The Dialogue between History and Political Culture: The Political Reception of the Work of Sir Lawrence Freedman in the Argentine Press

Sir Lawrence Freedman's The Official History of the Falklands Campaign is an exhaustive, rigorous and scholarly work of history. Although the author's free access to secret or confidential sources contributes to the quality of the work, its principal merit resides in its systematic verification of source material and its balanced and thorough analysis. The military phase of the conflict between Argentina and Britain over the Falkland Islands is set in the framework of its distant origins and the diplomatic and political contexts of the half-century that preceded it. The book's final chapters are also extremely useful. They analyse the impact of the invasion and the war on Argentine–British relations, on the Falklands archipelago itself, on domestic policy and on British military strategy.

Given the monumental scope of this book (it is 1,100 pages long), this review concentrates on the contribution it makes to the study of an important issue. Freedman helps to challenge prejudices and clichés associated with the Falklands conflict and the military engagement of 1982 in particular that have become endemic in Argentine public opinion, and which are even found in academic circles. This approach to the book will reveal some of its merits, and may be useful for English-speaking readers keen to advance a mutual understanding of the conflict. The reviewer would also like to take this opportunity to stress the desirability of a future translation of this work into Spanish.

To start with, the way the book was received by the Argentine press is worthy of note. The book's title caused a misunderstanding concerning the book's official character. The meaning of the term ‘official’ has been misinterpreted in the Argentine press. As Freedman explains, the work is official only in so far as it has been compiled using documentary sources from the most diverse departments of Her Majesty's government, and at the request of the Foreign Office (but not, as has been repeated in the press, on behalf of ‘the government’ and/or on behalf of the Prime Minister Tony Blair). In Argentina, the book has been portrayed as something it is not: as an ‘official version', endorsed by the British government. One commentator goes so far as to suggest: ‘It is as though without State control no research can be undertaken in the United Kingdom’ (La Capital, 27 July 2005). For a country in which access to similar documentation is still a practical impossibility (in part because of secrecy, but also because of the poor state of its archives and the misappropriation of material by former civil servants), such an affirmation is startling. The very notion of an official version of history is highly problematic, but this misunderstanding has become common currency, accepted unquestioningly by participants in the internal debate that has followed the discussion of the book in Argentina. So much so, that according to La Nación (28 June 2005), the government began a ‘detailed study’ of the facts described by Freedman in order to ‘adopt the necessary legal and diplomatic measures'.

In addition, the way the Argentinian press has analysed the value of the original British titles of sovereignty is interesting. The Argentine interpretation has resulted in a partial apprehension of the truth. It has been assumed that the book ‘places in serious doubt the legitimacy of [Britain's] claim to sovereignty’ and makes patent the ‘weakness of the British legal case in questions of sovereignty'. It is true that the author explains, and details, how the British Lord Chancellor's Office had its doubts concerning the strength of its claims on the Islands. But it is also the case that the book shows that Argentine claims were no less weak. Historically, however, Argentine opinion has always been convinced of the strength of its own claims of sovereignty, while at the same time little effort has been made by relevant state bodies to establish the real legal value of any such claims. It is no surprise therefore, that Freedman is so often quoted partially and out of context. The Argentine press doubts so little their own legal rights that the only thing that is appreciated in the book is what is said about the weakness of English rights. The newspaper Clarín provides an extreme example when one commentator affirms that ‘Margaret Thatcher … should perhaps not have gone to war. First of all because British sovereignty claims over the Southern archipelagos were so flimsy that a good proportion of the civil service held serious doubts over their validity. It is not a new argument, apart from the fact that now it has been published in the Official History of the war'. This propensity to present Freedman's conclusions in partial form and to ignore his explicit emphasis on the value of stating that the British claim gained strength over time as a result of the occupation points to greater underlying difficulties: the Argentinian inability to give appropriate consideration to the Islanders’ wishes, and their failure to realise that after the invasion and the military defeat things could not return to the status quo ante.

Another question that is central to the press's reaction to the book is, unsurprisingly, the episode of the sinking of the General Belgrano. The author argues convincingly, in the opinion of this reviewer, against a conspiracy theory. The motives that led to the torpedoing of the ship were entirely military. They had nothing to do with a desire to break a possible negotiation that might have resulted from an initiative of the Peruvian government. There is nothing either in the text or in the sources used by Freedman to contradict his conclusions. However, the information most frequently presented by the Argentinian press is not his analysis of the lack of a conspiracy but something that is not new, nor for that matter denied by the author: that the book constitutes ‘the official acceptance by Great Britain that the General Belgrano was sunk when it was outside the exclusion zone', adding that the General Belgrano received the torpedo ‘at a time when it had begun its retreat towards the continent'. However, this is too imprecise a description in military terms. When the Argentine reader receives this partial information – the Belgrano was sunk outside the exclusion zone and returning to the continent – the reader is led to believe, by omission, that the book confirms one of the sacred clichés of the war: that the decision was motivated by political, not military, reasons. It is true that there are exceptions; for example, La Nación reproduces statements made by Freedman which should help to clarify the problem, but when it is stated that ‘crucial facts of intelligence in the most controversial action in the Falklands War were not transmitted to the War Cabinet presided over by Thatcher until after the tragic measure was taken', it is difficult for the reader to draw the appropriate conclusion. The impression given is that the only change is the identity of the conspirators, above all because Freedman places the source of the problem elsewhere: on the British government's failures of communication when announcing the sinking of the Belgrano, rather than on an alleged omission in the sharing of intelligence data. Be this as it may, the fascination for this tragic episode is understandable: it allows Argentina's status as victim to be reinforced, together with the belief that the occupation of Port Stanley in April was an act of aggression based on a just cause, implying that the same could not be said for a government that decided to sink a warship motivated only by a desire for power and imperial ambition.

With regard to Chilean collaboration with Britain during the campaign, it is striking that the information which the book provides is seen as a ‘revelation'. Freedman's analysis of Chile's aid is impeccable, and the information the text provides very clear and detailed. But, in political and strategic terms, there is absolutely nothing shocking or essentially new in this respect. That Pinochet's regime collaborated with logistics and intelligence was well known. Why is information which is more specific, but which tells us nothing new, described as a ‘revelation'? I understand that this expresses a need linked to the very nature of the causa Malvinas as a cultural, ideological and political way of perceiving Argentina's relationship with the rest of the world. The press encourages us to discover, or rather rediscover time and again, a set of hidden factors: secrets, shadowy forces, betrayals, spurious alliances, in order to understand any historical processes that exert an influence upon us. The comment that reaches the greatest height of absurdity in this general tendency is that in spite of the publication of Freedman's book ‘what happened [behind the scenes] remains secret and [the book] only tries to whitewash a few actions for the benefit of a gullible international community'.

Another theme that echoes in the press is the presence of nuclear weapons in the campaign. In this regard the information provided in the book is once again treated as revelatory in character, although this is not the case: as Freedman himself reminds us, the British Ministry of Defence already acknowledged publicly in 2003 that some warships had carried nuclear weapons (for logistical purposes linked to the peremptory nature of the action, and not with the intention of their deployment). Furthermore, many comments in the press have insisted that until the publication of the book the British government had ‘refused to admit’ they were carrying them. The official British line, Freedman explains, followed a standard protocol: never either to deny or confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in any specific position. However, the way this has been presented in the Argentine press, which omits the general context given by Freedman, creates the impression that the official British stance consisted of a dishonest manipulation of the truth.

The book's impact on the Argentine press has resulted in the foregrounding of clichés and beliefs deeply rooted in the Argentine psyche, which, on the contrary, this work should allow us to question. One of the most important clichés refers to the British interest in holding on to the Islands, and to the reasons for this interest. The dominant notion in Argentine public opinion attributes to successive British administrations an iron will to preserve the archipelago within the Empire, for strategic and economic reasons. However, Freedman shows that, especially from the second half of the twentieth century, successive British governments found it ever less desirable to hold on to the Islands, either from the strategic or the economic perspective. The administration of the Falklands was always problematic. It was uncomfortable in terms of British foreign policy, and the benefits were outweighed significantly by the costs. The economy was in decline and the population was also slowly and inexorably falling. This could only be turned around via an integration of the Falklands into the continental economy. Furthermore, considering the price which Britain was having to pay, given the persistence of the conflict, the Falklands exerted a negative effect on British interests, particularly on the relationship between Britain and Argentina. What was at stake was considerably greater than any possible economic or strategic benefit that could come from holding on to the Islands.

Taking this into account, far from showing an iron imperial will, Britain demonstrated – and Freedman shows this clearly – a more or less constant impulse, although with some hesitation, to try to reach an agreement with Argentina, but without ignoring the Islanders, who strongly desired to continue to be British. Their preference for Britain became stronger as successive Argentine governments showed themselves increasingly less willing to take into account the Islanders and became ever more impatient in asserting Argentine claims of sovereignty. A chain of events followed in which each link comprised a failed attempt to reach an agreement satisfactory to all concerned. The Islanders always found in the British parliament a majority ready to stand up for their interests. As a result, an Argentine–British agreement would have been the equivalent of squaring the circle, because Argentinian governments showed considerable political blindness in assuming that British scruples were merely an excuse. Although Freedman's book is concerned less with considering the political and diplomatic terms of the problem from the Argentinian perspective, it is very useful in understanding that Argentina had at its disposal, from the 1960s to 1982, far more viable options than the ones it chose to pursue. In short, Argentina trapped itself in a cul-de-sac of an impossible strategy, which consisted in the veiled threat of the use of force in the eventuality that negotiations for restitution of sovereignty failed. In purely instrumental terms, this strategy could have been sensible only if the menace had been credible for the British and they in turn had been able to find a non-humiliating political way of persuading the Islanders of the need to admit a transfer of sovereignty. But if the threat were too credible, and in the meantime Great Britain did not find a political means of overcoming its domestic obstacles, the Argentine strategy could not work. Sooner or later this strategy would have led to British preventive defence measures. That is the reason why the Argentine threat strategy would fail, which is what probably would have happened in the mid-1980s if it were not for the occupation of 1982 and what actually happened, namely, the replacement of a bad strategy (the threat of occupation) with a worse one (the invasion). Argentina, of course, could have adopted better strategies, especially if it had managed to frame the conflict over the Falklands in its proper terms, that is, reducing it to a legal and political conflict between both states rather than conferring upon it the status of a national cause of redemption, in which national identity itself was in play.

If Argentina had been able to normalise the conflict, it would have gained the greatest weapon available for its resolution: time. Time was in fact in its favour, as is obvious in Freedman's work, taking into account for example that every year the economic situation and demography of the Islands was worsening. By showing its goodwill in relation to the desires (not only the interests) of the Islanders, a stable and democratic Argentina could have used the conflict as a lever for a more appropriate positioning of the country in the world, converting the region into a zone of cooperation and international exchange, stimulating in good faith the confidence of the Islanders and the British, in a long-term deal. Argentina could have made the most of all the offers that Britain formulated in terms of regional cooperation, rather than rejecting them in favour of obsessive demands – as Freedman documents in the repeated frustration of the British diplomats – to place the issue of sovereignty in the foreground. But against these options Argentina had two formidable obstacles: the nature of the conflict as a matter of national pride and the growing internal political convulsion, which broke out in 1976 in the form of the worst dictatorship in its history, with a terrible human rights record. To conclude, the work of Freedman is useful for questioning the clichés most deeply rooted around this issue: the nature of British determination and its motives and the wisdom of Argentinian policy on the conflict during the period which extends from the mid-1960s to the period of military dictatorship.

In the key period extending from the arrival of the dictatorship to the occupation of the Islands, British policy failed, as Freedman demonstrates, by not finding a sufficiently effective deterrent once it was clear that Argentina was changing its strategy. Perhaps in part it failed because, Freedman argues, the British government fell victim to a mirrored perception of what the Argentinian government was doing, which led it to suppose that Argentina would give Britain enough time to react, until in the end it was too late. A deterrent that was sufficiently effective, although very costly, might have allowed Argentinian society to gain time, normalising its political institutions, developing a new understanding of its relationship to the rest of the world and realising that the conflict offered the nation an opportunity to acquire prestige and confidence internationally. But this is not what happened.

The book is also of value in questioning other beliefs deeply rooted among Argentinians regarding the military phase of the conflict; some of them relevant historically, and others culturally. Two such historical beliefs stand out. First, political motives made it practically unavoidable that Great Britain should react with the energy and speed that it did – to this day Argentinian public opinion shows a lack of understanding that is scarcely credible. Second is the analysis of the North American position; contrary to what the vast majority of Argentinians assume, the United States was a reticent and difficult ally for Britain. The US placed pressure on the UK to accept negotiation proposals which to the British were abhorrent. Among cultural factors, we can mention the legend of the Gurkhas, who in Argentina are considered to have played an active and ferocious role in the fighting, when in fact the Nepalese mercenaries were hardly involved in combat.

The reading of the last chapters of Freedman's book evinces that not even after the war did Argentina choose – in the opinion of this reviewer – the wisest options: it delayed too long an agreement to suspend hostilities and normalise diplomatic relations, with the argument that a democratic government could not assume responsibility for a war decided by a dictatorship and that therefore it was necessary to discuss the question of sovereignty before anything else. And, even today, it is failing to choose the wisest option: it has discounted, of course, any alternative that involves the use of force, but many of Argentina's policies are designed to weaken the desire of the Islanders to continue to be British, through the implementation of measures which seek to make life on the Islands less comfortable.

Finally, another aspect that Freedman's exhaustive book discusses sheds light on a further consequence of Argentina's causa Malvinas: the fate of war veterans. In Argentina it is popularly thought that veterans were marginalised on their return from the Islands and the rising suicide rate among them is seen as the most obvious proof of their neglect. In Freedman's book similar information is provided concerning high suicide rates and emotional and mental problems among British veterans. This reviewer is inclined to think that the Argentine notion of neglect and disdain for the veterans is nothing but another metaphor of the causa Malvinas and that it leads us back to one of its central aspects: democracy ‘de-Malvinised’ us, the result is that ‘we forgot about the Malvinas', but preserving our national identity requires a ‘re-Malvinisation'. Of course, very many Argentinians today do not share in the causa Malvinas as a whole, and many of us not even in part, but it is still out there, a formidable challenge for us to overcome. Freedman's book represents an extremely valuable contribution to revisiting it. May it soon be available in a Spanish translation.