Lifting the Siege of Liberalism

Paul Starr's book on liberalism is a true tour de force in the evolution and transformation of both a political theory and a political movement. Besieged by neo-conservative ideas and politics in the last quarter of a century in America, liberalism can now break the siege and redefine itself in relation to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The book advances powerful arguments for dealing creatively with those challenges. Indeed, the true force of liberalism resides in its capacity to deal with a changing world and its contradictory needs, while remaining faithful to its own premises and promises.

During the last twenty years, liberalism has suffered from ill health. Especially in America, many have come to maintain that its historical trajectory has irrevocably run its course. The patient was in such a precarious condition that a plethora of doctors rushed to predict the date of the death. Since the 1980s, libraries have been filled with books about the end of liberalism, its crisis, its inability to address the post-industrial societies of the new capitalism and, after 1991, its problems in understanding the new world that emerged from the end of the Cold War. After all, Ronald Reagan's two terms in office (1981–8) had handed the presidency to a new Republican majority that had been formed in the conflicts and transformations of the 1960s, and that had delivered the south of the country for the first time since the Civil War to a rejuvenated Republican party. That party's subsequent conquest of the majority in both chambers of Congress in the mid-term elections of 1994 further strengthened the common conviction that America had entered a new era, namely the so-called neo-conservative era. Admittedly, during the final two decades of the last century, the liberals had managed to hang on to some important institutional positions, first in Congress and then the presidency. Nevertheless, with the advent of the new century those strongholds came crashing down. After the elections in the year 2000 and the mid-term elections of 2002, the country came to be controlled by a homogeneous neo-conservative majority in all the institutions of government. Some reached the conclusion that even the Democratic party had embraced some neo-conservative positions, to the point of unquestioningly accepting the fundamental domestic and foreign policy decisions of President Bush and his Congressional majority. Of course, between 2000 and 2002 something unprecedented had occurred that served to promote such an outcome. America was attacked on its own soil, as had never happened before. That attack had established the need to reaffirm the value of national security, which required the strength and determination that only the neo-conservatives promised to deliver. America had to free itself from external and internal constraints in order to pursue its historic mission, namely to rid the world of evil. America had to regain confidence in its own strength, in its own goodness, in its own exceptionalism. What space for liberalism and its culture of tolerance, inclusion, generosity, dialogue and compromise could there possibly be in such a world? Rather little, according to many.

Paul Starr sets out a formidable counter-argument to this common view. With precision, parsimony and in-depth knowledge, he shows that liberalism is far from being dead or in decline. In reality, liberalism has been under siege for a long time. But a siege can be overcome by identifying the right course of action. Moreover, the besiegers (i.e. the neo-conservatives) are no longer as self-assured as they once were. Rather, they have found themselves in great difficulty for some time now, both because the decisions inspired by their interpretation of the post-Cold War world have proved to be spectacularly misconceived (particularly in Iraq and in the Middle East in general), and because their domestic policies have met with rejection in public opinion, so much so that the Democrats have managed to regain control of both chambers of Congress in the mid-term elections of 2006 (and gone on to win both presidential and Congressional elections in 2008). The course of action suggested by Starr to break the siege of liberalism is very effective. It is divided into three stages. The first stage considers the origins of liberalism; the second one its modern evolution; and the third its future. Interpreting liberalism as a practical philosophy of government and politics, Starr begins his intellectual journey by examining the historical roots of American and English liberalism and above all its legacy. He defines this original liberalism, which emerged between the English revolution of the late seventeenth century and the American Revolution of the late eighteenth century, as ‘constitutional’. Constitutional liberalism found its ultimate expression in the Convention of Philadelphia of 1787, influencing in its turn the French Revolution, which was to occur only a few years later. According to this type of liberalism, constitutionalism is not only a ‘technique’ for controlling political power by means of dividing it, but it is also a project of good government. That project rests on the concept of a ‘system of enabling constraints’, of which individual rights form a crucial part. The liberal state is strong because it is constrained. By means of constitutionalism, liberalism is able to construct a strong power while simultaneously subjecting it to control. Ever since its inception, liberalism has thus realized that power and control may grow in tandem.

In Starr's view, liberalism is a philosophy of separation. Liberalism recognizes the nature of power, be it political, social, economic or cultural; namely that it is at the same time both necessary and dangerous. It confronts this situation through a strategy of separation: separating the institutions of government and thus requiring them to control each other; separating the public from the private sphere; separating the market among competitive economic actors; separating society in a pluralism of social interests; separating the parties in the political arena; and separating the political from the religious sphere. It is not power as such that constitutes a threat to liberal society, but rather its monopolistic concentration. However, in the wake of the vast expansion of economic power during the nineteenth century, liberalism underwent its first great ‘internal’ crisis. Laissez-faire views soon demonstrated their inability to come to terms with the vast problems generated by the process of industrialization. Liberalism had been reduced to free market liberalism, i.e. it had renounced the pursuit of social justice in the name of economic freedom. This was a significant renunciation, if liberalism truly is a practical philosophy that recognizes the contradictory nature of social values without being taken hostage by any one of them (as is typical of most ideologies). This second stage of Starr's journey is of remarkable originality. Liberalism, which originally was certainly not democratic, opens itself to democracy with the result that it is changed by it. Thus, between the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, liberalism became liberalisms. Laissez-faire positions were contested in the name of a positive vision of government intervention (or rather state intervention) in the economy. This vision would find its fulfillment with the New Deal policies of the Great Depression. The democratic liberalism that emerges from this long period of transformation is in its turn contested by many from within the liberal ranks. After all, its practical and non-ideological dimension allows liberalism to adjust to the times and change in relation to the new challenges that a liberal society must face.

Among these challenges inevitably ranks the profound income inequality produced by a market economy. Democratic liberalism embraces the redistributive policies of modern welfare systems, even if it continues to root these policies in the vision of ‘equality of opportunities’ typical of classical liberalism, and not in a vision of ‘equality of outcomes’ as maintained by socialist movements. Also among these challenges ranks that of an ever more unstable world, as witnessed by the two dramatic world wars. Starting with Woodrow Wilson's presidencies (1913–21) democratic liberalism shed its imperialist legacy without, however, falling hostage to the isolationist and pacifist sentiments of many of its supporters. Whereas the domestic challenges prompted the elaboration of a social liberalism, external challenges have subsequently led to the elaboration of an internationalist liberalism. Both can be distilled from the policies of President F. D. Roosevelt (1933–45). This conceptual luggage has permitted democratic liberalism successfully to confront many of the challenges of the ‘short century’ or ‘long crisis’ (1914–91). Yet liberalism's successes have ended up provoking tenacious resistance in American society. The successful inclusion of blacks and minorities into liberal citizenship has driven the southern states to abandon the Democratic party. The successful containment of the Soviet threat has ushered in a unipolar world where states and non-state organizations alike blame America for every incongruity and frustration. Partly as a result of the errors it committed, democratic liberalism was thus put on the defensive. It lost its creative capacity and became the philosophy of specific interest groups which sheltered under the umbrella of the welfare state.

From here departs the third and last stage of Starr's journey. Due not only to the evident difficulties faced by its neo-conservative rival, democratic liberalism has the chance to provide the inspiration of a new political coalition, in addition to contributing to a reformulation of the spirit of the times. It may do all this, Starr claims, by drawing inspiration from the European experience, i.e. from the European Union's project of continental integration, which is perhaps the most formidable and most successful liberal project that has been pursued during the last half-century. Of course, this project is not without its many defects either, but nevertheless it has demonstrated liberalism's ability to combine the defense and promotion of individual liberties with a market economy aware of its premises and its social consequences. Taking the European experience into account, American democratic liberalism must recover its historical justification: namely that power and control may find ever more advanced states of equilibrium. Just as a renewed idea of separation may establish an equilibrium between the various domestic powers, a renewed idea of cooperation can permit a reformulation of the equilibrium between the various countries in the world. If there is a difference between classical and modern liberalism, it is surely the idea of inclusiveness, the notion that ‘we're in this together'. The further development and adaptation of that idea to America and to the world of the twenty-first century may allow liberalism to break its siege. Starr's book should be required reading for all those who look forward to an America that is more equal internally and more respectful abroad.