Unravelling the Putin Myth: Strong or Weak Caesar?

Strong Caesar: Putin as the popular prince

To argue that Putin was the embodiment of a ‘strong Caesar’, or at least one who was successful in setting down a coherent political strategy, one would need to demonstrate that his strong leadership attracted a support base within civil and political society and coincided with evidence of strategic economic and political success. Perhaps the best indication of this was when Putin revealed his outlook for governance in an article released on the eve of his ascent to office. Here he outlined firstly the necessity of economic growth and stability and the need structurally to reform the economy to be effective, competitive and fully integrated in the mechanism of global capitalism (Putin, 2001). He also placed a hugely ambitious plan that projected economic annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth at around 8 per cent, which, due to the turmoil of the preceding years, was seen by many as wishful thinking. Economic growth, however, in twenty-first-century Russia has been maintained. This has not been at the rate that Putin had set for himself in order to catch up with the West, but at a consistent rate since the economic crisis of 1998. In his last four years as president the economy remained at a growth rate of around 7 per cent, with very little fluctuation. Indeed, in the final year of his presidency, economic growth rose to over 8 per cent, despite the international slow-down (Åslund, 2008).

The emphasis on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been seen as one of the most significant reasons for the upturn in the economy (Nikolayev, 2007). Having being unable to sustain any constant flow of foreign investment during the 1990s, Russia (arguably) became a popular destination for FDI under Putin. Statistically, while most of Eastern Europe has remained a popular destination for foreign investors, there has been a distinct shift towards targeting Russia as their final destination. Russia increased its share within the region of Eastern Europe to over 20 per cent (by 2006), with indicators arguing that this share will increase to 25 per cent by 2010 (World Investment Prospects, 2006). While this still remained modest in terms of its overall share of GDP, it nevertheless was a huge departure from the crony capitalist era of Yeltsin, Berezovsky et al. Much of this has been aided by Putin's stress on World Trade Organisation membership. Again, while Russia has still not gained membership of the organisation, it has made large strides towards meeting this aim and remains entrenched within the process of multilateral and bilateral negotiations in order to finally achieve this end. At present, Russia – at least in principle – is in its final stage of the accession process, having been praised by the organising body for the structural changes it has made to its economic and trading system (WTO, 2007), even though doubts remain whether the multilateral agreements between Russia and a variety of Member States will reach a feasible end (Rutland, 2007). Much of the recent modernisation drive was accredited to the Trade and Economic Development Minister, German Gref. While Putin has clashed with and overridden many political ideologists, Gref was largely given a free hand to put his own model of economic liberalisation into practice (Åslund, 2007). Unlike the Chicago School neoliberals a decade before (Gaidar, Yavlinsky), Gref adopted a more pragmatic approach towards modernisation, placing emphasis on tax reform, the removal of import tariffs and, more importantly, on the culture of protectionism and the curbing of expenditure. While this may have appeared on paper as radical as any other pro-market plan, it mainly took the form of a gradual approach and avoided the idealism of Gaidar (Sakwa, 2004). Gref did indeed come up against opposition in the form of Kasyanov (prime minister until 2004), but his sacking by Putin demonstrated the faith that Putin had in Gref, while again demonstrating his willingness to dismiss a potential challenger.

The move towards economic marketisation can be seen as one in which Putin has drawn from the zapadnik tradition. The same can be said for the significant changes to Russia's political infrastructure in order to complement the move towards a more competitive state. The adoption of a new labour and land code was accompanied by a tax code and a radicalisation of state and welfare benefits to facilitate a system of low taxation alongside a more flexible labour market (Chen and Sil, 2006; Hendley, 2007). While these reforms did attract resentment and prompted popular demonstrations (particularly from the elderly and the influential Pensioners party) of a kind not witnessed before under Putin, they did not lead to the depth of discontent seen during the Yeltsin era. Part of the reason for this might be due to the manner in which Putin had managed the political system so that potential opposition could be marginalised. While Yeltsin created a power base centred on a notorious oligarchy that failed to contain opposition from its parliament and the regions, Putin adopted a strategy that both co-opted and minimised oppositional potential. Here, his engagement with the derzhavniki becomes more noticeable. For while a zapadnik influence would seek to embed a democratic process, or indeed spark a ‘coloured revolution’ to accompany those elsewhere (Ukraine/Georgia), Putin sought to centralise power and embed a coherent style of autocracy and authoritarianism, firmly engaging with Russia's ‘Slavic’ past.

Putin's subordination of parliament had already secured the support of the newly found Unity party that had challenged the dominance of the Communist party in the Duma election of 1999, before his succession as president. The years that followed saw this support strengthen with the merger of Unity with Fatherland that resulted in a new pro-government bloc (eventually referred to as United Russia) that controlled 226 seats out of 450 in the lower house. As opposition from both the ‘liberal right’ and ‘conservative left’ slowly dwindled, Putin was aided by the support of another centrist bloc, ‘Fair Russia’, which allied the newly formed Rodina alongside potential oppositional independents and fringe groups. Putin used this support in the Duma to pass federal laws that centralised his position as a strong leader. These included the abolition of elected governors in favour of ‘appointed’ governors and the narrowing of appointments of deputies into the Federation Council of Russia (upper house). The renewed process of party building was precipitated in some degree by new controversial laws on political registration. In order to reduce the number of political parties throughout the country, laws were passed requiring parties to have at least 10,000 members across the country, and at least 100 members or more in more than half of Russia's 89 regions (see White et al., 2006 for an overview of these reforms). However, while many have pointed to this as being endemic of a wider attack on the democratic processes (Lucas, 2008), a similar argument could be made that this process was merely an action used to modernise political processes. Increasingly, a ‘Caesarist’ character was shown towards the end of Putin's presidency in adopting a single-constituency PR electronic system that set its threshold for representation at 7 per cent. Subsequently, the 2007 parliamentary elections saw the cementation of pro-Kremlin domination and the eradication of liberal opposition from the Duma. ²

Judging from his economic and political reforms, a strong case can be made that Putin indeed synthesised the contrasting zapadnik/derzhavnik traditions within Russia's socio-political tradition through strategic forms of power politics. Politically and culturally, Putin embarked upon a uniquely Russian form of governance that built upon the myth of the strong prince. In doing so he gained approval ratings that constantly remained at 70 per cent, further fuelling popular belief in the strong, flexible, yet distinctly ‘Russian’ Prince.

The weak Caesar: Putin as the fragile Prince

If Putin successfully managed to force a political consensus to consolidate his own means, it does not necessarily follow logically that this same process has been developed at the level of civil society. One response to the ‘strong leader’ thesis points to the growing divisions between the political elites at the centre and those dissenting voices that become increasingly sidelined. The attack on the oligarchs, the war on Chechnya, the disappearance and effective sidelining of the representation of the liberal vote, the clampdown on the freedom of the media, the notoriety surrounding the handling of disasters such as the Kursk, Beslan and the murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko have all added to the argument that Putin waged an unsustainable attack on any form of opposition during his term in office. Such a move is not indicative of a coherent Caesarist strategy but merely one that serves to stave off the threat of potential opposition by becoming negatively entrenched with individual power. Indeed one of the major characteristics of Machiavelli's Prince was that he must ‘secure himself from conspiracy by avoiding being hated or despised and by keeping people satisfied with him; such is a necessary accomplishment’ (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 61).

Before looking at the political and civil shortcomings of Putin's administration, the first port of call should be the economy. For while there is no doubt that the economy has maintained high growth and increased FDI, this has been achieved through a dependency on energy and through the favourable commodification of oil and gas. In addition, while the chaotic atmosphere of cronyism and organised crime that often limited capital inflow under Yeltsin may have been lifted, the watchful eye of the state has to a certain extent replaced it. For, as Philip Hansen argues, much of the investment is used to expand energy companies that have built a unique relationship with the state (Hanson, 2007). While structures have been put in place for the economy to become more competitive on one level, on another the state has inserted greater control. Therefore, while it may appear that Putin adopted a strong and coherent approach towards economic development and reform, this reality is distorted by its dependence on energy. This dependence – which became increasingly prominent during Putin's tenure – poses several questions to any valid claim that might be made towards economic stability.

At the civil level, instabilities were expressed through a mixture of regional, democratic and ideological discontent and disempowerment. In terms of regional discontent, Putin did not merely have to deal with the familiar separatist movement from Chechnya, but with the de-regionalisation process that occurred with the changes to the political processes. The regional set-up and tensions between the core and the periphery became highly topical in the early 1990s, with the Russian Federation eventually settling for a complex mix of republics and regions, some containing unique settlements of their own (Chebankova, 2007). Putin's hard-line approach to regional autonomy consistently threatened to reopen the many more potential little ‘Chechnyas’ that had threatened to surface in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. ³ Despite this, the centralisation of the regions did not have the backlash that some might have expected. More notable was the ideological resentment towards Putin's anti-democratic and market-based policies. Again, if Putin had in any way ‘solved’ the problem of containing the vast ideological forms of contestation that appeared with the advent of glasnost (Worth, 2005), then they would have somehow appeared less relevant. Despite the fact that political expression seemed to reject such ideological alternatives in favour of a general centrism, critics would still maintain that such movements have been augmented – rather than that they have disappeared – since Putin's ascent to power (Lucas, 2008). In particular, the toning down of the registration of political parties has done relatively little to quell neo-communist or nationalist opposition at a civil level, with groups such as the National Bolsheviks remaining notoriously prominent within dissident circles and the successful registration of parties such as the Russian Communist Workers party and People's National Unity that many had wanted to see sidelined or at least phased out (Worth, 2002). Indeed, towards the end of Putin's tenure, it was these more ideologically opposed social groups which forged alliances with more mainstream representative groups (such as the Pensioners Party with Rodina).

Civil campaigns for democratic change give us a clear illustration of deep-seated instabilities within Putin's Russia – if only because of the prominence of the figureheads involved and of the transnational media coverage. Since his ‘exile’ in London, Boris Berezovsky consistently proclaimed himself as ‘Putin's enemy number one’, and funded a variety of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and media campaigns that denounced Putin as an enemy of democracy. Having been connected with the financing of Yushchenko's campaign in the Ukraine, Berezovsky urged a Russian version of the orange ‘revolution’ (Berezovsky, 2007). If anything, however, the oppositional symbolism represented by Berezovsky played into Putin's hands and had a derogatory effect on the democratisation campaign within Russia, as Berezovsky was still equated with the corruption and turbulence that marked his period of influence in the Kremlin (McCauley, 2001). Possibly more significant, both within Russia and internationally, is Garry Kasparov. Due to his popular appeal (as a former chess champion), Kasparov's United Civil Front (UCF) appeared to illustrate the deep cracks in the Putin regime far better. Organised as an ‘open civil movement’ the UCF aimed to redress the democratic deficiencies that have occurred through the political reform process and sought to educate the public on the enclosed nature of politics and political choice within the Russian Federation (Kasparov/United Civil Front, 2007). The UCF later merged into a larger organisation known as ‘Other Russia’ that attempted to take this a step further by joining forces with other ‘organic’ political parties that have been marginalised through centric cronyism.

While ‘Other Russia’ might have been presented to external observers as a civil democratic challenge to Putin, the reality was quite different. The coalition contained a bizarre mix of NGOs and prominent campaigners from the UCF with the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), the Communist Workers Party/Party of Communists and former leader of the Stalinist Bloc. Victor Anpilov's Working Russia. The name itself, ‘Other Russia’, was partly drawn from leader of the NBP and self-proclaimed ‘Soviet Fuhrer’ Eduard Limonov's monographic ‘struggle’ – ‘Another Russia’. To complicate matters even further, the movement was co-chaired by the deposed prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov who – like Berezovsky in London – appeared to be waging a personal vendetta against Putin. While distanced by the official liberal opposition of Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, elements of support such as Maria Gaidar's Democratic Alternative joined the motley collection (Kolesnichenko, 2007). While the campaign was condemned as one that offered no real alternative other than to express the position of counter-ideologies, it nevertheless was reminiscent of similar unholy alliances that were prevalent during the Yeltsin era (Worth, 2005). The potential of such opposition is also indicated by reports that public trust in Russia's institutions – whether political, economic or even cultural – remains as low at the end of Putin's tenure as it was at the beginning. This would suggest that, despite the popularity of Putin as a leader, his inability to establish a similar popularity from the result of his reforms leaves the Russian state in a similarly weak position and, in real terms, cancels out his personal populist appeal (Shlapentokh, 2006).

There is much justification for the counter-claim that Putin did not so much create a strong base for hegemonic potential as merely use authoritarian populism as a method to consolidate the status quo. One could argue that his political and economic policies did not amount to an overriding strategy, but were geared towards a pursuit of continuity and, moreover, that Putin's brand of Caesarism failed to sustain the normalisation of political and civil society within Russia.

Conclusion

Taking into account Russia's much-heralded unique political heritage and culture this essay suggests two contrasting ways in which the Putin era may be looked upon – either as an expression of a coherent authoritarian democracy or that, like that of its predecessor, it remains a weak and fragile administration. To a certain extent, each interpretation holds a degree of truth and each contains certain shortcomings that the other does well to express. It should firstly be stressed, however, that Putin has undoubtedly gained more success in pursuing a hegemonic project than his predecessor. While Yeltsin was aptly referred to as a weak Caesar (Lester, 1995), Putin has shown more substance in establishing consensus. That being said, oppositional forces that existed under Yeltsin have reappeared under Putin and, more significantly, the problem with the hard-line nature of Caesarism is that it needs to serve its purpose in order to make way for a passive relationship between the state and civil society. Putin, however, seems intent on maintaining elements of the autocratic tradition that were rooted within traditional Eastern societies (Gramsci, 1971). In a civil democracy, however conditional, Caesarism can only go a certain distance before it becomes redundant, and Putin's model of ‘democratic statism’ could only go so far before it became highly contradictory (Sakwa, 2008).

As stated in the introduction, Putin's main objective for the construction of a hegemonic project was grounded in unifying the respective spirits of the zapadniki and derzhavniki. To a certain extent, this has been done, with Putin appeasing the former through economic reform and the latter through populist authoritarianism. However, this uneasy marriage became increasingly difficult to maintain when ‘coloured revolutions’ occurred in nearby states, leading to the fear of further Westernisation (Wilson, 2005). At the same time, while opinion polls maintained a high popularity rate for Putin, the fragility of an energy-dependent economy could see the strong governmental support that Medvedev has inherited quickly disappear.