Abstract
Collins observes that tacit knowledge is an issue only in societies where huge effort is expended to render all knowledge explicit, for instance through scientific explanations or attempts to mechanise via industrial technology series of actions previously performed by people. He therefore founds his study on the proposition that ‘[t]he tacit is that which has not or cannot be made explicit’ (85). In a thorough and convincing analysis, he establishes that many actions that sociologists and philosophers have referred to as exhibiting tacit knowledge can, in fact or in principle, be rendered explicit. Accordingly, Collins identifies three types of tacit knowledge – weak, medium and strong: these deal ‘respectively, with the contingencies of social life (relational tacit knowledge), the nature of the human body and brain (somatic tacit knowledge), and the nature of human society (collective tacit knowledge)’ (X).
The first three chapters lay out a conceptual framework, couched in a philosophical account of causality based on strings and their affordances. Important distinctions are made between mechanical and interpretive communication and between two types of action, polymorphic and mimeomorphic. Part two (chapters 4–6), the core of the case, examines the three types of tacit knowledge in detail.
Relational tacit knowledge (RTK) ‘is tacit for reasons that are not philosophically profound but have to do with relations between people that arise out of the nature of social life’ (11). People keep secrets, tell half truths, or A fails to pass on relevant knowledge to B because A is unaware that B does not already have that information. The texture and flows of everyday social interaction will always leave some people uninformed about some matters, but although in practice such concealments are unlikely ever to be eliminated, there are no insurmountable obstacles to revelation.
Somatic tacit knowledge (STK) either ‘can be written out (at least in principle) but cannot be used by humans because of the limits of their body’ or can be executed by humans ‘only because of the affordances of the substance of which they are made’ (11). One example he gives is playing chess, where a computer programme does not mimic the thought processes of humans but rather quantifies options exhaustively; Collins remarks that ‘no machines can manage trade-offs and repairs or apply the rules of gamesmanship in a human, social context-sensitive way’ (120). STK can sometimes be scientifically explained or mechanically copied, but nevertheless by virtue of the material nature of the human brain or body some activities are peculiar to embodied persons. He illustrates this through the much used example of riding a bicycle. Cycling is a skill that cannot be learned simply by following verbal instructions, but it can be scientifically explained and mechanically modelled. It is possible to imagine a robot, or even an animal, being able to balance on a moving bike. However, and this is Collins's key claim, it is impossible to imagine them riding in traffic. It is the ability to ‘respond to social cues and contexts’ and the capacity to improvise on rules in social situations which resist explicit formulation (31).
Hence the third and most interesting type, collective tacit knowledge (CTK), which is ‘strong’ because we know of no way to describe it or to make machines that can possess or even mimic it’ (11). CTK is a constituent property of polymorphic actions, ‘actions that can only be executed successfully by a person who understands the social context’ (ix). ‘[A]cute sensitivity to context’ (116) is the basis for competent engagement in social life. We are ‘social parasites’ (138) because we have no means to reproduce, replicate or model polymorphic actions other than through immersion in society, through ‘participating in the talk and practices of society’ (133), through ‘socialization’. Thus Collins postulates a strong and distinct sense of the social: ‘the one thing that is absolutely special about humans and not about subcomponents – brains, arms, calculators, and so forth – is that they are able to learn how to make use of the contributions of all the elements in ways that act in concert with what other humans are doing as a result of our mutual participation in the larger organism of society’ (165).
Tacit and Explicit Knowledge partly systematises Collins's earlier work, but offers greater precision and elaboration with regard to types of tacit knowledge. Key collateral arguments include a project ‘to demote the body and promote society in the understanding of the nature of knowledge’ (8). Collins is critical of the extent to which examples of tacit knowledge have turned on the capabilities of the body. He also insists on differentiating humans from animals, in terms not of their bodily characteristics but their intellectual and communicative capacities: animals cannot have tacit knowledge because they have no explicit knowledge (78) and, more importantly, ‘it is those very things that the animals cannot do – polymorphic actions informed by the collective tacit knowledge – that renders humans unique’ (167). A consequence is that theories ‘cannot be too symmetrical in respect of the role of humans on the one hand and animals and material things on the other’ (165).
This work is highly technical in places, but worth persevering with. It takes some, usually amiable, side-swipes at key aspects of uncongenial theoretical traditions, like phenomenology and actor network theory. Overall, it provides a much enhanced understanding of the nature and scope of tacit knowledge and, for me, a welcome sociological statement of the importance and irreducibility of collective knowledge.