Coalition Formation and Metropolitan Contention: An Analysis of the Politics of Light–Rail Transit in the Twin Cities of Minnesota

Introduction

Light–rail mass transit, despite its newfound popularity in a growing number of metropolitan areas, continues to be both an important and contentious political issue that sometimes brings parties and interests together that would otherwise seldom join forces to advance an agenda. With strong investment in mass transit systems during the beginning of the twentieth century, such projects all but disappeared throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, only to see a rebirth in the late 1960s and 1970s due largely to massive increases in federal funding. Because most privately controlled transit systems built during the early twentieth century could not operate profitably due to inefficiencies, competition, and escalating construction and operating costs, it was not feasible to build and operate rail transit systems without significant public investments (Pickrell, 1992; Gomez–Ibanez, 1996; Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003).

The large–scale entrance of public bodies into the sphere of mass transit by the mid–1960s accompanied heightened political controversy and debate surrounding how the systems would be paid for and who would have to pay for them. the debate continued throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and persists today as dozens of cities from Cleveland to Dallas have built systems from the ground up within the last 10 to 15 years. Not one of these systems has been either built or operated without public subsidies. Moreover, even though they have all relied on public monies, none of the systems are funded in exactly the same way (American Public Transportation Association, 2005; Hess and Lombardi, 2005). Systems in different cities and different states have been built and are operated with a variety of public subsidies derived from local property, sales, gasoline, and payroll taxes, as well as receiving funds from state and federal sources. Nevertheless, as federal support for mass transit fluctuates from year to year, growth in investment and funding has largely come from state and local sources (Hess and Lombardi, 2005).

In this article, I will focus on one such development, the Hiawatha light–rail transit (LRT) 12–mile light–rail system in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area that began operations in 2004. After years of political controversy and debate, state and metropolitan leaders approved the $715 million project in 1998 (Kazuba, 2004a). From this time until the line opened in 2004, however, significant political wrangling over the project occurred between Democrats and Republicans, the executive and legislative branches of the Minnesota state government, urban versus suburban and rural lawmakers, and business and citizens groups. My primary research questions include: (1) What were the types and characteristics of the coalitions that emerged from the debates regarding the Hiawatha light–rail project? (2) What strategies did local, state, and regional governing bodies use to construct and establish powerful coalitions to advance their agendas? (3) What strategies and tactics did the opposition utilize to attempt to derail the project? (4) Finally, why did one coalition ultimately triumph over the other, and what can this tell researchers about both the effectiveness and limitations of coalition–building? I will attempt to answer these questions by constructing a historical narrative of the project, and by utilizing prior research on urban coalitions to assist in analyzing coalition–building activity.

Regional Coalition–Building

Recent research has explored the ways in which different governing bodies and authorities have, both traditionally and more recently, formed coalitions to advance urban interests with varying degrees of success (Benjamin and Nathan, 2001; Orfield, 2002; Rusk, 2003; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom, 2004; Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom, 2005). in particular, Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom (2005) discuss the historical evolution of different coalition–building strategies and proceed to account for why some of them have become less reliable than in the past. in this study, I will combine the insights from these traditional strategies with some of the more recent coalition–building strategies to assist in accounting for the ultimate success of the pro–Hiawatha LRT coalition.

The analysis necessitates a brief discussion of the traditional urban coalition–building strategies as outlined by Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom (2005). Historically, the most important strategy has been party–imposed coalitions constructed by the dominant political party in the city in order to convince the party's legislative caucus to support or further the interests of the city. Typically Democratic, urban political leaders worked to form coalitions with state and local leaders who shared similar interests in regards to education, economic development, and income supports. Historically, New York City, Chicago, and Detroit have all relied upon this method. for instance, former Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley was able to establish a fairly solid power base in the state by collaborating with lawmakers in the economically struggling areas in southern Illinois whose constituencies shared many of the same problems as those of the inner city of Chicago. These types of coalitions have become increasingly tenuous, however, as cities are less likely to dominate party caucuses than in the past. as suburban and exurban areas continue to add residents, the share of urban–based legislators has eroded considerably in the last 30 years. Moreover, rural and urban political interests have also diverged in recent years making coalitions harder to attain (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom, 2005). Finally, lawmakers today are more reliant on campaign contributions than party workers, and this has hindered the success of party–imposed legislative agendas. Given these recent trends, along with the importance of bipartisanship for advancing large infrastructure projects, I do not expect that party–imposed coalitions played a major role in the Hiawatha project.

Second, Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom (2005) discuss interest–based coalitions. Here, leaders form coalitions based on shared interests. Regionalists such as Myron Orfield and David Rusk, in particular, have promoted this strategy among cities and suburbs. Traditionally, interest–based coalitions brought urban lawmakers together with officials from struggling rural areas or other cities. Economic and demographic shifts, however, have weakened these traditional ties, but the same trends could very well strengthen central city and inner–ring suburban coalitions. Indeed, research by Orfield (1997, 2002) has documented that inner–ring suburbs increasingly face the same problems, including job losses, static or declining property values, and heightened poverty, that central cities have faced for decades.

In addition to these trends, because both the central cities and suburbs of the Twin Cities metropolitan area had been experiencing unprecedented levels of traffic congestion during the time of the light–rail debate, and because LRT supporters generally claim that light–rail reduces traffic congestion, I predict that public officials would be more inclined to favor light–rail development in the current metropolitan atmosphere than if traffic congestion was not a large concern. Moreover, I also expect that the presence of two additional political structures—a regional government apparatus, the Metropolitan Council, and the formation of Regional Rail Authorities (both of which will be discussed in more length below)—aided the Hiawatha LRT project for a couple of reasons. First, members of the Metropolitan Council include suburban and urban officials whose purpose is to find regional solutions to regional problems based on shared interests. Second, both of these agencies also had a self–interest in the promotion of the project in that they possessed a level of authority over the funding and administration of the Hiawatha line.

Finally, state and local politics are increasingly influenced by governor–brokered coalitions. Cross–party coalition–building relies heavily on governor involvement, particularly when legislation surrounds major infrastructure projects. Because they represent larger and more diverse constituencies, governors may also act in manners that are less parochial than individual legislators who tend to represent relatively homogenous districts. Governors, regardless of party, may also recognize the importance that cities have on the overall image and economic health of the state. Finally, when political contributions play an ever–increasing role in state politics, governors know not to ignore corporate interests that are often centered in urban areas. Governor–brokered coalitions, however, can have drawbacks for cities especially if the governor's constituency lies in more affluent suburban areas as was the case with George Pataki in New York State. Pataki's support in 1999 of ending the income tax on commuters into New York City, despite meeting harsh criticism from fellow Republican Rudolph Giuliani, has cost the city about $400 million annually (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom, 2005).

Nonetheless, given the attributes listed above, I expect that a governor–brokered coalition in the Twin Cities case would on balance aid the Hiawatha LRT project in that Minneapolis–St. Paul dominates Minnesota politically, socially, and economically. for example, the number of corporate headquarters in the region is substantial, the massive main campus of the University of Minnesota lies in the heart of Minneapolis, and neighboring St. Paul is the state capital. the metropolitan area is also home to the Mall of America, one of the nation's most popular tourist attractions. Ultimately, any governor of Minnesota would be loath to ignore economic, quality of life, and transportation issues in the Twin Cities area.

Growth Machines

Growth machine theory has been a very popular analytical framework in studies of urban governance and development. It is a fairly straightforward concept, which argues that land is a city's central commodity, and that a city's “growth machine”—a coalition of business and government elites—has a mutual interest in its augmentation or maximization (Logan and Molotch, 1987). in this theory business generally takes the lead from which local government officials follow (Domhoff, 2005). Logan and Molotch's understanding of urban power follows a dichotomy in which the business or rentier interests stand at odds with the interests of regular city residents. the division exists because the rentier's primary interest is to maximize the profits or the “exchange–value” derived from properties, while the main concerns of the residents lie in quality–of–life, “use–value” issues such as affordable housing, access to parks and recreation, good schools, and public safety. the theory, along with the majority of research conducted within this area, claims that growth interests generally prevail because they are highly organized and possess institutional power. in general, the growth coalition is foremost composed of realtors and developers, but can easily expand into other industries that benefit from urban intensification and growth such as the banking and insurance sectors, local media companies, universities, utility firms, small business owners, and even certain non–profit agencies including those affiliated with the arts (Whitt, 1988).

Despite studies that have shown that the growth machine can be tempered and that some urban governing coalitions may pursue objectives not congruent with growth interests (Bennett et al., 1988; Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990; DeLeon, 1992; Clark and Goetz, 1994; Hogen–Esch, 2001), researchers generally agree that the most city governments can do in regards to challenging growth interests is by acting as a mediator between the differing parties and developing policies that bring community interests in mind when confronted by growth interests. Along the lines of public transit, studies have examined the support given to rail projects by powerful business groups in major cities who see rail–transit as a way to intensify development and increase property values (Whitt, 1982; Gomez–Ibanez, 1985) and elected officials who view rail–transit as providing increases in capital investments, leading to economic development and job creation (Taylor and Samples, 2002). Given this past research, I expect that city officials in particularly Minneapolis and Bloomington will be some of light–rail's staunchest supporters and will seek to persuade state and federal leaders to support the Hiawatha project.

Methods

This study relies on secondary sources to examine the composition of the competing political, civic, and business groups and officials that constituted the competing coalitions, the arguments for and against the light–rail system, tactics used by the different coalitions, and the overall timeline of the project. I use data from three major sources to examine this process. First, I searched records from the local newspaper, the Minneapolis Star Tribune, over a 13–year period from 1995 to 2007 for material surrounding the politics and development of the Hiawatha LRT project. Second, I examined archived radio transcripts from Minnesota Public Radio broadcasted between the years of 1998 and 2006 that dealt with the project. Third, I consulted reports and commentaries from various government and not–for–profit organizations. This part of the data collection process provided additional information on the various actors involved with the Hiawatha project, their positions, and their arguments both for and against the light–rail system.

I chose the Hiawatha light–rail project in Minneapolis, MN, primarily for theoretical reasons based on the political structure of the region. the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area is one of the few metropolitan areas in the country that has some apparatus of a regional government. the Metropolitan (Met) Council was established in 1967 by the Minnesota legislature to coordinate planning and development within the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area. Widely innovative, the Met Council has developed a governance structure based on municipal cooperation that includes revenue sharing and fair–share housing—policies that focus on infrastructure efficiency and equity between the central cities and suburbs. in addition, members of the Met Council are not elected but appointed by the governor, which should heighten regional cooperation in that members are not beholden to more narrow, parochial issues and the “NIMBYism” that at times come to dominate local politics. in light of this political structure, I expect that the existence and the undertakings of the Met Council benefited the Hiawatha LRT and helped to advance the project.

City and Metropolitan Characteristics

Minneapolis–St. Paul is the leading business, cultural, educational, and political center of a large region in the Upper Midwest. With a diversified economy, population growth in the region has been relatively strong. Metropolitan population increased by 16.9 percent during the 1990s from 2,538,834 to 2,968,806, while the combined central city populations of Minneapolis and St. Paul grew 4.6 percent, from 640,618 to 669,769 during the same period (Brookings Institution, 2003; U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). the metropolitan area's economy is centered around higher education, regional trade, high–tech industries, with a particular concentration in medical instruments, banking and finance, state government, and transportation. With some of the highest levels of education and labor force participation in the country, the region's economic climate is quite healthy. in 2005, the estimated median household income of the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area stood at $58,691, more than 20 percent above that of the United States as a whole at $46,242. However, estimated median household income in the central cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, at $41,829 and $44,103, respectively, stands below that of both the metropolitan area and the United States as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).

City and Metropolitan Politics

Politics in the central cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are dominated by the Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party (DFL). in Minneapolis, out of the 12 mayors since 1945, only two have been Republican. R.T. Rybak, a Democrat, has been the mayor of Minneapolis since 2002. Much of the debate surrounding the Hiawatha LRT, however, began under Mayor Sharon Sayles Belton, the city's first African–American mayor, who held office from 1994 until 2001. Though Chris Coleman is the current mayor in St. Paul, discussions over the Hiawatha LRT began under Mayor Norm Coleman, a former DFLer who later switched parties to become a Republican and then a U.S. Senator. the central cities are safely Democratic and DFL for both federal and state lawmakers, respectively. as might be expected, politics in the metropolitan area as a whole, however, are far more eclectic. Though many of the legislative seats in the older, inner–ring suburbs such as Bloomington, Roseville, Richfield, and Golden Valley are either competitive or largely DFL, Republicans, especially in the highly affluent western suburbs including Minnetonka, Eden Prairie, and Maple Grove, dominate politics in most of the outer–ring suburbs at both the state and federal level (Orfield, 2002).

As stated above, the Twin Cities, however, are unique in that the area is also served by a regional government, the Met Council. While initially focusing on sewage and water problems, it later established an innovative revenue–sharing program within the six–county metropolitan area. the Council has sixteen members, each of whom represents a district, and one additional member, the chair, who serves at large. All members are appointed by the governor (The Metropolitan Council, 2001a). the Council stands out as one of the few multipurpose regional governing bodies in the United States.

The Met Council seeks to establish regional and balanced approaches to development and transportation—approaches that in part seek to curb urban sprawl and decentralization that is seen as detrimental to the fiscal and social health of inner cities (Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann, 2005). the Met Council, by and large, has continued to support regional approaches to development and transportation despite the weakening of its objectives due to changes in leadership that resulted from successive years of more conservative governors such as conservative Democrat Rudy Perphich and moderate Republican Arne Carlson who believed that regionalism infringed upon the rights and autonomy of private property owners, specifically those in the suburbs. Despite the erosion of interest in regional governance and planning during the preceding two decades, the Met Council became an advocate of the Hiawatha LRT late in the Carlson Administration.

The Project

After nearly three decades of freeway expansion and little serious discussion of light–rail by policy makers, in the early 1980s, Hennepin County, of which Minneapolis is the county seat, with other counties following, began buying abandoned rail beds for future transit units. This was possible because Minnesota state law permitted County Boards to establish Regional Rail Authorities that, as separate political entities, could levy taxes to plan rail projects. Commissioners from the metropolitan counties of Hennepin, Ramsey, and Anoka lobbied for their creation in that as freight and passenger rail service declined in the 1960s and 1970s, abandoned rail corridors were increasingly being subdivided and bought up by private parties. Local, state, and federal officials realized that once private parties attained these parcels, it would be increasingly difficult and expensive to buy these properties back for future transit and development projects (Hennepin County, 2007).

The success of the new trolley system in San Diego and other cities also began to convince some rail skeptics that light–rail could be a viable option in Minneapolis–St. Paul. By the early 1990s new transit systems, made possible by huge infusions of federal, state and local funds, had been developed in cities throughout all parts of the country. Indeed, federal spending multiplied from merely $400 million in 1970 to $6 billion in 1980 (in 2002 dollars). Furthermore, because of federal matching grants, states and localities increased their spending from $1.4 billion in 1970 to $4.1 billion (in 2002 dollars) 10 years later. Cities that took advantage of these massive funding outlays included Atlanta, Baltimore, Buffalo, Miami, Portland, Sacramento, and Washington, D.C. Though federal spending declined in the 1980s at the helm of the Reagan Administration, the Surface Transportation Act of 1982 dedicated a penny per gallon as part of the 5–cent hike in federal gasoline taxes to a mass transit fund. These funds were earmarked to fund a grant program that was later expanded to cover capital maintenance costs at the 80 percent matching level. Changes in the grant program during the late 1980s dedicated 40 percent of funds to rail starts and extensions, with another 40 percent to rail modernization projects. the rest of the funds were allocated to bus projects and discretionary expenses (Hess and Lombardi, 2005).

The growing appeal of rail transit, combined with new federal policy encouraging flexibility of federal highway and transit dollars, provided momentum to rail transit by the early 1990s (Pickrell, 1992). Indeed, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 and the Transportation Equity act for the twenty–first century in 1998 allowed greater leeway for states and regions to spend federal money on their most pressing transportation needs regardless of the mode of transportation. Regional and metropolitan planning organizations were also given increased autonomy and responsibility for the specific and favored transportation projects they wished to plan and proceed with (Hess and Lombardi, 2005). With greater federal funding and increased autonomy over transit funds available to the metropolitan area, Twin Cities officials began serious discussions surrounding the construction of an initial bus transit–way with the eventual light–rail line to follow. They, however, could not at first agree on a location of the line. Some officials believed that the line ought to be built along University Avenue, a corridor that connects the downtowns of Minneapolis and St. Paul with the sprawling University of Minnesota campus located in between. Other leaders, however, felt a line along the Hiawatha corridor was the better option as it would connect to the Minneapolis–St. Paul Airport. in addition, the land along the corridor had already been cleared for the now–defunct expressway project (Blake, 1999a).

Involvement of Hennepin County

Hennepin County Commissioner Peter McLaughlin was the leading advocate of light–rail along the Hiawatha corridor in its initial stages and promoted the light–line primary by using interest–based arguments that primarily revolved around traffic congestion—an issue that deeply concerned urban and suburban residents alike. Based on burgeoning discontent over traffic congestion and the inflated costs and disruption of further road and freeway expansion, McLaughlin was confident he could persuade Governor Arne Carlson, a light–rail skeptic, along with the equally skeptical state legislature, to support funding for light–rail planning and construction. of the nearly $500 million that would have to be secured for construction, McLaughlin pegged the local share at over $60 million. Though no one had yet been approached for construction funding, the County assumed that local sources would include the City of Minneapolis, Hennepin County, the City of Bloomington, the Metropolitan Airports Commission, and the Mall of America (Blake, 1997).

Hennepin County would also have to convince the Met Council that light–rail through the Hiawatha corridor would be financially and politically feasible. This would not be a light task as the governor appointed all thirteen members of the Met Council, including the chairmen. Given that the current governor, Arne Carlson, largely opposed light–rail, the leadership in the Met Council could not be counted on to support the project either. Indeed, Met Council Chair Curt Johnson had actually spent the last 20 years with the conservative Citizen League fighting LRT, including earlier plans that would have included rail transit along Interstate 394, which had been built in the 1980s to increase the flow of traffic between downtown Minneapolis and the western suburbs of Hennepin County.

Chairman Johnson, however, emerged as a light–rail supporter by 1998 and Arne Carlson moderated his antirail stance around the same time. Carlson was primarily concerned that light–rail would force a property–tax increase. Johnson argued that the metropolitan area's growing population and traffic congestion, along with the ineffectiveness of the carpool and bus lanes that had been built along Interstate Highway 394 to reduce traffic congestion, necessitated a dramatic policy shift that included LRT along the Hiawatha corridor. He maintained that rapid bus transit should be built first with light–rail following when appropriate funding could be attained (Blake, 1998a).

Hennepin County, in contrast, wanted only light–rail along Hiawatha Avenue and argued that constructing an initial bus transit–way made little sense and would only increase costs (Blake, 1999a). Both County Commissioner McLaughlin and John Caroon, principal planner of the transit project, contended that in the long run light–rail would be a better choice than the bus–way even though the State Transportation Department had already secured the $20 to $25 million needed to construct the bus–way. Caroon explained that in comparison to a bus–way, light–rail would be faster, smoother, and quieter. Furthermore, arguing it would spur business investment and neighborhood renewal throughout the corridor, Minneapolis Mayor Sharon Sayles Belton advocated for LRT over the bus–way (Blake, 1999b). With most of the funds coming from state and federal sources, the city's role in the process would largely surround making decisions in regard to the locations of the light–rail stations.

U.S. Democratic Representatives Martin Sabo and James Oberstar held key House leadership posts and encouraged lawmakers to agree on transit plans. Sabo, a long–time representative from Minneapolis who had been known as one of the House's most liberal members, had been a staunch supporter of public programs that address inner–city concerns. Oberstar, a representative in northeastern Minnesota's struggling Iron Range, shared many of the same liberal views as Sabo—views that are amicable toward public investment in city infrastructure, including light–rail (Olson, 2004).

In April of 1998 with County Commissioner McLaughlin leading the fight, the Minnesota legislature passed the first bonding bill allocating $40 million for the Hiawatha LRT. Albeit rather reluctantly, Governor Arne Carlson agreed to sign it. Carlson's spokesperson stated, “he needs a comfort zone for the expenses of this proposal. He needs to know this won't fall back on the taxpayers as a tax increase. No way is this a done deal” (Karlson, 1998, p. 1A). At the time the 12–mile line was estimated to cost about $465 million. About a year later, in May 1999, state legislators passed a second bill that included another $60 million for the rail line.

Ventura and the Governor–Brokered Coalition

While Hennepin County, using interest–based arguments surrounding traffic congestion, provided crucial backing of the project initially, Governor Jesse Ventura subsequently saved light–rail from being scrapped by a divided legislature. Reflecting key aspects of governor–brokered coalitions, Ventura, in part, framed light–rail as a project that would enhance the competitiveness and image of Minnesota as a whole. Furthermore, Ventura, by appointing new members of the Met Council favorable to light– rail, consolidated support for LRT. According to a survey conducted by Minnesota Public Radio, the public, by and large, supported Governor Ventura's stance on transportation over that of the Republican–controlled House that opposed LRT. Therefore, Ventura also had a fairly strong case to present to the state legislature. ¹

In order to secure federal funds, it was necessary for the Minnesota legislature to first allocate sufficient state resources for light–rail. Federal funding must always be in the equation for light–rail projects due to their immense cost (American Public Transportation Association, 2005; Transit Research Board, 2003). in the fall of 1999 Governor Ventura, the new Ventura–appointed Met Council Chair Ted Mondale, and State Transportation Commissioner Elwyn Tinklenberg sent a formal request for $274 million in federal matching funds for the Hiawatha LRT. in addition to this request, through various grants, Twin Cities legislators, working with other state and metropolitan officials, were able to deliver federal funds worth $382.5 million which covered a substantial portion of the project's enormous cost. a specific breakdown of light–rail funding will be discussed later in the article.

Political Contention

The securing of state and federal funds did not come without a fight. in November of 1999, several Minnesota legislators set up plans to rescind $60 million in funding already allocated to Hiawatha. Similarly, two GOP plans appeared before the Minnesota House Transportation Committee in 2000. Representative Phil Krinkie, a Republican from suburban Shoreview, laid out a proposal that sought to cancel $100 million toward light–rail from a deal made the prior year. After this measured failed in the legislature, Krinkie sued the state in order to collect additional financial information while demanding a cost–benefit analysis from the Met Council and the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Kazuba, 2000). Krinkie's suit alleged that the Ventura Administration did not comply with a state law that mandated a cost–benefit analysis on any project worth $5 million or greater (Blake, 2000). Krinkie's lawsuit against Ventura, however, was dismissed in court, and he was unable to even convince GOP leaders in the Minnesota House not to repeal the cost–benefit analysis law that he had coauthored specifically to force increased fiscal scrutiny of the project (Kazuba, 2000).

Other opponents attempted to derail the Hiawatha LRT including House Committee Chairwomen Carol Malnau, a Republican from affluent, suburban Chaska, and Republican Representative Tim Pawlenty of suburban Eagan. Malnau's proposal consisted of building cheaper bus–transit lanes and shelving the rail project all together. Pawlenty, who would later become governor after Ventura, sponsored a provision in the Minnesota House calling for a referendum on the Hiawatha project. the referendum would allow Hennepin County voters to decide the fate of the project. Pawlenty argued that enough unanswered questions regarding the proposed project remained—justifying a public vote. the provision, however, was not included in the necessary Senate bill, and thus the referendum did not proceed (Whereatt, 2000). in the end, though powerful Republicans in the House opposed the project, they found their hands increasingly tied in that Ventura promised to veto any legislation that would cut funds for the Hiawatha LRT (Radil, 2000).

Opposition to the Hiawatha project largely stemmed from its perceived costliness. Republican lawmakers noted that when the Hiawatha LRT was proposed in 1997, the Minnesota Transportation Department estimated the project's cost at $465 million. By 1999, however, the cost had inflated to $548 million. Certain state legislators were not the only parties opposed to the Hiawatha project. the Taxpayers League of Minnesota, a relatively powerful, conservative public policy and advocacy organization founded in 1997 by a group of wealthy entrepreneurs in suburban Minneapolis, lobbied intensively against the rail project. the organization, headed by David Strom, argued that the hundreds of millions of dollars projected to be spent on the light–rail project could be put to better use by improving roads and highways, or by not being spent at all (Taxpayers League of Minnesota, 2005).

Construction Begins

Despite the politically organized and tenacious opposition, construction on the Hiawatha LRT began on January 17, 2001. as a celebration and media event, a ceremonial golden spike was driven into the ground by a gathering of Minneapolis officials on December 10, 2001. Present and speaking at the event included Governor Jesse Ventura, U.S. Representative Martin Sabo, Hennepin County Commissioner Peter McLaughlin, Minneapolis Mayor Sharon Sayles Belton, Metropolitan Council Chair Ted Mondale, and State Commissioner of Transportation Elwyn Tinklenberg (Minnesota Historical Society, 2001). a clear coalition of supporters was present at both ceremonies heralding the project's fruition as well as the planned final product as a vitally important public investment that would strengthen the entire region. for example, Ventura's sense of accomplishment and enthusiasm for the Hiawatha project was clear in his speech at the groundbreaking ceremony. He asserted that:

The reality of light–rail will make the Twin Cities region and the entire state of Minnesota more competitive in the 21^st century. This morning will be forever remembered in Minnesota history. This moment has been waiting to happen for more than 30 years. the Hiawatha light–rail line is happening today because the public demanded more transportation choices and because many people have worked hard and kept their sights focused. Congratulations to everyone who has remained dedicated despite the roadblocks and bureaucratic games some people chose to play at the public's expense. (Minnesota Historical Society, 2001)

Ventura's positions reflect core aspects of governor–brokered coalition in that he united LRT supporters and argued that light–rail would improve the image and competitiveness of Minneapolis–St. Paul and therefore of Minnesota as a whole. There are other reasons why Ventura supported LRT. for example, Ventura was the mayor of the struggling, inner–ring suburb of Brooklyn Park before he became governor. It is plausible that as mayor of a city experiencing challenging demographic and economic trends, Ventura was attracted to ideas and methods for strengthening existing communities of which LRT is often promoted. Ventura also claims to be a long–time environmentalist and a staunch advocate of “smart growth” development that focuses on density, mixed used developments, and walkability—positions that would lend one to support light–rail development and public transit as a whole (On the Issues, 2007).

Development Interests

Urban redevelopment was certainly on the mind of Mayor Sayles Belton, who, in part, promoted the Hiawatha line as an important catalyst for development in downtown Minneapolis. the synergy would be centered around a new downtown train station—a Minneapolis version of Grand Central Station that would connect the Hiawatha line to the planned suburban Northstar commuter line (Mack, 2001). the Minnesota Department of Transportation had already been planning a station in a location near to a potential baseball stadium, but Sayles Belton believed the downtown station would be more visible to commuters and encourage transit ridership. It would be expected that the downtown station would also spur activity, increase foot traffic, and, in turn, attract more customers to downtown shops and restaurants. Sayles Belton was not the only mayor who worked to support the project. Mayors Coral Houle and Gene Winstead of suburban Bloomington also provided important backing for the project (Minnesota Historical Society, 2001). Bloomington, the largest suburb of Minneapolis–St. Paul and site of the Mall of America, would stand to benefit tremendously as public officials widely believed that the LRT would spur development around the massive shopping and entertainment complex.

Private landowners and companies would also stand to benefit widely from the Hiawatha, including several individuals with ties to Minneapolis city government and the Met Council. One of the key players involved in development around the line was Steve Minn, who served as a member of the Minneapolis City Council from 1994 to March of 1999. While he served as State Public Service Commissioner from 1999 to 2000, afterward he concentrated on real estate development for Lupe Development Inc. By 2004 he was working with Bob Long, a former St. Paul City Council member on a $24 million development near the Lake Street/Midtown station that included two four–story buildings, underground parking, and 114 housing units. Long was primarily involved with the retail portion of the development. Critics of the project contend that their inside knowledge of local government provided them with important information regarding funding sources that was not available to other, less–connected firms (Kazuba, 2004b).

Another prominent developer with plans along the LRT corridor was Steve Wellington. a member of the Met Council from 1993 to 1999 and a long–time property manager, Wellington is the President of Wellington Management Inc. He secured a purchase agreement to buy a struggling shopping center adjacent to the Lake Street/Midtown station (Lake Street is a major mixed–use commercial corridor in South Minneapolis). Because of the strategic location, Wellington would be a strong candidate for public money when redevelopment proceeded. Indeed, Wellington contends that public subsidies for his project would be necessary given the complexity of the project site. Though Wellington left his post in the Met Council before Governor Ventura made the project a priority, project skeptics, including firms without the same connections to local government, argued that Wellington received unfair advantages from City Hall and Hennepin County—the major providers of public subsidies for the project (Kazuba, 2004b).

Other developments in the works near the LRT line include those of two companies with connections to Richard Brustad, a high profile developer at City Hall and cofounder of Brighton Development Corp. Brustad has long ties to city government after serving as a planner in the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority from 1966 to 1969, the executive director of the Minneapolis Housing Redevelopment Authority from 1972 to 1978, and chairman of the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority from 1991 to 1999. Brustad's company is developing projects near the Downtown East/Metrodome station and near the transit station at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in South Minneapolis. the downtown project includes condominiums starting at $300,000, publicly subsidized housing, and a parking ramp built with $2.6 million of state money. His project in South Minneapolis consists of a 146–unit housing project for veterans next to the light–rail station at the Veterans Affairs hospital. State money will pay for the majority of the $11.9 million project (Kazuba, 2004b).

Finally, development is likely on six high–priority parcels of land owned by the Met Council. These parcels are part of nearly 360 total parcels that the Minnesota Department of Transportation assembled in the 1970s when the department was planning a major freeway project along Highway 55/Hiawatha Avenue. as stated earlier in the article, those plans were derailed by neighborhood activists. the six high–profile parcels provide crucial land required for the mixed–use, transit–oriented developments sought by the Met Council and Minneapolis city officials (Clements, 2005).

In all, the Met Council, the City of Minneapolis, and other public bodies have contended that the Hiawatha LRT is responsible for the construction of 7,000 new housing units near the line and massive redevelopment projects such as the $600 million Bloomington Central Station project near the Mall of America by McGough Development of St. Paul. Touted as the state's first major transit–oriented development, the Bloomington project, which lies on 45 acres, contains two 17–story towers, 1,000 housing units, a 700–room hotel and resort, and one million square feel of office space (Williams, 2003). Numerous developers, however, have noted that many of their projects would have proceeded with or without the LRT line (Borger, 2004).

Hiawatha Rolls off the Line

After years of debate, considerable delay—including disputes between the Minnesota Department of Administration and the Minnesota Department of Transportation over no–bid contracts (Browning and Doyle, 2003), controversy and disagreements over the route of the line that would pass through historic Fort Snelling, and numerous threats by legislators of eliminating the project all together—the Hiawatha LRT launched its first trip down the twelve–mile corridor on June 25, 2004. Total costs for the project amounted to $715 million with $334 million coming from the Federal Transit Administration New Starts Program, $121 million from the State of Minnesota, $87 million from the Metropolitan Airports Commission, and $84 million from the Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority. in addition, Hiawatha received a $43 million Federal Surface Transportation Project grant, a $5.5 million Federal Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality grant, and a $20 million grant from the state transportation department (Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota, 2001; Newberg, 2004).

Funding for the operation of the Hiawatha LRT comes from a variety of sources. Operating costs between May 2004 and May 2005—the first year of operations—amounted to $18.5 million, of which $5 million or roughly 27 percent came from transit fares. Given that this figure was lower than what officials had expected despite the popularity of the system, Metro Transit was prompted to raise monthly rail passes (which also include bus service) from $40 to $78 (Blake, 2005). in 2005, the Hiawatha line carried a total of 7.9 million passengers and had a weekday ridership average of 24,000. These figures are 58 percent higher than preconstruction estimates (The Metropolitan Council, 2006a). However, cities have been known to underestimate ridership projections, including St. Louis, which saw ridership the year it opened in 1993 triple that of the projections (Economist, 2004).

Discussion and Conclusions

The Hiawatha LRT case clearly illustrates the combination of interest–based and governor–brokered strategies for coalition–building as well as certain elements of growth machine theory. Peter McLaughlin and Hennepin County took the lead in fighting for the project initially by using interest–based arguments to expand the pro–transit coalition.

Hennepin County primarily pointed to intensifying traffic congestion and the impracticality of further freeway expansion as key arguments for the necessity of LRT. the Met Council became a rail convert in 1998 and pointed to the deepening traffic congestion and the ineffectiveness of carpool and bus–lanes for reducing congestion as the basis for their prorail arguments. It is not surprising that both Hennepin County and the Met Council used traffic congestion as their primary method for building a coalition of LRT supporters. Traffic congestion represented a common interest among suburban and urban residents alike, and throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s residents in the metropolitan area overwhelmingly stated that transportation was the most important issue facing the Twin Cities area (Metropolitan Council, 2006b). ² in addition to the growing numbers of suburban residents facing increasing delays and frustrations over traffic problems, because the Hiawatha LRT would run through Minneapolis, Richfield, and Bloomington—all cities in Hennepin County—it is not surprising that the County became the initial supporter of the project.

Hennepin County and the Met Council needed to convince the state legislature to approve plans and this is where the governor–brokered coalition became important. Shortly before ending his final term Arne Carlson weakened his opposition to light–rail, saying “it's inevitable that we'll have to get into it” (Blake, 1998b, p. 1A). Light–rail, nonetheless, did not really get off the ground until Governor Ventura stepped into office. Ventura's support for the project reflects the literature in that governors, aware that the image of a state's major city reflects on the entire state, often support policies that they think will enhance the economic and/or cultural stature of the state's major city or cities (Rusk, 2003; Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom, 2005).

As a member of the Independence Party, Ventura may have had an easier time negotiating and drawing a consensus with state lawmakers than if a Republican or a DFLer had held this post. State support, in turn, was necessary for securing any level of federal funding by Minnesota's congressional delegation, specifically funds that were fought for by Martin Sabo and James Oberstar. Conversely, Governor Pawlenty was not the light–rail advocate that his predecessor was, and attempted unsuccessfully to cut the level of state funding for the operation of the LRT, which would have left the City of Minneapolis and Hennepin County to foot more of the bill for the ongoing operations of the Hiawatha LRT. Pawlenty's attitude toward LRT, however, improved after Hiawatha showed relatively strong ridership numbers, and he is continuing to advocate for the Northstar commuter rail line to the northwest suburbs as a vital economic development and congestion ameliorating tool.

Governors have typically been heavily involved in LRT expansion in other states. in the mid–1970s, former Oregon Governor Bob Straub helped to kill the Mount Hood freeway project in Portland and diverted those funds into mass transit. This set into motion plans for Portland's light–rail system, MAX (The Register Guard, 2002). Moreover, Neil Goldschmidt, before he was governor and Secretary of Transportation in the Carter Administration, pushed for light–rail as the mayor of Portland during the same period (Robertson, 1998). Finally, John Kitzhaber, governor from 1995 to 2003, fought for the expansion of the MAX system during the 1990s, which included an 18–mile rail extension into suburban Beaverton and Hillsboro (Mapes, 1998).

Utah's experience with LRT largely mirrors that of Portland. Throughout his tenure from 1993 to 2003, former Governor Mike Leavitt staunchly supported light–rail construction throughout the Greater Salt Lake City area. Leavitt pressed skeptical state and federal legislators to support the $300 million commuter rail line from suburban Sandy to downtown Salt Lake City. This included having closed–door sessions with U.S. Representatives Jim Hansen and Enid Waldholtz to work out transportation issues (Harrie, 1995). the line was eventually built, but throughout 1998 and 1999 Leavitt was forced to continue cajoling the skeptical legislature when he desired a $480 million, 10.9 mile extension poised to begin operations in 2002 (Van Eyck, 1999). Leavitt's second drive was also successful and his successors, Olene Walker and Jon Huntsman, continued to work with other lawmakers to expand the TRAX system during their tenures. the Utah governors contended that light–rail reduced air pollution and traffic congestion, spurred economic growth in the region, and improved land management and urban development practices.

Similar to Portland and Salt Lake City, governor–brokered coalitions in the Hiawatha LRT case were vital to the cause of light–rail. However, the Hiawatha case does not provide much evidence for the party–imposed strategy for coalition–building. Indeed, the election of Ventura himself points to the weakness of the major parties in Minnesota! While certainly there were individual lawmakers in both the Minnesota DFL and Republican parties that lobbied for their respective positions, there is little evidence that the leadership in either party drove the discussion. At best it was powerful individuals in the federal delegation including Martin Sabo and James Oberstar who pressured local lawmakers to agree on a plan, not leaders of the state parties. Indeed, the chance of receiving federal funding for LRT probably encouraged lawmakers to cooperate and form coalitions with partners that in other circumstances would be fairly unlikely (i.e., lawmakers from wealthy suburban areas working with inner–city business groups and public officials).

Some possible explanations for the lack of party involvement might include the fact that LRT had not historically been on the radar screen for either the DFLers or the state Republicans alike. in addition, though the DFL is very strong in the central cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, many of their leaders represented other DFL strongholds in relatively rural districts in the Iron Range and in struggling agricultural districts in the Minnesota River and Red River Valleys. in these areas highway funding and freight–rail are the most important transportation issues, not public mass–transit. Indeed, Hennepin County, the Met Council, and Governor Ventura were the key drivers of the rail plan, not the state legislature.

The actions of the City of Minneapolis, the Met Council, and Hennepin County illustrate some elements of growth machine theory, while challenging it in other ways. Both the Met Council and Hennepin County had direct economic interests in the Hiawatha LRT. for example, the Met Council controlled strategic parcels of land adjacent to Hiawatha Avenue and the LRT. Furthermore, not only did the Met Council have considerable ties to the development community, many of the Council's former members were developers themselves. Those parcels proved very lucrative for both the Met Council and the well–connected developers, many of whom received substantial public subsidies for their projects. Furthermore, the County's regional rail authority controlled many former rail lines that could be used for future light–rail development as well as significant parcels of land adjacent to the lines. If light–rail proceeded, the county rail authority could put its taxing authority to work and strengthen its organizational position.

Despite having a metropolitan revenue sharing program in which 40 percent of the increase in commercial and industrial valuation in post–1971 properties is placed into a common fund and is then subsequently dispersed among the different metropolitan municipalities (Martin, 1998), light–rail opponents still alleged that Minneapolis would be the primary economic beneficiary of the project. Had the Met Council and Hennepin County used economic arguments to advance LRT, this would have only compounded suburban and conservative opposition. This speaks to the limitations of growth machine theory in that while many property owners directly along the line championed the project as an economic boon, the weak support among many suburban officials suggests that many of their constituents, including land owners, believed that the light–rail would not lead to economic development in their communities. Finally, while growth machine theory argues that business takes the lead while government follows suit (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Domhoff, 2005), in the case of the Hiawatha LRT, government bodies were the initial backers of light–rail. to be sure, the complexity and financial resources involved in transportation projects require government to be in a position of authority.

In addition, unlike the Met Council and Hennepin County, Mayor Sayles Belton's emphasis on the economic development benefits of the LRT illustrate that the City, while certainly not bereft of building support among important private partners such as the Minneapolis Downtown Council, by and large did not make a concerted effort to build regional support for the Hiawatha LRT. This finding is similar to previous research that finds that mayors of large cities seldom lead the way in regional cooperation and metropolitan reform (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom, 2005).

Despite the City of Minneapolis's lack of effort in regard to regional coalition–building, the pro–Hiawatha coalition was successful in its agenda. Government opposition to the Hiawatha project was largely centered in the Republican–controlled Minnesota House while the Taxpayers League represented the key nongovernmental opponent. Both bodies believed that LRT would be neither cost effective nor practical for relieving traffic congestion. Through lawsuits and an attempted referendum, opponents sought to kill the project. Though Pawlenty initially opposed the project as a state legislator, when he entered the executive office the project was well underway, leaving lawmakers to simply debate the extent to which Hennepin County and the City of Minneapolis should pay for its ongoing operation. in the end, though at times fierce, the anti–LRT coalition could not take on Hennepin County, the Met Council, the City of Minneapolis, the Minnesota Senate, and Governor Ventura.

With both Governors Arne Carlson and Tim Pawlenty shifting their positions to eventually back LRT, this example adds to the limitations that many governor–brokered coalitions may possess. While the literature (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom, 2005) discusses that governors may often fail to support policies that cities view as priorities, it neither discusses the instances in which, nor the reasons for why the policy preferences of governors can shift over time. Because of this, the instability of governor–brokered coalitions should clearly be noted.

More research, however, could be useful for examining coalition–building in other policy areas outside of transportation. for example, how would the components of coalition–building in areas of land management, water, and fair housing differ from those of transportation projects? These cases would most likely present greater challenges due to NIMBYism and other quality of life factors, but future research ought to look at examples in which challenges can be partially overcome or at least tempered. Further research could also examine governor involvement in other policy areas affecting metropolitan development and challenges between cities and counties. for example, while Hennepin County and the City of Minneapolis were largely of one mind in regard to LRT, counties often forge policies that cities see as detrimental to their own wellbeing. This is especially evident in land development, and future research could look for instances in which counties and cities have come to an agreement on certain terms regarding growth or other metropolitan issues and how this was achieved.

Along with increases in fuel prices and in many areas tolls, with traffic congestion continuing to intensify, public transit could be the issue at which suburban and urban lawmakers and constituencies could increasingly convene. in turn, cooperation in this regard could potentially lead to greater cooperation in other issues such as housing and natural resource management. Though certain urban officials may see regional cooperation as a threat to their political autonomy, cities, with their relatively precarious financial circumstances and weak tax bases compared to the surrounding suburbs, have the most to gain from increased regional cooperation. as we have seen in the case of the Hiawatha LRT, however, federal and state involvement is also a vital component for many urban projects, and if cities and suburbs can find ways to cooperate in order to secure federal support, this should further strengthen their economic positions and thus the services that they can provide to their residents, adding to the livability and well–being of both urban and suburban residents alike.