Employment,Individualization and Insecurity: Rethinking the Risk Society Perspective

Introduction

Ulrich Beck, the ‘zeitgeist sociologist’, ¹ has been hailed as one of the most significant sociological thinkers of the age (see Adam et al., 2000; Boyne, 2003; Bronner, 1995). Beck's work has made a sizeable impression on the social sciences, stimulating an eruption of interest in the concept of risk (Caplan, 2000; Lupton, 1999a; Mythen, 2004). To date, the risk society perspective has been deployed for a spectrum of purposes, from tracing the social construction of childhood (Jackson and Scott, 1999) to analysing global futures trading (Boden, 2000). Notably, curiosity has been stirred within the sociology of labour, leading to the emergence of a series of articles probing the explanatory possibilities of theories of risk. Thus far, the risk society perspective has been applied to the demise of the youth labour market (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997), the content of employment policy (Perrons, 2000), the experiences of professional freelance workers (Ekinsmyth, 1999) and manual employment within local authorities (Reimer, 1998). In response to the growing interest in risk as a resource for understanding contemporary labour patterns, Beck has recently refined and extended his analysis. Building upon the interrelationship between employment and risk established in Risk Society (1992), The Brave New World of Work (2000a) ² singles out labour market change as a decisive factor in the development of uncertain and insecure forms of lived experience. Whilst there has been tentative consensus amongst reviewers about the general utility of the risk society perspective, a systematic examination of Beck's work has yet to appear. Bucking the trend of micro applications, this paper evaluates the overall efficacy of the risk society perspective as a mechanism for conceptualising contemporary patterns of employment.

The now well-recounted risk society thesis suggests that risk has become a pervasive and integral aspect of the modern condition. ³ For Beck, the penumbra of risk hovers over a cluster of social domains, including the family, personal relationships, education, employment and politics. Not only has risk become a recognisable feature of everyday experience, the mediation of high profile risk incidents has encouraged the public to challenge the authority of dominant institutions. ⁴ The ‘socially explosive’ quality of contemporary threats leads Beck to contend that there has been a fundamental shift in the nature and meaning of risk. In previous epochs, so-called ‘natural hazards’ – such as earthquakes, famine and floods – blighted human existence around the globe. In contemporary Western society, the destructive force of natural hazards has largely been suppressed by human intervention. However, paradoxically, the application of technology has also created an assortment of ‘manufactured risks’, such as nuclear accidents, mass pollution and endemic unemployment. Although exposure to danger is clearly not a new phenomenon, Beck wishes to differentiate between the characteristics of these two paradigmatic forms. In a nutshell, natural hazards are localized, open to regulation and attributable to the forces of nature. In contrast, manufactured risks are anthropogenic, incalculable and unconstrained by boundaries of time and space. Putting aside the evident limitations of this binary categorization, ⁵ Beck maintains that the unmanageability of contemporary threats questions the validity of risk-regulating institutions. As manufactured risks flourish, national governments, welfare systems and legal structures lose their ability to limit and control danger. In essence, the burden of risk migrates from the jurisdiction of institutions to the individualized sphere of personal decision-making. These underlying transitions in the nature and the experience of risk encourage Beck to beckon in ‘a new mode of societalization, a kind of “etamorphosis” or “categorical shift” in relation to the individual and society’ (Beck, 1992: 127). In the risk society approach, rapid labour market fluctuations and the de-standardization of employment relations serve as archetypal examples of the ‘categorical shift’ in social experience. In both Risk Society (1992: 139) and The Brave New World of Work (2000a), Beck discusses transformations in employment relations with reference to the intersecting processes of individualization and risk distribution. ⁶ The first process of individualization involves the negotiation of personalized life-paths which are increasingly reliant on individual decision-making and self-reflexivity (Beck, 2000a: 53). The second process runs along the axis of risk distribution, indicating a gradual transformation in the logic of social allocation (Beck, 1992: 87). For Beck, the articulation of individualization and risk distribution generates a nascent ‘risk regime’ of employment.

Unpacking the risk regime

In delineating the contours of the risk regime, Beck identifies a raft of employment policies and practices that have produced generalised patterns of insecurity. In particular, the risk society perspective accentuates the impacts of flexibility and labour market segmentation on employment experiences. Following the seminal contribution of Piore and Sabel (1984), Beck concurs that fluctuations in the global economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s demanded a more mobile and flexible workforce (Beck, 1992: 215; 1999: 12). A range of macro processes are said to have stimulated the development of flexibility, including the globalization of production, the figuration of a new international division of labour, labour market deregulation and a reformulated financial order. However, rather than dwelling on the evolution of flexibility, Beck seeks instead to unravel the cloak of risk which surrounds the flexibilization of employment.

Insofar as Beck acknowledges the multi-dimensionality of the ‘flexibility package’ (Allen and Henry, 1997: 181), he accords primacy to the flexibilization of labour markets, employment contracts and modes of production. It is argued that the emergence of an intensely competitive global market in the 1980s promoted organisational and technological changes, typified by the appearance of various strands of flexible specialization. Aligning himself with André Gorz (1982; 2000), Beck believes that the infusion of automated and computerised production methods has engendered contractual insecurity and dwindling employment opportunities:

The drift towards non-standard, insecure forms of work is exemplified by the plight of a growing band of ‘neither-nors’: individuals who are neither unemployed, nor in possession of a stable and secure source of income. Situating workplace change within a wider culture of risk, Beck contends that computerisation and the casualization of contracts have resulted in employees being forced to work additional or shorter hours as and when required. In addition to reformatting the temporal structure of work, flexibilization has produced tangible cost benefits for employers. The decline of collective bargaining and the utilisation of freelance, temporary and part-time staff has allowed various employment costs to be transferred from employers to individual workers. For example, sick pay, training and pension provisions have progressively become the responsibility of the flexible employee, rather than the employer and/or the state (Beck, 2000a: 53). Beck avers that the drift toward flexibility signals a radical departure from established patterns of employment and demands a new mode of configuring labour relations.

Of course, the suggestion of a radical rupture in employment patterns is not peculiar to Beck. Various forerunning theories, such as ‘the knowledge society’ (Bell, 1973), ‘post-industrialism’ (Gorz, 1982; 2000) and ‘post-Fordism’ (Aglietta, 1979) have sought to capture fundamental transitions in the nature of work. Although the risk society perspective overlaps with such models of change, ⁷ Beck's project is also distinctive. Insofar as the driving forces of change for his predecessors were the spread of globalization, the information and communications revolution and increased automation, Beck insists that contemporary employment transformations are best unlocked using the master key of risk.

Individualization at work

Theoretically speaking, the movement from a Fordist to a risk regime is underpinned by the diversification of individualization and the changing dynamics of risk distribution. In the risk society thesis, these two processes are locked into a symbiotic relationship. Nonetheless, for definitional purposes, it is worth unpacking each independently, prior to forging an integrated analysis. Individualization is depicted as a multifaceted process which underscores transformations in personal relationships, family structure, education and employment (Beck, 1992: 127; 1998: 169). The general thrust of the theory of individualization is that ‘given’ forms of collective identity have been eroded and are being supplanted by more ‘open’ practices of personal choice and reflexivity. Under the risk regime, rather than life trajectories being governed by the ties of family, class, ethnicity and gender, ‘do-it-yourself’ biographies become the prevalent form of cultural determination (Beck, 1994: 15). Despite promising greater scope for creativity and choice, individualization also presents tangible dilemmas. As individuals become untied from the certainties of collective structures, everyday life becomes contingent on an infinite process of personal decision-making: ‘all too swiftly the “elective”, “reflexive” or “do-it-yourself” biography can become the breakdown biography’ (Beck, 1999: 12). Beck believes that the deluge of employment-related risks and opportunities ushered in by the risk regime are sluiced through the channels of individualization. The increased mobility of people, capital, labour and information has loosened the cohesiveness of collective support networks and intensified the pressures of personal decision-making. While the risk regime fetches up a surfeit of employment choices, these choices are fixed within a wider context of insecurity and uncertainty (Beck, 2000a: 72). In Risk Society (1992), individualization is connected to work with reference to three evolving trends: the intensification of competition and mobility, greater stress on personal education and a decline in collective structures. In response to the needs of a differentiated labour market, schools and colleges have pluralized subject choices and exit points in the last two decades. During the same period, the labour market has become an increasingly hostile and competitive site, encouraging ‘job-seekers’ to advertise their qualifications and to become accustomed to bouts of periodic modification and reinvention. Under the risk regime, job evaluation, re-training and career changes become less like options and more like necessities. The flexibility and mobility demanded by the risk regime has served to undercut the stability of local networks and structures. The transition from collective, local employment to varied and specialised forms is a vital component of the individualization process (Beck, 1998: 43). The majority of employees no longer labour on production lines with well defined hierarchies and the formation of collective work-based ties has been further dislocated by flexible employment patterns and decentralised working sites. Given that entry into the labour market no longer takes place en masse in a collective of associates or classes, work now dissolves as well as creates structural networks. Consequently, taken for granted assumptions about employment, family responsibilities and local relationships are thrown into flux, as the labour market operates as a catalyst for individualization:

From class to risk: a changing logic of distribution?

In permeating analogous spheres of cultural experience, the individualization process intertwines with changing patterns of social distribution. ⁸ The risk regime is characterised by the intensification of individualization and the generalisation of patterns of risk distribution. Beck casts the Fordist era as an epoch of wealth distribution, in which overarching economic and political interests revolved around the distribution of ‘social goods’. Thus, the institutional structures associated with Fordism were geared towards distributing the ‘cake’ of material benefits, such as full-time employment, social security and healthcare facilities. Under Fordism, political conflicts still surfaced between those enjoying a fulsome slice of the cake, those with moderate pieces and those making do with the crumbs. Nonetheless, despite obvious disparities between cake-holders, the overarching purpose of the Fordist system was to eliminate scarcity by producing sufficient goods to meet the collective needs of society. Hence, the central dynamic – or logic – of the Fordist regime revolved around the concept of class. Beck reasons that the distributional patterns of the class society were noticeably interrupted in the 1970s, when the distribution of social goods became augmented by a cachet of social bads, such as endemic unemployment, mass pollution and nuclear hazards. Underlying the division between goods and bads is a rudimentary distinction between social priorities under the two modes of organisation: class societies are bound up with issues of scarcity, risk societies are preoccupied with the problem of insecurity (Beck, 1992: 49).

In the risk society perspective, labour market insecurity is emblematic of a new fleet of risks which undermine social structures and threaten established cultural practices. The most obvious manifestation of employment risk is the social diversification of joblessness. With the emergence of cyclical global recessions, unemployment and job insecurity no longer blight only the poorest and least academically qualified groups in society. In times of economic uncertainty, labour market fluctuations universalise the threat of redundancy: ‘you can run into anyone down at the unemployment office’ (Beck, 1998: 55). Not only does employment insecurity undercut established class and gender divides, the new logic of risk produces a circular motion of ‘boomerang effects’, as risks return to haunt their original generators. For example, highstatus business elites well schooled in dispensing with labour, themselves become dispensable. In this way, the sectoral effects of the class society are juxtaposed with the universalising effects of the risk society: ‘poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic’ (Beck, 1992: 36). The social diffusion of unemployment, combined with the flexibilization and casualization of labour, leads Beck to postulate that the traditional logic of the wealth distributing society is being replaced by a burgeoning logic of risk. In the risk society, new inequalities and unions emerge as ‘class positions’ become superseded by ‘risk positions’. As risk and insecurity become routine features of the employment system, the distributive motor of the class society misfires, leading to widespread uncertainty. The relative rise in cross-class unemployment in Europe leads Beck to the apocalyptic conclusion that post-industrial nations are headed towards ‘capitalism without work’:

Individualization revisited

Without doubt, Beck's argument speaks to us at the level of everyday experience. For many in the West, work is perceived as a site of instability, risk and insecurity. The uncertainties associated with short-term contracts, temporary work and self-employment have become the ‘stuff of life’ in contemporary Western society. However, whilst such asseverations may strike a cultural chord, they do not necessarily attest to the ‘radical rupture’ narrated in the risk society perspective. Having outlined the kernel of Beck's thesis, I now wish to critically examine the pervasiveness of employment-related individualization and, latterly, the theory of distributional logic. As noted previously, educational diversification, labour market competition and dissolving collective structures are identified as the drivers of individualization. With reference to contemporary Britain, evidence can be marshalled to support Beck's case in each of these areas. Firstly, the education system does appear to have opened up a more variable set of exit routes for young people. In the 1980s and 1990s, the transition from school to work diversified considerably via the expansion of post-compulsory education, apprenticeships and training schemes (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997: 13). Secondly, academic and vocational qualifications have become increasingly valuable – if not obligatory – commodities for the contemporary employee (Gangl, 2002; Goldthorpe, 2003). In contemporary Europe, increasing cultural emphasis is placed on self-improvement via educational choice, individualizing responsibility for success or failure (de Witte and Steijn, 2000: 248). Patterns of flexible working have also served to stimulate competition within the labour market, demanding a broad ‘skills-set’ and encouraging ‘self-development’ through training courses and vocational qualifications. In the last two decades, the linking up of economic infrastructures and the growth of global competition have spawned more aggressive employment markets in the West, which, in turn, have encouraged more concentrated forms of self promotion and surveillance. In accordance with Beck's outlook, these undercurrents do seem to indicate that workers have become individually accountable for their actions in the labour market and are assuming greater responsibility for the management of uncertainty. Furthermore, it is fair to say that employment-related risks have been individualized to the extent that people are encouraged to perceive structural inequalities as personal shortcomings. Thirdly, it is probable that class-specific paths from school to work have become increasingly open-ended. In contemporary Britain, large group transitions from mass education to standardised Fordist workplaces have all but disintegrated, with young people making the leap into a heterogeneous as opposed to an undifferentiated labour market (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997: 38). In the thirty-year period between 1950 and 1980, transitions from education to work were more distinct and predictable than in present times. Since the 1980s, a plurality of options have availed themselves, undermining standardised career routes and encouraging personal reflection and choice. Emphasis on personal planning – allied to the diversification of avenues into employment – may have fostered the illusion of uniqueness and individuality, rather than encouraging collective aspirations and motivations (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997: 7; Roberts, 1995). Certainly, pathways into work are no longer rigidly determined by class, gender or familial proximity and the transfer from school to work has become multifarious. As a result of labour market de-regulation, globalization and flexibilization, many people have become susceptible to the unsettling forces of mobility, competition and risk (Giddens, 1990: 23; Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 70). These spatial and temporal transitions have had a transformative effect on cultural experience, ‘chopping up’ the structure of family, work and community life.

In agreement with Beck, a rudimentary review of contemporary employment relations points towards an interrelationship between patterns of work and individualization. Nevertheless, if we scratch beneath the surface, it becomes evident that the risk society thesis offers a rather equivocal understanding of both the nature and the effects of the individualization process. Whilst we might reasonably concur that individualization is multivalent and courses through a matrix of institutions, the amorphous description of the process problematizes the collection of reliable data and the formulation of robust theoretical assumptions. At a superficial level, evidence can be garnered to support the permeation of patterns of individualization. It would appear that education and employment are vital engines of individualized experience. What is more, identity construction in Western cultures is undoubtedly a more demanding and discrete experience than it was in the ‘golden age’ of Fordism. However, given the extensive boundaries of definition, it should hardly surprise us that affirmative evidence can be turned up. In the risk society thesis, individualization is constituted by a rise in lifestyle choices; the fragmentation of cultural experience; a proliferation of social risks; greater personal responsibility and accountability; the undermining of class identities; social disembedding and the development of diverse and reflexive life paths. Of course, such definitional imprecision might well reflect the polymorphous nature of the process. However, it also raises the thorny issue of sociological proof. It may be difficult to falsify the diffusion of the individualization process, but – by the same token – it is equally difficult to ‘prove’.

Unfortunately, the imprecise usage of individualization in the risk society thesis leads to difficulties in calibrating the extent and the effects of individualization. Although Beck does make attempts to theoretically deconstruct individualization, individualized experiences are still tacitly assumed at the empirical level. Thus, the issue of how important individualized experiences are in relation to collective experiences remains an untapped area of inquiry. In particular, Beck is conspicuously mute about expressions of work related solidarity. It must be remembered that new forms of collectivism have emerged as a response to job insecurity and the fragmentation of formal paid employment (Aldridge et al., 2001: 571). Opposition to the individualising effects of the labour process is currently being expressed in various micro struggles around the globe. Both the growth in social movement unionism in newly industrialising countries and the rise in international collaboration between trade unions suggest that collectivist activities and practices are set to retain social purchase (Moody, 1997). The risk society perspective also fails to account for collective working activities undertaken outside the formal sphere. In recent years cashless trading networks have flourished, providing opportunities for those excluded from paid employment. In Britain there has been a notable rise in the number of Local Exchange Trading Schemes (LETS), from just 5 in 1991 to over 303 by 2000 (Aldridge et al., 2001: 566). Empirical research suggests that participation in such schemes can serve to re-build work identities, widen social networks and foster collectivism within communities (Aldridge et al., 2001: 570; Seyfang, 2001: 581). Given Beck's lack of attention to expressions of collectivism, an important question mark lingers over the social significance of individualization. While the risk society perspective suggests that the process radically alters the structure of society, it must be remembered that the development of modernity has been characterised by a variety of forms of social differentiation. ⁹ This qualification brings to the surface questions of continuity which question the speciality of the individualization process. Are we currently witnessing a fundamental social transformation, or are current forms of individualization the continuation of a process that is centuries long? The risk society approach casts individualization – and risk generally – as extraordinary and novel cultural phenomena, which fundamentally alter human behaviour and lay-expert interactions. However, both individualization and risk have embedded histories and are organic processes.

A second significant shortcoming in Beck's argument stems from his tendency to cite anecdotal examples in support of general arguments. In reflecting upon the circumstances supposedly unique to the risk society, one can propound a range of counter examples which question the haecceity of contemporary patterns of individualization. In assessing the extent of individualization, we need to be sensitive to experiences of cultural continuity, as well as change. By presenting a decidedly selective batch of cases, Beck overlooks the cohesiveness of social structures and flattens the complexities of social reproduction. For instance, in Risk Society (1992), the parameters of individualization are characteristically overstated:

Even allowing for Beck's hyperbolic style, such sweeping claims only serve to gloss over evident continuities in social reproduction in Western cultures. To argue that class and the nuclear family are losing relative cohesion as agents of socialisation is one thing. It is quite another to suggest that these structures are being replaced by ‘secondary agencies’. In a period of rapid social change, cross-cultural research continues to indicate that life biographies remain strongly influenced by gender, class, age and nationality (see Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 133). Adding weight to this point, recent ethnographic studies have stressed the significance of age and gender in shaping the social experience of individualization (Mitchell et al., 2001: 231). Thus, it would seem that a more relational approach is required to establish the flows and connections between the feeders of identity and cultural experience. Rather than supplanting social structures, individualization nestles into existing hierarchies and bleeds into multi-source biographies (Savage, 2000: 118). Contra Beck, it is likely that the range, intensity and quality of individualization will be mediated by embedded forms of stratification. Different social groups are destined to encounter contrasting employment and life experiences, with insecurity and risk being concentrated amongst the lowest paid, least educated tranches. In the risk society narrative, everyone seems destined to share a similarly individualized experience. However, whilst the process of individualization may be universal, experience of this process will be heterogeneous. Unfortunately, these crucial qualifications are not adequately acknowledged by Beck, who skims over cultural, historical and regional differences (Ekinsmyth, 1999: 354). In his desire to depict individualization as a blanket development, Beck elides that the extent and degree of exposure to individualization will be coupled to space and place. Although the risk society thesis makes reference to the global reach of individualization, its tentacles rarely extend beyond Germany, Britain and the United States. This is a significant oversight, given that the macro relationship between employment and individualization can only be properly evaluated across a range of geographical, social and economic contexts.

At present, variations between national and regional employment systems suggest that individualization is a variegated rather than a homogeneous process. Employment and welfare systems across Europe provide dissimilar degrees of regulation and protection against labour market insecurity (Gangl, 2002). This rider hastens the need for a more sophisticated cross-cultural approach, which places greater emphasis on the gamut of cultural experiences generated by the spread of individualization. In part, the process of individualization is invested with ‘riskiness’ through the interpretations of social actors, who are themselves rooted in situated environments. In order to meaningfully assess risk, subjects have – however sketchily – to locate their place within social hierarchies through the process of cultural differentiation (see Savage, 2000: 105). In this way, both perception and experience of risk/individualization will be vectored through socio-economic status, geographical location and cultivated values and beliefs. As it stands, the risk society perspective imputes meaning to cultural agency on the basis of a set of nebulous structural shifts, rather than through rigorous empirical substantiation. Of course, this translates as something of a ‘hermeneutic leap’ from macro processes to assumed subjective experience (Mythen, 2004: 146). As Hall (1997: 3) reminds us, only people can give meaning to objects, events and processes. To factor in the missing experiential angles, it is vital that research is oriented toward exploring the ways in which lay actors understand, negotiate and deal with individualization on a routine day to day basis (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 11).

The distribution of risk: logical continuities

In reviewing the empirical evidence, it seems likely that an increase in patterns of flexible working has intensified the degree of risk involved in acquiring and maintaining employment. As has been noted, in modern society, employees are required to be adaptable and receptive to change in a fluctuating labour market. In support of the risk society perspective, flexibilization has eaten away at standardized full-time contracts and facilitated the diversification of employment practices. In Britain, over six million people are currently employed on a part-time basis, with self-employment becoming an entrenched trend. ¹⁰ Although predominantly located within manual and service industries, ‘self-employment’ has also seeped into the professions, with employment agencies supplying lecturers, accountants, and computer analysts on demand. Again, at a surface level we can agree with Beck's line of reasoning. It is probable that employment risks are impacting upon a wider section of society than in previous eras. However, from this axiom, Beck superinduces that risk and insecurity are becoming universal features of employment. It is at this deeper structural level that the risk society thesis comes unstuck. Essentially, the crux of the matter revolves around whether there has been a discernible shift from a sectoral logic of class to a universal logic of risk. Of course, this question can be broached in any number of ways. If we approach the issue with reference to ‘objective’ empirical criteria, the logic of class demonstrates remarkable continuity (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2003; Mackintosh and Mooney, 2004: 93). Despite being aware of the resilience of economic inequalities (1992: 35), Beck is adamant that risk positions are steadily supplanting class positions as principal markers of identity and experience. Granted, at a ‘subjective’ level class may well be losing its purchase as a social glue that binds individuals and communities together (see Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Saunders, 1984). ¹¹ Yet while class identities may be receding, class location remains a key determinant of employment opportunities, and, at a broader level, life chances (Nolan and Whelan, 1999). Since the diffusion of employment risk is strikingly uneven, labour market insecurity is universal in a strictly hypothetical sense. Whilst it may be possible to ‘run into anyone down at the unemployment office’, in reality, it is the most impoverished, least qualified members of society that remain routinely dependent on social security. Class position remains a fundamental indicator of vulnerability to unemployment (see Gallie et al., 1998; Goldthorpe, 2002). Bluntly put, the critical issue is not one of risk perception, but risk impact. In a changeable economic climate, we may all sense labour market insecurity, but it does not sequentially follow that we will share the consequences. Indeed, in Britain, empirical evidence suggests that the socio-economic divide is expanding, rather than contracting:

In relation to the distribution of employment risks, there are growing not lessening divides between work-rich and work-poor households. By the turn of the millennium, over 44% of lone parent households in the UK were without formal paid employment (Labour Force Survey, 2000). The labour market may ostensibly be viewed as a site of general insecurity, but the diversification of uncertainty has not equalized employment experiences at a structural level. In spite of the seductive quality of the ‘boomerang effects’ argument, the ongoing union between social class and employment prospects serves to denude Beck's case. Unskilled labourers in manual or routine non-manual forms of employment remain more exposed to recurrent and long-term employment and are less likely to profit during periods of economic growth (Goldthorpe, 2002: 4). Extending this critique, employment breaks remain firmly fixed to traditional forms of stratification. Across Europe, the economic activity rate for women is below 60%, as compared to 78% for men (Labour Market Trends, 2001a). Meanwhile, gender divides between the sexes continue to be reproduced through unequal pay, status and conditions (Emslie et al., 1999; O'Campo et al., 2004; Russell and O'Connell, 2001: 4). ¹² In some Southern European countries, such as Italy and Spain, less than half of the female population are engaged in formal paid employment (Social Trends, 2001). Along the lines of ethnicity, the unemployment rate for men from minority groups in the UK is double that of the White population, with Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean males remaining significantly over-represented in unemployment statistics (Labour Market Trends, 2002; Perrons, 2000: 291). In relation to age, those entering the labour market for the first time will bear the heaviest burden of employment risk. Just under a quarter of 16–17 year old males are currently unemployed in the United Kingdom (Labour Market Trends, 2004). Therefore, although the world of work can legitimately be depicted as an area associated with feelings of uncertainty, actual employment opportunities remain encased within traditional layers of stratification. It is not so much that Beck is unwilling to acknowledge that class, gender, age and ethnicity condition life chances (see 1992: 92–97), but due appreciation of the social significance of these lines of stratification is reduced to fit the universalising arc of the risk society sweep. In stark contrast to the totalising bent of the risk society narrative, changes in the dynamic between capital and labour have not significantly altered patterns of risk distribution. Disadvantaged social groups experience higher levels of unemployment, are more likely to constitute peripheral workforces and habitually live under the spectre of job insecurity. Regrettably, the theory of distributional logic does not adequately discriminate between different levels of risk impact. The ‘boomerang effect’ implies that affluent risk disseminators are ineluctably hoist by their own petards. This argument may hold some water, but is prone to leakage under examination. For example, in the late 1990s, financial speculators in New York, Tokyo and London over invested in industries in developing countries, stirring vulnerabilities in the global market. The ploughing of vast sums of money into emerging markets was a contributory factor in the Wall Street crash in 1998, which resulted in traders and shareholders getting their fingers burnt. On paper, this example may be scripted as a classic boomerang situation. Yet the effects felt by investors in the West were far less severe than those experienced by low paid workers in Asia and Central America, whose only means of survival was withdrawn as a knock on consequence of MNCs tightening their belts (Hinchcliffe, 2004: 129). The boomerang effect may bruise some, but it will administer knock out blows to others. If, as the evidence suggests, risks invariably track the tramlines of poverty and disadvantage, then we have to question quite how radical the rupture described by Beck actually is.

In refuting the movement between distributional logics, we are alerted to a further flaw in the risk society argument. At a methodological level, Beck's insistence on a pervading logic of insecurity encourages him to view employment relations exclusively through the monocular of risk (Rose, 2000: 64). This blinkered approach generates both empirical and theoretical deficiencies. Empirically, the risk society thesis treats employment insecurity as a given, rather than a subject worthy of critical investigation. Beck's assumption that long-term stable employment is a relic of the past is not conclusively born out by empirical research. As a case in point, Doogan (2001) uses EUROSTAT data to demonstrate that average job tenure in Britain remained relatively constant between 1992 and 1999, with long-term employment showing a significant increase from 7.4 million in 1992, to 9 million in 1999. Therefore, in Britain at least, the general trend toward downsizing in the 1990s took place alongside an extension of long-term employment. More revealingly, rises in long-term employment occurred almost exclusively amongst those over thirty (Doogan, 2001: 428). These findings again point towards the reproduction of sectoral patterns of exclusion, rather than the emergence of a universalising logic of risk. A fortunate group of employees remain insulated against risk, whilst the unlucky numbers find themselves episodically out in the cold. From a theoretical point of view, the distinction between class and risk positions is far from drum tight. At best, the risk society thesis makes an unclean separation between class and risk effects. At worst, Beck's presentation of distributional logics is internally inconsistent, with his vista obscured by an unrelenting fixation with risk. Devilishly twisting the oft-cited maxim, Scott matches up the social effects of each logic:

In practice, quite where the logic of class ends and the logic of risk begins is difficult to determine. Indeed, at times Beck seems uncertain about the degree of divergence between the two logics, tempering his argument with reference to an intermediate phase between class and risk society, in which ‘class specific risks’ brush up against the universal dangers of the risk society proper (Beck, 1992: 20). The pliability of this historical narrative does permit a theoretical sleight of hand, but it leaves us in the dark about the material applicability of the risk society perspective. So long as the core claims being made remain insulated against empirical scrutiny, the layers of ambiguity and periodic back tracking are likely to be interpreted as tactics of evasion (Goldthorpe, 2002: 25; Smith et al., 1997).

The notion of a general distributional logic also disregards significant national and regional variations in employment structures and opportunities. Somewhat surprisingly, even intra-European differences are overlooked by Beck (see Allen and Henry, 1997: 184; Gallie, 2003). Denmark, for example, is one of the most affluent countries in the world, exporting a variety of quality goods worldwide. The country has a long history of tripartite corporatism with high levels of union density, currently covering over 80% of the workforce. Furthermore, high minimum wages, extensive union coverage and strong employment rights are embedded features of employment relations in Denmark (Scheuer, 1998: 155). Whilst flexible working methods and the effects of global recession have challenged the Danish model, Denmark has retained a comparatively stable labour market, with relatively low unemployment rates. In sharp contrast, the Spanish economy has historically been based on labour-intensive industry, with comparatively low use of technology, below average productivity and a lack of international competitiveness. In Spain, employment rights have traditionally been limited, welfare benefits streaky and unemployment rates high. Thus, even a cursory statistical comparison indicates significant disparities between levels of job security in the two countries. Around 6% of adults in Denmark are registered unemployed, compared with almost 12% in Spain (Labour Market Trends, 2004: 85). More tellingly, youth unemployment in Denmark hovers around 10%, compared with over 45% in Spain (Russell and O'Connell, 2001: 2). Evident variations in socio-economic conditions indicate that patterns of inequality and risk will differ according to space and place. Systems of employment regulation and labour market structures are the products of past histories, discrete strategies and government policies. These qualifications suggest that the diverse structural features of employment relations in Europe are productive of differential employment prospects which cannot be comfortably housed within the boundaries of a multi-purpose risk regime. ¹³

Rethinking the risk society perspective

Prior to concluding, it may be constructive to weigh up the overall costs and benefits of using the risk society thesis as a barometer of employment change. T o be fair, it is expectable that the kind of macro theory building which Beck is engaged in will produce gaps and fissures (Dingwall, 2002; Wales and Mythen, 2002). In all probability, the use of contrasting regimes is intended as a heuristic device, as opposed to a meticulous historical portrait. Treated as a snapshot of the modern world of work, Beck's argument has both functionality and appeal. It is likely that the velocity of employment flux has intensified over time and that the risks associated with work have become more unforeseeable and unpredictable. In many ways, the risk society thesis echoes the anxieties and insecurities which many people express about their employment experiences (Doogan, 2001: 421; Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 78). Beck's critical examination of workplace change also acts as a welcome antidote to overly optimistic accounts of flexibilization. In the last thirty years there has been a gradual shift in many sectors from standardized full-time employment to various non-standard, precarious forms of work. At a general level, legislation and governmental policy within Europe have assisted labour market deregulation and segmentation. Further, the processual erosion of workers rights has led to responsibility for employment risk being transported away from employers and toward employees.

In concordance with the risk society thesis, it is apparent that patterns of individualization are channelled through the labour market. More broadly, the theory of individualization is suggestive of the constant demands presented by the ‘planning project’ of everyday life (Lupton, 1999b: 67). Again, Beck's depiction of individualization chimes with our shared intuition that employment experiences are becoming more fragmented and erratic. This said, rather than being lumped together, the admixture of experiences, practices and encounters which embody individualization needs to be filtered and contextualized. To move the debate forward, we need to ascertain which facets of the process predominate, in which circumstances and amongst which groups. Here it has been argued that embedded layers of stratification will influence experiences of individualization, both inside and outside the workplace. It should be remembered that there is no sociological obligation to make an either/or choice between cohesive collective networks or individualized identities. Class consciousness is doubtless declining, but this should not be read off as evidence of unbridled individualization, nor the manifestation of footloose personal identities (Savage, 2000: 101). In filling the interstice between individualization as macro process and cultural experience, future studies must show sensitivity to continuities as well as disjunctions in social reproduction. Expressions of resistance and the proliferation of new forms of work-based collectivism should not be passed over for the sake of maintaining tidy theory. Evidence suggests that certain aspects of employment are becoming more individualized, but it is critical that the spread and impacts of this process are sensibly investigated. A broad programme of cross-cultural research is necessary to determine the ways in which individualization is experienced through the filters of class, age, gender and place.

As far as the second pillar of the risk regime is concerned, the application of the distributional logic to contemporary patterns of employment raises notable theoretical and methodological concerns. First, in slavishly relating his argument to risk, Beck overlooks the structural significance of conventional social formations. This tendency to focus on cultural practices through the monocular of risk, leads to an under emphasis on entrenched social structures. Secondly, continuities in the distribution of both ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ negate the idea of an equalising distributional process. Even when boomerang effects occur, the distribution of risk tends to reinforce rather than transform existing inequalities. What is required then, is a clearer demarcation between risk as perception and risk as a material force. Although the two entities are not comfortably decoupled, the risk society thesis simply conflates perception with exposure, setting in motion a distorted understanding of the relationship between work and risk. In the first instance, fear of unemployment is not necessarily congruous with the probability of job loss. Even in situations where people are confident about maintaining employment, the prospect of unemployment may still arouse concern (Doogan, 2001: 436). We all may worry about losing our jobs, but these worries will turn out to be more justifiable for some than others.

In practice, the unyielding reproduction of social divisions indicates that class, gender, age and ethnicity remain durable yardsticks of social opportunity (see Mythen, 2004: 135). What is more, fusions between different strata – for example, gender and class – may result in intensified inequalities (Skeggs, 1997). Beck is not entirely blind to the relationship between forms of stratification and social exclusion, yet the universalist thrust of his thesis dictates that these structural formations are downplayed in order to appear subordinate to the alpha logic of risk. Although Beck works hard to convince us of the uniqueness of new forms of labour market uncertainty, we can justifiably question the exceptionality of employment risks as features peculiar to contemporary society. In the UK at least, class-based patterns of employment disadvantage identified back in the 1970s have been recently restated by empirical research (see Gallie et al., 1998; Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2003: 6). It is evident that the bundle of anxieties and insecurities attached to the risk society predate its emergence: Much of what Beck describes … has long been standard for those without much money or control over their lives. Many, perhaps most, individuals have traditionally found it difficult to read the future, to remain in one place with their families and friends: in brief, to determine their own lives. (Day, 2000: 51)

Thirdly, methodological problems arise in distinguishing between the distributory networks of class and risk. The would-be theoretical boundaries erected by Beck are essentially fluid, with the effects of class and risk being largely inseparable. This excavates an underlying tension within the risk society perspective around the extent to which the axis of risk reroutes paths of social distribution. Beck wants to give the nod to sectoral patterns of risk distribution, whilst simultaneously maintaining that manufactured risks produce global dangers and result in universal victims. The risk regime necessitates that Beck leaves class behind, yet the snug fit between risk and inequality make this a decidedly faltering exit. Fourthly, the risk society perspective unhelpfully fuses disparate forms of danger and ignores the uneven geography of risk impacts (Anderson, 1997: 188). While labour market transitions in some European countries do bear comparison with the trends recounted by Beck, the risk society perspective is too blunt a tool to carve out the intricate architecture of employment experiences across the globe. In common with the corpus of Beck's work, the risk regime is not sufficiently sensitive to national variations and revolves exclusively around Western practices and experiences (Bujra, 2000: 63; Marshall, 1999: 267; Nugent, 2000: 236). In conclusion, Beck's risk society thesis presents us with an innovative and potentially constructive framework for analysing specific employment trends and particular working cultures. Nonetheless, however useful at a micro level, the risk society perspective does not allow for the diverse and scattered nature of employment relations. Insofar as a more mixed range of employment practices are visible today than in previous eras, it is improbable that there has been a paradigm shift from class to risk-based employment experiences. Whilst Beck has unquestionably contributed towards our understanding of the ‘brave new world of work’, ultimately he provides us with an incomplete and partial analysis of the changing relationship between the individual, employment and society.