The legacy of Habermas

From the structural transformation of the public sphere to the theory of communicative action

As a rule, Habermas’ historical-sociological dissertation Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit from 1962 is referred to as his first major work and his breakthrough work. This is where the ideas of the gradual establishment of a relatively free public sphere with conversations about culture, literature, and politics among citizens in Europe's cities emerges as a forum for enlightenment and opinion-making.

However, it took some years for this major work to really spread outside (at that time) West Germany. In Scandinavia, a translation into Norwegian was published in 1971 under the title “Borgerlig offentlighet” (“Bourgeois public sphere”). However, an English translation did not appear until 1989 (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society), and a French one in 1979 (L'espace public: Archéologie de la publicité comme dimension constitutive de la société bourgeoise).

Actually, it was Habermas’ philosophical writings from the following years that first attracted greater international attention. They were also the writings and ideas that led to the development of the main components of his theory of communicative action and communicative rationality, deliberative democracy, and discourse ethics. These were formulated in texts published between the years 1963 and 1968, some of which were later published in Der Positivismusmesstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Adorno et al., 1972), others in Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie (Habermas, 1968a).

The main figures in the positivism controversy were Karl Popper and Hans Albert on the one hand, and Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas on the other. The title of Habermas’ 2nd paper was: “Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus. Erwiderung eines Pamphlets” (Habermas, 1964). This expresses the essence of his positivist critique. The positivist delimitation of science leaves half of life, values, politics, and morality to the darkness of irrationality, the one-sided worship of Weber's Zweckrationalität (purposive rationality). In Weber's words, it leads to “Kämpfe zwischen ‘Gott’ und Teufel” when it comes to values such as justice and morality. This was not epistemologically well-founded, nor was it in accordance with ideals of enlightenment, freedom, and personal autonomy, according to Habermas.

This theme runs like a red thread through the rest of Habermas’ thought, that is, through “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie” (Habermas, 1968b, English 1970), Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968a), English 1971) and on to the critique of functionalist rationality in the never-ending debate with Niklas Luhmann in Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie – Was leistet die Systemforschung? Habermas & Luhmann (1971) and on to the Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981, English vol. I, 1984, vol. II 1987). The positivism critique also included a critique of positivism and nomothetic science as universally applicable epistemological ideals for all sciences. Habermas argued for a pluralistic understanding founded on openings towards hermeneutics, phenomenology, and philosophy of language as epistemological foundations for the cultural and action sciences.

Habermas, therefore, sought a broader and more differentiated concept of rationality. At an early stage in Erkenntnis und Interesse Habermas introduced a philosophical anthropological model with a division into three knowledge leading interests: technical, practical, and emancipatory, corresponding to three scientific forms and disciplines. However, he rather quickly downplays this solution in favor of a language theory rooted in pragmatism, Wittgenstein, and speech act theory (Austin, Searle), combined with reconstructions of previous positions in the social sciences and humanities.

These works are collected in the works Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (1970, English: On the Logic of the Social Sciences, 1988) and Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus (1976, English: Communication and the Evolution of Society, 1979).

Here we also find the important text: “Was heißt Universalpragmatik?” in which Habermas presents the division between the three forms of validity (cognitive) truth, (moral) rightness, and (authentic) sincerity with corresponding types of speech acts and ontological domains. Habermas later renamed the model “formal pragmatics” in order to downplay pretensions about universality.

A final component of this fundamental work is the critique of Marx's historical materialism that Habermas advances in both Erkenntnis und Interesse and in Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus. In general, Habermas is critical of any teleological, unilinear, and deterministic philosophy or theory of history. History is not “suitable for theory.” In addition, Marx is criticized for lacking concepts of language and linguistically mediated interaction.

The entire unfolding and synthesis of these critical reconstructions of wide-ranging sociological and philosophical traditions came with Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Habermas, 1981). A fundamental element in the construction of the concept of communicative rationality is formal pragmatics with its introduction of the mentioned above three forms of validity claims: truth, (moral) rightness, and sincerity (authenticity). Communicative rationality and action in social life have a coordinating function through a binding effect, which in principle must be testable discursively, that is, supported by valid, binding arguments in a free dialogue. Truth has a stronger binding effect than a “point of view,” not to mention lies. Discourse ethics constitutes a form of cognitivist metatheory of the intersubjective validity of morality and principles of justice. Sincerity has a weaker validity status (“Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogram,” 1983).

Habermas considers the capabilities to engage in clarifying argumentative dialogue as communicative competences that are universalizable. The ideal is universal communities of communication (Peirce) that can, in principle, encompass the whole of humanity. This is a counterfactual figure, which of course should not be confused with a description of really existing human conditions. Universalizability through free argumentative dialogue is a normative benchmark, “a foil,” that can be used as a normative yardstick for how successful the conditions of communication are.

Thus, in the mid-1980s, Habermas’ sociological theory construction in its basic components is completed, including its concepts of system and life world, modernity, and the diagnosis of colonization of life world. What follows in the sociological field is, in addition to corrections, elaborations, and expansions. The most important social science theoretical work was Faktizität und Geltung (1992, English: Between Facts and Norms, 1996). From the mid-nineties, Habermas’ interventions as a public intellectual grew in the form of a stream of analyses and time diagnoses. Many of these are published in Kleine politische Schriften, I–XII (Habermas, 2013).

Is Habermas’ sociological project still alive?

The question that naturally arises, and which will undoubtedly be dealt with for many years to come, is: How viable is Habermas's sociological theory, and how much will it be used and elaborated in the future?

Firstly, it is to be expected that the break with the unified science and nomotetic ideal in the legacy of classical positivism, the break in which Habermas and the positivism controversy have a large part, will be lasting.

The criticism of the principle of freedom of value is more controversial, however, partly because it has often been misunderstood as if it meant an opening for arbitrary subjective and particular opinions in research. That is not what Habermas had in mind at all.

Here, one must be aware of the distinction often forgotten between, on the one hand, neutrality, understood as neutrality of social research in a participatory role, as a participant in a public discourse, in relation to conflicts of interest and power relations. Research results will often be in conflict with power, political, religious, or economic, as was the case with Galileo's and Darwin's theories.

At the same time, research in the role of observer has to seek valid analyses and interpretations that must live up to demands for truth with intersubjective validity. That is different from neutrality. In Weber's words in his essay: “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis”: “There is no inner kinship whatsoever between lack of attitude and scientific ‘objectivity’” (Weber 1904/1988).

However, when critical theory meets practice in the role of participant in the social institutions, for example, in state administration and professional practice, resistance arises. Because of the normativity of critical theory, it is in conflict with rules about the neutrality of bureaucracies and (some) professions. Administration must be exercised objectively according to the dominant system logic. Here, objectivity means neutrality.

The truth may be inconvenient for power, but the normative orientation must be clarified explicitly and justified, as Habermas attempts in his discourse ethics and theory of deliberative democracy.

This conflict between critical research and power as a systemic medium of governance is real and a threat to free dialogue. It is the task of critical theory to uncover this conflict and criticize power, aiming to expand conditions of free dialogue.

That research results should be neutral in relation to power and interests is not a methodologically and epistemologically legitimate requirement. But it can be risky to challenge power, which we see frightening examples in these years, also in parts of the world which used to be otherwise liberal democracies. Critical theory is exposed to pressure and direct political repression of academic freedom in several parts of the world. Researchers and universities can be forced to silence. How this will be in the future is difficult to predict.

As for the assessment of the future fate of the theory of communicative action and rationality, including the associated diagnosis of modernity as an incomplete project, the uncoupling of system and lifeworld, the colonization thesis, the decay and fragmentation of the public, deliberative democracy, and so on, the situation is ambiguous and uncertain.

The answer depends on how one interprets all the violent ruptures that are taking place in these decades and that threaten democracy, the rule of law and the ideals of the Enlightenment in many countries in the form of anti-democratic currents, nationalism, military armament, new international conflict fronts, authoritarian forms of state with fascist features, and further the ecological crises and global warming.

The basic view in Habermas’ theories and analyses has been predominantly optimistic. But the past few decades have brought disappointments and lost battles. In an interview with Stefan Müller-Dohm in 2024, late in life, he answered a question about his view of the threatening tendencies of the time. He would not give up his conviction about the long-term strength of cumulative learning processes in history, he said. The long-term course of history has shown the upward and downward movements of cultures. Any form of human life is dependent on some degree of understanding. Despite the threats, there are still potential and opportunities in science, technology, freedoms, and rights that can be exploited and unfolded (Habermas, 2024: 151–156).

The threatening tendencies will encourage the maintenance and further development of Habermas’ project, it is to be hoped. It is more than urgent.

Others have thought that with the current developments, we are seeing an irreversible end to an era. The end of enlightenment, rational argumentation, democracy, human rights, and dissolution of the modern international order, which was the subject of Habermas’ social theoretical project. In that case, Habermas’ project can look too naïve. The alternative will be, however, raw power, perhaps the Hobbesian everyone's fight against all.

The present is not manageable. But I think it is too early to give up on modernity as a project, with all its values. Alternatives are worse.