What Should This Fight Be Called?

The Break From the Past

The idea of a war on terrorism represents a departure from the conceptions of past U.S. administrations in regard to this problem. After all, terrorism against the United States is not a new phenomenon. It has threatened American interests since the mid 1960s, so that in 1972 the U.S. government saw fit to establish a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

The Nixon administration faced Palestinian terrorism abroad and violence at home accompanying the student protest movement against the Vietnam War. President Nixon tended to prefer a disease metaphor and interpreted the two phenomena as the same threat: Palestinian hijackings and a bombing at the University of Wisconsin were thus described as symptoms of the “same cancerous disease” (Nixon 1970). (The disease analogue is central to the social epidemic metaphor considered later in this monograph.) Nixon expressed fears that society would accept such violence and permissiveness and that it would be, in effect, contagious. The disease metaphor wasn't exclusive of other negative metaphors and epithets in which terms Nixon depicted terrorists. They were defined as “international outlaws” (Nixon, 1972a, 1973; recalling the law enforcement metaphor considered later) and terrorism was said to threaten “the very principles on which nations are founded” (Nixon, 1972b).

The Carter administration had to deal with the Iran hostage crisis. The president frequently expressed a fear of anarchy and of rules being abandoned. He described terrorism as a threat to civilization, the rule of law, and human decency. The Iranian hostage crisis, in his somewhat introspective view, was a test for America. Carter brought a religious dimension to his perspective that “220 million people [are] brought to their knees not in submission but in prayer” (Carter, 1980) for the hostages' release. Moreover, he stressed that American concern for the hostages showed that it was a moral nation with character, strength, and greatness. His speeches contained frequent references to Iranian government support of “mob violence and terrorism” (Carter 1979a) and referred to “an irresponsible attempt at blackmail … supported by Iranian officials” (Carter, 1979b). His focus was on unity at home, American vulnerability to foreign oil supplies, and the need to protect human rights.

Reagan came to power believing that Carter's response to the hostage crisis was unacceptably weak. He referred to “swift and effective retribution” (Reagan, 1981) at the welcoming ceremony for the returning hostages in January of 1981. His consistent theme was the need for firmness: Terrorism would not be tolerated, the United States would not be intimidated, and its resolve would not be shaken. National pride, not national security, was at stake. Terrorism was defined as an attack on democracy, freedom, and even civilization itself. It was described as a form of surrogate warfare, which linked it to states—particularly the Soviet Union and its allies. Reagan warned that sponsors would be held responsible, and he put these words into practice in 1986 when the United States bombed Libyan targets (the capital, Tripoli, and the Benghazi region) in retaliation for its involvement in a terrorist attack in Germany. Terrorism was said to blur the distinction between peace and war. Like Nixon, Reagan favored the disease metaphor: “If we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like cancer” (Reagan, 1985); the world needs to come to grips with “the plague of terrorism” (Reagan, 1986).

Reagan's rhetoric tended toward the imaginative and extravagant: At different times he called terrorists fanatical, cowardly, cynical, madmen, skulking barbarians, vicious, ruthless, savage, criminals, thugs, despicable, repulsive, pitiless, crude, indiscriminate, evil, contemptible, and abhorrent. Terrorism was described as senseless, ugly, wanton, grisly, intolerable, and heinous. It was defined as an atrocity and an affront to humanity.

Clinton entered office determined to tone down the government's rhetoric and avoid any suggestion of a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1998). His general themes were the pursuit of justice, law enforcement, and international cooperation. Terrorism was compared to other intractable global problems such as drugs, crime, the environment, and disease. These common dangers were defined as boundary-crossing threats prevalent in the post-Cold War world, part of an environment characterized by modernity, open societies, open borders, technological advance, and access to information. Terrorism was often discussed in the context of nuclear proliferation and ethnic and nationalist conflict. (Clinton was particularly concerned with the threat of chemical and biological terrorism.) Even though the Clinton administration acknowledged that Osama bin Laden had declared war against the United States, and even though Clinton used military force to retaliate against terrorism-linked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 embassy bombings, Clinton did not adopt the war metaphor but employed more moderate—if somewhat combative—language, such as “[not letting] the terrorists … have the victory” (Clinton, 1996a), “battling terrorism” (Clinton, 2000), and “[taking] the fight to terrorists” (Clinton, 1996b).

In his farewell address to the nation in January, 2001, Clinton remained temperate about terrorism in providing his thoughts for the future:

Terrorism is thus only one of several “forces of destruction.” The question of agency—who the responsible perpetrators are—is left out.

The War Metaphor

After he came to office, President Bush initially spoke of terrorism as one of a number of “new and different threats, sometimes hard to define and defend against, threats such as terrorism, information warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction” (Bush, 2001a). However, on September 11, 2001, this changed. Bush adopted the war construct immediately, in the heat of the moment, according to Woodward (2002), although Suskind (2006, p. 19) recounts that in the period between September 11 and September 20, when the “war” was first declared, the meaning of the term drifted and several “facsimiles” were floated. Woodward (2002, pp. 30–31) reports that Bush's chief speechwriter, Michael Gerson, included the sentence “This is an act of war” in the first draft of the President's brief speech to the nation on the evening of 9/11, and that other assistants (communications director Dan Bartlett, for example) supported the declaration, but that the President ordered it taken out (and stuck to his decision) because he wanted to reassure the public. However, on the morning of September 12, after a meeting of the National Security Council, the President told reporters “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Woodward, 2002, p. 45; Woodward describes this as a deliberate escalation of public rhetoric).

It is understandable that the enormity of the destructiveness of the 9/11 attacks would lead the president to reach for a comparison with the worst threat that could be imagined. Certainly the attack itself seemed to meet the requirements of an “act of war.” Had it been committed by a state, the U.N. Charter certainly would have permitted the United States to use force in self-defense. Furthermore, being a “wartime President” seemed to suit Bush's personality; Suskind (2006) comments that he liked to call himself by this role (p. 72). His swift decision-making style also seemed appropriate for a crisis situation, whereas prior to 9/11 it might have been a liability. The President liked to hear “tales of combat” when he was briefed by the intelligence community and was apparently deeply interested in individual al-Qaeda leaders. Suskind recounts in the early days much boasting about putting their heads on sticks or bringing their heads back in boxes (p. 21).

Analogies and the Lessons of History

The generic and abstract war metaphor has been reinforced by concrete historical analogies to World War II and to the Cold War, including both the “war's” conduct and its ending. In the context of the Second World War, two events stand out in collective memory: Munich and Pearl Harbor. These are sources of transgenerational analogies, in that they influence both the generation that lived through them and later generations who did not have the same formative experience. Both events have deep meaning in the American view of history. They are available, vivid, and persistent myths with enormous affective power, resistant to disconfirmation by new information (see Vertzberger, 1990, p. 329). In the post-2003 debate over the Iraq war, critics of the Bush administration increasingly refer to a more recent counter-analogy, the war in Vietnam. It suggests a much more negative policy outcome.

President Bush also made unfortunate allusions to the Crusades in the early post 9/11 period. Here it was probably the case that he meant the reference as a general metaphor to imply a “moral crusade” against evil rather than as a specific comparison of American policy to the Western assaults on Muslims during the Middle Ages, which is the sense in which Osama bin Laden invokes the idea of a crusade when he refers to his enemy as “Jews and Crusaders” (bin Laden, 1998a). 4 It is easy to misjudge the emotional effect of an analogy on an unfamiliar audience. Misplaced analogies can backfire and be politically dangerous. In this specific case they may feed negative images of the United States and fuel anti-American sentiments among Muslims.

Concluding Comments: Psychological Aspects of the War Metaphor

Why does the Bush administration's conception of counterterrorism policy as a “war” matter? It seems clear that the metaphorical and analogical reasoning underlying this framing is a genuine reflection of key policymakers' views, not just a way of framing the issue in order to mobilize the public behind a new policy that is potentially more risky and costly than past responses to terrorism. The war metaphor is totalistic and extreme in its demands. Arguably, it was adopted in light of the immensity of damage and national hurt produced by the 9/11 attack. In addition, it might have suited the beliefs, policy objectives, and personal styles of key decision makers and was useful in implementing policy interests that entered with the Bush administration. It has insinuated itself into the public discourse about counterterrorism, and it has guided policy, but it has also met challenges because of lack of fit and the availability of counteranalogies with different lessons of history.

Suskind (2006) offers a motivational explanation for the relatively unchallenged development of the war metaphor and its acceptance in the early days after 9/11:

The war metaphor of counterterrorism focuses on an actor who employs violence as a tactic and is defined as the enemy. The psychological rationale of war in its general sense is to bring the enemy to its knees and convince it, and its support base, that its objectives are unattainable. In this sense, the logic of warfare in its application to terrorism is to address that part of the terrorists' belief system that sees terrorism as effective, and to demonstrate compellingly that it is not (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

Does this logic work? Cumulative experience (in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ireland, or Palestine) suggests that the use of military force to “prove” the inefficacy of terrorism may have limited success. Often, military strikes against terrorist targets may have short-term effects involving temporary interference with terrorists' ability to launch their operations but might not undermine terrorists' motivation (Kaplan et al., 2005), because of the enmity that foreign occupation typically engenders and the injustice and excesses that the waging of war typically entails. In this connection, Anthony Cordesman (2006), a strategy expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, stated that the “US … needs to give avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage the same priority as directly destroying the enemy” (p. 15, emphasis added). A 2007 news item (Tang, 2007) states that more Afghan civilians were killed by U.S. or NATO forces (203 from January 1 to June 23, 2007) than were killed in attacks by the Taliban (178). In response, Afghan president Hamid Karzai “directed … his anger at foreign forces for being careless and viewing Afghan life as cheap” (Tang, 2007). Evoking such anger is a seemingly unavoidable (if unintended) consequence of waging massive military operations (i.e., “war”) against terrorists and the result of conflating the “war on terrorism” with more limited interventions in insurgencies.

The perpetrators of terrorism have often claimed considerable staying power, as well as numerous achievements on the ground. Hezbollah boasts having forced the withdrawal from Lebanon of the French, the Italians and the Americans in 1984, and of the Israelis in 2000. Hamas credits its waves of suicidal terrorism for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (see Prusher & Mitnick, 2005). The destabilization in Iraq, perpetrated by terrorist attacks with partial involvement of al-Qaeda, highlights the considerable difficulty of defeating terrorism by military force alone. The apparent staying power of various terrorist organizations and their survival of massive assaults by superior military powers—in a war that they themselves declared on the United States in 1996—feeds the belief that the West is vulnerable and tends to run out of steam, so that despite momentary setbacks (like that in Afghanistan), insurgency will prove effective and, ultimately, successful.

Nor is the war concept sufficiently attuned to the sources of terrorists' motivation. By framing the issue squarely in terms of “good” versus “evil” (a framing often invoked to justify a massive effort such as war) it minimizes attempts to appreciate the other side's concerns or address the frustrations and grievances that may have fostered terrorism, as well as the belief systems (jihadism) that may have lent it ideological sustenance.

Finally, framing counterterrorism as war may exact considerable costs from society. It threatens to corrupt its values, disrupt its orderly functioning, and reshuffle its priorities. We have already commented on war's all-encompassing nature. It calls for the disproportionate investment of a nation's resources, with correspondingly less left for other concerns such as the economy, health, welfare, or education (McCauley, 2007). For a nation at war, security is the overriding goal, and it trumps (or renders less psychologically accessible) alternative national objectives or ethical values. As a consequence, putative means to security become liberated from constraints usually dictated by alternative objectives (Kruglanski et al., 2002). “Collateral damage,” ethnic profiling, overly harsh interrogation tactics, unlimited internment of suspects, etc., may all be condoned given the centrality of security concerns and excused by the uniqueness of circumstances the war concept implies.

Most problematic is the difficulty with war termination. Despite the Bush administration's cautions concerning a “long war” and the attempts to redefine “victory,” well remembered in the public's mind is the surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS Missouri, marking the unconditional surrender of the adversary and cessation of conflict. Imprisoned by the metaphor, as long as terrorist bombs keep exploding, the war is not over, and the United States must remain on a war footing.

Magnitude of the Challenge to State Authority

Some of the drawbacks of the war metaphor are addressable in the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism. One thing war and law enforcement have in common is that they both constitute major ways in which states are geared to protect their citizens from harm. The choice between them will often depend on the perceived magnitude of the challenge—law enforcement constituting the response to a relatively restricted challenge to the state's authority, and war to a massive one. For instance, on February 16, 1993, Ramzi Yousef and his co-conspirators placed a truck bomb in the parking garage of the World Trade Center that resulted in six deaths, hundreds of injuries, and property damage not exceeding half a billion dollars (McCauley, 2007). The response to this event was entirely in terms of law enforcement, including extensive police work, prosecution, trials, and convictions. Compare this with the devastating attack on the same structure on September 11, 2001 that caused close to 3,000 deaths and untold tens of billions in damage. The response to that attack was war. The implicit attributional logic of such differential responding could be that a high-magnitude effect requires a cause of a comparable magnitude (Kelley, 1971), elimination of which requires a commensurately powerful response, in turn.

Qualitative Differences Between War and Law Enforcement

Beyond the difference in response magnitude, the war and the law enforcement metaphors have qualitatively distinct implications for how terrorism is understood and reacted to. Whereas the war metaphor is focused on an actor defined as the enemy, the law enforcement metaphor is focused on the act (the “crime”) deemed unacceptable and unlawful. In support of the law enforcement approach, Shibley Telhami (2004), a political scientist and Mideast expert, argued that an emphasis on the (criminal) terrorist activities would be more efficient than “waging war” on the terrorists and their supporters. Specifically:

Similarly, Senator John Kerry, in a presidential candidates' debate in South Carolina in 2004, stated that, although counterterrorism will be “occasionally military,” it should be “primarily an intelligence and law enforcement operation that requires cooperation around the world” (Will, 2006). The United Nations has never been able to agree on a definition of terrorism, but it has developed several articles prohibiting particular acts—such as airline hijacking and violence against diplomatic persons—consistent with a law enforcement framing.

Beginnings and Endings

In a recent chapter, McCauley (2007) systematically compared the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism to the war metaphor, and identified a number of major differences between them. Unlike wars that typically have clear-cut beginnings and endings, law enforcement is a continual enterprise. Law enforcement begins with a clear infraction of a criminal code. War is defined less clearly and is determined by “a declaration from one government to another that a state of war exists between them” (McCauley, 2007, p. 58). Unlike criminal investigation that requires investigation or discovery, war requires neither, and “an attack or ultimatum is typically the clear occasion of war” (p. 58).

Thus, in a videotaped conference that took place on May 26th, 1998, bin Laden formally declared war on the United States (bin Laden, 1998b). CNN recovered the tape in 2002 and Nic Robertson reported its content: “‘By God's grace,’ bin Laden says on the tape, ‘we have formed with many other Islamic groups and organizations in the Islamic world a front called the International Islamic Front to do jihad against the crusaders and Jews’” (Robertson, 2002). And President Bush, in a speech to the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, labeled the 9/11 attack as an act of war: “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country” (Bush, 2001c).

In contrast to the state of war, the extraordinary nature of which requires a special declaration by a nation's leadership, law enforcement is an ongoing concern, as the potential for crime is ever-present in orderly societies; it arguably serves an important function for society (Durkheim, 1947), and presumably it will even exist “in a society of saints” (Erickson, 1966, p. 4). Whereas war's special nature and presumed circumscribed duration justify pumping extraordinary resources into the war effort, law enforcement, as an ongoing concern, must compete for resources with education, jobs, housing, and welfare policy. Taking issue with the terrorism-as-war framework, General Wesley Clark and Kal Raustalia (Clark & Raustalia, 2007) argue in an opinion piece that terrorists should be viewed as criminals, and “ought to be pursued, tried and convicted in the courts” (p. A19).

Compatibility With Alternative Societal Concerns

Because it forms part of a comprehensive network of arrangements designed to address society's varied needs, the law enforcement approach is less likely than the war approach to collide with alternative values and rights similarly protected under such arrangements. McCauley (2007) puts it as follows: “In time of war, talk about money cost or opportunity cost or human rights cost is unpatriotic; in the criminal justice system, these costs can be counted in the balance of competing values and priorities” (p. 62).

Perceived violations of human rights resulting from the war approach to counterterrorism have evoked considerable criticism both in the United States and abroad. Washington has not been unresponsive to these concerns. Specifically,

A major advantage of the law enforcement approach to counterterrorism is its focused nature. If one conceives of terrorists themselves as an apex of a pyramid whose base is made up of sympathizers who support the terrorists' goals even if they aren't themselves prepared to engage in terrorist attacks, law enforcement is much more likely to target the apex and avoid the base. The law enforcement metaphor suggests precision of counterterrorist initiatives and minimization of possible overreactions to terrorist strikes, which constitute major problems for the war-on-terrorism framing.

Minimization of Costly Mistakes

McCauley (2007) points out that the costs of mistakes incurred in the course of counterterrorist operations are considerably smaller when such operations are conducted as law enforcement than they are when they are conducted as war. Civilian casualties, nearly unavoidable in bombing raids of terrorist targets when implementing the war metaphor, are unlikely under law enforcement policies. As already noted, such casualties (“collateral damage”) could represent a major factor fueling anger and increasing support for terrorist organizations (Kaplan et al., 2005). As an Irish Republican Army member remarked, “the British security forces are the best recruitin' officer we have” (Geraghty 2000, p. 36).

“The criminal justice system also makes mistakes, but these mistakes are more likely to lead to imprisoning the wrong people than killing the wrong people” (McCauley, 2007, pp. 62–63). In this vein, the criminologists LaFree & Hendrickson (2007) note that “The supreme penalty—execution—is used rarely in criminal justice, even in democracies such as the United States that have not banned its use” (p. 9). In contrast, the killing of innocents in war is seen as inevitable and morally acceptable, even if sad and regrettable. As Onkar Ghate (2003) of the Ayn Rand Institute put it, “The moral principle is: the responsibility for all deaths in war lies with the aggressor who initiates force, not with those who defend themselves” (p. 1); in so far as each side in a war tends to view the other as aggressor, each side treats the killing of innocents on the other side as excusable.

Focus on the Act

Another advantage of the law enforcement metaphor is its focus on the criminal act, rather than on the actor vaguely defined as the enemy. This reduces the tendency of those who combat the terrorists to stereotype them and to discriminate against (innocent) members of the broad social categories to which they may belong (e.g., Muslims, Saudi Arabians, Middle Easterners; McCauley, 2007).

Terrorism as Crime

LaFree & Dugan (2004) enumerated several major features that terrorism and crime share in common: “Terrorism, like common crime, is disproportionately committed by young males” (p. 56); “sustained levels of terrorism, like sustained levels of crime, undermine social trust” (p. 56.); and “terrorism is … closely related to breaking of laws” (p. 53). As Osama bin Laden expressed it, “let history be a witness that I am a criminal” (Rahimullah, 1999).

Indeed, terrorists often engage in crime as it is conventionally defined. And “while terrorist activities typically constitute multiple crimes (e.g., murder, kidnapping, extortion), for many nations a specific crime of terrorism does not exist” (LaFree & Dugan, 2004, p. 57). Accordingly,

Though terrorist activities per se are often classifiable as criminal, terrorists often engage in additional criminal activities—such as drug trafficking, bank robberies, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and smuggling—aimed at financing terrorist operations. For instance, in 1994, Jawed Naqvi, writing in the News India–Times, quoted Interpol's chief drugs officer, Iqbal Hussain Rizvi, as saying that “Drugs have taken over as the chief means of financing terrorism” (Naqvi, 1994, p. 30). Because the law enforcement system is oriented and equipped to cope with criminality in its varied forms, it is ipso facto equipped to cope with those aspects of the terrorists' operation that are criminal in the conventional sense of the term.

Police Work

But the efficacy of law enforcement as an approach to counterterrorism extends even farther. Experience of the Israelis and the British suggests that effective counterterrorism often resembles painstaking police work more than it resembles war. McCauley (2007) notes that

International cooperation in counterterrorism is also more likely under the law enforcement metaphor than under the war approach. According to Senator John Kerry's comment (as paraphrased in a 2004 New York Times Magazine article), cooperation between law enforcement agencies has shown that “many of the interdiction tactics that cripple drug lords, including governments working jointly to share intelligence, patrol borders, and force banks to identify suspicious customers, can also be some of the most useful tools in the war on terror” (Bai, 2004, p. 45). McCauley (2007) states in this connection that

International Cooperation

Whereas the international community is basically in favor of law and order, and hence likely to support international law enforcement treaties aimed at stopping terrorism, the war metaphor might be too committing and demanding for numerous states to embrace; it might encourage sitting-on-the-fence neutrality in the struggle against the terrorist enemy.

For instance, even in 2003, when political tensions between the United States and France ran strong because of France's opposition to the Iraq war, there was still highly effective cooperation between American and French law enforcement that had dated to the post-9/11 period. Thus, a joint American–French investigation brought Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber, to justice. Similarly, France and the United States shared evidence in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was allegedly involved in the 9/11 attacks. International cooperation in law enforcement resulted in the apprehension and trials of suspected terrorists in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, and other European countries (Nacos, 2003). Nonetheless, as observed ruefully by the Secretary General of Interpol Raymond E. Kendall, one of the impediments to sharing information through the international police organization is that states supporting terrorism also belong to Interpol—in particular Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya (personal communication, interview with R.E. Kendall, by Jerrold Post in 1986).

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Law Enforcement Metaphor

The law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism offers appreciable advantages over the war metaphor. It affords an approach to counterterrorism that is focused on the actual perpetrators and that balances security needs with human rights concerns. Thus, it may minimize the outrage (and support for terrorism) that civilian casualties, human rights abuses, or stereotyping and discrimination commonly inspire. Moreover, it encourages international cooperation that transcends shifting political contingencies. In view of these obvious advantages, McCauley (2007) asserted that “Criminal justice can be a treatment of choice for a chronic terrorist threat” (p. 22).

Nonetheless, careful scrutiny suggests that the law enforcement approach to terrorism also has limitations. A main issue is that terrorism, unlike typical crime, is ideologically inspired (e.g., by religious, ethno-nationalist, or political beliefs). As LaFree & Dugan (2004, pp. 59–60) noted,

In a similar vein, Pape (2005) concluded from his research that “altruistic motives … play an important role [in terrorism]” (p. 187). Gunaratna (2007) similarly noted that “what actually motivates Al Qaeda is not power, wealth or fame but an ideological belief” (p. 29). And Atran (2004) observed that terrorists “are motivated not by personal comfort or immediate gain but rather by religious or ideological conviction and zeal” (pp. 68–69).

These differences between crime and terrorism have far-reaching implications for counterterrorism. Because of their ideological commitments and collective motivations, terrorists often inspire admiration and respect on the part of the larger communities in which they are embedded. The “cult of the suicide bomber” is widespread in the West Bank and Gaza, for example. During much of the second intifada, public opinion polls conducted among the Palestinians have revealed support for suicide attacks against Israelis to be at the 70–80% level (Atran, 2004). Thus, in the recent past, terrorist activities in Palestine and other locations were anchored in a solid base of community support.

The reason this matters is that effective police work requires extensive community support, including the collection of background information and its transmittal to law enforcement agents (Siegel & Senna, 2004). As the economists Akerlof & Yellen (1994) remarked, “the major deterrent to crime is not an active police presence but rather the presence of knowledgeable civilians, prepared to report crimes and cooperate in police investigations” (p. 174). In a larger sense, effective police work requires driving a wedge between a community and the criminals living within it, and the same applies to psychological and physical separation of insurgents or terrorists from their communities. In this vein, David Ucko (2007, p. 63), a security expert at King's College, London, comments on the successful campaign of the British and Commonwealth forces against the insurgent Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) from 1948 to 1960. Specifically,

On the flip side of the coin, community cooperation with law enforcement may be difficult to secure if terrorists' activities are supported by their communities, as they often are. Where this is the case, collaboration with law enforcement is often seen as treason to the cause. For instance, according to a recent account, in the West Bank, approximately one person a day is killed having been accused of collaborating with the Israeli security forces (B'tselem, n.d.). Thus, despite the Israelis' apparent successes in information gathering, arrests of suspected terrorists, targeted assassinations, etc., their law enforcement efforts are a daily struggle against community resistance.

Law enforcement efforts against terrorism may also be countered by a community's perception that law is sometimes devised and followed hypocritically. For example, (a) many Palestinians would argue that the United States's refusal to hold Israel to U.N. resolutions is at odds with international law; (b) the U.S. definition of terrorism carefully excludes state actors from any culpability; and (c) the U.S. refusal to submit to the legal oversight of the World Court diminishes the credibility of American claims of pursuing justice through law.

Finally, despite considerable policing efforts against terrorism-using organizations in various world locations, attempts to quell terrorist activities have often been unsuccessful in the long run. Various ethnonationalist movements (e.g., in Algiers, Israel, or Kenya) have used terrorism successfully to attain national independence for their peoples. The research literature on human goals (see Kruglanski et al., 2002 for a review) suggests that the higher the importance of a goal, the greater the number and variety of means to the goal that people are likely to generate. Terrorists' ideological commitment, particularly if supported by their broader community, indicates the supreme importance that they attach to their goals.

Law enforcement operations, however successful, may be countered by terrorists' creativity in finding effective countermeasures to counterterrorism initiatives (Kruglanski et al., in press). Difficulties of finding escape routes and the costs involved in keeping an intricate network of safe houses may prompt the “invention” of suicide terrorism. Hard-to-penetrate boundaries may lead to increased use of rocket technology that overcomes distance and barriers (Sharvit, 2005). Indeed, as compared to typical criminals, terrorists have been often credited with considerable inventiveness (LaFree & Dugan, 2004).

Ultimately, despite several advantages, the law enforcement framing of counterterrorism and the approach it implies exhibits a partial mismatch with the realities of terrorism. Especially, law enforcement methods might temporarily hamper terrorists' ability to launch attacks without substantially undermining their motivation to do so. For example, although the Israeli West Bank barrier and military initiatives are credited with substantial reduction in Palestinian suicide terrorism from the West Bank (Israeli West Bank barrier, n.d.), in 2007 there were hundreds of Qassam rocket and mortar attacks each month launched from the Gaza strip against Israeli towns (Chehab, 2007). This suggests that terrorism is often a part and parcel of a broader, ideologically based social movement, and in this sense it is distinct from mere crime in significant ways.

Partitioning the Ingredients of Jihadist Terrorism

Both the war and the law enforcement metaphors of counterterrorism deal with the violent manifestations of terrorism rather than with the constellation of factors that may have engendered terrorism in the first place. These latter factors are addressed by the epidemiological metaphor of terrorism we now consider.

The epidemic spread of ideas has long been a subject of study. In his 1843 work Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Mackay, 1967), Charles Mackay wrote of the tulip mania that consumed the Netherlands in the first part of the 17th century. In 1636 and 1637, a speculative frenzy overtook the tulip market, with vast fortunes being spent for a single tulip bulb. Indeed, the term “tulipomania” was applied to the so-called dot.com bubble of 1995 to 2001 (Wallace, 2001). Gustav Le Bon's The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (Le Bon, 1896) addressed herd behavior and crowd psychology, emphasizing the role of the media in spreading ideas. In Crowds and Power, the Nobel Prize-winning writer Elias Canetti likened the spread of the psychology of mass hatred to a forest fire or a flood (Canetti, 1984).

The public health epidemiological model has been applied to the phenomenon of terrorism. This model utilizes the epidemiologic triad, consisting of (a) an external agent, (b) a susceptible host, and (c) an environment that brings them together. An important element of the environment is what is known as the vector. So, for example, for a malaria epidemic, such as that which almost brought the Panama Canal project to a halt, the pathogen (or agent) was the protozoan Plasmodium falciparum; the vulnerable host was the nonimmune population; and the environment was the tropical jungle with standing water that fostered the breeding of the vector, the Anopheles mosquito. A major contribution to countering the epidemic was preventive methods, such as spraying the ponds of stagnant water in which the mosquitoes bred, wearing protective clothing, and using screens and mosquito nets; chemoprophyllaxis is currently employed to protect susceptible individuals who travel or work in areas where malaria is endemic.

The public health epidemiological model has been applied to the phenomenon of terrorism in two distinct senses: (a) to the targeted populations' psychological reactions to terrorist attacks, and (b) to the spread of terrorist ideology in societies potentially susceptible to such ideologies. In regards to the first sense, the Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, formed by the National Academy of Sciences under the Institute of Medicine, characterized the violent terrorist act or threat as the agent; affected individuals and populations as the host; the way terror is propagated, including the role of the media, as the vector or vehicle; and characteristics of both the physical and the social environment as the environment (Butler, Panzer & Goldfrank, 2003, p. 29).

In the second sense, and of greater relevance to counterterrorism, the epidemiological metaphor was used in a recent paper by Stares and Yacoubian of the United States Institute of Peace (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006). The authors note the several practical advantages that the epidemiological approach to the strategic struggle against terrorism may afford. First, it guides intelligible questions as to “the origins, geographical and social contours of an outbreak, where is the disease concentrated, how is it transmitted, who is most at risk or ‘susceptible’ to infection, as well as why some portions of society may be less susceptible or immune” (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006, p. 88). Second, “epidemiologists recognize that diseases emerge and evolve as a result of a complex interactive process between people, pathogens and the environment in which they live” (p. 88). Third and relatedly, “just as epidemiologists view disease as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon so public health officials have come to recognize that success in controlling and rolling back an epidemic typically results from a carefully orchestrated systematic, prioritized multi pronged effort to address each of its constituent elements” (p. 88).

Stares and Yacoubian (2006) classify the factors involved in an epidemic into four separate categories of host, agent, environment, and vector. In their scheme, “The agent refers to the pathogen (e.g., a virus, or bacterium) that causes disease, the host refers to a person infected by the disease (“infective”), while the environment refers to a variety of external factors that affect both agent and host [and] the vectors [are] the key pathways or conduits that help propagate the disease” (p. 89).

In Stares & Yacoubian's (2006) specific application of the epidemiological metaphor to jihadist terrorism, the agent refers to the militant Islamist ideology, 8 the environment “refers to key factors specific to the Muslim world that promote exposure to Islamist militancy—conflict, political repression, economic stagnation, and social alienation. Vectors … refer to a variety of known conduits … used to propagate the ideology and associated action agendas such as mosques, prisons, madrassas, the Internet, satellite television and diasporic networks” (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006, p. 90). It is important to emphasize in this context that the pathogenic ideology identified by Stares and Yacoubian (2006) is militant Islamism, an ideology that may be adhered to by a group significantly larger than the terrorists per se (as in the pyramid model described earlier). Thus a broader population may approve of what the terrorists are doing, as well as gratefully accept the terrorist organizations' (e.g., Hamas' or Hezbollah's) financial and logistical aid to the community at large without taking the leap to killing in the name of God. Nonetheless, this larger supportive “sentiment pool” is not irrelevant to counterterrorism, as it constitutes the population whose members may be particularly prone to move to active militancy—prompted, for example, by the death of a close friend or a relative.

In specifying the epidemiologic elements of agent, host, vector, and environment, the epidemiological metaphor usefully focuses the challenges of counterterrorism on these essential ingredients, which we now discuss individually.

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Epidemiological Metaphor

In its fourfold partition between ingredients of terrorism (including the “agent”/ideology, the “vector”/communication sources, the “host”/susceptible populations, and the “environment”/predisposing situational factors), the epidemiological metaphor is more comprehensive than either the war or the law enforcement metaphors. It addresses at once the individual level of analysis represented in the focus on the susceptible population, the social/organizational level represented in the focus on the vector that accomplishes recruitment and indoctrination of potential terrorists (e.g., via the Internet, mosques, or radical madrassas), and the cognitive level of analysis represented in the focus on the ideological “virus” (radical beliefs and terrorism-justifying arguments). Thus, it implies a varied array of efforts meant to counteract and discourage the development of attitudes and beliefs likely to translate into terrorism: Individual disaffections may need to be ameliorated in order to reduce people's readiness to buy into terrorism-warranting ideologies, and the ideologies themselves may need to be countered by credible authorities presenting cogent counterarguments to the extremist rhetoric—especially countering the extremist messages found on radical Web sites and sermons of radical imams preached in the mosques.

More than an alternative metaphoric framing of the counterterrorism effort, the epidemiological metaphor implies the need to focus particular attention on the ideological struggle against jihadist extremists, with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of potential recruits to jihadism. Indeed, in 2007 al-Qaeda intensified its propaganda efforts, releasing a video every 3 days aimed to generate substantially more recruits and support for its cause. (Gunaratna, 2007).

In an attempt to counteract this “virulent” lobbying enterprise, moderate Muslim communities and governments in states with substantial Muslim populations (e.g., in Singapore., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan) have initiated systematic deradicalization programs designed to “cure” detainees suspected of terrorism of adherence to their ideology and to “immunize” youths who might find it appealing against such ideology. We have already mentioned the on-line dialogue with jihadists by moderate clerics and jurists supported by the Saudi interior ministry. In addition, there exists a program carried out in Saudi prisons in which moderate Muslim clerics, abetted by psychologists and sociologists, attempt to dissuade the detainees from their ideology and incite them to abandon their radical beliefs (Boucek, 2007).

A particularly comprehensive deradicalization effort directed at Al-Jemmah Al-Islamiya detainees in Singapore was launched in 2003 by the Religious Rehabilitation Group, a Muslim organization based in the Khadija Mosque of that city. In addition, the Taman Bacaan, or “After Care” organization (bin Kader, 2007), attends to the needs of the detainees' families and organizes educational and media events (workshops, lectures, artistic performances) for Singaporean youths (Muslim as well as non-Muslim) designed to carry an ideological antidote to jihadism.

What is uniquely impressive about the Singaporean deradicalization efforts is their psychological comprehensiveness. Specifically, they target not only the minds (i.e., ideological beliefs) of the detainees and potential recruits to terrorism but also their hearts (i.e., feelings and desires). Just as the anger at the West (fueled by the al-Qaeda propaganda machine through messages and videos portraying the suffering of Muslims in the hands of their enemies) may increase Muslims' readiness to open up to vengeful interpretations of Islam, so assuaging the detainees' anger and frustrations by showing authentic concern for their families, actually funding their children's education (through private donations), and offering professional training for their wives may increase their readiness to open up to moderate religious interpretations and to accept the notion that jihadism is contrary to the humane principles on which Islam is founded. Similarly, the twin efforts to address the concerns of the detainees and those of their communities (and families) supports the classic psychological principle that changing an individual's belief systems (ideology in this case) requires changing the norms of the group to which the individual belongs (Lewin, 1947). Though such deradicalization efforts are promising and constructive, their actual socio-psychological impact is in need of careful evaluation. Assessment of these programs poses, therefore, an important challenge for psychological researchers.

Finally, it is noteworthy that whereas the war and the law enforcement metaphors address the proximal “here and now” of terrorist activities, the epidemiological metaphor highlights the long-term motivational, cognitive, and social/organizational processes that increase the likelihood of terrorism. Nonetheless, all three metaphors approach terrorism as an external problem in need of treatment via action against its actual and/or potential perpetrators. In contrast, the analysis considered next views terrorism as a “two way street,” focused on the social relations between terrorists and their potential targets.

Intergroup Relations in Western Europe

On that fateful date, three young Muslims—Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—each piloted an airplane in a spectacular strike on a monument of American military or economic power. Atta is thought to have been the tactical leader of the 9/11 plot. Ramzi Binalshibh, who shared an apartment with the first two, probably facilitated the plot. All four were apparently radicalized while living in Hamburg, Germany, and were probably influenced, at least in part, by cleric Mohammed Haydar Zammar at the Quds Mosque (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2004). One of the most important discoveries of the 9/11 investigation was that young Muslims who had spent substantial time living and working in Western Europe could become principals in the most infamous anti-Western terrorist act in history.

The story of the 9/11 cell is hardly unique. Since then, a series of attacks, interrupted attacks, or plots has been linked to other young Muslims from European backgrounds: On December 22, 2001, Bromely-born Richard Reid attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight en route from London to Miami. He had apparently converted to Islam while incarcerated in Feltham young offenders' institution and is thought to have become radicalized while attending the Brixton Mosque in south London (BBC News, 2001).

On November 2, 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a 26-year-old Amsterdam-born Mohammed Bouyeri, who apparently became radicalized in 2003, perhaps influenced by visits to the El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (BBC News, 2005). Also in 2004, Operation Crevice by the British Metropolitan and local police led to discovery of a 1,300-pound cache of ammonium nitrate, used in making explosives, and the arrest of seven young British Muslim men, including 24-year-old Omar Khyam, accused of plotting to bomb targets including a shopping mall and a nightclub (Rotella, 2006a). In late 2005, French police arrested 35-year-old Safe Bourada and 31-year-old Oussani Cherifi; both were of Algerian descent, both grew up in the tough suburbs of Paris, and both were accused of organizing multiple bloody plots for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (known by its French initials GSPC; Rotella, 2006b).

The life stories of the Madrid train bombers of March 11, 2004; of the London transport bombers of July 7, 2005; and of those suspected in a U.K. plot publicly revealed in August 2006 to blow up airlines en route to the United States have also been documented. Most recently, eight Muslim doctors or doctors-in-training working in British hospitals were arrested in connection with two attempts to explode car bombs in downtown London on June 29, 2007 and an attempt on the subsequent day to ram a flaming Jeep into the main entrance of Glasgow airport. All of the known perpetrators and suspects in these varied incidents were young Muslim men who had either been born and raised in, or lived and worked for extended periods of time in, Western Europe. In terms of McCauley's (1991) pyramid model, these individuals represent the tiny apex of a much larger group: the disaffected Muslim diaspora population of Western Europe.

The size of the Muslim population in Europe and its increasing proportionality in European societies can be explained by two factors: (a) the considerably greater natural growth of the Muslim population than that of Europe's ethnically native populations 12 (the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Council predicts that Europe's Muslim population will double by 2025; Hunter, 2002; Nielsen, 1999; Pauly, 2004); and (b) the unprecedented migration of people from underdeveloped, often politically oppressed Muslim states into Europe. The actual Muslim population of most European nations is unknown due to restrictions on gathering religion data, but estimates put the current number of Muslims in Europe between 15 and 20 million, or 4 to 5% percent of Europe's total population.

The problem is that Muslims and non-Muslim Europeans are failing to integrate. Data confirm the development of highly negative attitudes on both sides of the divide, defining an EU-wide apartheid reminiscent in many ways of the state of relations between Blacks and Whites in the mid-20th-century United States. Several factors might be contributing to this problem: cultural differences in values and world views separating Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans (Huntington, 1998); the sheer size of the immigrant population, affording newcomers a coherent shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) distinct from that of the host countries and reducing their psychological need to integrate (Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004); and a lack of consistent immigration policies in EU countries, breeding uncertainty and intergroup tension (Kosic et al., 2004). 13

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Prejudice-Reduction Frame

The unique aspect of the prejudice-reduction frame is its explicitly bilateral character. Admittedly, the war, law enforcement, and epidemiological metaphors did hint that some counterterrorist tactics employed by the targets of terrorism (e.g., those likely to produce the killing of innocents, destruction of property, and spawning of a refugee problem) may augment rather than reduce terrorism; yet their primary focus has been on the psyche of the terrorists and their supporters. By contrast, the prejudice-reduction approach recognizes that terrorism involves a recursive interplay of two types of mentality, that of the terrorists and that of their targets. For instance, the perceived otherness of Muslim immigrants for European hosts, and vice versa, as well as the aversion that otherness often evokes, may feed mutually negative stereotypes that motivate actions that may, in turn, augment and polarize the stereotypes (via an expectancy-confirmation mechanism)—and hence exacerbate intergroup tensions.

A major social-psychological intervention to reduce prejudice is the creation of positive contact between members of the conflicted groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Research suggests that the creation of optimal contact, particularly if carried at an early enough age, may contribute to the development of positive attitudes toward members of the out-group. However, positive contact in unique and isolated settings (e.g., a certain school or recreational facility) may be counteracted by events, initiatives, and rhetorics external to that context, such as depictions in the media and discussions in one's community. To the extent that such depictions portray aggressive, humiliating, or discriminatory activities perpetrated by one group against the other, they might well damage the positive will engendered in the restricted, positive-contact settings. Thus, efforts at prejudice reduction via positive contact need to be pursued in the context of a larger set of policies—for example those concerning immigration laws, educational programs, and foreign policy initiatives designed to augment the good-will-generating efforts of optimal-contact programs.

The War Metaphor

Each of the perspectives discussed in this monograph addresses a specific psychological piece of the “counterterrorism puzzle” (Ganor, 2005); each has vulnerabilities as well as points of strength. The flaws of the war metaphor include the massive overcommitment to counterterrorism at the expense of major alternative concerns including the humanitarian value of protecting lives and ensuring the enlightened treatment of prisoners. Much has been written about the outrage in affected communities evoked by killing of innocents, destruction of property, and dislocation of families. All these may create a “boomerang effect” based on a defiance motivation (LaFree & Dugan, 2007), potentially boosting the stock of recruits to terrorism (Kaplan et al., 2005).

An additional drawback of the war metaphor, related to overcommitment of resources that the war concept implies, is the arousal of unreasonable expectations as to the counterterrorism effort's required duration. In case of asymmetrical struggle against insurgents or terrorists, such expectations often involve serious underestimates, breeding general disappointment with the results and a public outcry to discontinue the effort and bring the troops home. Finally, the war metaphor may evoke conflicting and inconsistent expectations derived from the divergent war analogies one may envision (e.g., the Second World War, the Cold War, or the Vietnam War). These may forestall the formulation of a coherent counterterrorism policy and give rise to unhelpful debates based on questionable historical similes.

The Law Enforcement Metaphor

Like the war metaphor, the law enforcement metaphor has some advantages but also potential disadvantages. One of its main advantages is its targeting precision in focusing on actual perpetrators/conspirators who are in violation of the legal code. Such an approach avoids the sense of injustice and attendant outrage that indiscriminate war-related destruction may invite. Relatedly, the targeting precision of law enforcement may allow a separation of the apex of the terrorism pyramid (i.e., actual perpetrators) from its support base (i.e., individuals whose attitudes may be aligned with those of the terrorists but whose actions are in conformity with the law). Such separation may constitute a precondition for driving a wedge between terrorists and their broader community; an obvious advantage of this is the potential for obtaining invaluable human intelligence needed to thwart impending terrorist schemes.

The law enforcement metaphor also has possible disadvantages. Police forces are limited, for example, in their ability to launch the massive strikes that may be occasionally required to cripple terrorists' capability (even if temporarily) and reduce the damage that such capability might afford. Additionally, massive commitment of force communicates resolve and determination, an asset in the battle of wills that counterterrorism typically involves.

A further limitation of the strict law enforcement metaphor is that it neglects the ideological basis of terrorists' struggle. It is that feature of terrorism, after all, that distinguishes it from ordinary crime. In this sense, the rational cost–benefit analysis that decision to collaborate with the police versus the gangs, say, may involve (Akerlof & Yellen, 1994) doesn't fully apply to terrorism. 15 Especially in those cases where a strong ideological bond exists between large segments of the broader society and the militant organization (a bond that may exist between the Palestinian population and Hamas, the Southern Lebanese population and Hezbollah, or the Tamil population and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam [LTTE]), it may be rather difficult to drive a wedge between the community and the militants without addressing the ideological underpinnings of their collaboration. The latter enterprise may necessitate a “struggle of ideas” in attempts to persuade the broader community that terrorism is (a) ineffectual and/or (b) immoral, (c) that there exist alternative superior means (e.g., negotiations, diplomacy) to achieve the goals currently pursued via terrorism, 16 or (d) that those goals (e.g., the dream of a global ummah) are unattainable and in need of adjustment (for discussion, see Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

The Epidemiological Metaphor

An advantage of the epidemiological metaphor (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006) is the linkage of the terrorism problem to the ideological bases of terrorist commitments (the “virus”), their modes of transmission (the “vector”), and the vulnerability factors present in certain segments of society (the “susceptible populations”) that fuel people's readiness to buy into terrorism-warranting ideologies. In this sense, the epidemiological metaphor explicitly recognizes the wide-ranging efforts needed to combat certain (strongly ideologically entrenched) types of terrorist activity as well as the likely protracted nature of the process that might be needed to eradicate it.

Despite its several advantages, the epidemiological metaphor has limitations as well. Whereas the war and law enforcement metaphors that focus on the immediate threat neglect the long-range process of ideological conversion and radicalization, the epidemiological metaphor, focused on the wider picture, neglects the “here and now” of counterterrorism and the value of resolute strikes and intelligence gathering activities needed to counter terrorists' concrete schemes and capabilities.

The epidemiological metaphor may also be faulted for its unilateral emphasis on the perpetrators of terrorism and its neglect of the targeted side's policies and their possible part in offending the Muslim population and fueling its resonance to the terrorist rhetoric. 17 As part of the issue, the negative language of the metaphor that likens the Islamist ideology to a malignant “virus” (as well as the disease metaphor as a whole) might be offensive to adherents of the Islamist ideology, hence inducing resistance to campaigns designed to change their hearts and minds.

The Prejudice-Reduction Frame

The danger of offending groups that use terrorism is avoided by the prejudice-reduction frame, which explicitly locates the terrorism problem at the interface of two communities troubled by deteriorating relations. One advantage of this approach is its appreciation of the dynamic character of intergroup relations and of the potential for a spiraling enmity that leads intergroup communication to break down (Deutsch, 1973), for mutual blame placing, and for the entrenchment of positions behind pernicious stereotypes.

Another advantage of the prejudice-reduction approach is provision of a specific intervention technique that is grounded in the notion of optimal intergroup contact. If applied broadly, such a prejudice-reduction technique might make an appreciable contribution to the lessening of tensions between groups and the opening of minds to more constructive reciprocal approaches (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski, Dechesne, & Erb, 2006). In particular, the possibility of applying the technique to children in school settings at a relatively early age might afford an opportunity to psychologically “immunize” individuals' attitudes (McGuire, 1961) against subsequent conflict-promoting communications.

In fact, some “optimal contact” programs are already under way—for instance, the School Linking Project in Bradford, West Yorkshire, where teenaged students from different backgrounds are brought together for multiple contact experiences in which they work cooperatively on learning projects. This project, which has been underway since 2000 and other similar ones merit careful psychological assessment as to how effective they are at promoting positive intergroup attitudes, how persistent they are, and how resistant they are to radical rhetoric. Substantial evidence that carefully designed prejudice-reduction interventions yield measurable short-term improvement in intergroup relations exists. However, a major gap appears in the literature of applied social psychology: It has yet to be demonstrated that such interventions produce long-term enhancement in intergroup relations and reduction in intergroup violence. Given the current worldwide tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, rigorous research in this area is urgently needed.

For all its benefits, the prejudice-reduction framework, like the previously considered metaphors, captures a particular aspect of the terrorism problem, however important, and inevitably neglects other aspects: First, it is vulnerable to being overridden by other powerful influences, including policies of states (e.g., Britain's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. support for Israel) that may be readily interpreted as anti-Muslim. Thus, even if a positive-contact program manages to instill positive attitudes toward specific members of an out-group, large-scale events on the social and political levels might undermine their generalization to the out-group as a whole.

Second, in context of the positive-contact notion, the prejudice-reduction framework is free of ideological contents. It is mediated by cooperative activities on neutral tasks, such as the jigsaw classroom (Aronson & Bridgman, 1979), and it fails to address the ideological element (radical Islamism and jihadism) that appears essential to the process of radicalization.

Finally, like the epidemiological metaphor, the prejudice-reduction concept cannot address the “here and now” of terrorism and the need to counter specific terrorist schemes and protect societies from the immediate threats that these entail. Thus, the prejudice framework offers a potential long-term solution to one important driver of the psychology of grievance, but it neglects the short-term challenges posed by terrorism; it does not resolve substantive political issues and grievances, does not disable terrorists' methods for addressing such issues, and may only influence the communication channels for disseminating ideological arguments and a radicalized belief system after considerable delay.

Concluding Comments: Paradoxes of Counterterrorism

The counterterrorism metaphors examined in this paper beam a search light (to use a metaphor!) onto diverse aspects of the problem, each illuminating some of its aspects while leaving others in darkness. Jointly, however, they manage to convey the considerable complexity that systematic counterterrorism efforts must encounter.

In part, the complexity stems from the fact that counterterrorist activities that may appear desirable from the standpoint of a given framing of the problem may contradict goals implicit in another metaphor. For instance, the use of military force suggested by the war metaphor might convey one's resolve and determination, cripple a terrorist organization's ability to function, and apply psychological pressure on its members. Yet at the same time it might fuel the outrage of the population affected by the military activity and undermine the objective of reducing their support for terrorists, which are desirable goals from the perspective of the law enforcement metaphor. The same may be said of tough interrogation tactics, ethnic profiling, and discriminatory immigration policies that are compatible with the war metaphor but rather incompatible with the law enforcement metaphor or the long-term goal of reducing prejudice. Negotiating with terrorists may communicate that there are alternative means to their goals outside of terrorism—consistent with the goal of countering the virulent terrorism-encouraging ideology, as suggested by the epidemiological metaphor. Yet negotiating with terrorists also conveys that terrorism is an efficient tactic for the attainment of strategic objectives, thereby encouraging its future use. This is consistent with the terrorist-promoting ideology and inconsistent with implications of the epidemiological approach to counterterrorism. Attempting to treat all varieties of terrorism as crime, suggested by the law enforcement metaphor, may encourage international cooperation in the fight against terrorism but may also contribute to a collaboration between terrorist organizations and forego possible alliances with militant organizations whose activities are consistent with one's own strategic interests—an approach suggested by the war metaphor. 18

As is typically the case with metaphors (Lakoff, 1990), each counterterrorism framing described earlier affords a restricted understanding of the phenomenon. Hence, its unlimited adoption may impose blinders on decision makers' vision, leading to potential pitfalls and producing unintended consequences. From this perspective, a comprehensive approach is called for, based on appreciation of the complex trade-offs that each move in the counterterrorism enterprise may entail. At present, such an integrated counterterrorism policy seems to be lacking in most nations' dealings with terrorism. 19 Ideally, military, law enforcement, and area experts should collaborate and utilize data from social scientists in pertinent disciplines that may contribute to the tactical and strategic decision-making process by highlighting the likely psychological, political, or sociological impact of various counterterrorism initiatives.

Admittedly, setting up of such a collaboration may not be easy. The difficulties of coordination and information sharing between the different intelligence-gathering and law enforcement agencies in the United States received ample commentary and led, in 2005, to establishment of the office of Director of National Intelligence, the effectiveness of which has yet to be determined. No less problematic is utilization by government of academic knowledge. Ariel Merari, an Israeli terrorism expert, noted in 1991 that “For a variety of reasons including resistance to external influences in general and suspicion of academia in particular, government officials have failed to utilize even sound knowledge and competent professional advice of academics” (Merari, 1991, p. 88).

Sixteen years later, in 2007, the situation is somewhat different. There seems at least the will (if not exactly the way) on part of government to draw on pertinent academic knowledge in regards to terrorism. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 wrote into law the establishment of the University Programs under the Division of Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This initiative has led to the establishment of several centers of excellence (COEs) at different U.S. universities, addressing different aspects of terrorism—including its social and behavioral aspects, investigated at The Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START). Thus, an important formal step toward establishing a communication channel between academic research in the behavioral and social sciences and a government agency entrusted with national security has been made. The common task of the COEs and the DHS is to develop ways in which each is continually kept abreast of the other's concerns, questions, and pertinent findings. To be sure, the incorporation of long-term considerations may seem at odds with, or tangential to, current security needs as seen by the government. 20 Indeed, the appreciation of their essential relevance to policy may require a climate change and cultivation of new cadres of security experts whose outlook would be formed through an educational process in which social and psychological aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism constitute an inseparable part and parcel. Training such cadres is a major task confronting the security community these days.