Abstract
Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a widely used and defined term. From a practitioner’s perspective, it works on three levels: prevention of radicalization, intervention with individuals in danger of radicalization, and de-radicalization. The European Union pursues a holistic approach, which includes transnational collaboration and eliminating possible root causes of radicalization. The focus is not exclusively on national security concerns but also on prevention, de-radicalization, and rehabilitation. European states have developed a variety of CVE strategies, some of which are perceived as centrally controlled, while others are characterized by participative and cooperative structures. At both the European and national levels, collaborative approaches that encompass incorporation of civil society organizations and governmental programs are seen as the most effective in CVE.
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Strategies: Current Challenges in Europe
The development and sustainable implementation of programs capable of preventing people from joining extremist groups and terrorist associations has become increasingly apparent, especially in Europe. The term “countering violent extremism” (CVE) has been greatly discussed and defined. From the viewpoint of practitioners, whose work it is to implement these programs, a clear definition of CVE is essential. We also must take complex action to meet such a complex social challenge.
Collective and national strategies to combat and stave off extremism should dovetail with many social endeavors. These comprise research into the causes of radicalization, prevention through civic and intercultural education, and efforts to address de-radicalization and reintegration of those who have crossed the line into extremism. A CVE strategy must also comprise security efforts, because the path from disaffected youth to violent fighter can be extremely short.
Take, for example, the case of Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein. As a schoolboy, he was regarded as a fervent anti-Semite by his fellow students. The Danish criminal prevention service placed him on a list of those who had radicalized while in prison. When he was incarcerated, he announced that after being released, he wanted to travel to Syria to join the so-called Islamic State (von Altenbockum 2015). Two weeks after his release, on February 14, 2015, El-Hussein murdered one person and injured three who were taking part in an event on freedom of opinion. On February 15, he shot a Jewish security guard and injured two police officers during an attack on a Copenhagen synagogue.
Toulouse in March 2012 (Wiegel 2012), Brussels in May 2014 (Lehnartz 2014) and March 2016 (Faigle, Geisler, and Polke-Majewski 2016), Paris in January and November 2015 (Le Devin and Mouillard 2015), Copenhagen in February 2015 (von Altenbockum 2015), and Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray in July 2016 (Simons 2016)—for all these killings, we see ourselves confronted with perpetrators who were born or socialized in Europe. All these perpetrators could have had access to prevention, intervention, and de-radicalization programs in schools and prisons. CVE strategies in the three countries in question were in place at the time of the attacks, though possibly not yet adequately implemented. All the perpetrators identified to date were also known to the respective country’s security agency (Lobo 2016). The Danish case illustrates how comprehensive CVE strategies need to be checked continually for potential loopholes and adapted to new findings. Intervention and, in particular, de-radicalization are still not common in CVE strategies in Europe despite these horrendous experiences. The focus is most often on prevention.
One of the greatest challenges of this new form of violence exerted by young people who have grown up in Europe is its terrorist quality. Perpetrators are usually not spontaneous and instead are focused on targets with great symbolic effect and exposure, and they act with cold-blooded “effectiveness” and brutality.
Antiviolence or therapeutic initiatives that are unspecific tend to come up short as an intervention measure. Efforts that do not take into account the hyper-moral code of ideologized groups and the victimization that results will not be able to prevent actions such as those listed above (for the meaning of victimization interpretations and their processing by de-radicalization in practice, see Buschbom 2015b). Based on my own experience counseling families in which family members have become radicalized, it is clear that the number of young people becoming radicalized is increasing, and that radicalization puts emotional pressure on family members. Therefore, auxiliary and support services for family members are needed. It has also become clear to me, however, that counseling, and especially intervention, for radicalized individuals themselves is necessary. Family members’ influence has its limits.
Work with radicalized individuals returning from a crisis area represents another challenge. Being in the middle of international jihad can have a multiplier effect on radicalization. But not all those who travel to Syria inevitably end up in the arms of Islamist combat units. And not everyone who survives the combat missions of militant jihad returns highly radicalized; some, who are deeply disillusioned, knock again on the doors of family members; others are deeply traumatized; and often both apply. Peter Neumann from King’s College in London describes the group of returnees: there are “some who return who are without doubt dangerous—they are in the minority. There are those who are disillusioned and traumatized who need psychological support. But it is not yet clear to most what to do next” (Steffen 2015).
People whose lives had previously been dominated by academic and professional failures, dysfunctional family situations, or a general criminal environment are usually the victims of indoctrination. It is mainly people who are faced with a lack of future prospects in their homelands who seem to be particularly susceptible to Islamist extremism (for the correlation between biographical experience and its interpretation by the individual ideology, see Buschbom 2016; for processing by de-radicalization in practice, see Buschbom 2015a).
Fired up by the so-called refugee crisis in Europe, the rise of right-wing extremist and right-wing populist forces has led to a third challenge that Europe is sure to face for many years to come. It was not only in Germany that the influx of refugees in 2015 led to polarization, radicalization, and violence. “According to the BKA (German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation), it registered 1,005 criminal acts [in 2015] directed at facilities occupied by refugees. This figure was 199 the year before. 901 of these crimes were attributed to the right-wing scene as politically motivated criminality. The number was only 177 in the whole of 2014” (Zeit online 2016). These violent attacks against refugees and their accommodations must be dealt with by the penal system, but they must also be factored into the framework of prevention and de-radicalization as laid out in a comprehensive CVE strategy.
The rise of right-wing parties in many countries in Europe, such as the Front National (France), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Switzerland), the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Austria), the Danish Volkspartei (Denmark), the Fidez (“Hungarian Civic Alliance”) (Hungary), the PiS (“Justice and Fairness”) (Poland), and the Sweden Democrats (Sweden), is an endorsement of the violence toward refugees. This is where classic CVE approaches have had no effect. If things are to change, a pan-European alliance of democratic powers, along with frank debate on the anxieties and demands of the voters who support these parties, is an absolute requirement.
The Three-Level Approach: Prevention, Intervention, De-Radicalization
To counter the radicalization of young people, a three-level approach, comprising prevention, intervention, and de-radicalization/disengagement, is indispensable. It has allowed different target groups to be approached, enabled a flexible methodology, and allows for cooperation among different professional fields and social organizations. Approaches that are based on these three levels are part of many European CVE strategies. Because of the varying degrees of radicalization, specific prevention, intervention, and de-radicalization measures necessitate differentiation and the “best fit” must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Preventive measures are used to strengthen “tolerance of ambiguity,” to build resilience, and to, therefore, prevent radicalization. Such measures are usually unspecific, with the objective of strengthening positive personality traits and reducing susceptibility (in this case, to radicalization). The target of such preventive measures is people who are only slightly ideological; that is, they are not entrenched in a specific ideology nor do they have violent tendencies. They are often resentful of those who are perceived as “different.” In such cases, group-specific initiatives (such as political and/or interreligious education) are required to strengthen tolerance of that which is different or foreign (tolerance of ambiguity) and to illustrate the appeal of democracy and diversity. Therefore, prevention efforts should target those who might be at risk of religious or political radicalization at an early stage in intercultural and interreligious dialogue and broaden their knowledge of democracy, human rights, and religions, for example.
Arming practitioners with the appropriate skills, such as awareness training (e.g., teachers, specialists in child and youth services, the police, and those working in the penal system), is also key in preventing extremism and radicalization.
Intervention measures are directed at those with a discernible risk of becoming radicalized. If we pay attention to the root causes of radicalization, such as alienation, loss of belonging, and social exclusion, we will find members of social groups that have less power or influence over societal development or those who have fewer possibilities to shape their lives. Intervention can take place within many social entities. Schools and the penal system are the most obvious. Comprehensive awareness training for staff can enable early intervention into the radicalization processes. Confronting ideological positions and radicalized behavior with pedagogic group training and one-on-one coaching fosters self-reflection and change among participants. A dialogue that is free of moral judgments allows clients to question their own reasons for moving toward radicalization, thereby opening up a chance to dissolve these ideologies in the early phase.
De-radicalization and disengagement support come into play when radicalization is advanced and there is a risk that young people will endanger themselves and others, by travelling to a war zone and after returning, for example. Exit programs are directed at those who have already decided to turn their backs on extremism. The objective here, besides (re)integration into society, is to confront the ideological interpretation regime, because the decision to exit is only the start of a long detachment process from previous thought patterns. Other programs provide opportunities for dialogue to people who have yet to make the decision to exit. This approach can trigger distancing from an ideology and radicalized group and allow for an eventual exit from the extremist scene and renunciation of the ideology. The target group for this approach comprises radicalized people, some of whom have strong violent tendencies. If a person joins an extremist group with the will to go so far as to kill for his convictions, the primary objective is to avert any risk to themselves (the radicalized individuals) and others. The de-radicalization process takes a long time.
To be effective in the long term, a comprehensive CVE strategy must include all three levels in the abatement and prevention of extremism. Only then can different groups, from undecided and politically disinterested pupils to highly radicalized potential killers, be targeted effectively.
Joint and National European CVE Strategies
One of the major achievements of the European Union (EU) is that it has made it easy to move freely within European borders. This gain in freedom for many entails the possibility of misuse by a few (such as terrorists). Collective approaches to fighting terrorism and preventing radicalization are therefore an absolute requirement within Europe. In addition to numerous agreements to exchange data and share information relevant to security, and the cooperation of police and the judiciary, 1 the EU adopted the European Union counterterrorism strategy in 2005. This strategic commitment “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom security and justice” (Presidency and CT Coordinator 2005) is split among four levels: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond.
Including prevention as a key part of the strategy to combat terrorism indicates a broader evaluation of the phenomenon; it is not simply a national security issue. The European approach implies that countering extremism is not just a remit for the security services, police, and justice system, but also defines (as laid out in the three-level approach mentioned at the start) responsibilities for social entities for preventing and combating radicalization and extremism. Educational institutions, changing labor market policies, and promoting intercultural dialogue and long-term integration are also key actors and steps in preventing individuals from taking part in terrorism and getting at the root causes of radicalization. Therefore, this strategy forms—parallel to the international approach—the foundation for a cross-resourced and interdisciplinary course of action to prevent and combat extremism. The decision to include prevention in its strategy shows that the EU does not differ from the approach of the United Nations: “The UN’s global anti-terrorism approach in 2006 also called for a holistic strategy that encompassed the conditions conducive to terrorism” (Nünlist and Frazer 2015).
Notwithstanding the many Member States that are investing huge sums of money in the prevention of extremism, challenges in European prevention and de-radicalization initiatives still abound. Since the beginning of 2013, the number of returning foreign fighters has grown steadily, and thus the issue of reintegration was moved to the top of the political agenda in Europe. The Council of Europe agreed in 2015 to equalize the criminal proceedings—countries are obligated to criminalize various acts of terrorism—and most of the governments agreed to work closely with the national security services to secure risks that the returnees can pose, and identify terrorists at an early stage (Council of Europe, Directorate of Communications 2015). In addition to the security issues and law enforcement agreements, there is a broad understanding among European governments about the necessity of prevention, de-radicalization, and rehabilitation efforts in response to radicalization and terrorism. 2 Criminalizing, accusing, and arresting will do little to change minds.
It is arguably for this reason that the European Commission also set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2011. 3 The primary purpose of this network is to bring together experts, now more than two thousand, from all EU Member States to discuss CVE and exit strategies. Sharing experiences, developing new approaches jointly, and disseminating expertise throughout the whole of Europe is rendered possible by dialogue among practitioners, policy-makers, and academics. The goal of this network is to make exclusive knowledge of CVE approaches accessible to many and to support Member States in the development of national and regional strategies to prevent and combat extremism. This approach relies on a participative and cooperative strategy for developing solutions for one of Europe’s most significant social challenges. Political decision-makers are not the only ones involved; the discussions also involve practitioners and theoretical experts who work with individuals who already are, and who are at risk of being, radicalized.
Several times a year, teachers, policemen/women, court and prison employees, social workers, psychologists, disengagement practitioners, and victims of terrorist attacks from all over Europe meet to share experiences with experts and to gain new insights into how the growing problem of radicalization is being combated. The objectives of this European knowledge transfer are to develop local level approaches, which take into account the specific, regional situations, and to formulate recommendations related to specific issues for political decision-makers.
The European Parliament has also passed the resolution, “Prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations,” which “highlighted the importance of combining de-radicalization programs with measures such as establishing partnerships with community representatives, investment in social and neighborhood projects … aimed at disrupting economic and geographical marginalization, and mentoring schemes for alienated and excluded young people considered at risk of radicalization.” 4 This resolution strengthens the European method of a cross-disciplinary approach.
Despite the intention to cooperate across Europe and develop and implement measures under joint basic assumptions, the EU is nothing more than an alliance of independent nations. Intervening in national law is largely impossible, be it for countering terrorism or preventing extremism. The majority of resolutions are cooperation commitments and coordination strategies. Their basic assumptions are reflected in national law, and sometimes important elements of an effective cooperation are not always implemented. To name one example, as of April 2016, there was still no shared data for all terror suspects and those who pose a public threat that can be updated and viewed by all European countries. This allows, for example, (potential) terrorists to move unhindered between countries because the police and security services have no shared information about them, either on the European or, in part, on the national level. Here data protection has taken priority over the safety of citizens, and bureaucracy prevents speedy implementation of applicable law. Nevertheless, different countries have developed national CVE strategies within Europe. Generally deemed the most comprehensive so far is the Prevent Strategy from the British government.
Britain
In 2003 the British government developed and implemented a project in response to the increasing risk of radicalization and terrorism, which was the precursor to Prevent. A combination of primary preventive measures, such as workshops and debates and targeted intervention, for those at risk of radicalization and those already radicalized, were developed with Prevent. The program was implemented across the country at a massive financial cost. Although the program had positive effects, it also had ill-judged outcomes because it was implemented so quickly. Criticism was leveled, for example, at the fact that the first few years saw the program’s financing channeled to organizations that were part of the spectrum of extremism itself rather than part of the sector combating extremism.
Critical voices (such as David Cameron who was then in the opposition) commented in 2008: “Public money that is meant to be used to combat extremism has ended up in the hands of extremists” (Cameron quoted in Vidino and Brandon 2012). These challenges were comparable to the initial difficulties of the “Action Programs against Aggression and Violence,” which the then–Minister for Youth and today’s Bundeskanzler Angela Merkel initiated in Germany in the early 1990s, and which arguably can be called the first European CVE program. With an annual budget of DM 20m, the program sought to address right-wing extremism between 1992 and 1996, which was on the rise mainly with youths in the five new Federal States. “The pointed criticism levelled at the programme was: ‘Skinhead care paid by public purse.’ Extreme right-wing youths were able to undergo ideological training paid by the state, and practise their martial arts” (Lüdecke 2013).
In response, the British government introduced mechanisms for checking (potential) contracted organizations. However, the decisions about which organizations should be included in publicly funded programs to combat extremism and radicalization should not be made solely by the individuals who belong to these organizations. In many cases, these individuals can also be representatives of very conservative Muslim communities that cannot themselves be described as radicalized or affiliated with extremism.
The “Channel Programme,” an element of Prevent, has been just as criticized. In this program, those who already are defined by the police or security authorities as radicalized, or those who are at risk of being radicalized due to their affiliation with a vulnerable social group are assessed individually by a coordinator with regional responsibility. Depending on the degree of radicalization, the respective intervention steps are initiated and the police and security services get involved (if applicable). That this program is controlled by the British police evoked a sense of being “spied on” within Muslim communities, although many public and nonpublic organizations at the local level are involved (Vidino and Brandon 2012). Following the revision of Prevent in 2011, the decision was made to safeguard long-term financing for the “Channel Programme” in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015), despite criticism from Muslim communities. 5
To build on the program for prevention and intervention, and particularly because Great Britain identified around one thousand prisoners in Great Britain as extremists or at risk of extremism, the British Prime Minister announced on February 8, 2016, that “we [Great Britain] will develop a new prison-based programme for countering the non-violent extremism that can lead to terrorism and violence and this will focus on those at risk of radicalisation, regardless of the crime they originally committed – as well as those convicted of terrorism offences. And to deal with the most serious cases, just as we introduce mandatory de-radicalisation programmes in the wider community, we will also introduce these in our prisons.” 6 In August 2016, a review of Islamist extremism in prisons, during probation, and in youth justice centers (Acheson 2016) was published by the Ministry of Justice. Key measures to be implemented include:
creating a new directorate for security, order and counterterrorism, which will deliver a plan for countering extremism in prisons and probation services;
instructing governors to remove extremist literature and putting in place a thorough process to assess materials of concern;
boosting plans for rapid responses by intervention teams to terrorist-related incidents;
improving extremism prevention training for all prison officers; and
strengthening vetting of prison chaplains and a range of positions to make sure the right people are in place in prisons to counter extremist beliefs. 7
The explicit focus of these measures is security rather than targeted interventions that will encourage Islamist extremists to disengage and de-radicalize.
Spain
Although other European countries have also been victims of terrorist attacks, they have not always implemented CVE programs particularly quickly. Spain for example, despite the wave of attacks by Islamist terrorists in 2004, did not formulate the “Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta” until 2015. 8 The plan essentially defines the national and regional responsibilities in the fight against violent radicalization. At the heart of Spain’s approach is the Coordination Centre for Information on Radicalization. Institutions and citizens can report possible cases of radicalization to the center via a web page, email, or a free hotline. In April 2015, State Secretary for Security Martinez announced: “In its first five months of activity, we have received almost 1,500 notifications, of which 45 percent have been assessed as worthy of police investigation. Forty-seven percent of these notifications have been received via the web page, which substantiates the importance of this method of communication for preventing these threats.” According to Martinez, the main focus of all Spanish activities to prevent violent extremism should be juvenile youths, because radicalization can be addressed at an individual level for this group, with the hope of preventing it from continuing. “Quality education and teaching values from a very young age play a key role” in this strategy, including the “teaching of human rights and respect for diversity, fostering critical thought and tolerance.” Programs to prevent and combat extremism within the penal system are also part of the strategy. 9 It is not possible at this stage to determine whether this approach has been successful, to what extent experts in civil society or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are involved, how the implementation will be carried out in detail, whether central control includes regional requirements, or whether this is a long-term model with sustainable effects.
It is also not possible to gauge the extent to which the lack of prospects for youth, due for instance to a lack of integration into work processes by labor market policies, is being sufficiently addressed. Spain should coordinate this strategy with the Department of Employment, especially since youth unemployment in Spain, at around 45 percent, is double the European average. 10
The Netherlands
Without having been the victim of an Islamist terror attack, The Netherlands introduced the “Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan” in 2007 in the hope that “improving the material integration and sense of belonging of young Dutch Muslims [into Dutch society] … would reduce the breeding ground for radicalization” (Butt and Tuck 2014). Radicalization here was assessed as a consequence of social erosion processes. Efforts to increase integration and social cohesion were put in place to counter negative developments, that is, radicalization.
This preventive plan was not renewed after 2011. However, the action program for combating jihadism (Ministry of Security and Justice, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2014), published in August 2014, continues to call for a networked and cross-resourced approach to preventing and combating extremism: “Finally, the government is investing in knowledge, expertise and partnerships on local, national, and international levels. Central government and the municipalities concerned will come to agreements on preventing radicalisation and managing social tensions, thus cementing the comprehensive approach and cooperation between municipalities, local partners (welfare, social affairs), educational institutions and the police” (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism 2014).
Denmark
The Danish CVE strategy—A Common and Safe Future—presented in 2009 as a national action plan represents a cross-resourced approach. This plan also includes action in three areas—prevention, intervention, and de-radicalization. Key elements of this plan are based on cooperation structures that were in place before it came into force, such as among schools, social workers, and police.
Anchored in the SSP network, social services and the police focus on prevention of radicalization and exit from extremist groups based on dialogue, awareness raising and direct support. The effort is a supplement to the ongoing crime preventive efforts for people under 18, but now also targets people up to 25. Counter-radicalization is implemented in the crime preventive work based on three levels of engagement: (a) preventative interventions aimed at general socialization and crime prevention; (b) anticipatory interventions aimed at identified vulnerable groups and individuals; and (c) direct prevention and exit aimed at individuals who are already part of the extremist milieu. The strategy is to approach radicalization in the same way as other crime preventive work, which needs both a group related and an individual approach. (Brett et al. 2015)
This linking of different approaches and different departments is implemented along the lines of the well-known “Aarhus” model. This approach of community engagement consists of two areas of intervention. Workshops and dialogues with mosques and cultural societies in the local communities reach the general public. In addition, a task force of first-line practitioners performs risk evaluations of and mentors radicalized individuals.
Belgium
In contrast to the Netherlands, for a long time Belgium did not have a comprehensive national program, despite knowledge of radicalized groups, such as in Molenbeek. The absence of these programs has had massive consequences for the country and the world at large. “He radicalised himself in the prisons of Vorst and Sint-Gillis, where he was an inmate some time ago. Much more than out on the streets,” said the sister of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the supposed backer of the Paris attacks in November 2015. In 2010, Abaaoud was detained following an armed robbery; he met fellow perpetrator-to-be Salah Abdeslam in prison (Biermann et al. 2015). “Afterward, in September 2012, Abaaoud started his wave of terrorism, according to court documents. Over the following two and a half years, he abducted his younger brother Younes, taking him to Syria, and fostered contacts with those around Khalid Zerkani, a notorious protagonist in the Belgian jihadi scene” (Becker and Kuntz 2015).
Belgian politicians finally responded after the attack in Paris in January 2015: “A working group in Brussels will commence to work on de-radicalization. … Representatives from around the region, as well as of the four districts having the greatest risk potential for radical Islamists—Brussels, Anderlecht, Schaerbeek and Molenbeek—were at the meeting. The meeting was about sharing information, improved monitoring of the phenomenon, and also intervening so that a stop can be put to the level of youth radicalisation” (Kniebs 2015).
Germany
Germany’s history gives rise to a particular responsibility to combat extremism, to prevent radicalization, and to de-radicalize. It is hardly surprising, then, that since the Federal Republic of Germany was established, combating extremism has been high on the political agenda, albeit without the term “CVE” finding its way onto a bill or government policy statement.
In 1952, the Federal Agency for Civic Education was set up “to promote the understanding of political issues, to consolidate democratic awareness and to strengthen the willingness for political collaboration.” 11 Values such as democracy, pluralism, and tolerance are communicated to the population by publications, trainings, and conferences. Since 2012, the agency has had its own “extremism” department, dedicated mainly to radicalization prevention and de-radicalization.
Because of the federal state structure of Germany, the initiatives for combating and preventing extremism came about in sixteen different states, not just at the national level. Since 2011, and before the series of murders by the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU), each of the sixteen federal states has had a democracy center (formerly a state coordination office) that controls the resources and assistance from the state for issues pertaining to right-wing extremism (and Islamism since 2015). These centers are linked into a consultation network that operates nationwide and shares knowledge and experience. These structures, called “a hotchpotch (Kraut und Rüben)” (Steffen 2015) by Peter Neumann of King’s College London, can be seen as decentralized, participative, and complementary. Over time, this has led to heterogeneity in approaches and expertise, which has allowed for the implementation of long-term and effective approaches. However, maintaining cooperation, knowledge transfer, and experience sharing within this federal entity, which spans professions and disciplines, remains one of its greatest challenges. The unfettered actions of the NSU over many years showed us where lack of information exchange, bickering over responsibility, and lack of cooperation could lead. This might be one reason why the German government released in summer 2016 their cooperative and interdepartmental Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Foster Democracy (Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung).
A broad landscape of NGOs has developed in Germany to implement government tasks in the social sector. These initiatives focus mainly on the fields of fighting and preventing extremism. Unlike many other countries in Europe, the CVE sector is characterized by civil society engagement and is not controlled solely by governmental players. Even before reunification, the federal government began funding nongovernmental initiatives with extensive special programs (e.g., “Aktionsprogramm gegen Aggression und Gewalt” [1992–1996], “Jugend für Toleranz und Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus” [2001–2006], “XENOS – Integration und Vielfalt” [2007–2014], “Vielfalt tut gut” [2007–2010], “Toleranz fördern – Kompetenz stärken” [2010–2014], and “Demokratie leben!” [2015–2019]). Given the increased risk of Islamist terrorism and the increase in right-wing extremist attacks on refugees, the German federal government has decided to increase the funding for the current program “Demokratie leben!” from €55m in 2016 to €100m in 2017 (Geisler 2016). In addition, the government is trying to implement a legal basis for promoting democracy and the prevention of extremism to ensure the continuation of such funding streams regardless of election results in the future.
German politicians attach a great deal of importance to these nongovernmental organizations. Extremists perceive the state and its employees as enemies of the respective movement, be it right-wing extremism or Islamism. Any interaction with representatives of the state is appraised from this perspective. Therefore, successful intervention or de-radicalization, which requires a trusting atmosphere and emotional frankness, is difficult, if not impossible. This difficulty is one of the reasons the German government, unlike other European countries, does not intervene alone in CVE and, instead, partners with nongovernmental organizations.
Violence Prevention Network
This strategy is illustrated in the German NGO that the author founded and operates, which focuses on de-radicalization and combating extremism. Founded in 2004, Violence Prevention Network (VPN) has specialized from its outset in the de-radicalization of extremists and those at risk of extremism, unlike many other organizations involved in the fight against extremism. VPN specially designed de-radicalization programs for inmates in the penal system, which met with unusual success in relapse prevention. Since 2001, more than one thousand inmates have participated in the program. At 13.3 percent, the re-imprisonment rate of those who participated in VPNs program stands at close to 70 percent below the national average in Germany.
Since 2004, VPN has worked on this program in the German penal system with assistance from many state and federal ministries. This partnership came about because an external evaluation in the first few years made it clear that the implementation of these kinds of programs by external organizations, which were not part of the German penal system, and thereby did not represent the enemy state, were much more promising than internal prison programs. “The participants were all of the opinion that it is very important to be able to work with trainers who are not employed by the prison” (Lukas 2007). This has been found to be the case in other European countries as well: “initiatives with too much government involvement may be counter-productive. … Leeway must be given to communities and civil society players to develop initiatives of their own and to determine if and when state involvement is appropriate, and to what extent. This is particularly important in the case of initiatives aiming to mobilize players outside of the mainstream” (Nünlist and Frazer 2015).
Since 2011, VPN has been implementing tailored de-radicalization initiatives in the domain of Islamist-motivated extremism, in conjunction with government interior and judicial authorities. This first (confidential) pilot project in Germany that VPN implemented in coordination with the Department of Public Security at the Federal Ministry of the Interior was the pioneer for today’s programs that VPN runs in many of Germany’s prisons with inmates convicted of terrorist offences.
In parallel to this program, VPN has developed, in close coordination with security authorities, a program in several federal states that aims to prevent jihadists from increasingly leaving for war zones (such as in Syria and Iraq), by introducing processes to distance themselves from extremist ideologies and enable de-radicalization over the long term.
Using an NGO in a very specialized field of governmental remit, such as combating extremism, clearly illustrates the strategic approach of the government and the NGO community, and VPN is arguably Germany’s best practice example. Germany’s strategy relies on diverse approaches, innovative concepts of nongovernmental initiatives, and decentralized offerings. The governments at the state and national levels see themselves more as commissioning and coordinating entities than implementing ones.
Germany sees combating and preventing extremism as a continuous political obligation, not as a short-term, ad hoc measure. Only an interdisciplinary and cross-resourced strategy can be a successful countermeasure to extremism. “The dovetailing of different official instruments, the collaboration with other security authorities, the government and civil-socio institutions as part of prevention, and, not in the least, efficient criminal prosecution, represent appropriate resources to stem the threat to internal security in Germany” (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2015).
Conclusions from the European experience
The visible differences among the countries mentioned above are indicative of Europe. The EU directives and resolutions for CVE or counterterrorism generally leave leeway for Member States and must not be interpreted as binding codes of practice. Comprehensive prevention measures are common to all approaches, however. This way, a picture is created within the European community that states’ shared values form the foundation for dealing with extremists and those at risk of extremism. What does not result from it, however, is coordinated action, or even a concerted approach. This accumulation of agreed-on but nonobligatory measures and approaches within the EU—all the more so knowing about the international direction and coordination on the part of those behind the Paris and Brussels attacks—is, to the mind of this author, both incomprehensible and negligent.
Some European governments are reacting to the increasing number of terrorist attacks and the growth of extremist organizations with huge budgets for “special programs” or national initiatives to combat extremism. Transferring these budgets to national budgets in the long term, even beyond potential changes of government, is in most cases not guaranteed. This is not sustainable political practice. Such strategies assume that comprehensive measures that counter the causes of radicalization do not need to be implemented in the long term but, rather, hypothesize that these phenomena are temporary and need to be watered down.
Key Factors of Promising CVE Strategies and Approaches
All CVE and de-radicalization approaches must be appraised in terms of success and transferability within the context in which they take place. National strategies have just as much influence over success and effectiveness as do regional and local conditions. Successful strategies to combat violent extremism and programs for de-radicalization must be implementable in the long term, sustainably effective, and organized flexibly. Ad hoc programs running for a short time deliver little information on which developments are directly linked to which measures. All findings to date on radicalization and extremism indicate that the causes are multifaceted. One-dimensional approaches and concepts for prevention are therefore not effective. The way back for de-radicalized individuals is profoundly individual. There is no one-size-fits-all approach.
Coordinated cross-disciplinary approach
These findings have overarching consequences for the development of programs and strategies. Multifaceted causes can only be rectified or at least ameliorated in a multifaceted way. This requires a coordinated and cross-disciplinary method. Violent extremism is not the sole responsibility of security authorities, the police, or the penal system. Education and labor are only examples of sectors that can become active in combating extremism such as in Paris Banlieues, in Molenbeek, and in other larger European cities. Successful cooperation, be it between different professions or between governmental and nongovernmental institutions, presupposes a high degree of flexibility and trust. Intervention and de-radicalization approaches requiring cooperation with security authorities and NGOs, such as in Denmark, Germany, and Great Britain, presuppose acceptance and appreciation of one for the other. Clear-cut guidelines regarding data protection laws and decision-making powers avert mistrust and promote transparency.
Long-term concepts
Long-term concepts require political actions beyond legislative periods. Short-term pedagogic measures cannot work successfully in prevention or in the implementation of de-radicalization programs. Changing behavior and questioning one’s own attitudes, values, positions, and opinions require time. A human being is capable of changing at any time in life; however, a long-term and sustained change requires that we try out what has been newly learned with all its obstacles and unforeseeable challenges. If prevention and de-radicalization are to be truly part of a CVE strategy, the strategy must reflect this in its duration, financing, and scope.
Direct work with extremists
Only a few organizations are turning directly to those moving in extremism networks and circles with the objective of triggering distancing from extremist ideologies. Given the now-visible networks of extremists, such as in Molenbeek, and the terrorist attacks they carried out, it is exactly in this area of CVE that urgent action is needed. Could access have been established to people such as Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Salah Abdeslam, and Ibrahim and Khalid El Bakraoui years ago? This remains an important question.
Continuous evaluation and flexibility
Changing global conditions and politically unstable regions both will have a bearing on the development of extremists at the international, national, and regional levels. A successful CVE strategy must be flexible and react to changing conditions appropriately. The concepts of the strategy, and their implementation, must be continually questioned, evaluated, and, if necessary, modified.
Targeted de-radicalization measures during imprisonment
As indicated at the beginning of this article, being in prison can play a key role in radicalization (Korn 2015). This is where one of the greatest challenges, and at the same time one of the great opportunities, lies. Law enforcement measures, if not combined with de-radicalization and rehabilitation approaches, will be unsuccessful. We have a choice—either lock them up for good or give them a chance to change. Otherwise, highly radicalized individuals will be released from prisons, putting the public at risk, as was the case in Brussels, Paris, and Copenhagen.
Many of the prison sentences for terrorist activities are rather short. Thus, the time frame for “treatment” in the penal system is often too short to trigger long-term changes. A multiagency approach—which involves the process of de-radicalization or exit strategies across diverse professions before, during, and after imprisonment—is more promising than a one-dimensional treatment model inside the penal system. This approach should also be applied to cases where prisoners convicted for nonideological crimes show signs of radicalization. Such approaches require trust and collaboration, as well as a rethinking of certain data protection and data exchange regulations.
Internet: Communication instead of prohibition
Those who are at risk of radicalization or will tend to radicalize can be seen very clearly in the relevant forums of extremist groups on the Internet (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2012) and in social networks. The number of initiatives that create counternarratives, which are believed to be a way of combating such activities and processes on the Internet, is increasing. 12 And the data collected from the Internet by official authorities and civil organizations on the activities of extremists are constantly growing. 13 Nevertheless, there are not as many approaches that enable real contact between individuals at risk of being radicalized or who are radicalized and de-radicalization practitioners. As a result, incipient radicalization processes can take root, and vulnerable individuals can begin to isolate themselves and become embedded in the radicalized scene. Such isolation leads to further distancing from governmental and social entities, thereby impeding the pathways to exit the radicalized scene.
Feeding counternarratives onto the Internet can produce a preventive effect. In contrast, for individuals who view the world around them in an ideologically colored way, such counternarratives will only confirm what they already think they know. Practical experience tells us that de-radicalization efforts that have no contact with those who sow the necessary seeds of doubt only work in rare cases. Online de-radicalization does not and will not work. The key factors for successful de-radicalization efforts are interpersonal relationships and dialogue. Tracking relevant forums on the Internet 14 is hampering the dissemination of extremist ideology. For de-radicalization, however, this approach is not only ineffective but counterproductive. Such approaches only confirm the images of their enemies that radicalized individuals already have. An authoritarian response to extremists only deepens radicalization instead of disbanding it.
Efforts to de-radicalize via the Internet may seem necessary and sensible, but they have been mainly counterproductive. They can be discouraging, and they highlight problems and make them public. Extremists and those at risk of extremism are therefore not reached, and often even become more embedded in the radicalization process. To stop and successfully reverse radicalization, plugging the gap between existing knowledge and necessary, practical actions is an absolute requirement, instead of contradicting the extremists’ arguments (which they expect and can easily integrate into the structure of the ideologeme) or simply banning the content. When monitoring social networks online, the objective must be to approach radicalized people and motivate them to participate in debate through direct contact, beyond the virtual world, and to build subsequent relationships that initiate disengagement from radicalization. Unlike in previous approaches, the focus here lies in bringing about change in the target group. Practitioners must build a working relationship through outreach to initiate detachment from extremist groups and encourage the questioning of violent ideology.
Early intervention
The classic “exit programs” begin at a time when the client has already begun to distance himself from the extremists. Other approaches reach people who have not yet questioned their own ideologies and attempt to trigger initial distancing through collaboration between coach and client. This approach can also reach those who would not seek such collaboration on their own. It focuses on distancing processes and detachment from extremist worldviews and thought patterns. Early intervention requires early detection.
Relationship, dialogue, and trust
Effective de-radicalization depends on dialogues between extremists and de-radicalization practitioners. It is about trust, not about arguing against one another. Extremists’ communication does not need to be “countered.” Change cannot succeed in an antagonistic atmosphere. One of the key factors is the relationship between the practitioner and the extremist. People who feel disenfranchised and regard their life as senseless need someone who is interested in them, not only in their radicalization or offence. They need to feel appreciated. This is the prerequisite for self-confidence, independence, and responsibility.
My overall conclusion, after dealing with many European CVE strategies and approaches, and talking to many CVE practitioners and politicians over the past 10 years, is that CVE is not so much about countering the extremist narrative. It is more about strengthening those who are working for a diverse, democratic, and nonviolent society. It is more about immunizing those who can be recruited by extremist groups in the future. It is more about extending one’s hand to those at risk. It is more about sowing doubt in the minds of those who are still convinced. And it is also about counseling those who have doubts and still think about their exit.
Footnotes
Notes
Judy Korn is the founder and CEO of the Violence Prevention Network, where she works with radicalized individuals. In 2007, she was named an Ashoka Fellow.