Applying the Psychology of Science to the Science of Psychology: Can Psychologists Use Psychological Science to Enhance Psychology as a Science?

PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE

Probably the reason why there are so many psychological specialties is that almost any phenomenon can become the subject of psychological inquiry. The minimal requirement is that the phenomenon is (a) the effect of a psychological variable, (b) the cause of a psychological variable, or (c) both (i.e., the causal relation between two psychological variables). These variables may be behavioral, cognitive, or affective and may operate anywhere between the micro level (e.g., single neurons in the brain) and the macro level (e.g., a whole nation at war), albeit most psychologists study variables that operate at the individual level between these extremes.

Given this condition, science surely qualifies as a phenomenon worthy of psychological. Science certainly is an effect of psychological variables (e.g., problem-solving expertise), has consequences for psychological variables (e.g., superstitious beliefs), and involves the causal interplay of numerous psychological variables (e.g., personality and intelligence). The psychology of science merely involves the psychological study of science using theoretical frameworks and methodological techniques comparable with those used in other psychological specialties. The fact that researchers are using psychological science to study science does not in anyway undermine the validity of the enterprise.

The psychology of science was born with the 1874 publication of Francis Galton's English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture. Just a little more than a century after Galton's classic, Fisch (1977) published a review of the extensive research that had already been published in this area. The field has grown substantially since then (Feist & Gorman, 1998; Webster, 2008), and it now includes book-length treatments (e.g., Gholson, Shadish, Neimeyer, & Houts, 1989; Shadish & Fuller, 1994; Simonton, 1988). The most notable of the latter is Feist's (2006) The Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific Mind, winner of the 2006 William James Book Award. Since 2006, the area has had a society devoted to the subject (the International Society for the Psychology of Science and Technology) that holds biannual conferences. In 2008, the society started publishing its own journal (Journal of Psychology of Science and Technology). As the new journal's editor noted in the opening editorial, “the psychology of science has arrived” (Feist, 2008, p. 2).

Needless to say, the psychology of science is almost as rich in significant research questions as is psychology as a whole. Even so, many of these questions are only of value to particular subdisciplines or specialties. For example, it is extremely important to learn how children develop scientific concepts or how adolescents acquire the capacity to make scientific inferences. But although such empirical findings may contribute to the body of work known as psychological science, they may not necessarily render psychological research more scientific. And it is the latter possibility I wish to emphasize here. Some of the investigations in the psychology of science try to fathom the psychology of doing great science. These empirical and theoretical inquiries may be grouped into the following four subdisciplines:

1. Cognitive psychology of science: What are the mental processes that contribute to scientific discovery? What cognitive factors underlie the creation of high-impact work? What cognitive factors operate in deciding a publication's influence? Can content analytical methods be used to predict the most likely impact of a scientist's research? What about contrasts across domains? For instance, is there a one-size fits-all creative procedure, or is creativity domain-specific? If the latter, how are the mental processes differentiated in various domains? Do psychologists think differently than physicists? And should they?

2. Differential psychology of science: How do high-impact scientists differ from their less-influential colleagues with respect to key intellectual and personality variables? Are there differences regarding intelligence, cognitive style, the Big-Five personality factors, motives, vocational interests, or basic values? Do these discriminating variables have differential relevance depending on the specific domain of scientific creativity? To what extent do these variables have a genetic foundation? Is it possible to speak of someone having a talent for science? If so, can someone have a talent for conducting research in psychological science?

3. Developmental psychology of science: To what degree are the predictors of scientific creativity based on early environmental influences? Is family background important, and if so what is the relative impact of shared and nonshared experiences? What should parents do and not do in fostering any scientific talents displayed by their children? How does education and training affect creative development in science? How can the influence of role models and mentors be maximized? Finally, how does the creative career typically unfold in a given scientific domain? At what age should we start expecting high-impact work, when will a scientist attain his or her career peak, and at what point can we meaningfully speak of a creative decline? Are there ways to retard the rate of that decline?

4. Social psychology of science: Is creative development partly a function of the larger sociocultural milieu? Is it easier to foster creativity in science when a young talent grows up in a scientific golden age? What kind of interpersonal relationships are most likely to promote the full realization of a scientist's creative potential? Are collaborators essential? Does competition help or hinder? What persuasion techniques enable scientists to maximize their disciplinary impact? What is the optimal way to convince colleagues of your ideas? And what about those “big-science” domains in which creativity emerges out of the large research laboratories? Just as there are variables that predict individual impact, can we identify the factors that are most likely to predict the emergence of high-impact research from such enduring collaborative groups? Under what circumstances will the whole be greater or less than the sum of its parts?

Lastly, how do the answers to all of the foregoing questions change over time? As a scientific discipline becomes better established and more rigorous, will we see telltale signs in the psychological constitution of its practitioners? When a discipline experiences some crisis of self confidence owing to the failure of popular paradigm, what kind of scientists should we be looking for to save the day?

POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS

For the purposes of argument, let me assume that these questions all have scientific answers. In principle, identifying the cognitive, differential, developmental, and social conditions, correlates, or predictors of high-impact science is no different than teasing out the variables associated with any other criterion, whether social adjustment, grade-point average, job performance, altruistic behavior, or subjective well-being. In point of fact, researchers have already tackled almost all of the questions raised in the previous section (for integrative reviews, see Simonton, 2003, 2004). Then, given this assumption, I can suggest at least three ways that results from the psychology of science can be applied to making psychology a better science:

1. Identification: Standard ability tests are routinely used to identify scientific talent, but what should we do if certain personality traits and developmental experiences turn out to have incremental predictive validity over and above that attributable to ability measures? What if these additional variables allow us to determine the scientific domain to which a young talent is most likely to make a contribution? Should prospective scientists be asked to take personality, value, and interest inventories as well as fill out biographical inventories? If it proves impractical to implement these more comprehensive assessments in the selection process for undergraduate or graduate admissions, what about the possibility of offering such measures as part of the repertoire available at the career counseling center? Why not allow persons to identify the domains in which they are most likely to maximize their creative potential?

2. Education: The psychology of science can also contribute to the training of future practitioners of psychological science. If cognitive psychologists eventually succeed in working out the procedures that optimize scientific problem solving, then it makes sense to incorporate these findings in research courses that cover the scientific method. And if it so happens that there are some contrasts across domains in the creative process, then this training can be tailored accordingly. Another example comes from empirical inquiries into the work habits of high-impact scientists (reviewed in Simonton, 2004). This research can be used to address such questions as: Should I work on one project at a time, or should I work on two or more projects simultaneously? Should I keep up on the research literature outside my specialty area, or should I concentrate my reading solely on the one or two journals that publish research in my area? Should I give up all my hobbies—like listening to music, reading poetry, or playing tennis—in order to devote even more time to pumping out research articles?

3. Evaluation: The psychology of science can help psychologists evaluate psychology's progress as a scientific enterprise. It has the potential to provide concrete, even quantitative answers to the question: How are we doing? For instance, suppose that researchers were able to tease out the general characteristics of high-impact journal articles, such as articles that earned their authors Nobel prizes in physics, chemistry, physiology/medicine, or economics. But suppose, too, that the articles that received the most citations in the psychological literature had totally discrepant features. Wouldn't the discrepancy make us wonder whether we're doing science right? Wouldn't it be possible that these contrasts might lead to suggestions on how to make appropriate changes in graduate education and publication conventions? In a parallel fashion, what if the cognitive, differential, developmental, and social factors associated with a scientist's eminence in these same disciplines were strikingly different from those associated with eminence as a psychologist? At the minimum, shouldn't that difference make us ponder whether psychology programs might make some changes in the identification or training of future researchers in psychological science?

These potential applications alone should suffice to motivate many psychologists to conduct research on the psychology of science.

I realize that some Perspectives on Psychological Science readers and even fellow contributors to this special issue may feel that I've grossly cheated. After all, the editor's original charge was for each contributor to identify “the biggest one or two questions in their field that they hope to see answered in the foreseeable future. What questions or questions will most advance your field, or psychology in general?” (Ed Diener, personal communication, November 7, 2007). Haven't I raised dozens upon dozens of issues rather than just one or two? No, not at all! I've only asked one really awesome question: Can psychologists use psychological science to enhance psychology as a science? Because that sentence only counts as one question, I am even permitted under the guidelines to ask a second: “And will we do it?” From my perspective on psychological science, I cannot imagine two questions any bigger.