Abstract
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze was a philosopher of distinction who worked in the areas of African philosophy, race and the Enlightenment, and postcolonial critique. His last book, published posthumously after his untimely death at the age of 44, addresses these themes through an in-depth interrogation of his key idea: that reason / rationality emerges through difference or, put another way, that ‘diversity constitutes a necessary condition of thinking in general’ (3). This is an idea of considerable sociological significance, although Eze develops the argument primarily through philosophical sources. Reason, he argues, is less a thing than a process and, as such, there is no possibility for the existence of ‘a general mind’, that is, a mind decontextualized of all specificities (92–3). In making this argument, however, Eze is not advocating collapsing the distinction between philosophy and politics. As is made explicit in the concluding chapter, while he does argue for ‘the relative independence of philosophical reflection from contextual morality and political settlements’ (235, my italics), he is not defending the idea / ideal of ‘pure reason’ (or philosophy) against a contextualist morality and politics.
The book develops the themes outlined above through a number of linked chapters which draw on both ‘standard’ Western philosophical texts as well as contemporary writing in the area of postcolonial critique, literature and philosophy. The book starts out by discussing varieties of (theories of) reason and moves from a discussion of the different models of rationality presented variously in Hobbes and Bacon through Heidegger, Husserl, and others. In the process, Eze identifies six ‘types’ of reason: calculative, formal, hermeneutical, empirical, phenomenological, and vernacular reason. In developing his conception of the latter, vernacular or ordinary reason, Eze seeks to move beyond both the metaphysical foundationalism and the transcendental idealism that he sees as characterising the other positions (82). His argument for a vernacular conception of rationality rests on the ‘empirically ordinary rather than absolutely speculative or speculatively transcendental’ (88). This is an argument of considerable interest to sociologists, especially those familiar with discussions of the distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ rationalities within phenomenological and hermeneutic sociological traditions. It provides a bridge where sociology can connect with Eze's philosophical reflections.
Eze develops this position by arguing that, in interrogating Descombes' question, ‘Where do we locate the mind?’ we ‘arrive at the answer that there is not one “where” but multiple natural and social complexes through which the mind can be said to have and express its existence’ (82). Eze shifts the question from Descombes' formulation of ‘Where do we locate the mind?’ to ‘What is a mind?’ and argues that the everyday task of making up one's mind demonstrates the way in which individuals reason ‘within and out of relationships to nature, to self, and to others’ (84). As we, individually, make up our minds in different contexts, those contexts then, Eze argues, are the conditions for the processes of reasoning. The mind is defined by Eze as to be understood in the language of ‘figures of reason’ where a ‘figure of reason’ is an ‘insightful representation of experience in thought’ (87); that is, the self-consistency of the mind is regarded as achieved in the process of thinking, of formulating thoughts.
Eze also develops his thinking on ordinary historical reason through a discussion of the pragmatist philosophies of Quine, Dewey, McDowell, and Rorty before moving on to address, what he characterises as, postcolonial philosophy; that is, philosophy after Philosophy (116). These arguments are further elaborated by way of discussions on the ‘science’ of race, on the relationship between the writing of colonial and postcolonial narratives of history, and a concluding chapter on the necessity for maintaining a distinction (albeit not a separation) between philosophy and politics, which is illustrated by reference to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. His adept handling of postcolonial fictional narratives alongside critical philosophical discourses unsettles and decentres the standard philosophical accounts. In the process, Eze develops a distinctive contribution to the debate on reason, and its relation to Reason, and makes a persuasive argument for its reconsideration in the terms outlined above.
This is not a work of sociology, but it is a work of philosophy that many will find resonates with a sociological imagination, especially one open to the impact of postcolonial thinking across the humanities and social sciences. It merits reading (and re-reading) and matching its philosophical reflections with sociological reflection on its themes. It is a thoroughly rewarding and valuable book and one which makes a significant contribution to the field.