Abstract
The EU has developed its global role in recent years. This has taken place by developing procedures for foreign policy and in the deployment of civilian and military missions internationally. However, the EU suffers from weaknesses that limit its ability to exercise significant global influence and that are apparent in the EU's relationship with the rising powers. The article analyses these limitations which encompass the EU's ‘hardware’ — its capacity to deploy fully the capabilities of all its constituent Member States – and failings in its ‘software’ — incoherence and inconsistency in the definition and application of its ideas guiding the EU's global role.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) and its Member States have responded with uncertainty and hesitance to the early twenty-first-century transitions in international relations. Individually and collectively, European states are struggling to define the nature of the relationship that they wish to cultivate with the new ‘rising powers’ and how to respond to an ongoing process of globalisation. Furthermore, Europeans have been wary of fundamentally recalibrating their relationship to a United States in apparent relative economic decline, with increasing indebtedness, and diminished US military power as a consequence of the difficulties encountered in interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Alongside drawing appropriate strategies to structural changes within international relations, European states continue to face a collective action problem in responding to foreign policy episodes and crises. Differences among the EU's Member States have impeded collective responses to some recent crises – including the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the question of the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. However in others the EU has responded collectively – notably Russia's intervention in South Ossetia (Georgia).
A key issue of uncertainty for the EU is whether it can develop the capacity to define and pursue a ‘grand strategy’ in response to a shifting structure of power within international relations. Additionally, what should be the aspiration of any such strategy? Can the EU seek a greater resemblance to other significant and rising powers within international relations and acquire the necessary diplomatic and military capabilities to facilitate such a role? To do so would require not just the development of the ‘hardware’ of material resources to facilitate a role as a great power but also the ‘software’ of ideas and aspirations to seek such a role.
A great power role had been mooted for the EU in the 1990s in response to the apparent moment of unipolar pre-eminence of the United States and the need to balance the power of this ‘hyperpuissance’ (Védrine, 1999). This idea, however, did not achieve widespread acceptance among the EU's policymaking elite. Rather, the notion that the EU should seek to stress the distinctiveness of its capabilities and aspirations for international relations is much more deeply embedded.
This position was established and refined during the decades of the Cold War. The, then, European Community was considered to be a ‘civilian power’ constrained in the instruments available for its diplomacy and in the options available for its foreign policy (Duchêne, 1972). With the end of the Cold War a key constraint on a distinctive European foreign policy disappeared. However, the notion of maintaining a European ‘difference’, in terms of the forms and purposes of power to be exercised, has had considerable resonance and has been rearticulated in the academic literature as the notion of a ‘Normative Power Europe’ (Manners, 2002).
The international relations of Europe
The removal of the ideological ‘straitjacket’ of the Cold War, which had conditioned the foreign policies of European states, triggered two decades of preoccupation with changing the structure of the international relations of Europe. Intra-European foreign policy has been dominated by enlargement; the economic and political extension of the wealthy West of Europe (underpinned by institutional membership of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) to struggling new democratic states in the East. European integration acted as a new conditioning factor on individual states' foreign policies by transforming intra-European states' relations through the progressive enlargement of the EU. This is an ongoing process that requires political and financial commitment by the EU; it will impact on the EU's capacities and energies that are available for a wider global role.
A counterpoint to these intra-European changes has been the attempt to build a collective (EU) foreign policy – an extra-European foreign policy – through the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) launched under the Treaty on European Union in 1993. The institutional structures of the CFSP were intended to provide the basis for a broader and more comprehensive foreign policy – including structures and personnel to develop a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is the mechanism through which the EU conducts civilian and military crisis management and peace support missions across the world. These developments have been explained by structural realist commentators as a quiet and cautious balancing by Europeans of US power and a desire to have greater influence vis-à-vis the US (Posen, 2006).
The EU and its Member States have given inordinate attention to the development of institutions and decision-making processes for the CFSP and CSDP through successive Treaty amendments since the middle of the 1990s. However, they have been unable to devise a clear grand strategy informing what range of capabilities would be necessary to give the EU the greatest power and influence within international relations. Such a preference for procedure, as a substitute for policy substance, has been a long-term characteristic of EU foreign policymaking.
These EU characteristics are highlighted where there has been an attempt to engage in grand strategy making. The then High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, presented the first European Security Strategy (ESS) to the European Council in December 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003). The document was clear in its identification of key threats to European security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. In a review of the ESS in December 2008 there was an update to the security threats facing Europe that included climate change and the global economic crisis (Council of the European Union, 2009). What was lacking in the document was any clear agenda as to how the EU would organise its relationships with a set of ‘strategic partners’ that were identified in the ESS. Rather, the focus was upon the EU's preferred mode of diplomacy: multilateralism and the commitment to international co-operation to deal with global security challenges. This was to be achieved by supporting an ‘effective multilateral system’. 1
Willingness to use power
The EU faces a unique situation from that of the other powers considered in this special issue. Although it is possible to aggregate the military, economic and diplomatic capabilities of the 27 Member States to suggest that the EU is a putative superpower (see Young, 2010, in this issue), the EU lacks a political decision-making infrastructure that would enable utilising them (McCormick, 2007).
All European states retain the foreign policymaking and diplomatic infrastructure to pursue national foreign policies in international politics and this affects the EU's relationships with other great powers. EU Member States have differing resources at their disposal and differing levels of ambition in international relations. The UK and France retain extensive diplomatic networks and foreign policymaking infrastructures, pursue foreign policies that are global in extent and aspire to be first-order international actors active on all issues on the international agenda. These two states have not contemplated a diminution of their roles, as exemplified by their unwillingness to relinquish their seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
However, EU membership also embeds all the Member States within a dense institutional network that constrains and conditions the conduct of national foreign policies. Such constraints and conditioning generate a process of convergence in national policies by the increase in shared norms and interests in Member States' foreign policies which has been defined as a process of ‘adaptation’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000) or ‘Europeanisation’ (Wong, 2005). This is not to suggest that national foreign policies in Europe are becoming homogeneous but rather that a distinctive ‘system’ of European international relations, which includes both the European and the national level (Hill, 1993, pp. 322–323; White, 2001) has emerged.
Under this understanding of the foreign policymaking arrangements within the EU and between the EU and its Member States, the CFSP and the CSDP provide a framework for co-ordinating national foreign policies and producing common policies rather than for harnessing the collective power potential of its component parts. The success of European foreign policy through the CFSP is thereby to be read as evolution from an original character of consultation among Member States to the development of a ‘co-ordination reflex’ (De Schoutheete, 1980). Constant reforms are thereby an integral part of the CFSP as the framework has been stretched to cover four times the original number of Member States. This has given the EU an increasing capacity to act collectively in certain areas and on given topics, including in military and civilian crisis management missions under the CSDP, but the process has neither been designed for nor does it facilitate the full mobilisation of Member State capabilities for collective endeavours. Consequently the EU's capacity for foreign policy and military power is less than the sum of its Member State parts.
Assessing Europe's global role
The EU's enlargement process and its aspirations to make a greater contribution to international security and development are grounds on which it can be argued that the EU has become a significant actor. Nevertheless, in terms of impact and influence, the EU's performance tends to be less impressive than might be expected. This article further explores this anomaly by examining how the EU interacts with partners collectively and bilaterally, and assessing the reasons why the EU often punches below its weight. It does so by considering the EU's engagement in multilateral institutions and its relations with other great powers, two key areas identified in the 2003 ESS in which the EU laid out its nascent global strategy.
The EU as a multilateral actor
The ESS emphasized that the EU's commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ has become a guiding idea for EU foreign policy. The EU works with and within a wide number of multilateral institutions, including the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and others.
There is some evidence to suggest that the EU operates as a comparatively successful actor at the multilateral level. When Member States are united in purpose, they can have a real impact in multilateral forums. The extent of EU policy co-ordination in the UN is impressive, for example, and the EU's role in the WTO strongly reflects its position as an economic giant. In both these cases the EU's structure does not significantly hinder the elaboration of a coherent policy, and Member States are generally united on key issues such as human rights and global trade.
The EU benefits in these forums from its practice of long-term co-operation and because of its experience. It capitalises both in the UN and the WTO on its ability to pre-negotiate, putting the onus on third parties to adapt their policies in line with EU wishes. Also, the EU's clout has arguably increased in the WTO as a result of the launch of the euro in early 1999. Nevertheless, the EU's influence in the WTO and the UN is very variable, especially in the latter case, where its performance varies considerably across different UN agencies and institutions.
Envisioning effective multilateralism as the best arrangement for the governance of international relations is a pragmatic strategy for the EU in the absence of many of the accoutrements of a great power. The EU, its institutions and Member States are all extensively involved in multilateral institutions. This includes Member State presence on the UNSC and in the G8 and G20. In addition the Member States collectively constitute a large bloc within the UN General Assembly and the WTO, and represent over 30 per cent of voting power within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see Young, 2010, in this issue, Table 2). Within the major European regional organisations of NATO, OSCE and the Council of Europe the EU Member States are the predominant grouping.
However, there is also no single EU multilateralism; the EU's presence within multilateral institutions is marked by a variety of different arrangements. For the EU there are a multitude of actors that operate under the jurisdiction of various EU treaties. The European Commission, for example, represents EU Member States in the WTO because economic policy is a competence delegated to the EU, yet the EU lacks collective representation on the UNSC. The recently ratified Treaty of Lisbon attempts to iron out these anomalies by bringing all EU external competences together under the notion of ‘External Action’ but does not eliminate the freedom for Member States to conduct their own national foreign policies or bring into question the membership arrangements for the key international institutions including the UNSC.
The EU's record in the multilateral context is therefore far from perfect. When Member States disagree, or are at cross-purposes, this can be a disaster for EU foreign policy. The reason why the EU's relationship with NATO is tense is because of the lack of Member State consensus on the development and the purpose of a fully autonomous EU military capability. Without a clear statement on EU military strategy and the use of force, the EU cannot stand side by side with NATO as an equal partner. This lack of strategy has also impacted negatively on the EU's relationship with the US. Similarly, when Member States disagree in the UNSC or the WTO, the EU can look weak and divided. A recurring theme in the EU's multilateral performance is confusion in the face of the growing power and influence of Russia and China. The EU can co-operate internally in the UN to great effect, but it struggles to exert the kind of external influence that this internal strength should reflect. The EU may be a key actor in the UN and the WTO, but it is not necessarily a leader. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, over 16 years after the inception of the CFSP, the EU still lacks the skills and the will to act effectively in the sphere of ‘high diplomacy’, the traditional reserve of the nation state.
The EU's bilateralism with ‘great powers’
This shortcoming in EU diplomacy is even more blatantly displayed in the EU's bilateral relationships. The EU's identification of ‘strategic partners’ in the ESS has focused EU attention on some of the most difficult global partners. Before turning to the problems, however, it is worth considering what the EU has achieved. All bilateral relations are marked by variations in duration, nature and depth. The notion of strategic partnerships is significant, however, in that it reflects EU global political ambitions, and is designed to complement and reinforce EU action at the multilateral level.
The EU's relationship with the US is perhaps its deepest bilateral partnership. The relationship suffered during President George W. Bush's administration (2000–08), but transatlantic co-operation remains crucial and is showing signs of improvement under President Barack Obama's administration (see Dumbrell, 2010, in this issue), with both the EU and the new US administration supporting multilateral solutions to global problems. The transatlantic relationship remains important, but in recent years the EU's relationships with the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China (commonly known by the acronym ‘BRICs’) have moved to centre stage. This follows the relative declines of the US and Europe in the face of the growing economic and political strength of new powers. The decline is not simply economic: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to the decline in political influence of the US in particular, and also the EU. The continuing instability in Afghanistan and Iraq points to the limitations of military power in establishing peace and addressing the global terrorist threat. The unilateral actions of the US, with the support of many European allies, have exacerbated divisions in the UNSC, and have also had a deleterious impact on the EU's bilateral relations with China and Russia in particular.
EU relations with Russia and China share a number of common themes: a lack of Member State consensus over the nature and scope of co-operation; a disconnect between Member State bilateral relations and EU bilateralism; and weak EU diplomacy in the face of powerful states espousing a fundamentally different world-view to that of the EU. The case of Russia is particularly problematic because the level of Member State disagreement precludes a common EU approach. The case of EU–Russia relations is one example in which enlargement has not strengthened the EU's hand. While the division regarding Russia is not simply a case of ‘old’ versus ‘new’ Member States, it is understandable that states previously under the yoke of the Soviet Union may have a different historical and geographical perspective on relations with Russia from that of Western states. The situation has been exacerbated by the growing political and economic strength of the Russian Federation, which has led to a more forceful stance in global affairs. The EU, rather than addressing the ramifications of history and the unexpected rise of the Russian state, has neglected the development of a coherent Russia strategy. The EU Member States’ differences over policy with China are less acute, but there are still damaging divergences on the question of how vigorously to press China on human rights and whether to lift the arms embargo imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. The lack of a true common EU policy towards either Russia or China opens the door for differing Member State bilateral deals and agreements. This tends to undermine further the quest for a consensus within the EU, as well as confirming international impressions that the EU is a weak diplomatic power. Moreover, the EU is clearly perplexed by the often unco-operative stance of these states at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. Yet these states will not pause in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives in order to allow the EU time to decide how to respond.
The EU's bilateral partnerships with Brazil and India have proceeded relatively successfully, but are at a very early stage of development. The EU's relationship with India has been cultivated only recently for two reasons. First, India has not been perceived as representing the same degree of competitiveness challenge to the EU as China and, consequently, has had a lower profile on the Brussels agenda. Second, relations with India have been ‘subcontracted’ to the UK as the former colonial power. Brazil is a recent ‘strategic partner’ of the EU and is particularly important as the largest economy in Latin America. Brazil's ‘world-view’ and foreign policy are conducive to a positive relationship with the EU (unlike in the case of China and Russia). Brazil is a key supporter of multilateralism in the South, and supports the reform of the UN to reflect better the contemporary balance of global power (see Sotero, 2010, in this issue). Additionally, President Lula da Silva's government (elected in 2002) supports EU efforts to tackle climate change, and the EU is, at least to some extent, viewed as a model for South American integration. However, while the EU and Brazil have much in common, with the notable exception of agricultural trade, there is less at stake in the partnership than in EU relations with other emerging powers.
Thus while the EU's role in the world has increased exponentially in the post-Cold War years, its influence and impact continue to be hindered by the complexity of the EU's presence at the international level, involving many institutions and actors. Significant shortcomings at both the multilateral and bilateral levels contribute to a failure to translate global reach into global influence.
The future EU in a shifting global balance of power
The Treaty of Lisbon contains some reforms to the EU's foreign policy apparatus that could contribute to forging a stronger global role for the EU. Of particular significance for the EU's global role is the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (or EU ‘Foreign Minister’); and the European External Action Service to support the work of the High Representative. The position of High Representative, as Vice-President of the European Commission, will have a foot in both the intergovernmental Council of the EU and the supranational European Commission. This innovation has the potential to resolve the institutional wrangling and competition that have characterised the making and implementation of European foreign policy since its inception. The first post-holder, Baroness Ashton, will also have a dedicated External Action Service to support her work, which will also include staff from the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, as well as seconded staff from Member States. This Brussels-based service in turn will operate EU ‘embassies’ across the world, which will replace Commission delegations and incorporate staff from EU civilian and military missions.
The potential for a more coherent and comprehensive external policy as a result of these reforms is clear: no more different messages coming from the Council and the Commission, no more confusing array of EU voices in third countries, and far more synergy and consistency at the policy-formation level. Important details relating to these new reforms, however, have still to be decided by Member States, and these details strike at the heart of divisions about the scope and nature of EU foreign policy, such as the institutional affiliations of the High Representative and the service and nature of EU external representation in third countries. Moreover, the External Action Service will not replace Member State embassies, meaning that the potential for different Member State foreign policy positions, and the infrastructure to support them, still exists.
Conclusion
There is much to commend in terms of the development of the EU's global role in recent years. During the 1990s the CFSP was criticised as being procedurally unwieldy, stifling the EU's ability to respond quickly to crises. The EU has now reformed its procedures to enable quick action in a crisis, as was demonstrated in the unified response to the Russian–Georgian conflict in August 2008. Furthermore, the EU has deployed an impressive number of civilian and military missions across the globe under the auspices of its CSDP, proving wrong the sceptics who doubted that the level of co-operation and organisation required for such deployments could ever be successfully executed at the EU level.
Nevertheless, despite achievements that were unthinkable in the early post-Cold War years, the EU fails to punch its true weight and to capitalise on its strengths. Why is this still the case? First, the EU's impact and influence suffer from a lack of ‘joined-up’ global policy; multilateral objectives are not effectively pursued in bilateral partnerships, and vice versa. Greater synergy between the bilateral and multilateral levels would contribute to a more coherent and visible global role, allowing the EU to present a more decisive and coherent message to partners. A coherent global policy would also have to go some way towards addressing the inconsistencies in EU external policy that have led to a loss of support for (as well as faith in) the EU at the global level – particularly in the cases of trade and human rights policies.
Second, the EU needs to resolve Member State differences in order to improve its relations with the emerging powers. The EU is a much stronger player at both the multilateral and bilateral levels when it is united. It is no surprise that success at the UN and the WTO and with partners such as China comes when the EU has already reached a consensus among its members. Reasons for EU successes and failures in specific cases require further scrutiny, but clearly unity of purpose is a crucial factor. Working for greater consensus between Member States requires leadership and painstaking diplomacy, but is a prerequisite for strengthening the EU's global role. Once this first step is taken, Member States might put an end to bilateral agreements that do not follow the EU line, and the EU will have the confidence to punch its weight alongside Russia, China and other global powers. The EU has potential, through the capabilities of its Member States, to be considered a candidate for great power status but does not envision itself as an active participant in forging a new global balance of power.
Footnotes
1
The recently ratified Lisbon Treaty reiterates the EU's commitment to ‘promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations’. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Official Journal of the European Union, C306, Volume 50.