Recognition and Social Esteem: A Case Study of the Struggles of People Affected by Leprosy

Abstract

This article aims to discuss the role of social esteem in the theory of recognition. It argues that the importance of esteem for self-realization should not be reduced to the affirmation of group identities. In order to support this argument, the article analyzes the struggles of former leprosy patients in Brazil, using data gathered from: (1) a newsletter published by the Movement for the Reintegration of People Affected by Hansen's Disease; and (2) twelve conversation groups conducted in former Brazilian leprosy colonies. The article analyzes the discursive ways through which these individuals sought esteem, which include the confrontation of stigma, the claim of contributing to the accomplishment of social goals and the demonstration of personal achievements. Supporting Honneth's conception of social esteem, the article has three major conclusions. The first one is that justice should not be restricted to the universal language of rights. The second one is that the distinction between struggles based on social contributions and struggles grounded on personal achievements is hard to be made empirically, and that it is misguiding to derive direct consequences from different types of claim. Lastly, the third conclusion concerns the fruitfulness of operationalizing Honneth's abstract realms of recognition in empirical studies.

Keywords

recognition social esteem Axel Honneth leprosy social struggles

Axel Honneth's work has led to a deep renewal of critical theory. His political philosophy is extremely innovative, as it re-conceives key concepts of the Frankfurt School, without giving up its quest for an inner-worldly instance of transcendence. In order to explain social struggles, processes of identity formation and the moral transformation of societies, Honneth has built a theory of justice grounded on the concept of recognition and steered by the idea of self-realization.

One of Honneth's significant contributions is the central role he attributes to social esteem in his theory of justice. According to him, the struggle for esteem is an important dimension of self-realization and, thus, a key element for the moral development of societies. For the German philosopher, the permanent attempt of presenting oneself as valuable and worthy of esteem helps to promote social bonds, fostering broad solidarity in complex societies.

The role of esteem for social justice is, nevertheless, highly controversial. Some scholars, such as Jürgen Habermas (1994), advocate that an expanded idea of rights would be enough to promote justice. Others fear that some demands for esteem may lead to harmful social competition (McBride, 2009; Seglow, 2009). There are still those who claim that esteem may reify collective identities, generating more oppression (Fraser, 2003; Markell, 2003).

This type of argument is based on the interpretation that struggles for esteem are battles for the positive reception of one's collective identity. Very often, recognition is taken as a synonym for identity politics, which seeks to attribute positive meaning to marginalized groups.

I claim, however, that this interpretation does not do justice to Honneth's notion of esteem. The importance of social esteem for self-realization should not be reduced to the idea of valuing group identities for their specific attributes. In order to support my argument, I analyze the struggles of people affected by leprosy. Obviously, former patients do not seek the appreciation of their disease, given that an illness cannot be seen as a cause for pride. Individuals who have had leprosy do not aim at promoting some sort of admiration for their shared attribute. And yet, esteem is a central dimension of their struggles.

The article is divided into two main parts. In the first, I will support a Honnethian definition of social esteem that does not reduce recognition to identity politics. I will also point out some controversies within Honneth's definition, drawing insights especially from Jonathan Seglow (2009). In the second part of the article, I will analyze how esteem permeates the struggles of people affected by leprosy in Brazil. This analysis is based on focus groups held in former Brazilian Hansen's disease¹ colonies and in a newsletter published by Morhan (Movement for the Reintegration of People Affected by Hansen's Disease). The analysis reveals, first of all, that esteem is at the heart of what these individuals see as justice. It also reveals that there are several ways of struggling for esteem that do not aim at positively valuing an essentialized collective identity.

The Role of Esteem in Recognition

Honneth (1996) argues that a sufficiently differentiated notion of recognition is the best theoretical tool for the interpretation of social struggles and for the promotion of their emancipatory potentials. His framework articulates a theory of psychological development with a broader social theory, placing the notion of self-realization at the crux of justice. Honneth (1996) argues that self-realization is sustained or undermined in social relations, because the self is a dialogical construction.

According to Honneth (1996), in contemporary Western societies, three realms of interaction are important for self-realization: (1) primary relationships provide the necessary emotional support that grounds the emergence of self-confidence; (2) legal relations provide a universal sort of respect that allows individuals to build self-respect; and (3) communities of values foster social esteem, which is at the heart of the possibility of self-esteem. This article is particularly concerned with this third realm of recognition.

Based on both Hegel and Mead, Honneth (1996, p. 121) claims that ‘in order to be able to acquire an undistorted relation-to-self, human subjects always need – over and above the experience of affectionate care and legal recognition – a form of social esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities’. Differently from the legal respect dimension, which does not accept degrees or differentiations, social esteem allows individuals to be valued in their specificities. ‘Persons can feel themselves to be “valuable”

only when they know themselves to be recognized for accomplishments that they precisely do not share in an undifferentiated manner with others' (Honneth, 1996, p. 125).

Individuals' traits and abilities are daily evaluated according to the way they are seen as contributing in some sense to the accomplishment of collective goals. If esteem is tied to the values and goals established by concrete communities, it is thus historical and susceptible to change. Individuals who feel that their traits and abilities are often belittled may struggle for the transformation of socially shared patterns of interpretation.

According to Honneth, struggles for esteem are important for the moral development of society, because they foster the idea that every individual should have the chance to be seen as valuable. In doing so, these struggles promote social solidarity. If esteem is symmetrical, every person can be seen as contributing to societal goals in a certain way. This process is important for binding people together in contemporary societies, as it promotes ‘that kind of special consideration we owe to each other insofar as we participate jointly in the realization of a project’ (Honneth, 1997, p. 32). Nicholas Smith (2009, p. 56) explains Honneth's idea in a very clear manner:

Without social bonds that extend beyond the familial sphere, and which have greater binding power than those generated by the mutual recognition of persons under law, the social cohesion of highly individuated, modern societies is at risk. Social esteem through mutual recognition could in principle provide such cohesion, thus helping to secure the integrity of the society and individual identities in one stroke.

It is important to highlight that Honneth's definition of esteem does not imply that everyone should be esteemed equally, nor that individuals should be esteemed because they share a specific collective attribute. Simon Thompson (2006, p. 74) points out that, for Honneth, persons ‘are not esteemed simply because they are associated with a particular culture or because they have a particular social identity, but rather because they possess specific features which distinguish them as unique individuals’. Honneth (1996, pp. 129–30) himself has highlighted that symmetry of esteem does not mean that everybody should receive the same amount of social esteem. Essentially, it means that nobody should be disrespected on the basis of their identity.

Nancy Fraser's (2003, p. 32) critique of Honneth's idea of esteem seems thus unfair. Fraser claims that he empties the notion of esteem by advocating that esteem should be equally distributed.² This is clearly not the case. Patchen Markell's (2003) skepticism about the theory of recognition also seems misguided. In equating the idea of recognition with a struggle for self-affirmation, he assumes that Honneth would advocate some sort of public approval for collective entities. From Markell's perspective, the theory of recognition could only produce more oppression because it is based on a will of sovereignty. However, as long as esteem is not equated with the affirmation of difference, Markell's fear seems unwarranted.

In attempting to show that these criticisms do not do justice to his ideas, Honneth has further clarified his definition. His replies to the critics emphasize that esteem should be thought of in terms of achievement, and not in terms of collective attributes (Honneth, 2001;

2003). He argues that the emergence of capitalist societies has created the conditions for an individuation of esteem, in which esteem is distributed ‘by individual achievement within the structure of the industrially organized division of labor’ (Honneth, 2003, p. 140). Prestige started to be awarded on the basis of merit, according to standards of productivity.

The problem, nonetheless, is that what is characterized as ‘important work’ ends up undervaluing other social activities, such as those of the housewife or mother. One of the problems of capitalist societies is that they have a severely restricted conception of ‘valuable contribution’, which does not consider contributions that are not located in the labor market (Hartmann and Honneth, 2006; Honneth, 2003). In an interview given to Anders Petersen and Rasmus Willig (2002, p. 273), Honneth states, for instance, that he considers as outrageous the fact that our societies cannot make persons with disabilities feel socially needed.

From this perspective, struggles for esteem are attempts to change the patterns of distribution of both prestige and the resources associated with it. As explained by Cillian McBride and Jonathan Seglow (2009, pp. 8–9), ‘for Honneth, the primary terrain on which struggles for particular esteem recognition takes place is the economy which ostensibly distributes social esteem according to the “achievement principle” ‘. Hence, struggles for esteem should not be understood as competitions to show oneself as better than others. They should be thought of as fostering a process of reciprocal understanding in which individuals ‘learn to understand themselves as subjects possessing abilities and talents that are valuable for society’ (Honneth, 2003, p. 142). Through esteem, individuals do not seek to be recognized as members of a cultural group, but as cooperative members of society.

If Honneth (2003, p. 168) has made it explicit that social esteem is not directed at cultural groups, his definition is still broad enough to encompass different meanings. Several scholars point out that the notion remains somehow imprecise in his work. Geoff Boucher (2004), for instance, notices that esteem could be distributed by division of labor, by abstract societal goals or by concrete attributes of individuals. He argues that Honneth has changed his mind, even if he does not acknowledge it. This shift would become evident in the replacement of solidarity by merit and achievement in Honneth's recent formulations (Boucher, 2004; Cooke, 2009, p. 94).

Seglow (2009) suggests that, more than a shift, Honneth's conception of esteem would carry two different meanings. On the one hand, social esteem could be granted according to personal achievements. On the other hand, social esteem could be distributed on the basis of the contributions that individuals offer to society. For Seglow (2009), there would be a tension between these two definitions:

On the achievement view, individuals are focused on individual striving … There may be difficulties in fostering a common ethos. On the contribution view, by contrast, society regards itself as a community of members, each of whom is able in some way to satisfy common needs and interests. … Solidarity is more easily explained on this later view (Seglow, 2009, p. 70).

Seglow's point is that merit and contribution are not synonyms. According to him, the latter would be compatible with solidarity, but struggles are often based on claims of achievement that challenge social cohesion. Struggles for esteem might therefore stimulate a competitive sort of politics that does not lead to a ‘common ethos’.

This point is also made by McBride (2009), according to whom the struggle for esteem may be a dangerous political enterprise. Citing Rousseau, he claims that this type of struggle ‘has a dynamic that always risks turning a reasonable concern with amour propre into an unreasonable compulsion to hierarchically distinguish ourselves from others' (McBride, 2009, p. 106).

It is important to highlight that McBride (2009) acknowledges that esteem recognition should not be eradicated, because it is important for the emergence of stable personalities (McBride, 2009, p. 104). However, he argues that esteem should not be seen as the focus of the politics of recognition, especially if we are to think of policies implemented by the state. ‘While the pursuit of esteem may be relatively harmless at the individual level … at the collective level it risks pitching us into a morally unacceptable and politically destabilizing politics of competition and hierarchy’ (McBride, 2009, p. 107).

If Seglow (2009) and McBride (2009) accurately point out a tension within Honneth's conception of esteem, they somehow seem to simplify the effects of this tension. The public exhibition of one's achievements does not necessarily lead to a destabilizing social competition, although this may be the case. Showing one's achievements may also be a way to confront taken-for-granted meanings that reduce one's existence to useless (or harmful) survival.

An analysis of the struggles of people affected by leprosy in Brazil reveals exactly this point. It also reveals that social esteem should not be equated with the affirmation of differences. Struggles for esteem play an important role even when the appreciation of a shared attribute is definitely not at stake. These struggles can be seen as attempts to challenge the symbolic patterns that prevent these individuals from being seen and regarded as estimable. More than a quest for public approval, they should be seen as a quest for the possibility of public approval.

Case Study: The Struggles of People Affected by Leprosy

Leprosy is a chronic illness ‘that mainly affects the skin, the peripheral nerves, mucosa of the upper respiratory tract and also the eyes, apart from some other structures' (World Health Organization, 2009). The initial symptoms of leprosy are patches on the skin that have a loss of sensation to heat, touch or pain. As the disease evolves, nerve damages and disabilities are also frequent. It is mainly transmitted through long and intimate contact with an ill person who has not undergone treatment. However, more than 80 per cent of human beings are believed to be resistant to the Mycobacterium leprae.

Leprosy has been a curable illness since the early 1940s. It has been eliminated as a public health problem for most countries.³ In spite of that, around 250,000 cases are diagnosed every year, according to the latest statistics of the World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2008). India and Brazil are responsible for approximately 70 per cent of these cases.

Besides this problem, one cannot talk about leprosy without referring to its history of stigma. Throughout centuries, and based on different justifications, persons affected by the disease have been segregated and systematically disrespected (Gould, 2005; Gussow, 1989; White, 2001). They have been seen as challenges to: the idea that men were made according to God's image; the anthropocentric ideals of sovereign men; the civilizing processes; and the aesthetic and productive ideals of contemporary societies (Mendonça, 2007). This complex web of meanings that constitute the stigma has generated a variety of social practices, including exclusion from communities, symbolic funerals and massive segregation.

The history of leprosy is also constituted, nonetheless, by a more silent web of practices and meanings through which people have struggled against disrespect. There are several occasions in which individuals collectively sought to rectify historic and symbolic values that have denied them the possibility of self-worthiness. It is important to mention here the successful struggle of former Japanese patients for financial compensation in the early 2000s. Long before that, between 1930 and 1960, the American national leprosarium of Carville had watched a powerful political struggle, fostered by a publication named The Star, and led by Stanley Stein (Gould, 2005; Gussow, 1989, p. 160). The United States has also been the stage for the work of civic associations, such as the American Legion, which gathered war veterans who had acquired the disease overseas. One of these veterans, John Early, was considered a pioneer of leprosy activism, engaging with the issue at the beginning of the twentieth century (Gussow, 1989, p. 145). Even before that, in 1870, Hawaiian patients and family members had violently risen up against insular isolation (Gussow, 1989, p. 100).

Brazil has also had its history of struggles. It is worth mentioning the diligent work of Alice Tibiriçá in the first half of the twentieth century and Abrahão Rotberg's international campaign to change the name of leprosy to Hansen's disease in the 1970s. In contemporary Brazil, there are also associations concerned with people affected by leprosy. The most active and representative of them is Morhan, which was founded in 1981. Morhan has 62 branches spread throughout Brazil, comprising roughly 2,000 activists. Since its creation, Morhan has fought for the elimination of leprosy and for the reintegration of those affected by it. The movement has significant accomplishments, including participation in several governmental bodies. In 2007, it promoted a series of demonstrations aimed at supporting a bill that would compensate individuals who had been compulsorily segregated. The bill was transformed into a Presidential Decree and it was later approved in both legislative houses. The Law 11.520 has already benefited more than 5,800 former patients.

Morhan's claims can be conceived of as struggles for recognition. Its demands include struggles for love, rights and social esteem, in an attempt to assure the possibility of self-realization for those affected by leprosy.⁴ It proposes new moral grammars that seek to alter patterns of behavior and intersubjective relationships. The social movement thus provides interesting data for the analysis of struggles for social esteem.

In order to collect these data, I have observed meetings, seminars and events organized by Morhan over a period of four years, besides conducting several non-structured interviews.

More importantly, for this article I have read and summarized the stories published in all the 45 issues of the movement's newsletter (Jornal do Morhan). I have paid particularly close attention to the twenty issues published between 1988 and 2007.

The dimensions of recognition (love, rights and esteem) were coded every time they emerged in texts. This process of coding did not aim, however, at comparing, quantitatively, the significance of each realm of recognition for Morhan. It was used to identify how each realm of recognition was discursively presented by the movement's official newsletter.

It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to restrict the struggles of people affected by leprosy to the demands presented by a social movement. Citing Bourdieu, Honneth (2003, p. 118) points out that ‘the overwhelming share of cases of everyday misery are still to be found beyond the perceptual threshold of the political public sphere’. In order to collect the more invisible demands for recognition, I have conducted twelve conversation groups in former leprosy colonies situated in three Brazilian states: Acre, Ceará and Minas Gerais. These groups were audio-recorded and the tapes were transcribed. The transcriptions have been coded according to the realms of recognition.

In what follows, I present an analysis of different ways in which the dimension of social esteem emerges in the struggles of people affected by leprosy. This analysis combines the data collected in Morhan's newsletter with the data collected in conversation groups. In this specific article, I do not aim to compare these two different discursive contexts, although I have done so in another work (Mendonça, 2009a).⁵ My goal is to map how the realm of social esteem permeates demands, so as to show that there are several ways of struggling for it that do not aim to affirm difference. I also argue that the demonstration of one's achievements does not necessarily lead to social competition.

The Struggles for Social Esteem of People Affected by Leprosy in Brazil

The data analyzed point to the existence of three main ways of struggling for social esteem. The first one, very important in the context of leprosy, refers to the contestation of negative meanings that undervalue individuals a priori. The second way of struggling for social esteem is to show how former patients contribute to important social goals, such as public health. The third way is to challenge the crystallized idea that leprosy patients are useless through the demonstration of personal achievements.

Confronting Stigma

The contestation of negative meanings and metaphors that define leprosy is a key element of the struggles of people affected by the disease. Former patients realize that prejudice severely reduces their chances of being esteemed, since it frames them as despicable, disgusting and unproductive. Stigma challenges the symmetry of esteem because it places these individuals at the bottom of social hierarchies, also depriving them of the possibility of being esteemed.

The centrality of stigma becomes evident in the way injustice is defined. Storytelling is often used to show how stigma has generated disrespectful social practices. The examples below illustrate this point:

Eduardo⁶ (Group 12): I suffered when I tried to get a professional driver's license. I felt embarrassed, because they said I couldn't. They told me I was incapable, because of the disease. I felt humiliated.

Osmar (Group 6): It would be better to be an outlaw, a thief … anything bad. At least, we would be healthy and we wouldn't be stigmatized. If we were arrested, we would be able to come back after a while. But the Hansen's disease patient will never be able to say he was … He is! He is a leper! He can never say he no longer is. … No compensation can pay for the dreams I had. I wanted to be something. I wanted to grow up and to build something.

The fragments show how these individuals use stigma to define injustice. Stigma creates significant hurdles to their aspirations, contradicting normative expectations of fair treatment. In the second statement, Osmar claims that stigma attaches its connotations to individuals, depriving them of their singularities. People always tend to see the stigmatized attribute, further attaching depreciated identities to subjects. This process would hinder individuals who wanted ‘to be something’, ‘to grow up’ and ‘to build something’. It prevents them from being perceived as valuable and estimable.

Although former patients are highly skeptical about the possibilities of actually overcoming stigma, they have proposed some strategies that may be capable of diminishing the strength of such stigmas. Several comments made by them suggest the need to establish a continuous conversation with society that would demystify the disease. Health campaigns are an important part of this conversation, as they would enlighten society about the scientific and biological dimensions of the disease.

Ana (Group 1): If people know and have information, especially the right information about Hansen's disease, their prejudices will diminish.

Morhan is deeply engaged in this process of demystification. It constantly publishes biomedical information about the disease and relentlessly states that ‘Hansen's disease is curable’. Besides its newsletter, the movement produces ‘textbooks, cartoons, books, folders and advertisements’.⁷ An influential activist recalls that ‘the elimination of prejudice requires the clarification of this pathology to society’.⁸ Seeking to amplify social conversation, the movement highlights the importance of debating leprosy ‘with schools, churches, physicians, associations and the media’.⁹ It suggests including the issue in school curricula,¹⁰ and it has established partnerships with several universities.¹¹ Broad and diffuse conversation is considered essential because the ‘diminishment of stigma is related to an effective transformation of societies' ethical and cultural standards’.¹²

The media can also play an important role in this process. Morhan dedicates several articles of its newsletter to advising its activists how to deal with media professionals. It highlights that journalists can become extremely important allies.¹³ Celebrities could also be significant actors in the struggle against stigma. They can shed light on issues that have been invisible to the public and media, ‘since a famous person advocating something is more newsworthy than you or I doing so’ (Parkinson, 2003, p. 147). In Brazil, several musicians and television stars have supported Morhan.

Besides lending their visibility to the issue, celebrities may also contribute to attaching positive meanings to leprosy, as explained by colony residents (Group 10):

Nair: Label is what matters, my friend. It is the label! Do you understand? … So, if a famous person [hugs Carolina] ‘Oh, I will hug Carolina; Carolina has Hansen's disease, but I will hug her, because that famous guy has hugged her’.

Carolina: Solange Couto [renowned Brazilian actress] has taken a picture with her, so I want one too [laughs].

Nair: The label of someone with leprosy is rotten! Our label is rotten, because the word in itself says everything. It reproduces the stigma. … I think we should mobilize these famous people. … People like things that have media, fame, status, you know?

In this conversation, two women suggest that celebrities might be able to link the disease to positive images, therefore contesting their (‘rotten!’) label. As celebrities are the expression of societies' ideals and projections, they can help in challenging the stigma of leprosy.

The importance attributed to the media and to its celebrities can also be seen in the continuous work of media watch. In many occasions, colony dwellers and Morhan activists have denounced newspapers and broadcasters for reproducing stigma. They mainly criticize the use of the word ‘leper’, the publication of jokes about the disease and the association of the illness with images related to ‘pieces falling apart’ or to some sense of incapacity. Most of the time they say that their complaints are not heard. When they feel they have affected media narratives, however, they celebrate it.

A story told by Carolina illustrates this point. She sent several letters to a broadcasting company, complaining about the existence of prejudice in a soap opera. She was skeptical about the fruitfulness of this strategy until she noticed that the characters of another soap opera had raised the issue of leprosy in a non-stigmatized fashion.

Carolina (Group 10): At that point, I felt like a winner! Because if I had not complained, they wouldn't have contradicted what they had said in the other soap opera.

The way activists and colony residents emphasize the relevance of information and the role of the media against stigma evinces their belief in the potential of a broad and diffuse social conversation for challenging degrading images. Clearly, this struggle against stigma can be thought of as part of a larger struggle for esteem. If the negative meanings attached to the disease are contested, it will become possible for these individuals to be perceived as estimable. Confronting stigma is a powerful way to foster the symmetry of esteem. It is thus evident that the search for esteem may not be based on the affirmation of differences. Social esteem is sought here through challenges to a priori denigration.

Protecting Society: Some Contributions of Persons Affected by Leprosy

A second way of struggling for esteem consists in showing that persons affected by leprosy offer important contributions to society. The struggle moves one step forward here as activists and colony residents claim they can help society to achieve some of its goals.

The statements analyzed suggest that the major contribution persons affected by leprosy claim to offer society is their persistent effort for the elimination of the disease. Medical information abounds in Morhan's newsletter, and the movement is constantly engaged in campaigns for early diagnosis. Morhan often presents its actions and strategies aimed at eliminating the disease. It claims to help when advising governmental actors; when divulging information; when keeping governmental authorities accountable; and when motivating different social actors. In all the issues of Morhan's newsletter there is news about the movement's branches and their strategies to confront leprosy, ranging from concerts¹⁴ to cycling events¹⁵ and theater productions.¹⁶

Morhan argues that it ‘is doing its part; and hopes the government will do the same’.¹⁷ An activist points out, in a letter published by Jornal do Morhan, that anybody who knows the movement's work ‘will understand immediately its relevant social importance to the world’.¹⁸

Honneth (1997, p. 30) argues that, in the realm of social esteem, ‘the individual is recognized as a person whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community’. Similarly, Seglow (2009, p. 68) points out that ‘Social movements' battles to get their esteem-worthy achievements on the public agenda evince their belief in the normative power of a community of esteem’. If that is so, the best way Morhan could claim that its activists are esteem-worthy is defending values taken as unquestionable, such as public health. In an editorial, the national coordinator of Morhan tries to convince other activists about the need to struggle against the disease:

At this moment, we are deeply involved in accelerating the pace towards the elimination of Hansen's disease in our country. Grass-root activists must follow this strategy, seeking uniformity and the quality of our actions. We need to struggle for the rights of people affected by the disease. But how can we achieve this in a country in which the great majority of the population does not fully exert citizenship? The movement's struggle is thus broader, advocating citizenship and health to everybody.¹⁹

The text justifies the importance of struggling for the elimination of leprosy and it requests activists to work in this direction. Morhan's coordinator argues that the struggle for citizenship depends on the universality of the right to health. In doing so, he states that the movement's struggle is socially relevant and aims at the construction of a better society. Curiously, a claim for citizenship can be part of the struggle for social esteem. This is why Morhan's coordinator argues, in the same text, that ‘every day we will feel prouder for being at Morhan’.

More than propelling self-interest, these persons would be fighting for justice and social well-being. This explains, for instance, their involvement with several struggles in the field of health, including those related to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and thalidomide.²⁰ Instead of affirming the differences of people affected by leprosy, the movement broadens the scope of its political goals, claiming that it is committed to society's objectives (Alexander, 1996; Barnes et al., 2006, p. 201; Melucci, 1996). The health discourse helps the movement to show its value.

This is not, however, the only contribution that people affected by leprosy claim to offer society. An entirely different way to show their value is related to their past experiences. Several individuals in conversation groups argue that their entire lives have been sacrificed to protect society from the disease. They argue that they have lost their freedom, their rights and their families so as to allow society to accomplish modernity's cleansing goals. They have had their houses burned and their families destroyed for the sake of public health. Based on these arguments, they affirm society owes them:

Osmar (Group 5): Society has a duty towards patients, you know? Because, if it wasn't for society, we wouldn't have been sent to a hospital. We went because of society, even if we were a part of society. Society has isolated us. It must embrace us now. … It has the obligation of receiving us, because we came from it and we are here because of it! … Society must receive us, because we belong to it. We are part of society!

Osmar argues that, if society has segregated these individuals to protect itself, it must now receive them. These individuals should be praiseworthy due to their sacrifices and society should acknowledge the value of their contribution.

This sort of argument emerges frequently in the struggle for the compensation of those who have been compulsorily segregated. It is important to mention that my data were collected in a period marked by a debate in Congress over a bill to compensate former patients in Brazil. In most conversation groups, the bill was mentioned. People often supported it with arguments grounded on the idea that the lives of segregated individuals were sacrificed for the sake of public health, and society was indebted to them.

César (Group 7): You were placed here against your will … If you had remained in society you could have infected other people. So, they pushed you into this colony without asking you. Against your will, splitting families, sons and mothers … I look at my mother's case and many other persons' stories. I think this compensation is more than fair. And it shouldn't be small. It should be even higher, because they are already at the end of their lives.

From César's perspective, persons who have been segregated deserve a high compensation, because they were pushed into colonies to avoid contamination. Their contribution would be manifest in their own biographies and the hurdles they had to face so that society could achieve its goals.

Personal Achievements

A third way of struggling for social esteem involves the demonstration of personal achievements. Several individuals try to show they are not incapable or unproductive. They often deny, for instance, anything that associates them with panhandling, as it may corroborate the idea of uselessness.

Raimundo (Group 3): Ask him for how long I have worked with this bike? Always selling bread. He mentioned the possibility of begging … The beggar should feel ashamed.

Esmeralda (Group 2): Morhan struggled a lot against panhandling, you know? It helped in showing that patients are capable; they can work and improve their conditions.

Work is a way of showing oneself as productive and capable. If work is clearly a way to claim one's social contribution, in this case it is also a way to show one's personal achievements, due to the severe hindrances these individuals had to face in order to work. Several statements evince that self-esteem may emerge from the capacity to be productive.

Eduardo (Group 12): I am a professional driver. And why do I say I am professional? Because I can work exactly in the same way as those that have their hands and feet in perfect conditions. … I worked for several years as a nurse, receiving half of a minimum wage. But, as a leprosy patient, I was proud to be working and to be financially independent.

José (Group 5): I was very demanding as a construction worker … Every detail had to be done perfectly … God gave me the gift of working. I started when I was five years old, when I lost my father. … I can't stand still. As the sun goes up, I feel like doing something.

In both utterances, individuals state they are suitable for work and express their pride in being able to sustain themselves financially or in having ‘the gift of working’. Effort and work ground self-esteem, as individuals claim they are not a burden to society. On the one hand, this perspective challenges the stigma of incapacity. On the other hand, it corroborates the idea that individual effort is a fair way to give value to human beings. The statements dispute the connection between leprosy and worthlessness, but not the broader understanding that ties social value to work. This broader understanding is, nonetheless, at the basis of contemporary stigma around leprosy (Bakirtzief, 1994; Mendonça, 2009a).

Martin Hartmann and Axel Honneth (2006) point out the dangers of meritocratic societies when they discuss the paradoxes of contemporary capitalism. Although the principle of achievement has an emancipatory dimension, it leads to an overestimation of the role of market success, transforming it into ‘the sole criterion for rewarding achievement’ (Hartmann and Honneth, 2006, p. 54). Other forms of achievement are often not taken into account and this can create a sense of inner emptiness and absence of purpose (Honneth, 2004, p. 467).

In this sense, there are other sorts of achievement claimed by persons affected by leprosy that seem to be more destabilizing than showing one's capacity to work. Two of them must be noted here: (1) activist engagement; and (2) the arts of everyday practices.

Several activists display their engagement as an important source of achievement. They try to show themselves as leaders of important victories.

Nair (Group 10): Many Hansen's disease patients were leaving the colony and they came to me. That is how this neighborhood was formed. I was always organizing projects. I sent one to Brasília during the government of President Sarney [requesting resources] so that we could construct houses. And we have received 105 houses. And we built these houses in a time when there were no roads. We were in the dirt, carrying wood on our shoulders. My shoulder was injured and I have photographs to prove it. But we have accomplished it. We built 105 houses in 11 days! That is why I say I can walk with my head held high. I know I have paid my duties to society!

Claudia (Group 12): I was engaged with several popular movements. I was one of the founders of the Labor Party. I have walked through 80 suburbs, and I was the only one with Hansen's disease. Then, I went to work with the basic ecclesiastic community. I became the coordinator. After that, I worked in the church. I have done many things. I have given 17 years of my life to communities and popular movements. … And then we founded Morhan. If you look at the initial meeting minutes, my name is there, as one of the founders of Morhan. … I was also in the feminist movement. I arrived there as an activist and I became president.

Both Nair and Claudia seek to show how they have been active in their communities. Nair emphasizes the effort required to build 105 houses for former colony residents, which allows her to feel proud. Claudia highlights her biography of struggles and victories in civil society. These examples clearly show how personal achievements and social contributions can be thought of as intertwined in certain cases. These women state that they have devoted their lives to the improvement of their communities. Their personal achievements are also social contributions.

Similarly, Morhan's newsletter shows how activism is simultaneously seen as a source of personal achievement and as a form of social contribution. Several stories point to important accomplishments attained by activists. Bacurau, the founder of Morhan, has received many international awards and has also met with the Pope.²¹ Even after his death, ‘he is remembered in the entire world’, as shown by visits to China²² and Italy.²³ Antônio Borges, another highly ranked Morhan activist, has also been granted many awards.²⁴ He has visited New York for a United Nations meeting²⁵ and has written an autobiography about his accomplishments.²⁶ A third activist to be cited is Cristiano Torres, who is the only former Hansen's disease patient to have carried the Olympic torch.²⁷

If all these stories show personal achievements, they also relate these achievements to social contributions. An article published in 2006 claims that the volunteers engaged in the movement should be thought of as performing an important social task.²⁸ Some articles emphasize that volunteering fosters the ‘pleasure of feeling useful’²⁹ and ‘valued’.³⁰ The fact that volunteer work is unpaid does not reduce its significance.³¹ In displaying their accomplishments as activists, people can blend personal achievements and social contributions.

These cases suggest that it is very hard to establish a sharp distinction between personal achievements and social contributions. Despite clarifying different dimensions of struggles for esteem, Seglow's (2009) dichotomy seems misleading, as it does not consider the merging between these dimensions. It also seems problematic, because it deduces very specific effects from each dimension. According to Seglow (2009), the display of personal achievements will foster social competition, while claims of social contribution will advance solidarity. This does not seem to be a general rule.

In order to clarify this point further, I move now to the other way, mentioned above, by which to claim one's personal achievements: the arts of everyday practices. Actions that can be thought of as ordinary may carry great potential for esteem, as they help individuals to prove they are not useless:

José (Group 5): Even if my hands are like these [shows hands severely affected by leprosy], I can thread a needle and sew a button.

Vera: Can you still thread a needle?

José: I can!

Vera: And sew a button?

José: Absolutely! … Can you see all these fences? [Pointing to fence around his house] I haven't

paid a penny for that … I have done it myself!

Osmar: Look at that! … This is incredible!

[Fuad Abdala was a] tough and determined man, who has never given up, despite having been affected by leprosy and having lost his vision. The mutilations have not obstructed him from going to university, where he graduated in law. Excellent professional, example of kindness, he has always worked on a volunteer basis. Good father, he had eight kids, seven of them adopted. Good husband, he shared 50 years of his life with Palmira, his full time partner. And as a friend, he would always have a word of affection to everyone who approached him.³²

The first conversation shows the happiness caused by the realization of tasks that, although simple, are extremely difficult for persons who have lost the sense of touch. José can sew buttons and make fences, which is regarded as ‘incredible’. There is no claim to social contribution here, but simply the expression of one's personal merits. These small chores enable him to see himself as valuable. The second text is a fragment of an obituary published by Morhan's newsletter. It serves as a life lesson. For those affected by leprosy, it is motivating as it evinces the possibility of overcoming obstacles. For others, it demonstrates accomplishments that contest stigma.

Although these statements clearly express personal achievements, it would be hard to say that they somehow stimulate social competition. In this regard, Seglow's (2009) argument that claims concerned with social contribution are the ones that foster solidarity seems problematic. There is no causal relation between the nature of a claim for esteem and its pragmatic effects. Claims of personal achievement and social contribution may foster either competition or solidarity, depending on other contextual elements.

To conclude, I would like to cite a last type of claim related to personal achievements which helps to show both problems of Seglow's (2009) proposition (i.e. its sharp distinction between intertwined dimensions and its way of deducing effects from the nature of claims). In the data analyzed, one of the most common personal achievements claimed by persons affected by leprosy is the capacity to take care of one's own family and raise one's children, as shown below:

Manuel (Group 1): If I tell people I have been an intern patient – with more than fifty years of isolation – and I have raised a man for society … this will make them pay attention: ‘This guy wasn't useless! He was sick, but he was a normal citizen’. If I tell people that Aparecida raised a lot of kids when segregated … Aparecida: Three! Two of them are nurses and my boy is a driver.

Isabel (Group 8): I was married, and my first son is employed in the city!

These fragments express the pride of parenting. Manuel states that the fact of having raised his son, now ‘a man for society’, proves his life has been worth living. From his perspective, this seems to be his greatest achievement, evincing he ‘wasn't useless!’ Again, it would be difficult to interpret this utterance as fostering social competition.

It is also important to notice that his achievement is framed as social contribution. He has not only raised a man, but he has raised him ‘for society’. That is why professions and employments are mentioned. Aparecida has raised two nurses and a driver. Isabel has a son employed in the city. Both of them are proud because they have managed to reintegrate their children. Both of them are proud because they have done something they believe to be good for society. Seglow (2009, p. 70) states that ‘since parenting focuses on making children into secure, self-confident, autonomous and hence productive citizens, from society's point of view it looks more like a contribution than an achievement’. In the case of persons affected by leprosy, however, it mixes both categories, as the activity of parenting has been managed in extremely adverse conditions.

Concluding Remarks

This article sought to explore the notion of social esteem as one of the fundamental modes of recognition in Honneth's theoretical framework. It presented his understanding of social esteem, emphasizing that he does not equate struggles for esteem with battles for the positive evaluation of collective identities. Honneth's conception is centered on individuals and their possibility of being seen as estimable.

After presenting Honneth's definition and claiming that some of his critics do not do justice to his ideas, the article discussed the recent literature that points to the existence of different types of struggle for social esteem. Several scholars fear that claims steered by the display of personal achievements may lead to social competition. The article focused particularly on Seglow's (2009) argument about an internal tension in Honneth's proposals.

Based on these theoretical discussions, the article then presented a case study about the struggles for social esteem of persons affected by leprosy in Brazil. The analysis revealed that esteem is a central dimension of their claims. This finding corroborates the idea that struggles for esteem should not be equated with quests for the positive consideration of shared attributes. Persons affected by leprosy do not seek the affirmation of their difference. They struggle for social esteem through: (1) the contestation of stigma; (2) the claim of contributing to the accomplishment of social goals; and (3) the demonstration of personal achievements.

There are at least three suggestions that could be made from the analysis of this case. The first one is that justice should not be restricted to the universal language of rights. Former leprosy patients are not demanding a right when they claim they can help eliminate the disease or when they show their capacity to do incredible tasks. When individuals state that they have raised children for society or that they can sew a button even if they have lost hand sensibility, they are claiming they are not useless. In doing so, they challenge the degrading meanings that deprive them of the possibility of self-realization. In asserting their value, they also make clear that their personal achievements and social contributions are essential for the construction of their identities.

If justice is understood, through the lenses of recognition, as grounded in self-realization, it becomes dependent on the possibility of feeling worthy. Such feeling cannot be granted or assured a priori, but it can be easily inhibited when individuals only face demeaning and humiliating feedback in their social interactions. By showing the importance of social esteem for self-realization, and by advocating a theory of justice centred on self-realization, I thus claim that the possibility of being esteemed should be protected or promoted.

It must also be emphasized that social esteem is important for another reason: it plays a key role in empowering individuals to struggle against disrespect.³³ Individuals who are systematically stigmatized may internalize degrading meanings that end up limiting their capacity of agency. By seeing oneself as valuable, one can more easily challenge the situations and frameworks that are seen as unjust. When an individual shows his or her achievements and social contributions, he or she is simultaneously presenting him or herself as a subject capable of confronting ingrained negative meanings and, hence, disrespect.

My argument, in sum, is that self-realization cannot be assured only through universal rights. As recently highlighted by Maeve Cooke (2009, p. 79), ‘contemporary politics must take seriously a concern for recognition that goes beyond a demand for recognition of universal qualities or capacities’. There is something in justice beyond general citizenship.

This is the problem of Habermas' (1994; 1998) approach to recognition. According to Habermas, ‘all that is required is the consistent actualization of the system of rights' (Habermas, 1994, p. 113). In advocating that the language of rights should encompass recognition, Habermas leaves unexplored the non-universal dimension of selves. He argues that rights may be conceived of in ways that address the issue of cultural differences, but he does not seem to notice that the category of social esteem should not be reduced to struggles about cultural differences.

In the same direction, Robert Goodin once presented me with an intriguing question: ‘what may the theory of recognition offer us that an extended theory of rights doesn't?’³⁴ At the basis of his question lies the premise that justice can be attained through the assurance of universal conditions of dignity. My analysis suggests, however, that the possibility of struggling to be seen as valuable due to one's contributions and achievements cannot be explained through the universal language of citizenship. The foundations for the construction of self-esteem are established in the specificities of individuals, allowing them to see themselves as important and needed. The crux of social esteem, its integrative function and its impacts on practical self-realization, cannot be grasped by the idea of citizenship, no matter how broadly it is conceived. And social esteem becomes important to justice precisely because the goal of justice is understood here as the promotion of the conditions for self-realization through moral grammars that are simultaneously reciprocal and inclusive.

The second suggestion arising from the analysis regards the distinction between struggles for esteem based on social contributions and those grounded on personal achievements. The case explored shows that social contributions and personal achievements may be interwoven. The distinction proposed by Seglow (2009) seems to indicate different facets of struggles for social esteem rather than a tension within Honneth's framework. From this perspective, it seems incorrect to derive direct consequences from types of claim. The demonstration of one's personal achievements does not necessarily lead to competition. In the same way, it is plausible to think that attempts to frame one's actions as social contributions may hurt social solidarities. The pragmatic effects of claims cannot be deduced from their nature, especially because it is often impossible to distinguish social contributions from personal achievements in struggles for esteem.

Finally, the third suggestion raised by the article is related to the fruitfulness of operationalizing Honneth's realms of recognition in empirical studies. The analysis of different cases and sorts of struggles can be very enlightening for a deeper understanding of the actual dynamics of recognition. Struggles for recognition take on different shapes in different contexts. The application of these concepts to empirical realities will help to clarify the nuances of recognition, as well as its strengths and shortcomings.

Footnotes

I have discussed some of the ideas in this article with Rousiley Maia, Claus Offe, Selen Ayirtman and Ana Carolina Ogando and I thank them for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers of Political Studies for their suggestions. Finally, I thank Fapemig, Capes and CNPq for the financial support that allowed me to conduct this research.

1

The use of the term leprosy has been legally banned in Brazil since the 1970s. It has been replaced by Hansen's disease (Hanseníase).

2

I am referring here to a very specific point of Fraser's critique of Honneth. The debate between them is obviously more complex. Fraser (2000; 2001; 2003) proposes a significant shift in the notion of recognition, by advocating a status model steered by the idea of parity of participation. She is mainly concerned with a theory of justice that thinks of disrespect not in terms of negative impacts on self-formation but in terms of hindrances to parity of participation. Fraser claims that recognition and redistribution are both essential for the promotion of justice, and policies that target disrespect should be built deliberatively in the public sphere. I have dealt with this debate in detail in another paper (Mendonça, 2009b). My point here is simply that she misinterprets Honneth's understanding of social esteem.

3

The elimination of leprosy as a public health problem is achieved once the prevalence rate of a country is inferior to one case per 10,000 persons.

4

Morhan's struggles for love include demands related to the situation of children who were separated from their parents; claims for relatives not to abandon patients; campaigns to alter the relationship between physicians and patients; and arguments about the importance of touching. Struggles for rights involve civic, political and social rights, which aim at guaranteeing equality and dignity in society. Struggles for social esteem will be targeted as the focus of my analysis.

5

In I investigated how some of the struggles of people affected by leprosy were discursively mobilized in three contexts of communication: (1) informal conversations in former leprosaria; (2) issues of Morhan's newsletter; and (3) stories published by two daily newspapers with national circulation. A qualitative analysis of discursive content was conducted following three steps: initial description, coding of the dimensions of recognition and comparison of findings from the different contexts.

6

Names were changed randomly in order to safeguard individuals' identities.

7

Jornal do Morhan (JM), 40, 2004, p. 12.

8

JM, 39, 2004, p. 10.

9

JM, 30, 1999, p. 6.

10

JM, 25, 1998, p. 13.

11

JM, 39, 2004, p. 5.

12

JM, 27, 1999, p. 2.

13

JM, 28, 1999, p. 7; JM, 30, 1999, p. 12.

14

JM, 28, 1999, p. 5.

15

JM, 33, 2000, p. 10.

16

JM, 44, 2006/7, p. 11.

17

JM, 27, 1999, p. 2.

18

JM, 33, 2000, p. 11.

19

JM, 28, 1999, p. 2.

20

JM, 28, 1999, p. 3; JM, 30, 1999, p. 5.

21

JM, 27, 1999, p. 12.

22

JM, 27, 1999, p. 5.

23

JM, 37, 2001, p. 2.

24

JM, 34, 2000, p. 9; JM, 35, 2000, p. 12; JM, 36, 2000, p. 15.

25

JM, 25, 1998, p. 16.

26

JM, 31, 1999, p. 2; JM, 34, 2000, p. 9.

27

JM, 39, 2004, p. 10.

28

JM, 42, 2006, p. 12.

29

JM, 39, 2004, p. 11.

30

JM, 41, 2005, p. 12.

31

JM, 37, 2001, p. 8.

32

JM, 40, 2004, p. 12.

33

I am thankful to Ana Carolina Ogando for her support in clarifying this argument.

34

Personal conversation held in the Research School of Social Sciences (ANU), 18 September 2007.

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