Does Compulsion Cure Alienation? A Reply to Fischer

Can compulsion be part of the solution?

Officially, Clara Fischer claims not to be taking sides on the merits of compulsory voting. She insists that ‘compulsory voting need not be a matter of pro or con, but that an accommodation of the valid concerns on both sides can be broached by making voting a legal requirement, while simultaneously supplementing the shortcomings of compulsory voting through more thoroughgoing measures of reform’ (Fischer, 2011, p. 37). Thus, ‘mandatory voting becomes part of a multi-pronged approach to tackling the exclusion of alienated citizens’ (Fischer, 2011, p. 40).

To advocate compulsory voting along with other measures is still, though, to advocate it. The issue between supporters and opponents of compulsory voting is not about the desirability of other measures to increase turnout or tackle social exclusion, but about whether the coercion involved in mandatory voting is either legitimate or helpful. In other words, the debate is about whether compulsory voting should be part of the solution at all, or rejected in favour of alternative remedies.

Admittedly, the main point of my article was to question the need for any solution, by casting doubt on the widespread assumption that there is necessarily a problem associated with low levels of turnout. This does not, however, commit me to denying that alienation – if it does exist – is undesirable. As Fischer characterises my argument, it is that ‘politically alienated citizens must not have an interest in, or understand politics, and with nothing at stake, should remain absent from the polling stations’ (Fischer, 2011, p. 37). I did not, however, say that all of those who abstain have no business voting. Rather, my point was simply that there may well be some who have good reasons for not voting and thus we have no reason to force them to do so. This is consistent with thinking that alienation may be a problem, but my response to that was that coercion is unlikely to cure it (Saunders, 2010a, p. 71).

The focus of my discussion was on groups that are not systematically alienated. I argued that higher turnout among some groups than others may simply reflect that members of the former group feel more strongly about a particular issue and thus that there is a plausible democratic case for saying that they ought to have more influence over it. Thus, even if Arend Lijphart (1997, p. 7) is right to liken unequal turnout to weighted voting, that does not establish that it is a bad thing (Saunders, 2010a, pp. 72–73).

Unequal voting is not exclusion

I do not, contrary to what Fischer, (2011, pp. 3–4) suggests, argue for giving some people more votes than others, though I cited some others who do (e.g. Brighouse and Fleurbaey, 2010). Fischer's quotation of my remarks on differential votes (Fischer, 2011, p. 38, citing Saunders, 2010a, p. 72) excludes the crucial reference to symbolic value. My point was merely the much more modest one that democracy does not demand strict equality and so is not obviously undermined by differential rates of turnout.

There is a big difference between some having more influential votes than others and some having no votes at all. It does not follow, as Fischer concludes, that we ‘might as well just hand over the reins of political rule to the privileged few, as equality of votes, and by proxy, votes for the masses are irrelevant’ (Fischer, 2011, p. 38). She claims that, in national elections, ‘to restrict or to weight votes … amounts to disenfranchisement and is clearly undemocratic’ ((Fischer, 2011, p. 39), but it seems to me that there is a clear difference between these two.

Democracy is about rule by the people, so if some of those people do not have votes then that is indeed undemocratic. Conversely, that some people's votes are less weighty does not mean that they are disenfranchised. It may indeed be a bad thing, for it might be that the best form of democracy is an egalitarian one, but I do not see how it follows from the minimal meaning of democracy – rule by the people – that all must have equal influence.

We accept that, where there is disagreement over outcomes, some will get their way and others will not. Giving people equal votes is merely a way of giving them the opportunity to get their way (Saunders, 2010a, p. 75). If all we are giving people is the opportunity to influence outcomes, then their enfranchisement ought to suffice – we need not ensure that they actually exercise their right to vote. At least, I see no reason why we ought to think that their voting matters, without then concluding that we need to make sure that outcomes are actually affected by each vote cast. I have argued elsewhere that ensuring the opportunity to influence political outcomes may require electoral reform (Saunders, 2009a). Perhaps the present first-past-the-post electoral system in the UK, by making so many votes inconsequential, is largely responsible for low turnout. If this is the case, however, then forcing people to cast meaningless votes is even more objectionable. The solution to this problem is electoral reform.

Freedom to vote or not

Fischer rightly highlights that there are difficulties in determining who is affected by any given decision and to what extent. It would thus be extremely hard for the state to determine who should and should not get a vote on these lines. It should be noted, firstly, that such determinations are made quite regularly in setting the franchise, usually on grounds of locality. Unless Fischer wants to say that any democratic decision must be truly universal – on a global scale – then she must accept that we are indeed able to draw some boundaries.

Of course, geographic residence is a poor proxy for who is actually affected. This is why some have questioned the reliance on territorial boundaries and argued that the demos ought to be defined on some other, allegedly more relevant, grounds (e.g. Beckman, 2009; Goodin, 2007). It is here that Fischer's criticism bites, but I entirely agree with her. It would be exceedingly difficult for the state to distinguish who is and who is not affected to a sufficient degree. But this is why I favour the liberal solution – enfranchise everyone and then leave it up to the individuals enfranchised to decide for themselves whether or not to vote, depending on whether they perceive that their interests are at stake.

It may be that the franchise is too narrow, in which case we will have to rely on those who have a vote to consider the interests of those excluded (Goodin, 2000). But it may also be that we have drawn the franchise too broadly, in which case we should expect that some will choose to abstain and this is actually a democratic virtue – leaving the decision to those who are really affected. My point was, thus, that there might be perfectly good reasons for some of those enfranchised not to exercise their votes (Saunders, 2010a, p. 74).

Socio-economic disadvantage

Fischer (2011, p. 39) attributes to me the position that there is ‘nothing wrong with low voter turnout, despite its linkages to socio-economic disadvantage’, but this is to conflate non-voting – which need not be a problem – with socio-economic disadvantage – which is. If it is true that non-voting exacerbates socio-economic disadvantage then there is indeed something problematic about it, but only in so far as it has these effects. The issue, then, is one of socio-economic justice, not democracy. It should be possible to tackle socio-economic disadvantage without forcing everyone to vote and, indeed, I am sceptical whether compulsory voting would really do much to help combat such disadvantage (Saunders, 2010a, p. 71).

It seems that Fischer too is unconvinced that compulsory voting is sufficient to combat social exclusion and disadvantage. Hence, she endorses a model of inclusive deliberative democracy, proposed by Iris Marion Young. There is a significant difference, though, between voting and participating in more intensive deliberation. Maybe the latter can indeed contribute to tackling social exclusion and we should explore various proposals, such as holding a national ‘deliberation day’ prior to elections (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2002).

Even here, however, there is the issue of whether or not participation in such schemes should be compulsory. This is not addressed by the literature on compulsory voting, since the benefits and costs of such participation differ from those of merely voting. Although I cannot argue it here, I would suggest that – while universal participation in deliberation is probably a more worthwhile goal than universal turnout – forced participation is unlikely to achieve significant benefits. I think it probably better to offer people incentives to take part (Saunders, 2009b), rather than to coerce them. This also seems to be the opinion of Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin (2002, pp. 133–140).

This, however, is strictly beside the point if our focus is on whether voting should be compulsory. Fischer thinks that such a measure can be part of a multi-pronged solution to social disadvantage. I am all for tackling problems of social deprivation and exclusion, but see no reason to think that mandatory voting will contribute anything towards solving them. A multi-pronged strategy is doubtless necessary, but the case still needs to be made that compulsory voting should be part of it.