the policy-makers and provide the window for public input’. ⁵ The centre holds a range of round tables and national fora in which area and issue specialists and representatives of civil society are invited to participate in discussions of how Canada should conduct its foreign relations. The results and recommendations of these discussions are given to the relevant government minister. Recent examples include sessions on human rights, small arms proliferation, war-affected children, conflict prevention and preventative diplomacy, and Canada's bilateral relations with other states. This process of dialogue has not been confined to Canadian citizens, with interested parties from overseas being included and specifically catered for, for example when a round table of foreign experts was held in March 2000 to discuss ballistic missiles. Key recommendations from this session urged that Canada ‘work together with civil society to make a panel of scientific and civil society experts to develop a mature proposal on a multilateral approach to the ballistic missile problem’, and initiating outreach and reassurance to Russia (Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development 2000, 2). In this way, it is claimed, the deliberations on Canadian policy become part of the diplomatic process.

This deliberative aspect of foreign policy and diplomacy is not seen as a purely domestic process. Canada has been pushing within the UN Security Council for that body to be more transparent and to have an increased dialogue with NGOs, academics and journalists in its work, with as many open meetings as possible. It is argued that through Canadian lobbying, the Red Cross was invited to speak to the UN Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. ⁶ This was possible in part because Lloyd Axworthy, then Canadian foreign minister, spearheaded consultation with NGOs in the development of foreign policy and their involvement in the execution of foreign policy and diplomacy. Axworthy had extensive experience of working with NGOs during his political career and ‘maybe recognized the validity of contacting and dealing with NGOs at an early stage’ in the policy-making process. ⁷ Indeed, on the day that Axworthy announced that he was stepping down as foreign minister, he said that the ability to reach across to NGOs outside of Canada had helped Canada to impact on multilateral negotiations. ⁸ This has been demonstrated by the success Canada has had in promoting its human security agenda internationally. More generally, it is possible for small and medium-sized states to utilise NGOs and transnational issue groups to reinforce their message in multilateral negotiations, giving such states a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis their more powerful allies such as the United States or the European Union in a new form of two-level game to advance their diplomatic objectives. In this way they are able to get their desired outcome because others want what they want. Information and communication technologies make this possible. However, the use of public diplomacy to boost Canada's position at the bargaining table does have its critics, who argue that the consultation is largely window dressing, and has led to little real change (Hampson and Oliver 1998, 398).

It is argued that the attempts to have a more inclusive diplomacy are a result of Canada's political culture, where there is an ‘evolutionary track record of public participation in public policy’, and the need for public consultation has been recognised by the state. ⁹ Outreach is seen as an integral part of the policy-making process. In turn this is influenced by Canada's geographic and constitutional basis, whereby it is important for the federal government to maintain co-operation of the provinces. The role that provinces play in the development and implementation of their own policy in areas such as culture, the environment and fishing rights, which are increasingly issues addressed in international as well as domestic fora, is increasing. ¹⁰ Previously provinces had felt left out of the foreign policy and diplomatic process (Mace, Bélanger and Bernier 1995). Another motivating factor in having a more inclusive diplomacy is that by reaching out and consulting with interested parties, states are then able to obtain information from experts and to gain their support for policies. As Patricia Lortie from the Canadian foreign ministry says, In addition to this, bringing groups from civil society into the policy-making and consultative process means that they are more likely to be supportive of your initiative—it is possible to ‘co-opt them into your agenda’. ¹² This enables governments to diffuse criticism from the public on a range of issues.

The attempt to have a more inclusive policy process is not fully comprehensive. As Maureen Molot has noted, it is a well-organised and articulate ‘attentive’ public that is involved in these deliberations, not the general public per se. ¹³ Some have criticised the presentation of the deliberative process as new, pointing out that Canada has a tradition of involving NGOs in foreign policy and diplomacy anyway. ¹⁴ On the other hand, it is argued that while the impact on foreign policy content has not been greatly affected, the process of fora and round tables has been beneficial in that it has had a high impact on the transparency of foreign policy and the visibility of non-state actors in international diplomacy. ¹⁵

While the outreach and active involvement side of the public dimension of diplomacy is increasingly important, Canada has placed less emphasis on projecting its image abroad through a more traditional public diplomacy approach. Evan Potter has argued that there is an ‘image problem in Canada's public diplomacy’.

Thus, ‘there is an urgent need to create a vibrant public diplomacy, using all the communications and technological tools at Ottawa's disposal, to defend both Canada's sovereignty and to promote its values and economic development’ (Potter 2002, 181). This issue has been more widely addressed in Britain, where recent developments in diplomacy have tended to focus on presentation rather than participation.

The Public Dimension of Diplomacy Under New Labour in Britain

States are realising the need to present themselves and their foreign policies in a more effective manner to overseas publics. Promoting values such as democracy, human rights and good governance is becoming an essential part of foreign policy, as is projecting a particular image of the state. Attempts to rebrand Britain's national identity are a symptom of this, namely the idea that ‘some of the methods used by global companies to manage their corporate identities can be usefully taken up to ensure clarity and consistency for the whole “corporate” image of the UK, from embassies and British Council offices to promotional literature and news services’ (Leonard 1998, 65). So too are suggestions that states need to employ the techniques of mass advertising and principled political campaigns in order to shape international public perceptions of their foreign policy (Metzl 1999, 188). As in Canada, research on Britain's image overseas found that people retained an image of Britain that was out of date. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has also made use of material gathered by other agencies on perceptions of Britain by the overseas public, in particular by young opinion formers. Through Other Eyes: How the World Sees the United Kingdom found that Britain's major strengths were seen to lie in a strong and stable economy, in its traditions and its heritage. But many people also saw British tradition as its greatest weakness. While people in the participating countries held a largely favourable view of the UK, the British were seen as ‘cold, reserved, unadventurous and not welcoming to outsiders’. The UK's claim to be a centre of artistic creativity and design excellence received only lukewarm acceptance, and the claim was seen to be based more on past then present performance. The image most associated with England was of the Queen and Royal Family (British Council 1999a, 2–3, 35). This has been a cause of concern within the New Labour government for, Thus there have been attempts to ‘rebrand’ Britain through trade and cultural events, and through new departures such as the Planet Britain 2000 CD-ROM. Produced by the FCO (1999c), and aimed at a young, technologically minded audience, this highlighted the attractions of British music, arts, fashion, business, sport, technology and ‘street culture’. This was partly a result of the work of Panel 2000. This was set up to stimulate debate on how Britain's identity is projected abroad, and to come up with new policies and initiatives. ¹⁶ The FCO also launched a Planet Britain website on 1 January 2000, providing information about the attractions and opportunities Britain has to offer young people from across the world. Diplomatic missions abroad have launched more traditional cultural initiatives. One very successful example was the ‘Accent UK’ series of FCO-sponsored cultural events held in Ottawa, which featured the work of young designers, artists and musicians, and which was aimed specifically at a young audience. The British Council, with support from six government departments, is also developing a ‘brand identity’ for British education to encourage the enrolment of overseas students at British institutions (British Council 1999a, 46). In China, the British Embassy is engaged in a major public diplomacy effort, ‘designed to promote the UK as a modern, innovative and dynamic partner for China in the 21^st century’. The embassy and its local partners send out more than 50,000 copies of Chinese language brochures and magazines every year, targeted at national and local decision-makers and the ‘successor generation’ of educated professionals. Stories on Britain's science, creative industries and inward investment opportunities are regularly placed in the national press. The embassy is currently launching a bilingual website, and monthly audiences for programmes on Chinese television incorporating FCO footage total more than 150 million (Foreign Affairs Select Committee Tenth Report 2000).

Under New Labour, Britain has also started to rethink traditional notions of diplomatic conduct. The recently established think tank, the Foreign Policy Centre, has produced a report on Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Age. This aims to start a public debate about the future of public diplomacy, and to highlight the importance of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy amongst policy-makers (Leonard and Alakeson 2000, ii). This think tank had regular contact with Robin Cook while he was foreign secretary, and part of its role is to re-energise public debate on foreign policy and to ‘rethink what a New Labour foreign policy could be like’. ¹⁷ Certainly Going Public came up with a list of suggestions for how Britain could improve its public diplomacy to take advantage of the changes wrought by the information age. However, according to one FCO press officer, ‘The Foreign Office is very good at public diplomacy, it already does the things that Mark Leonard's book suggests, it is just that the Foreign Office is not very good at selling what it does back home’. ¹⁸

The FCO itself has been aware of the need to change in order to keep up with changes in the world. It produced a number of pamphlets for this purpose, such as Modern British Diplomacy (1999b). British Diplomacy in Action, an information booklet produced for the British public, emphasises that ‘our foreign policy is something that directly affects the British people’, and describes the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO 1999a). Robin Cook was particularly keen to open up the FCO to wider involvement, introducing open days for school students. The idea was to encourage students from as wide a background as possible to apply to work there, as ‘the Foreign Office represents modern Britain and we need people here who are representative of that modern Britain’ (Cook 1997). Cook also brought in a number of experts from NGOs, business, developing countries and other government departments to work as part of the FCO's research teams on the environment and human rights, for example Diana Melrose, formerly the policy director at Oxfam. Indeed, Cook himself sees these institutional changes as one of his successes as foreign secretary. ¹⁹ These ideas did not develop in isolation, however. Britain has also been learning from the Canadian experience. The director of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development held discussions with the Foreign Policy Centre, members of Robin Cook's office at the FCO, and with Clare Short at the Department for International Development (DFID). ²⁰ Clare Short has subsequently used the national forum format to discuss international development issues.

The Department for International Development has taken a more radical and systematic approach to the idea of having a more inclusive policy towards diplomacy and external relations. The 1997 white paper, ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century’, contained a commitment to public consultation (DFID 1997). This promised to ‘work closely with other donors and development agencies to build partnerships with developing countries to strengthen the commitment to the elimination of poverty, and use our influence to help mobilise the political will to achieve the international development targets’ (DFID 1997). This was to be done through a commitment to ‘put in place new ways of working with the UK private and voluntary sectors, and the research community, towards the international development targets including transforming the Commonwealth Development Corporation into a dynamic public/private partnership’ (DFID 1997). However, while area and issue experts welcome these initiatives, these have been seen by some participants as little more than presentation and window dressing.

Another minister who has been vocal on the issue of public consultation is Peter Hain, while minister of state at the FCO from 1999 to 2001. Hain had, like Axworthy, a personal commitment to working with NGOs and groups in civil society. Indeed his background is one of political activism, forming pressure groups such as ‘Stop The Seventy Tour’, which successfully campaigned to stop the 1970 cricket tour of South Africa, and the Anti-Nazi League. In a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, to launch his pamphlet ‘The End to Foreign Policy?’, Peter Hain made a very public commitment to a new kind of approach. He pointed out that ‘increasingly the problems that come across ministerial desks in the Foreign Office are of a new and intractable kind. They do not respond to traditional diplomatic solutions’ (Hain 2001a). The spread of AIDS, BSE, the protests at Seattle and international drug trafficking ‘reflect a new kind of world shaped not by old clashes of ideology or power, but by more complex forces’ that do not respond to the traditional tools of diplomacy. There is a growing domain of interests that affect every human being. This has two consequences. First, the responsibility of politicians and diplomats is no longer solely to think in terms of national interests, ‘it is to align the way nations see their own interests with the new global imperatives’ (Hain 2001a). Second, ‘action by governments alone is not sufficient’, whereas ‘previously, responsibility for foreign policy resided in an elite group of specialist diplomats’ (Hain 2001a). Now an increasing number of issues ‘will not be solved at the conference table’ and require the specialised skills of all government departments ‘and the committed and innovative involvement of nongovernment actors in business and civil society’ (Hain 2001a). New forms of non-governmental organisation ‘are creating new and powerful agents of change’ (Hain 2001a). Shared global interests ‘cannot sensibly be pursued without new forms of engagement and negotiation, in which governments allow more space for others with legitimate contributions to make’. The ‘emergence of new interest-based coalitions, enabled by modern communications, is fragmenting international power and distributing it in more complex ways’. What is needed is for the government to move ‘beyond diplomacy’ and towards ‘convergent policy-making’ (Hain 2001b, 6, 13, 30).

It was reported that ‘Britain is to bring down the curtain on centuries of diplomatic tradition by cutting back on international round table negotiations in which countries push solely for their own national interests’. Policy in the style of Bismarck and Kissinger ‘was dead’. Foreign policy was no longer the business solely of foreign ministries, and openness had become vital (The Guardian, 23 January 2001). Hain's speech and the pamphlet it was based upon were important. His desire to open up foreign policy and diplomacy is no doubt informed by his involvement with NGOs. However, Hain was moved to the post of energy minister two days after his pamphlet was published, following the minor reshuffle created by Peter Mandelson's resignation, and he has been far less high profile about the need to change British foreign policy since returning to the FCO as minister for Europe following the 2001 general election. This, along with Cook's replacement as foreign secretary by Jack Straw, who has been careful not to lay out his vision as foreign secretary, means that it is still unclear as to the future of the British attempts to adapt to the information age with an upgraded emphasis on the public dimension of diplomacy.

Conclusion

The ‘new public diplomacy’ can be characterised as a blurring of traditional distinctions between international and domestic information activities, between public and traditional diplomacy and between cultural diplomacy, marketing and news management. However, this has manifested itself in different ways in Britain and Canada. In Britain, there has been a re-packaging of diplomacy for public consumption, rather than a rethinking of the paradigm of diplomacy. There is an increase in the role of public diplomacy, but this is still mostly state centric in focus, with the public being the passive recipients of diplomacy. However, in Canada there is evidence of a more inclusive new public diplomacy, with a greater role for transnational issue groups, NGOs and the public. This is possibly due to geographical, constitutional and cultural factors predating the economic, political and technological changes outlined at the beginning of this article. In Canada, there is a tradition of consultation in policy formation, and the state has most to gain from utilising the ability of groups to mobilise and focus attention on an issue. This is because while the FCO has traditionally focused on its international audience, DFAIT has traditionally focused on its domestic audience. This can be seen in the differences between their websites. While Britain has a tradition of public diplomacy, Canada has a tradition of public affairs.

Finally, while it can be agreed that the public dimension of diplomacy is taking on an increasingly central role in the conduct of foreign policy in the information age, a number of issues have yet to be addressed. For instance, to what extent is the increased participation in diplomacy limited to NGOs' academic experts, actors who have traditionally had access, and to what extent does it involve individual participation or participation by actors not previously granted access? To what extent do the changes provide opportunities for strengthening democratic governance and empowering citizens by increasing their knowledge of issues and decisions? If we could identify examples of good practice in public affairs and public diplomacy from around the world, then this could help inform future policy and practice.