Abstract
Normalizing Japan challenges assumptions that Japan is on the cusp of a transformation in security identity that would see the country renounce its post-Second World War identity of domestic anti-militarism, which emerged as a result of domestic and international political compromises during the immediate post-Second World War years and coalesced around 1960. It is important to point out that this book is not just targeted toward Japan specialists. Indeed, Andrew Oros’ contribution to constructivist literature through his challenging of realist theories of international relations and rationalist understandings of domestic politics combine to make Normalizing Japan an important addition to international relations and comparative politics scholarship.
Oros argues that security identities, defined as ‘a set of collectively held principles that have attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalized into the policy-making process’ (p. 9), provide a useful framework for explaining policy change, although not specific policy outcomes. Through three carefully crafted case studies which explore limitations on arms exports, countering the militarisation of outer space, and missile defence, Oros emphasises that neither realist approaches to international relations nor rationalist approaches to domestic politics can adequately explain the remarkable degree of continuity in Japanese security policy over time (pp. 32–3). However, there is an important caveat to Oros’ principal argument. The author does not claim that security identities necessarily dictate predetermined policy outcomes and he reminds the reader: ‘a focus on Japan's security identity of domestic antimilitarism alone is not enough to understand security policy outcomes in Japan … But, [it] does provide a useful framework for developing a full explanation for policy change’ (p. 32).
Oros posits that Japan's security identity of domestic anti-militarism contains three central tenets: no traditional armed forces; no use of force by Japan except in self-defence; and no Japanese participation in foreign wars (p. 5). While these central tenets have often found themselves under challenge, it is emphasised that none of them are likely to be abandoned in the near future. Indeed, even policies that seem to cut against the aforementioned central tenets, such as Japanese rear-area assistance provided during the war in Afghanistan and humanitarian assistance provided during the Iraq War in 2004, have reified the core tenets of domestic antimilitarism through force restrictions that limited Japanese participation in these conflicts to non-combat roles (pp. 181–6). In sum, the value of this book is twofold. The first lies in its empirical richness and description of compromises reached among domestic and international actors, while the second reflects its contribution to constructivist theory through charting the institutionalisation and evolution of Japan's security identity.