Wales in the World: Intergovernmental Relations and Sub-State Diplomacy

Introduction

This article focuses on intergovernmental relations (IGR) between the UK government and the devolved Welsh Assembly Government (WAG). ¹ While IGR are an important facet of governance across the devolved UK, they are particularly important in the Welsh case due to the particular characteristics of that country's constitutional dispensation (Rawlings 2003, 389). As a result, Wales offers a particularly appropriate prism through which to consider some of the issues that arise in the context of IGR including the focus of the current special issue, namely the impact of party incongruence on the nature and outcomes of IGR. From 2007 to 2011, WAG took the form of a coalition of the Labour party and Plaid Cymru, giving rise to a period of partial incongruence between the devolved and central state levels. The formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government at the UK level in June 2010 began a period of full incongruence.

In addition to discussing incongruence this article differs in two other ways from existing discussion of IGR in the Welsh devolved context. While the extant literature is quite extensive, it has tended to focus on how general trends in IGR affect Wales, including the plight of the UK's formal structures for managing IGR and the (previously) central role of the Labour party in managing IGR (see, for instance, Laffin et al. 2000; Rawlings 2000 and 2003; Patchett 2002; Trench 2007a and 2007c). Less attention has been paid, however, to how relations between the Assembly Government and Whitehall departments work in practice. This article begins to fill that gap by focusing on two specific examples of IGR between WAG and Whitehall. While policy-oriented studies of IGR are certainly no panacea (for an important corrective see Bolleyer 2009, 15), they offer a valuable perspective, one that is as yet underdeveloped in the Welsh case.

But what is perhaps most novel about what follows is that our case studies examine IGR in the context of the Assembly Government's sub-state diplomacy (or paradiplomacy). One case focuses on international trade and investment activity and the other on the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme. Sub-state diplomacy refers to the international relations-related activities of sub-state governments, be those relations formal or informal, permanent or ad hoc, bilateral or multilateral. It represents a particularly instructive context in which to examine IGR. The pre-eminent role of the sovereign state in international relations is, of course, underpinned by international law and, in this case, by the devolution dispensations themselves. Moreover, this leading role is, and the prerogatives and privileges that are entailed by it are, often jealously guarded, especially in the context of regional actors within the borders of the state who chafe at the restrictions inherent in the designation ‘stateless nation’. Sub-state diplomacy increases the potential for tension in central–sub-state relations and can therefore highlight the limits of IGR; or more precisely, the potentially limiting and disciplining role of sovereignty on relations between states and regional actors.

It should be noted that this article concentrates on WAG's sub-state diplomacy outwith the European Union context. In doing so, it also represents a further departure from the current academic discussion on sub-state diplomacy in Europe, which tends to focus on regional–EU-level relationships or on the triangular interrelationships between region, state and the European Union. By examining the Welsh Assembly Government's international relations activity beyond Europe, we deliberately focus on activity that takes place in a less institutionalised and habitualised context, thus allowing more focus on the ‘play’ of IGR between Cardiff and London.

A final point regarding the case studies is that they offer an opportunity to investigate the implications of partial incongruence between 2007 and 2010. From the summer of 2007 to May 2011, economic development was part of the ministerial portfolio of Plaid Cymru leader and deputy first minister, Ieuan Wyn Jones, while international development was the preserve of the Labour first minister, Rhodri Morgan and subsequently (after December 2009) Carwyn Jones.

The two central questions at the heart of this article may be summarised as follows:

To answer these questions, our discussion is organised into five sections. We begin with a brief, conceptual overview of the dynamics of sub-state diplomacy and a look at the limited literature on sub-state diplomacy in the Welsh context. Second, we locate our discussion in the academic literature on IGR and provide a general overview of IGR between Cardiff and London, particularly prior to partial party incongruence. Third, we outline the findings of our two case studies, both in the context of party congruence and partial incongruence. The fieldwork forming the basis for these case studies comprised the analysis of primary and secondary materials as well as 32 semi-structured, elite-level interviews conducted between March 2008 and October 2010, predominantly with WAG officials, but also including relevant officials from Whitehall departments, public sector bodies and the third sector in Wales. In a fourth section, we consider the effects of partial party incongruence, while also bringing our story up to date with a brief look at the first indications of the impact of full party incongruence after June 2010. The concluding section draws out some of the broader implications of the preceding discussion for our understanding of IGR.

Sub-state Diplomacy: Cui Bono?

Why are sub-state actors increasingly willing (Cornago 2010) to expend scarce resources on paradiplomatic activities? Especially so given that international relations are almost universally regarded as the prerogative of the sovereign state, and that states already have requisite infrastructures in place such as diplomatic services and extensive international links through which those relations may be developed and maintained.

As illustrated by our case studies, as the distinction between domestic and foreign policy appears increasingly outmoded, sub-state diplomacy is often justified as assisting in the effective delivery of sub-state government functions (Duran et al. 2010). So, for example, sub-state diplomatic activities are often aimed at promoting economic development (Hocking 1999, 23; Keating 1999, 4). Sub-state international links are also regularly justified in terms of ‘policy learning’ or ‘spreading best practice’, even if this is, at best, very difficult to confirm empirically (Cornago 2010, 28). Apart from such material benefits—real or apparent—sub-state diplomacy is also a form of political agency (Cornago 2010, 27). An important motivation for sub-state diplomacy is the symbolic capital that is generated for those politicians and officials involved. Evidence for the latter point is provided by a somewhat unexpected source, namely the memoirs of Wyn Roberts, a prominent Welsh politician of the 1980s and early 1990s. Roberts reveals his pride and pleasure at being feted by other regional leaders, delighting in the ‘VIP treatment’ received. This is all the more significant as Roberts was a minister in successive Conservative governments, sharing his party's hostility towards devolution. ‘Perhaps it was just as well’, he muses, ‘that she [Margaret Thatcher] did not know too much about what we regionalists were up to’ (Roberts 2006, 218).

The symbolic capital that may be generated by international activity seems to play a key role in the calculations of those sub-state governments that represent ‘stateless nations’. André Lecours and Luis Moreno (2003) emphasise the role of nationalism in encouraging sub-state diplomatic activities in such contexts. On this understanding, sub-state diplomacy is part of a wider project of nation-building (see also Duchacek 1988; Keating 2001, 74; Cornago 2010, 31). Unsurprisingly, such activity can lead to tension with the state level attempting to limit the sub-state level's international activities (Lecours and Moreno 2003, 272). In practice, central government responses vary. A constant, however, is the use of intergovernmental channels and mechanisms to embed co-ordination and to address any potential conflicts of interest (Lecours 2008, 9–10).

As the cases of Scotland and Wales underline, it is not simply representatives of non-state nationalist parties that promote sub-state diplomacy in ways that are consistent with the logic of nationalism. In both countries, before 2007 at least, it was Labour and Conservative politicians who played the leading role in sub-state diplomacy. Part of the explanation for this is the political usefulness of sub-state diplomacy for such ‘unionist’ politicians as a means of undermining ‘nationalist’ claims that independence is a prerequisite for engagement in international affairs. But there is more than such instrumental calculation at work (Jeffery and Palmer 2003). Michael Keating's (2009a) useful distinction between ‘neo-unionism’ and ‘neo-nationalism’ also reminds us not to draw overly rigid distinctions between sub-state nationalists and their putatively unionist rivals. In fact members of state-wide parties may well support the development of sub-state diplomatic activity not only to head off ‘the Nats’, but also because they themselves subscribe to a nation-building project at the sub-state level. This is a point to which we will return below.

‘And Less So for Wales …’: IGR in Theory and Practice

In a recent comparative survey written with an eye on the situation in the post-devolution UK, Alan Trench (2008a, 224)—building on previous work on Canada by Dupré—differentiates between three models of IGR widely observable in international practice. These are the ‘functional’, the ‘financial’ and the ‘summit-orientated’. On Trench's account, these three models may be viewed as a continuum with the functional representing the least intensive manifestation of IGR and summit-orientated the most intensive. But in the context of the UK, what is striking is Trench's rueful conclusion that, prior to May 2007, post-devolution IGR ‘barely made it to having “functional” intergovernmental relations, given the level of disengagement of most departmental ministers and their senior officials’ (Trench 2008a, 225). The UK, it seems, is different: not only different in this international comparative perspective, but also different internally. Given the contrasts between the constitutional dispensations for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, rather than conceive of IGR in the post-devolution UK as a common set of relationships or processes, we are advised to think in terms of ‘three sets of bilateral relations with only limited overlap or common ground’ (Trench 2008a, 222).

The broader literature on IGR in federal or regionalised states also assists in conceptualising the implications of party incongruence. Clearly, the degree of party congruence is likely to affect intergovernmental dynamics with a greater potential for conflict in cases where politicians in power at different governmental levels are members of different political parties (or, in some contexts, party families) (Bolleyer 2009, 55). The degree of incongruence is also likely to affect the extent and the ways in which intergovernmental processes are institutionalised. Generally speaking, the greater the level of congruence, the greater the likelihood of informal intra-party contacts playing a significant role in relations between different levels of government. Locating the UK within the broader literature, Wilfried Swenden anticipated that party incongruence in the UK would result in the need for ‘better IGR channels which provide the regions with a more secure input’ and ‘a more adversarial climate may generate a more active role for the courts or enhance the visibility of more formalized channels of IGR’ (Swenden 2006, 211, 232).

For scholars of UK politics, the difference of Northern Ireland is, of course, axiomatic. In terms of IGR, perhaps the key distinguishing feature is the role of the Irish Republic—a role formalised by international treaty. As for Scotland, the existence of a powerful Scottish National party (SNP)—and the associated threat/promise of independence—is regarded as giving IGR a real ‘edge’. Meanwhile, those of us who take a particular interest in Wales have become largely resigned to reading accounts of devolved politics in the UK that treat Wales as a somewhat less interesting and less important addendum to developments in Scotland: ‘and less so for Wales’—or some variation thereof—is an all too familiar trope in the literature. This applies to IGR even if, constitutionally speaking, the nature of the Welsh devolution dispensation—at least until the Yes vote in the March 2011 referendum on further powers (for which see Wyn Jones and Scully 2012)—suggests that relations between London and Cardiff are at a premium.

Operating for its first two terms (1999–2007) under the terms of the 1998 Government of Wales Act, the National Assembly for Wales confronted a number of politico-constitutional difficulties in which the intergovernmental dimension featured heavily. One striking example, which had major implications for the subsequent direction of devolution, was the vote of no confidence in the Assembly's leader Alun Michael in early 2000 which arose from his apparent inability to secure match funding from the UK Treasury for European structural funds to Wales (see Trench 2007b, 103–104). But finance was far from being the only source of tension between London and Cardiff. The fact that the National Assembly had only executive powers prior to May 2007 made the Assembly Government wholly dependent on Whitehall/Westminster for primary legislation. Weaknesses became apparent very early on and were subsequently highlighted in a number of inquiries initiated by both the National Assembly and Westminster (see for instance House of Commons 2003 and 2004; House of Lords 2002; NAfW 2002). The Richard Commission established as part of a coalition agreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 2000 represented the most comprehensive investigation and critique. Its final report highlighted a number of relevant themes including: a lack of understanding among Whitehall civil servants of the complexities of, and differences between, constitutional settlements across the UK; the wide variation in the relationships between Assembly Government and the various Whitehall departments; and the heavy reliance of the Assembly on Whitehall's ‘goodwill’ (Richard Commission 2004, 146–147). But while recognising that ‘the Assembly Government is the junior partner in the relationship with Whitehall’, the Commission's report also argued (somewhat optimistically) that ‘while the relationship continues to present challenges, Whitehall is becoming more familiar with the requirements of devolution’ (Richard Commission 2004, 147, 163). That said, the fact that the Commissioners also recommended wholesale reform of the constitutional basis for Welsh devolution, making the Assembly less dependent on the centre, also suggests that they did not believe that familiarity alone would be enough to overcome the limitations of the 1998 Act.

In fact, Swenden's comparative analysis of federal and regionalised states in Western Europe suggests that Wales’ degree of dependence on central government has been quite exceptional, with its devolved government ‘bound to cooperate with the centre for any policy which it implements. In this sense, the level of legislative–executive interlocking is nowhere higher than in Wales’ (Swenden 2006, 92). In common with other accounts of IGR across the devolved UK, analyses of the post-devolution relationship between Cardiff and London also stress the ad hoc and piecemeal approach to the intergovernmental arrangements. Among the key factors identified as important in maintaining those ad hoc, informal working relations were long-standing familiarity at official level (a holdover from the pre-devolution era as well as the continuation of the unified Home Civil Service) as well as at the political level (where intra-party links between Labour politicians were further bolstered by a keen realisation of the mutual electoral advantage accruing from maintaining good relations.) Another important factor was how both sides of the relationship tended to interpret the absence of public tension or disagreements between different levels of governments as a sign that devolution was proving a ‘success’. This too helped ensure that any instances of minor disagreements were discussed and resolved informally, behind closed doors (Trench 2005 and 2007c).

As well as initiating a period of Labour–Plaid Cymru coalition government, the beginning of the third term of devolution coincided with the implementation of the 2006 Government of Wales Act. Initially this created a constitutional dispensation under which the Assembly enjoyed ‘measure-making’ powers in the 20 ‘fields’ of devolved competence, with Assembly ‘measures’ enjoying the same legal status as acts of the UK parliament. The real extent of these powers were, however, very much dependent on the willingness of the UK government to sponsor and shepherd the requisite Legislative Competence Orders (LCOs) through Whitehall and Westminster. The LCO process was subject to much criticism. Evidence collected by the House of Commons Select Committee on Welsh Affairs reflected the growing frustration on the Welsh side of the intergovernmental relationship (House of Commons 2010a and 2010b, 50). Indeed, some requests for legislative competences were characterised as disappearing for more than two years into ‘the black hole of Whitehall’ (Livingstone 2010a). More generally, the central state's failure to co-ordinate and manage its response to devolution was once again highlighted, as well as the lack of understanding and expertise among the Whitehall civil service regarding the differences in the devolved arrangements across the UK (House of Commons 2010b, 12, 28–29, 43–44). The Justice Select Committee and the Calman Commission also raised similar points (House of Commons 2009; Commission on Scottish Devolution 2009). Indeed, while some suggested that the 2006 Act raised Wales’ profile inside Whitehall, the opposite view is more prevalent, with authoritative voices arguing that the Act exacerbated the complexities of the devolution legislation, making it harder for civil servants to keep up with the evolution of devolution (See House of Commons 2010b, Ev 1, Ev 125, Ev 146). It is indicative of the strength of feeling that in late 2009, Gillian Morgan, permanent secretary to WAG, was willing to call into question publicly the commitment of parts of Whitehall to devolution. There were, she suggested, a ‘culture of arrogance’ and a lack of acknowledgement of Wales (Osmond 2009, 20). Outgoing First Minister, Rhodri Morgan, even suggested that, in contrast to Scotland and Northern Ireland, Whitehall found it difficult to conceive of Wales as a distinct country due to the continuing grip of an ‘England and Wales psychology’ (House of Commons 2010b, Ev 9). Put bluntly, the particular challenge of IGR from the perspective of Wales’ devolved government has arisen from the fact that its relationship with Whitehall is so lopsided—or ‘asymmetric’, to adopt the somewhat euphemistic academic parlance. While Wales was dependent on Whitehall and Westminster, when viewed from London Wales is rather peripheral: a small and relatively poor country with no obvious political or geo-strategic importance. When this is combined with the fact that IGR in the UK have tended to be based on ad hoc and informal relationships, legally non-binding and non-enforceable, it is clear that WAG has found it difficult to make its voice heard in even the most favourable circumstances (Swenden 2006, 203). Indeed frustration with this state of affairs was a factor in ensuring the almost unanimous support across the Welsh political class for a Yes vote in the March 2011 referendum which allowed a move to Part 4 of the 2006 Act and the granting of far less restricted legislative powers to the National Assembly (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012).

If we grant that the ad hoc is the defining characteristic of IGR in the post-devolution UK, and should this ad hoc-ery escape the various comparative models of IGR extant in the academic literature, then this serves to underline the utility of Keating's focus on the function—rather than the form—of IGR. Keating (2009b; see also Keating in this issue) distinguishes between three possible functions:

But given also Keating's stress on the disciplining role of IGR in a context where the powers of the constitutionally subservient level remain un-entrenched, it may well be useful to make this more explicit by adding a fourth function, namely:

The relevance of this fourth function will become clearer as we turn now to our case studies.

Wales in the World: International Trade and Investment and International Development

The Welsh Assembly Government has made a significant effort to enhance its international presence. This third section outlines two case studies of IGR related to Wales’ sub-state diplomatic activity to 2010. First we focus on WAG's efforts to promote Welsh economic development before turning to WAG's role with regard to international development. Both cases present clear contrasts. International trade and investment promotion activity not only builds upon pre-devolution experience, but is also very clearly related to a devolved competence, namely economic development, providing a robust legal basis for WAG's role. By contrast, international development represents a much more recent and perhaps unexpected departure. There was no pre-devolution precedent for the Welsh Assembly Government undertaking such activity, and international development remains a reserved matter; that is, the exclusive competence of the UK government.

The Impact of Partial and Full Party Incongruence on Welsh IGR

Viewed through the prism of party congruence, what is striking about our case studies is that they were unable to unearth any evidence to suggest that partial incongruence following the formation of the Labour–Plaid Cymru WAG in 2007 had any impact whatsoever on relations with London. Nor was the formation of a coalition government in Wales raised as an issue at any point during the Wales Affairs Committee's ‘Wales and Whitehall’ inquiry (House of Commons 2010b). While it is tempting to accept the somewhat mischievous suggestion of one of our interviewees that, such is the limited awareness of Welsh politics within Whitehall departments, some of their London interlocutors may simply have been unaware of the formation of a coalition government in Cardiff, our finding that partial incongruence appears to have had no impact surely deserves further explanation.

The fact that it was a Labour-led coalition that governed in Wales from 2007 to 2011 meant that the political impact of partial party incongruence was limited, especially when compared to the incongruence arising from the formation of the SNP minority government in Scotland at around the same time. Indeed, while Gordon Brown may have initially opposed the formation of the Welsh coalition, it appears that he was quick to change his mind when faced with the real possibility that Labour might lose power in Wales too (Williamson 2007). Nor were the differences between Plaid and Labour—or, at least Welsh Labour in the Assembly—as stark as is sometimes imagined. Since Alun Michael's forced departure as the Assembly's first secretary in early 2000, Welsh Labour, in Keating's helpful terms, pursued a neo-nationalist agenda. Indeed, there was broad agreement across the parties at the Assembly about the legitimacy of nation-building. Moreover, the shared ground of neo-nationalism was further bolstered by a shared commitment to gradualism. Plaid Cymru had no interest in provoking conflict with London. This was partly because the party was intent on using its time in office to kill off any doubts about its ability to govern. An additional factor, however, was also because its determination to ensure that another referendum to approve devolution of further powers for the Assembly be held before the end of the Assembly's term in 2011—the key coalition agreement commitment—put a premium on keeping the pro-primary powers camp relatively unified. In other words, continuity and caution were overdetermined. Partial incongruence may not have been a problem for IGR quite simply because it changed so little.

But although there was no evidence that partial incongruence itself was a contributory factor, there is nonetheless abundant evidence of increased tensions in IGR after 2007. First, as already noted, the entry of Plaid Cymru into government coincided with the implementation of the 2006 Government of Wales Act, Part Three of which represented Wales’ latest ‘interim constitution’ (Rawlings 2003, 20). The effect of Part Three, with its legislative competence transfer mechanisms and measure-making powers, was to make Whitehall, as well as the Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, veto players in the National Assembly's legislative process (Trench 2008b). With Whitehall apparently keen to protect its prerogatives and the Select Committee, in particular, taking on an extremely proactive role in its scrutiny of LCOs, it is not surprising that tensions ratcheted up, not only between the different institutions but between the Labour party's elected representatives in Wales. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a legislative system more likely to create tensions and conflict. Little wonder therefore that in February 2010 the National Assembly for Wales voted unanimously to approve a referendum on implementing Part Four of the 2006 Act which would provide the Assembly with less encumbered law-making powers.

The second source of tension in Wales–UK IGR related directly to the issue of party congruence, but in this case differences in political make-up between the Scottish and UK governments. It should be noted that opinions varied on the impact of the formation of the SNP government on Wales–UK relations. On one view, Wales benefited by dint of the fact that the Welsh partial congruence was far less threatening than Scottish incongruence: Wales was, in effect, ‘good cop’ to Scotland's ‘bad’. But other evidence suggested a different impact: for example, a central government less willing to allow WAG ministers to be part of UK delegations at international events due to concerns regarding how Scottish Government SNP ministers would utilise international opportunities to promote their autonomist agenda. Perhaps most authoritative in this regard is the judgement of Sir Emyr Jones Parry, formerly a senior UK diplomat and more latterly chair of the Convention that paved the way for the 2011 referendum. In evidence to the Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, Jones Parry argued that an SNP government made Whitehall ‘more vigilant and on their guard, and I think that affected officials and it affected ministers in their response to Scotland and with a side-effect as to how they then dealt with Wales’ (House of Commons 2010b, Ev 36).

As is pointed out elsewhere in this special issue, there has also been a modest revitalisation in more formal mechanisms for managing IGR in response to the arrival of UK–Scottish party incongruence. But while welcoming the symbolic possibilities offered by summitry, it is not clear that these mechanisms offered many concrete benefits for WAG. Given the very intensive and highly technical nature of the interactions between Cardiff and Whitehall required by Part Three of the 2006 Act, multilateral fora did not seem a likely location for dispute resolution even if the political imperatives had been different. And politically, while Labour remained in power at Westminster, the Labour-led WAG was very wary indeed of anything that might have smacked of the ‘devolveds’ collaborating together against the UK government. With the change of government in London, however, that—and much else—changed.

Since June 2010, full party incongruence has been accompanied by a marked deterioration in Wales–UK IGR. Welsh ministers have demonstrated a new willingness publicly to draw attention to and criticise those instances during which the UK government—in their view, at least—failed to honour David Cameron's self-styled ‘respect agenda’ vis-à-vis the devolved institutions (see, for example, Jones 2010; Livingstone and Williamson 2010; Shipton 2010a; Williamson 2010a, 2010b and 2010c).

Finance has been by far the most contentious issue on the intergovernmental agenda since the establishment of the coalition government at Westminster, as was apparent in the context of the UK government's 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). In contrast to WAG's previous reluctance to be seen to be making common cause with other devolved administrations against London, in October 2010, the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Ireland leaders issued a joint declaration calling on the UK government to scale back its plans for cuts (Williamson 2010d). In WAG's subsequent response to the CSR, a ‘seething’ first minister Carwyn Jones claimed that Wales was being hit harder than Scotland and Northern Ireland (Livingstone 2010b). WAG's official response was to describe the financial settlement as a ‘hammer blow for the people of Wales’ and to accuse the UK government of unfairly targeting Wales (Williamson 2010e). This sense of injustice was underpinned by the findings of the Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, established as part of the Labour–Plaid Cymru coalition agreement. Reporting in July 2010, it concluded that Wales was underfunded by the current Barnett formula and that radical reform was required (Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales 2010). In response, the UK government's CSR statement and subsequent comments by the UK Treasury recognised the concerns raised but argued (somewhat unconvincingly to Welsh ears) that deficit reduction must take precedence over Barnett reform (Williamson 2010f).

In addition to the general concerns about the size of the Welsh block grant, tension has been further stoked by a string of statements announcing cuts or cancellations in the public spending plans of the previous UK Labour administration (Shipton 2010b and 2010c). These have included the decision to cancel the Defence Training College project in St Athan; the cancellation of plans for a tidal barrage across the Severn Estuary; the closure of the passport office in Newport; the decision not to electrify the main London to south Wales rail line beyond Cardiff; and swingeing cuts in the funding of Welsh-language television channel S4C. In most cases, these decisions seem to have been announced without prior consultation with WAG. Speaking in the context of the treatment of S4C, a clearly exasperated Carwyn Jones stated that ‘there is no respect agenda’; ‘Wales is being bluntly ignored’ (Williamson 2010f).

The cuts also raised questions about Welsh voice and representation at the UK level following the establishment of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government. Doubts focused on: the ability and influence of secretary of state, Cheryl Gillan; the level of influence enjoyed by Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs from Wales within the Westminster coalition government; and the ability of WAG to make its voice heard (Livingstone 2010c; also Shipton 2010d).

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, opposition figures at Westminster responded by adopting the kind of language for which the term neo-nationalist seems somewhat euphemistic. ‘This is a little England Prime Minister and a Little England government with no understanding of Wales or the other proud nations and regions of Britain’: or so said shadow Wales Minister, Owen Smith (Livingstone 2010d). Frustration at the state of IGR following the emergence of full-blown party incongruence also featured in a number of the arguments proposed in favour of a Yes vote in the March 2011 referendum on extending the Assembly's legislative powers. According to First Minister Carwyn Jones, further powers would enhance Wales’ status within the UK, thus providing its devolved institutions with more influence in Whitehall (Shipton 2010e). Strikingly, it is not only politicians who have felt frustrated by the state of post-congruence IGR. Behind the scenes senior WAG civil servants also fulminated about the obstructive attitudes encountered in London. ³

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that these frustrations at the political and even the senior civil service levels were necessarily felt in those day-to-day intergovernmental contacts between officials that form a key part of relations between Cardiff and London. Indeed, our own research suggests that relations with some Whitehall departments actually improved following the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat administration. Interviews with WAG officials in October 2010 pointed to a different political approach in Whitehall, with some departments showing a greater willingness to work positively with the devolved administrations. The explanation proffered for this was that Wales was no longer being caught in the London–Edinburgh crossfire as the new UK government adopted a less hostile position towards the SNP government than its Labour predecessor. This underlines that party incongruence is itself only part of the story; what also matters is the dynamics of the relationship between the incongruent parties.

It must be stressed that it is too early to say whether or not this apparent difference between political- and official-level relationships will persist. Nonetheless our findings support the point already apparent from the Scotland-focused literature on IGR (as discussed by Cairney in this issue), namely that the nature and quality of day-to-day interactions at official level cannot simply be read off ministerial and other public pronouncements. With the ad hoc remaining the norm, variation is the sine qua non of post-devolution IGR.

Conclusion

This article has examined two key central questions. First, what do our two case studies from the realm of sub-state diplomacy tell us about the broader dynamics of intergovernmental relations between WAG and the UK government? Second, what in the Welsh case appear to have been the implications of party incongruence for the dynamics of and organisational arrangements for IGR? In this concluding section we summarise our findings.

In general our evidence serves to confirm conventional accounts of IGR in the post-devolution UK. Relations are largely ‘functional’, in Trench's terms, with officials coming together to oil the machine of governance. Ministerial involvement, certainly at the London end of the relationship, is limited. That said, individual ministerial attitudes are important in terms of the signals they send to their officials. As the experience of the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme suggested, while positive attitudes can greatly facilitate relations, more sceptically disposed ministers could have the opposite effect; all of which serves to underline further the ad hoc nature of IGR in the post-devolution UK.

Our case studies also confirmed the centrality of asymmetry in shaping IGR: asymmetry both in terms of resources and constitutional status. The resource gap was apparent even in the case of IBW, which in Welsh terms was a generously resourced organisation. Despite this it remained dependent on the much larger UKTI. As for constitutional status, what is particularly striking from our case studies is the extent to which IGR was corralled within a framework of agreements and legal oversight. Witness, for example, the way in which the details of the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme—a very modest scheme undertaken at the initiative of a government from the same party and in pursuit of aims vigorously promulgated by the UK government—were pored over by both DFID and Treasury lawyers. In the international realm, at least, the central state is clearly guarding its prerogatives jealously. To this extent the stress on the ad hoc nature of post-devolution IGR may require modification or clarification; ad hoc does not necessarily mean informal or unregulated. It also underlines the validity of our addendum to or clarification of Keating's account of ‘what IGR are for’. Disciplining is also an important part of the story.

We have also highlighted the almost immediate transformation in intergovernmental relations that accompanied the arrival of full-blown party incongruence in June 2010. The strength of the language routinely deployed in public by leading WAG figures, in particular, represents a dramatic change from that witnessed in previous periods of party congruence or, indeed, partial incongruence. But while this is indeed a significant development, we should not ignore longer-term if less immediately obvious changes that are (inevitably) changing the nature of IGR in the post-devolution UK. If interpersonal relationships have been key to greasing the wheels of intergovernmental contacts over the past decade, it is striking that these relationships are becoming increasingly attenuated. At the political level, most of the important relationships that have underpinned devolution since its inception were forged in the bars and restaurants of Westminster in the 1980s and early 1990s, as back-bench MPs got to know and (to some extent) trust each other. But those individuals have now almost all departed the stage. Similarly at the official level, although still part of the same unified UK civil service, WAG and Whitehall are increasingly divergent in terms of focus and experience. Could it be that this fraying of personal links and relationships might well prove to be even more significant for the future of IGR than party congruence?