The Rising Relative Presence of Whites in Majority Non-White Cities

Abstract

After several decades of Whites fleeing large metropolitan areas, they are now increasingly gentrifying urban neighborhoods and communities. This analysis uses data from the 2000 decennial census and the 2012 and 2017 American Community Survey to assess the growing presence of Whites in U.S. cities. The analysis examines the extent to which Whites have experienced an increase in their percentage share of the populations of 212 majority non-White communities with 50,000 or more inhabitants over two time periods (2000 to 2008–2012 and 2008–2012 to 2013–2017). The results show that 39 communities have experienced an expanding relative presence of Whites in one or both periods. Whites generally are growing at a faster pace than Blacks and Latinos in these communities and there are large socioeconomic gaps favoring Whites. The article concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings.

Keywords

white space white flight non-white cities racial demographics

Introduction

Beginning in the post-WWII period, Whites increasingly moved out of metropolitan centers to suburban areas. The U.S. government established policies to provide Whites with cheap affordable housing in newly constructed, planned suburban communities that became almost exclusively White (Jackson, 1985; Katznelson, 2005). In addition, the White flight was also associated with court-ordered desegregation during the Civil Rights era along with the social unrest taking place after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968 (Kozol, 2005; Massey & Denton, 1993). In a short period of time afterwards, predominantly White suburbs outgrew large metropolitan cities (Boustan & Shertzer, 2013). Many cities in the Midwest and Northeast, led by the likes of Detroit, witnessed Whites taking their children, economic resources, and tax base to suburban areas where they established White havens that largely kept out people of color (Katznelson, 2005).

In the meantime, U.S. policies related to disinvestment and redlining in metropolitan core areas aggravated the fiscal problems that communities sustained as the tax base of Whites went off to suburban areas (Clark & Ferguson, 1983; Jay & Conklin, 2017). The tragedy is that while governmental policies facilitated the purchase of homes and the building of wealth for Whites, disinvestment and redlining practices barred African Americans and other people of color from obtaining affordable loans to purchase their homes and establish a wealth base from their homeownership (Schuerman, 2019). For much of the last quarter of the 20th century, Whites were disproportionately located in suburban areas and people of color in metropolitan centers.

However, toward the end of the 20th century, neoliberal revitalization and development projects have increasingly lured Whites and the well-to-do to metropolitan central cities (Alvaré, 2017; Chronopoulos, 2016; Mumm, 2017). These business ventures have razed dilapidated houses and public housing (Goetz, 2011) to make way for high-rise lofts, trendy houses, along with upscale restaurants, bars, retail shops, and amenities to attract people with financial means to metropolitan centers (Ali, 2014; Danley & Weaver, 2018; Ocejo, 2015; Sullivan & Shaw, 2011). By the end of the 20th century, there were signs that Whites were making their way back to certain metropolitan areas of the country (Freeman & Cai, 2015). It has become increasingly clear in the 21st century that the expansion of Whites in certain cities is real and that the trend is expanding (Freeman & Cai, 2015). These demographic and residential shifts have resulted in the transition of neighborhoods and communities where people of color and the poor have been displaced. Gentrification has led to the establishment of White spaces while altering or, at worse, erasing the cultures and histories of people of color with deep roots to these areas (Alvaré, 2017; Anderson, 2015; Hargrove, 2009).

While we do know that Whites are increasingly making their way into metropolitan areas after decades of shunning these places, we have limited information on the full range of cities in which this is occurring (Billingham, 2015). Most research on gentrification has focused on certain neighborhoods in a handful of large metropolitan areas. There is a need for research on gentrification to focus more widely on cities overall, after all it is municipalities rather than neighborhoods that use the levers of public policies, incentives, and resources to attract businesses and other forms of development that set in motion gentrification (Billingham, 2015; Thu et al., 2017). Moreover, there is a need to draw attention to the smaller metropolitan communities that are undergoing gentrification and the changing racial and class mix of their inhabitants (Billingham, 2015).

To this end, this article is based on population changes along racial and ethnic lines for two time periods (2000 to 2008–2012 and 2008-2012 to 2013–2017) across cities that contained at least 50,000 inhabitants in the 2013–2017 period. The analysis identifies the set of cities where Whites maintained or expanded their percentage representation between the 2000 to 2008–2012 and the 2008-2012 to 2013–2017 periods. The core part of the analysis focuses on these metropolitan places where Whites accounted for less than 50% of the population in 2000. Particularly important is that the set of communities where there is a growing presence of Whites represents an anomaly, as most communities throughout the country are experiencing relatively slow growth or population decline in their White populations due to the increasing aging of Whites. The analysis also provides a profile of the cities where Whites are expanding in order to better understand the diverse sets of communities where this phenomenon is taking place. We next turn to the racial and geographic context in which gentrification is spawned.

The Racial and Geographic Context

In order to understand the contemporary growth of Whites in certain cities around the country, we need to comprehend the racial and geographic context in which Whites and people of color have existed in this country.

Segregation

Throughout most of the history of the United States, particularly after the termination of slavery, Whites have shunned living close to Blacks and other people of color. Even recent polls show that Whites prefer to live in neighborhoods where Whites are the solid majority group alongside fewer people of color, especially Blacks, desiring to live in places where Blacks account for less than 30% of the area’s population (Krysan et al., 2009). The geographic lines separating Whites and Blacks became especially intense as Civil Rights legislation sought to bring about greater equity in education, housing, and work during the mid to late 1960s and the unrest that took place in many cities following the murder of Dr. King in 1968. Toward the close of the 1960s and over the next few decades, Whites fled metropolitan centers to suburban areas or beyond where they established communities, neighborhoods, and schools that were largely White.

There were tremendous changes in the demography of metropolitan areas between 1960 and 1980. For example, the percentage of the U.S. metropolitan population living in central cities fell from 51% in 1960 to 40% in 1980, while the percentage living in suburban areas rose from 49% to 60% during this period (Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). Census data show that of the 10 largest cities in the U.S. in 1960, eight experienced population losses between 1960 and 1980, the exceptions being Los Angeles and Houston (Biggest US Cities, 2020a; 2020b). The population of St. Louis fell by 40% between 1960 and 1980, that of Cleveland by 35%, and that of Detroit by 28%. Moreover, the populations of Whites fell uniformly across the largest 10 cities, while that of persons of color rose (author’s calculations based on data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Ruggles et al., 2020). Detroit led the way with a drop of 65% in its White population between 1960 and 1980, followed by St. Louis with a decline of 55%, Cleveland and Washington, DC with a 51% fall, and Chicago with a decrease of 50%. The percentage of Detroit’s population that was White fell from 70% in 1960 to 34% in 1980, while that of its African American population increased from 29% to 63%. Furthermore, even when Whites and Blacks lived in the same metropolitan areas, they resided far from each other. Indeed, Massey and Denton (1993) identified 16 metropolitan areas in 1980 that were characterized by hypersegregation, in which they were “highly segregated on at least four of the five dimensions [of segregation] at once” (p. 74). The 16 hypersegregated metropolitan areas at that time were Atlanta, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit, Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Milwaukee, New York City, Newark, Philadelphia, and St. Louis (Massey & Denton, 1993).

As Whites fled metropolitan centers between 1960 and 1980, many cities experienced significant declines in their tax base and budgets toward the brink of bankruptcy (Jay & Conklin, 2017). The economic setback was particularly devastating as many of these large cities sustained major losses in employment as manufacturing jobs—long the bloodlines of many communities—disappeared (Wilson, 1978). The crack epidemic and get-tough crime policies leading to mass incarceration took a heavy toll on people of color in urban America (Alexander, 2010). Blacks and Latinos were especially hit hard and driven further into highly segregated areas with high levels of unemployment, concentration of poverty, poorly funded schools, and isolation from the opportunity structure. As such, we see the expansion of Black and brown space where African Americans and Latinos, respectively, are marginalized and secluded from areas where the good schools, jobs, housing, and opportunities for social mobility are located. This geographic isolation alongside convenient stereotypes of Black and brown people contribute to what Elijah Anderson (2015) calls the “ghetto icon,” an image that Whites regularly invoke when they encounter people of color, particularly African Americans, in White space.

Despite their neglect and concentrated poverty, Black and brown spaces in many cities throughout the country have increasingly become attractive to Whites. In some instances, the low rent and housing values of the area attract bohemians, artists, writers, and “techies”—the creative class (Florida, 2002). In other situations, the low real estate value along with central locations in the city attract developers. As such, Black and brown spaces undergo racial, demographic, cultural, and economic transformations, rather than merely a “brief moment of housing turnover” (Green et al., 2017, p. 5).

Gentrification

While the transformation of such areas is often highly racialized, the literature for the most part emphasizes class differences between the newcomers and the established residents (Chronopoulos, 2016; Mumm, 2017). Ruth Glass (1964), a British urban geographer, coined the term of “gentrification” to describe the process through which London’s “gentry” (the upper middle and higher classes) moved to areas of the city where the poor lived. Glass (1964) observed that “Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced and the social character of the district is changed” (p. xix; see also Shaw, 2008, p. 2). In London, at the time that Glass coined the term, gentrification was along class lines. In addition, earlier gentrification of predominantly Black neighborhoods involved the movement of African American middle and upper classes (Chronopoulos, 2016) and rural gentrification tends to involve the movement of upper- and middle-class Whites into communities where poor and working class Whites reside (Golding, 2016). After decades of White flight from metropolitan areas, racial gentrification has reappeared to a considerable degree beginning in the 1990s and strengthening in the 21st century (Freeman & Cai, 2015). As Chronopoulos (2016) points out, the new trend in the gentrification of Black communities in the 21st century is that Whites now are the primary group displacing Blacks.

The Neoliberal Forces of Gentrification

Neoliberal urban policies established over the last few decades have increased the prevalence and speed of gentrification (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Gustavussen, 2018). Mumm (2017) suggests that gentrification is a microcosm of globalization—“a localization of globalization and what has been called ‘financification,’ the increasing complexity, speed, and liquidity of finance and the generation of new financial products, services, and investment banking” (p. 105). Global neoliberalism, Mumm (2017) adds, “involves the opening and deregulation of markets in the interests of capital investment, assuring greater concentration of wealth and increasing income disparity and polarization” (p. 105). As cities compete to attract highly mobile corporations and a peripatetic workforce, neighborhoods become vulnerable to major changes due to a “sudden, steep increase in investment” (Kwak, 2018, p. 9; see also Gustavussen, 2018). Chronopoulos (2016) makes reference to “neoliberal urbanization” characterized by the public-private partnership efforts to revitalize and develop areas where people of color and the poor are concentrated. For city planners, politicians, investors, and developers, the low housing values of areas where African American and Latino poor are concentrated represent the potential for major revitalization and development activities (Alvaré, 2017). Neoliberal policies promoting privatization as well as public–private partnerships lead to the purchase of homes and land in areas to develop upscale housing. The razing of public housing has been extremely lucrative (Goetz, 2011; Green et al., 2013; Khalek, 2014), as was the case with Cabrini-Green which, located near Chicago’s “Magnificent Mile,” represented prime real estate (Thu et al., 2017). The case of New Orleans illustrates the devastation that can come about when elected officials and city planners team up with developers to “redo” the city after it was ravaged by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Racial discrimination policies regarding the restoration of privately-owned homes and the destruction of public housing contributed to the massive restructuring of New Orleans, characterized by a major decline in its African American population along with soaring housing values and rents (Barrios, 2011; Green et al., 2013). Green et al. (2013) note that “It is suggested that political leaders paid more attention to the interest of developers and big businesses in the restoration of New Orleans than to the interest of the predominantly Black working class in the city” (p. 145). Neoliberal policies in the city quickly led to the privatization of public schools and their large-scale transformation into charter schools (Gustavussen, 2018) as well as the closing of Charity Hospital, which provided free medical service to the poor (Arnon, 2017).

There are a variety of other factors that promote gentrification. For example, escalated policing of communities of color through racial profiling not only contributed to mass incarceration but also to making these areas “safer” for Whites (Alvaré, 2017; Chronopoulos, 2011; Jay & Conklin, 2017). When Rudolf Giuliani became mayor of New York City in 1994, he instituted get-tough policing tactics, including going after minor infractions, to bring down crime and make the city safe and attractive to tourists and the well-off (Chronopoulos, 2016). In addition, as creative-class newcomers make their way early into areas where people of color are concentrated, they establish a hip, cool ambience with coffee shops, bookstores, art galleries, restaurants, and bars cropping up in the area (Ocejo, 2015; Sullivan & Shaw, 2011). Subsequently, the locale becomes highly attractive with rents and housing values climbing (Kwak, 2018). Furthermore, as areas undergo gentrification, pressure (e.g., rising rents, enhanced policy enforcement, and punitive fines) is put on small mom-and-pop and minority-owned established businesses intended to drive them out to make room for upscale businesses (Sutton, 2015).

What We Know About Recent Gentrification

The literature shows a growing body of research on cities undergoing gentrification over the last couple of decades. We find research on specific cities such as Camden, New Jersey (Danley & Weaver, 2018), Charleston, South Carolina (Hargrove, 2009), Chicago (Mumm, 2017; Papachristos et al., 2011; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019; Timberlake & Johns-Wolfe, 2017), Dallas (Sandoval-Strausz, 2019), Dekalb, Illinois (Thu et al., 2017), Detroit, Los Angeles (Kwak, 2018), Miami (Jay & Conklin, 2017; McBride, 2015), New Orleans (Barrios, 2011; Green et al., 2013; Gustavussen, 2018; McBride, 2015), the New York City area (Ali, 2014; Chronopoulos, 2016; Fuentes-Mayorga, 2011; Ocejo, 2015), Portland (Serbulo, 2019; Sullivan & Shaw, 2011), San Diego (Kwak, 2018), San Francisco (Kwak, 2018), Washington, DC (Green et al., 2017; Shinault & Seltzer, 2019), as well as research on sets of locations (Freeman & Cai, 2015; Goetz, 2011; Golding, 2016). Some of the most prominent substantive issues in this set of research include the displacement of people of color (Danley & Weaver, 2018; Hargrove, 2009; Mumm, 2017) and established small-scale businesses (Sullivan & Shaw, 2011), disaster capitalism (Barrios, 2011; Green et al., 2013; Gustavussen, 2018; McBride, 2015; see also Klein, 2007, 2018), the erasing of the histories and cultures of neighborhoods (Chronopoulos, 2016), the rise of neighborhood policing (Jay & Conklin, 2017; Kurwa, 2019; Papachristos et al., 2011), the emergence of charter schools and segregated schools (Gustavussen, 2018; Serbulo, 2019), the costs and benefits/winners and losers of gentrification (Shinault & Seltzer, 2019), the resistance movements fighting gentrification (Alvaré, 2017; Kwak, 2018; Thu et al., 2017), and the emergence of White space (Chronopoulos, 2016; Danley & Weaver, 2018; Hargrove, 2009).

Some of the most prominent cases of gentrification related to the entrance of Whites into Black areas include Brooklyn, Washington, DC, New Orleans, and Detroit. Fort Greene, a neighborhood situated in the western part of Brooklyn, where Blacks have been largely concentrated for approximately the last half century, has recently experienced major gentrification (Chronopoulos, 2016). The racial demography of Fort Greene has changed dramatically over the last decade. The White population in the neighborhood more than doubled between 2000 and 2014 with the African American population declining (Chronopoulos, 2016). Fort Greene is rapidly becoming a majority-White neighborhood for the first time in the last 50 years. In the case of Washington, DC, over a relatively short period, the city has been transformed from what was called a “Chocolate City” to a “Mocha City” or a “Chocolate Swirl” (Shinault & Seltzer, 2019). Between 2000 and 2017, the White population in the nation’s capital rose by 59% while the Black population declined by nearly 8% (author’s calculations from data from the Explore Census Data Web site, U.S. Census Bureau, 2020). The Black percentage of the Washington, DC population fell from 59% in 2000 to 45% in 2007 with the White share rising from 28% to nearly 37%, respectively. In the case of New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina spurred what the city’s White power structure had for long coveted—the displacement of the city’s African American population, which was seen as standing in the way of development. The African American population in New Orleans declined by 29% between 2000 and 2017 compared to a drop of 6% for the White population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020). The percentage of New Orleans’ population that is Black declined from 67% in 2000 to 59% in 2017 while the White population rose from 27% to 31%. In the case of Detroit, Whites have been returning to the city that they abandoned half century ago. Prompted by major investments in the city to attract White residents, Whites have taken advantage of “rock-bottom real estate prices” in Detroit (Jay & Conklin, 2017, p. 38). Between 2010 and 2017, the White population in Detroit rose by 28% while the Black population declined by 10%. In each of these four cities, rents and housing values have risen rapidly as Whites have moved into these places. Of course, there are many other cities across the country where such gentrification is taking place.

Gentrification and White Space

The entry of Whites into Black and Latino areas brings about the creation of White space in places where White newcomers are clustered including the areas where they live and the establishments and places that they frequent. As Anderson (2015) points out “As demographics change, public spaces are subject to change as well, impacting not only how a space is occupied and by whom but also the way in which it is perceived” (p. 11). The distinguishing features of White space are the “overwhelming presence of White people” and the “absence of Black people” (Anderson, 2015, p. 11). In places undergoing gentrification, despite their long presence in the area, people of color are viewed with suspicion, as outsiders, or as people who do not belong in the White spaces that gentrification generated. According to Anderson, Whites rely on stereotypes and common images—the ghetto icon (Anderson, 2015) or the “criminal Black man” narrative (Feagin, 2013)—to readily question the motive of people of color for entering White space. Recall George Zimmerman questioning the presence of Trayvon Martin, as looking like he is up to “no good” or “he’s on drugs or something” before Zimmerman killed the African American teenager (Alcindor, 2012, p. 1A; see also Sáenz, 2014). In White space, Whites are vigilant against intruders of color, especially Blacks. Anderson relates that:

Defensive Whites in these circumstances may be less consciously hateful than concerned and fearful of ‘dangerous and violent’ Black people. And in the minds of many of their detractors, to scrutinize and stop Black people is to prevent crime and protect the neighborhood. Thus, for the Black person, particularly young males, virtually every public encounter results in a degree of scrutiny that a ‘normal,’ White person would certainly not need to endure” (p. 14).

Blacks develop strategies or the “dance” to demonstrate that the ghetto icon does not apply to them. In other words, they “perform to be accepted” (Anderson, 2015, p. 13). Still even doing the dance or having appropriate credentials to be in White space results in Whites seeking to put people of color “back in [their] place” or a forceful demand to “go back where you came from” (Anderson, 2015, p. 14).

The gentrification literature offers ample illustrations of Whites establishing White space and protecting it from the intrusion of people of color. For example, as Whites gentrify predominantly Black areas, they impose their own rules on what is “proper” and police the White-defined boundaries. Spike Lee, who was giving a Black History Month talk at Pratt Institute in Brooklyn several years ago, reacted to an audience member’s taunt by raging against White gentrifiers:

Then comes the motherfuckin’ Christopher Columbus Syndrome. You can’t discover this! We been here. You just can’t come and bogart. There were brothers playing motherfuckin’ African drums in Mount Morris Park for 40 years and now they can’t do it anymore because the new inhabitants said the drums are loud. My father’s a great jazz musician. He bought a house in nineteen-motherfuckin’-sixty-eight, and the motherfuckin’ people moved in last year and called the cops on my father. He’s not—he doesn’t even play electric bass! It’s acoustic! We bought the motherfuckin’ house in nineteen-sixty-motherfuckin’-eight and now you call the cops? In 2013? Get the fuck outta here! (Coscarelli, 2014).

The literature shows that Whites monitor and police people of color in their White space. Kurwa (2019) illustrates how Whites, as a network of neighbors, use Nextdoor, a neighborhood social networking service, to alert each other about the presence of “suspicious” people of color who are considered “outsiders” and “being up to no good.” Kurwa (2019) relates the work of Levin (2015), a journalist in Oakland, who wrote an essay on how Blacks are racially profiled and wrongly accused of being criminals with neighbors encouraging each other to report these incidents to police or security guards. Kurwa (2019) also highlights the essay that Nisa Ahmad (2018), a resident of a Los Angeles neighborhood underdoing gentrification, wrote concerning why she decided to stop being part of the Nextdoor network:

Then came an African American neighbor who had been reported as being ‘suspicious’ during his morning run. He came on the app and asked people to be more mindful of the diversity of the neighborhood because he should not be criminalized for jogging. The responses were somewhat straight out of our Trump’s America. “We can’t take chances on safety” and ‘“perhaps you looked suspicious”. “You can’t blame us for wanting to protect our community”. How exactly is it “Ours” when the concerned inhabitants seem to only be the newly relocated gentrifiers.

Furthermore, established residents of gentrifying areas resent the aloofness of White newcomers who have no sense of the history, the culture, and the lifestyles of people who have long lived in the neighborhood. People of color and the poor who have long lived in their neighborhoods resent that it took the arrival of Whites to finally attain adequate city services. Sullivan and Shaw (2011) cite an African American resident of Alberta Street in Portland, where Blacks have been concentrated and which is undergoing gentrification, who reports that “It’s a shame that it had to take for them to come here and fix up the streets and…property… [W]e’ve been here long before they even got here…I don’t like that it is not my people here anymore” (p. 421). Similarly, people of color living in places undergoing gentrification feel that the amenities, such as parks, restaurants, bars, and White space generally, is not for them and sense that they are not welcome in such spaces (Danley & Weaver, 2018).

Moreover, the value of housing property in gentrifying areas rises with the increasing presence of Whites and the displacement of people of color, what Mumm (2017) refers to as the “racial fix.” Mumm (2017) illustrates the White reasoning behind this notion. Mumm (2017) relates the words of a White woman gentrifier in Humboldt Park, Illinois, who equates “neighborhood improvement” to the “increasing presence of Whites,” as she opines: “It could just be because I see more people like me” (p. 108). Mumm (2017) summarizes that the “racial fix relies on an overarching narrative of increasing value associated with White people, White space, White symbols, and White consumption—framed against local Others” (p. 108). As such, people of color are viewed as standing in the way of rising housing values of places where Whites enter.

Having provided a comprehensive overview of the movement of Whites out of metropolitan communities about a half century ago and their recent return to these areas that they are now gentrifying, we now turn our attention to the particular research that we conduct below.

Methods

Data for three time periods are used to conduct the analysis. These include data from the 2000 decennial census Summary Tape File 3 (STF3) and the 2012 and 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) Five-Year Estimates. The data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2020) Explore Census Data Web site. Data from this source were obtained for three specific racial/ethnic groups including non-Hispanic Whites (herein referred to as “Whites”), Blacks (including persons who are non-Hispanic or Hispanic), and Latinos. Unfortunately, the data source does not allow us to separate non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanic Blacks.

The initial part of the analysis examines differences in the percentage change of the White population across varying levels of community population size for the (1) 2000 to 2008–2012 and (2) 2008–2012 to 2013–2017 time periods. All incorporated places and Census Designated Places (CDPs) (see Shaefer, 2016) are included in this part of the analysis consisting of 24,459 geographic areas for the 2000 to 2008–2012 analysis and 28,847 for the 2008–2012 to 2013–2017 analysis. We aggregate the White population for each of the two time periods being compared across community size level and compute the percentage change in the White population between time 1 and time 2. The analysis also examines the percentage changes among Whites for the two periods by four categories of communities based on the relative size of the White population among the 805 places and CDPs with at least 50,000 inhabitants in 2013–2017. This initial part of the analysis will allow us to assess the extent to which the White population is growing in larger metropolitan areas as well as in places where Whites account for less than half of the population.

The subsequent part of the analysis represents the core of the analysis. The focus now is on the degree to which the White population has expanded its percentage share of the overall populations of selected communities across the two time periods of interest: (1) 2000 to 2008–2012 and (2) 2008–2012 to 2013–2017. The attractive feature of this measure is that it reflects not only growth among Whites but also relative to other racial and ethnic groups in the communities. In this case, the analysis consists of 212 incorporated places and CDPs where the White population accounted for less than 50% of the population in 2000 (i.e., communities where non-Whites outnumbered Whites) and the geographic areas had 50,000 or more persons in the 2013–2017 period. This selection criteria ensures that Whites represent the numerical minority in these cities at the initial time period of 2000. Subsequently, we compare the percentage share of the overall population of the communities that are White in the three time periods (2000, 2008–2012, and 2013–2017) to determine whether or not the percentage share of Whites rose for the two comparative time periods: (1) 2000 to 2008–2012 and (2) 2008–2012 to 2013–2017. This part of the analysis will allow us to identify places where the White population increased its relative presence across the two periods among communities where Whites were the numerical minority in 2000.

Once we identify places where the White population increased its relative size and those where the White population did not do so, we compare these two sets of communities on selected demographic and socioeconomic characteristics to assess the degree to which the classical form of gentrification took place in these communities across the two time periods. In particular, we examine the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos across the two sets of communities (those where the White population expanded its relative presence and those where it did not) for the two comparative time periods: (1) 2000 to 2008–2012 and (2) 2008–2012 to 2013–2017. The demographic and socioeconomic indicators include six race-/ethnic-specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics: (1) average population size, (2) average percentage share of the overall community, (3) the percentage of communities with absolute population gains, (4) average percentage of persons 25 and older who have a bachelor’s degree or higher, (5) average median household income, and (6) the average percentage of families with incomes below the poverty level. This part of the analysis will allow us to compare the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of the White population across the communities in which the White population increased its relative presence to those in which it did not as well as to compare the demographic and socioeconomic profile of the White population to those of Blacks and Latinos in places where the White population expanded its relative presence.

Results

Population Change among Whites in Metropolitan Areas by Community Size and White Relative Size

In our review of the literature above, we observed that the White population showed an increasing presence in larger metropolitan communities at the close of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries. We examine here the population changes that have occurred in the two comparative periods of interest: 1) 2000 to 2008–2012 and 2) 2008–2012 to 2013–2017 among Whites living in incorporated places and CDPs along the lines of community size. Figure 1 shows an important turnaround in communities with populations over 100,000 from population declines among Whites in the 2000 to 2008–2012 period to population increases in the 2008–2012 to 2013–2017 period. In the first period, Whites experienced population gains in places with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants, but by the second period growth took place in metropolitan places with populations over 100,00 with the greatest growth level (3.8%) taking place in areas with populations between 500,000 and 999,999.

Figure 1.

Percentage change of White population in all U.S. incorporated places and Census Designated Places (CDPs) in two periods. (Source: 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, Summary Tape File 3; American Community Survey 2012 and 2017 Five-Year Estimates).

Given the recent growth of Whites in metropolitan areas, we now examine the degree of the expanding relative share of Whites by the relative size of Whites among the 805 metropolitan communities with 50,000 or more people in the 2013–2017 period. We categorize the 805 places along the lines of the percentage of the community population that is White at the beginning of each of the two comparative time periods (2000 and 2008–2012) into four categories and obtain the percentage of communities in each of these categories in which the relative size of the White population rose between the 2000 to 2008–2012 period and the 2008–2012 to 2013–2017 period. Across the board, Whites experienced a greater expanding relative presence in the second time period compared to the previous period (Figure 2). However, this trend was the most likely to occur in communities where Whites represent less than 25% of the overall community population with nearly one-fifth of such communities experiencing a growing presence of Whites, as is the case with one in 11 of those where Whites account for between 25.0% and 49.9% of the population.

Figure 2.

Percentage of all U.S. incorporated places and Census Designated Places (CDPs) with 50,000 or more residents that had a rising percentage share of Whites in two periods by the relative size of the White population. (Source: 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, Summary Tape File 3; American Community Survey 2012 and 2017 Five-Year Estimates).

Now we turn our attention to the core part of the analysis in which we examine the metropolitan communities where Whites accounted for less than half of the city’s population in 2000 to assess their relative growth in these communities over the two periods.

The Identification of Cities with an Expanding White Presence

Of the 212 cities with at least 50,000 inhabitants in 2013–2017 in which Whites represented the numerical minority relative to non-Whites in 2000, 15 (7.1%) experienced a rising relative presence of Whites between 2000 and 2008–2012 with the number more than doubling to 32 (15.1%) between 2008–2012 and 2013–2017. Overall, 39 communities (18.4%) saw a growing percentage of their populations being White in one or both time periods. We divide the 39 cities into three categories: (1) reversal cities, where Whites increased their relative presence in period 1 and then declined in period 2, (2) turnaround cities, where Whites declined their relative presence in period 1 and then rose in period 2, and (3) consistent White gains, where Whites increased their relative presence in both periods (Table 1). The seven reversal cities tend to be relatively small and include four in California (three of these in the Los Angeles area) and the other three being in Arizona, Colorado, and South Carolina. The 24 turnaround cities tend to be quite diverse including the relatively larger metropolitan cities of Detroit, Santa Ana (located in California’s Orange County), and St. Louis, as well as three small- to medium-sized cities (Birmingham, East Los Angeles, and Inglewood, California), and 18 smaller cities with populations below 100,000. The turnaround cities consist of places within major metropolitan areas including seven (East Los Angeles, Inglewood, Carson, Gardena, Huntington Park, Pico Rivera, and Rowland Heights) in the Los Angeles metropolitan area; three (Union City, New Jersey; West New York, New Jersey, and Brentwood, New York) in the New York City metropolitan area; Union City, California in the San Francisco metropolitan area; Camden, New Jersey in the Philadelphia metropolitan area; and Tamiami, Florida in the Miami metropolitan area. Finally, the consistent White-gainer cities consist of eight cities featuring larger metropolitan areas including Chicago, Washington, DC, Oakland, Atlanta, New Orleans, along with Richmond, a medium-size metropolitan area, and Pasco, Washington, a community of approximately 70,000 in 2013–2017.

Table 1.

Three Categories of the 39 Cities With Expanding Percentage Share of Whites in One or Two Time Periods.

Period 1: White Relative Expansion/Period 2: White Relative Decline	Period 1: White Relative Decline/Period 2: White Relative Expansion	Period 1 and Period 2: White Relative Expansion
Casa Grande, Arizona	Avondale, Arizona	Atlanta, Georgia
Columbia, South Carolina	Birmingham, Alabama	Chicago, Illinois
Commerce City, Colorado	Brentwood, New York	Gary, Indiana
Compton, California	Camden, New Jersey	New Orleans, LA
Florence-Graham, California	Carson, California	Oakland, California
Indio, California	Colton, California	Pasco, Washington
Pasadena, California	Detroit, Michigan	Richmond, Virginia
	East Los Angeles, California	Washington, DC
	East Orange, New Jersey
	Flint, Michigan
	Fort Myers, Florida
	Gardena, California
	Huntington Park, California
	Inglewood, California
	Marietta, Georgia
	Pico Rivera, California
	Rowland Heights, California
	Santa Ana, California
	St. Louis, Missouri
	Tamiami, Florida
	Union City, California
	Union City, New Jersey
	Valdosta, Georgia
	West New York, New Jersey

Note. Period 1 = 2000 to 2008–2012; Period 2 = 2008–2012 to 2013–2017.

Source. 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, Summary Tape File 3; American Community Survey 2012 and 2017 Five-Year Estimates.

Comparison of Cities with an Expanding and a Declining White Presence

Cities with an expanding White presence in the two comparative time periods of interest (2000 to 2008–2012 and 2008–2012 to 2013–2017) are not a random lot. Rather, they tend to differ from cities with a declining White presence on the basis of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Table 2 provides a comparison of the two types of cities (those with an expanding and those with a declining White relative presence) in the two time periods on selected demographic and socioeconomic attributes by race/ethnic group. In both time periods, the White population in communities with an expanding relative presence of Whites increased, on average, by 4.6% in period 1 and 7.8% in period 2, while the White population in places with a decreasing relative presence of Whites declined by 9.0% and 1.1%, respectively. In addition, the White population largely grew in absolute terms in cities with an expanding White presence (80.0% in period 1 and 96.9% in period 2) while relatively few communities with a declining White presence experienced absolute growth among Whites (14.7% in period 1 and 20.0% in period 2). Moreover, Whites were younger in communities with an expanding White presence than their White counterparts in those places with a declining White presence. Across the board, while other groups consistently got older with a rising median age between the beginning and end of each period (2000 to 2008–2012 and 2008–2012 to 2013–2017), the White population actually was slightly younger at the end of each period compared to the beginning (data not shown), reflective of a gentrifying population. Finally, while Whites in gentrifying areas tend to be more educated than Whites in other communities, Whites in cities with a decreasing presence of Whites tend to have higher household incomes and lower poverty rates.

Table 2.

Summary Statistics for Selected Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics for Cities With an Expanding or a Declining White Relative Presence by Period.

Selected Characteristics for Cities by Race/Ethnic Group	2000 to 2008–2012		2008–2012 to 2013–2017
Selected Characteristics for Cities by Race/Ethnic Group	Cities with Expanding White Presence	Cities with Declining White Presence	Cities with Expanding White Presence	Cities with Declining White Presence
Average population size
White	115,476	69,692	68,208	73,801
Black	133,315	51,857	94,599	51,336
Latino	84,967	91,123	66,525	103,310
Pct. of cities with absolute growth
White	80.0	14.7	96.9	20.0
Black	33.3	53.8	46.9	55.0
Latino	93.3	94.9	68.8	91.1
Average pct. share of city population
White	30.8	23.9	21.2	22.9
Black	30.7	19.6	29.9	18.4
Latino	32.2	43.4	38.6	45.0
Average median age
White	38.7	44.3	41.5	45.3
Black	34.6	33.4	35.8	34.6
Latino	26.5	28.3	30.1	29.5
Average pct. of persons 25+ college graduates
White	45.7	32.5	38.4	36.1
Black	20.0	20.8	20.2	23.1
Latino	14.7	12.8	14.9	14.6
Average median household income (2017 $s)
White	$65,233	$63,533	$60,281	$66,006
Black	$41,872	$48,744	$41,964	$49,343
Latino	$44,763	$47,856	$45,689	$48,917
Average pct. of families in poverty
White	10.7	7.5	9.8	7.4
Black	22.3	18.8	20.0	18.1
Latino	25.2	20.8	22.1	19.9

Note. The values in the table were measured at the end of each of the two periods (2008–2012 for the first period and 2013–2017 for the second period).

Source. 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, Summary Tape File 3; American Community Survey 2012 and 2017 Five-Year Estimates.

We can also compare the demographic and socioeconomic standing of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos in communities with an expanding White presence. In period 2, on average, among communities with an expanding relative presence of Whites, the White population grew faster than the Black and Latino populations. In fact, the Black population generally declined in both time periods in cities where the White population expanded. Indeed, in period 2, more than half of the communities experiencing White gentrification had an absolute decline in their Black residents, as was the case for Latino population decline in approximately 30% of these communities. With respect socioeconomic characteristics, there are major socioeconomic gaps between Whites and persons of color in communities with an expanding White presence. For example, in period 2, Whites were nearly twice as likely as Blacks and 2.6 times more likely than Latinos to be college graduates; for every US$1 that households made, Black households earned 70 cents and Latino households 76 cents; Black and Latino families were more than twice as likely as White families to be in poverty.

A Focus on a Select Group of Cities with an Expanding White Presence

These racial disparities can be illustrated more directly with particular cities that are undergoing alterations in their racial and ethnic composition. There are eight specific cities that have seen consistent gains in the relative share of Whites across the three time periods. These cities include Gary, Indiana (9.9% Whites in 2000, 10.9% in 2008–2012, and 11.8% in 2013–2017); Pasco, Washington (36.8%, 37.7%, 38.6%); Washington, DC (27.7%, 34.5%, 36.0%); New Orleans (26.7%, 30.4%, 30.6%); Atlanta (31.3%, 36.2%, 37.3%); Oakland (23.4%, 26.0%, 27.3%); Richmond, Virginia (37.8%, 39.1%, 40.0%); and Chicago (31.3%, 32.0%, 32.7%). With the exception of Pasco, the major racial/ethnic groups in these cities are the White and Black populations. Thus, in the analysis below, we exclude Pasco from this part of the analysis.

Overall, there are major demographic and socioeconomic differences between Whites and Blacks in the seven cities. Over the period between 2000 and 2013–2017, the White population increased significantly in most cities while the Black population declined (Table 3); in three instances, the White population declined but at a much lower level than the decrease of the Black population. In addition, with the exception of Gary (where Whites have the lowest socioeconomic standing across the seven cities), in the other six cities Whites fare much more favorably than Blacks across the three socioeconomic indicators. These differences are greatest in Washington, DC, Atlanta, Oakland, and Chicago. In Washington, DC, for example, Whites were 3.6 times more likely than Blacks to have a bachelor’s degree or higher, Black households earned 32 cents for every US$1 White households made, and Black families were 18 times more likely to be in poverty than White families. Across these selected cities and certainly many others that are not part of this specific analysis, gentrification has displaced Blacks and exacerbated racial inequality.

Table 3.

Selected Demographic and 2013-2017 Socioeconomic Indicators for Whites and Blacks in Seven Cities with an Expanding Relative Presence of Whites in 2000, 2008-2012, and 2013-2017.


City	Pct. Change 2000 to 2013–2017		Pct. 25 and Older College Graduates		Median Household Income		Pct. Families in Poverty
City	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Atlanta	32.9	−4.9	77.3	22.9	$91,050	$29,854	2.4	29.0
Chicago	−1.9	−21.8	61.2	20.2	$79,425	$31,056	4.8	27.6
Gary, IN	−10.7	−27.7	18.0	11.9	$33,052	$28,433	24.1	33.4
New Orleans	−8.2	−28.9	65.1	18.3	$68,828	$25,860	3.9	28.2
Oakland	21.8	−29.1	72.1	23.9	$102,426	$38,667	2.9	21.0
Richmond, VA	18.1	−5.5	62.5	15.2	$62,738	$28,326	4.2	29.7
Washington, DC	52.5	−7.3	91.1	25.5	$129,351	$41,387	1.3	23.0

Source. 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, Summary Tape File 3; American Community Survey 2017 Five-Year Estimates.

There is still another set of communities where Whites are expanding their presence which deviate from the traditional image of gentrification. As we just saw, Gary, Indiana is quite different from the other six cities where Whites have increased their relative presence over the three time periods. We examine here six cities, including Gary, where the communities have sustained declining populations from 2000 to 2008–2012 and to 2013–2017 (Table 4). In these communities, Whites have increased their relative presence even though they are also experiencing population loss over time. Three (Birmingham, Camden, and Detroit) of the six communities had similar levels of population loss between 2000 and 2013–2017 across Blacks and Whites, while Blacks had higher levels of population decline in Gary and St. Louis as did Whites in Flint. With respect to socioeconomic status, Birmingham and St. Louis stand out. In these two cities, about half of Whites had a bachelor’s degree or higher, along with higher median household incomes, and lower poverty levels. In these two communities, there are major racial disparities with Whites being three times more likely to be college graduates. In addition, in St. Louis. Black households earned 46 cents for every dollar of White households and Black families were nearly five times more likely to be poor than White families, with the respective figures in Birmingham being 56 cents and three times relative to Whites. Nonetheless, although the racial disparities are not as great in the other four communities (Camden, Detroit, Flint, and Gary), across the board, Whites fare better socioeconomically compared to Blacks.

Table 4.

Selected Demographic and 2013-2017 Socioeconomic Indicators for Whites and Blacks in Six Cities with Overall Population Declines in 2000, 2008–2012, and 2013–2017 and With an Expanding White Presence in One or Two Periods.


City	Pct. Change 2000 to 2013–2017		Pct. 25 and Older College Graduates		Median Household Income		Pct. Families in Poverty
City	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Birmingham, AL	−15.6	−14.9	52.4	15.5	$52,097	$29,166	9.1	27.0
Camden, NJ	−25.3	−21.3	12.4	9.5	$28,893	$23,047	24.1	36.6
Detroit	−32.7	−30.5	30.1	12.0	$31,982	$26,958	28.4	32.8
Flint, MI	−27.2	−19.8	14.1	10.2	$30,511	$23,880	29.1	38.6
Gary, IN	−10.7	−27.7	18.0	11.9	$33,052	$28,433	24.1	33.4
St. Louis	−9.6	−15.5	49.6	15.1	$54,980	$25,080	6.7	30.9

Source. 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, Summary Tape File 3; American Community Survey 2017 Five-Year Estimates.

Conclusions

Half a century ago Whites fled metropolitan centers toward suburban areas where they established predominantly White communities, neighborhoods, and schools. However, over the last couple of decades Whites have been increasingly moving to metropolitan areas where they are gentrifying many neighborhoods and communities throughout the nation. Neoliberal policies in urban areas have established public–private partnerships that have significantly transformed neighborhoods and communities. Many areas with predominantly African American and Latino residents that had been long neglected and marginalized are being turned into trendy locales where Whites and richer people are flocking toward and, in the process, driving up housing values and rents and displacing people of color and the poor. As places gentrify, brown and Black spaces have been replaced by White spaces where people of color are closely monitored and policed.

The analysis conducted here shows that in the 212 majority non-White communities, 39 have experienced an expanding relative presence of Whites with the number increasing between the two comparative time periods of (1) 2000 to 2008–2012 and (2) 2008–2012 to 2013–2017. The results show differences between Whites in these cities and in those places with a decreasing presence of Whites with respect to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Further, among cities with an increasing presence of Whites, the White population is growing faster than the Black and Latino populations, suggesting the displacement of people of color—particularly Blacks—in this select set of communities, and Whites are much better off socioeconomically than Blacks and Latinos. There is a subset of eight cities that have experienced an expanding White presence across both time periods of interest. In these communities with significant levels of gentrification, the White population is growing while the Black population is declining and there are extremely wide socioeconomic gaps between Whites and Blacks.

Undoubtedly, the number of cities throughout the country that are experiencing gentrification is much larger than the 39 that we identify here, as we are focusing here on the overall city in places where Whites are the numerical minority relative to non-Whites. In many cases, the growth of Latinos—as well as Asians, for that matter—may be offsetting the entry of White gentrifiers with such communities not having an overall increasing White presence. The analysis carried out here clearly shows that there is great diversity in cities with an expanding White presence and gentrification. The dynamics of race relations and gentrification are likely to vary widely across this diverse set of communities. Many others where Whites were the numerical majority were not part of the analysis, but are experiencing extremely high levels of gentrification, including cities such as Austin, Denver, Minneapolis, New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle.

The results of the analysis have important policy implications. Policy makers need to ensure that people of color and those with limited resources are not displaced from the neighborhoods and communities that are undergoing gentrification. Many of these individuals have deep roots in these areas with their families extending back generations. City leaders need to create programs that set caps on property taxes and rents of people with limited resources living in gentrifying areas. In addition, city leaders need to establish funds for the building of affordable housing for their residents.

Yet, around the country, there has been a ray of hope with the development of resistance movements and organizations that are fighting gentrification. There is a growing literature that has called attention to the activism in places that are beset by gentrification (Alvaré, 2017; Gustavussen, 2018; Kwak, 2018; McBride, 2015; Thu et al., 2017). Sociologists concerned with social justice and human rights have established partnerships with activists and community residents in organizing efforts to defend neighborhoods from the jaws of gentrification. However, it should be stressed that these efforts need to be collaborative and on an equal basis rather than scholars dictating the course of action. There is certainly a lot of work that we need to do to stop the ravages of neoliberal policies that spawn gentrification and the displacement of people of color and the poor.

Finally, we are in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and the murder of George Floyd, a 46-year-old man, in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020 who was killed by a White policeman who pressed his knee on the neck of the defenseless Floyd who pled for his life. The pandemic and image of a White policeman ruthlessly and without any emotion taking the life of a Black man in Minneapolis have served as wakeup calls for many Whites who had for long been in denial or refused to see the racial disparities and the devaluating of Black lives that white supremacy has spawned. Protests over the killing of Floyd persisted for several months in many parts of the nation. In this environment of support for structural change, policymakers need to address the mechanisms that generate gentrification and the processes that lead to heightened profiling, criminalization, and the displacement of people of color. We need to dismantle white supremacy and the cruel and hideous inequalities and harm that it has generated and reproduced with impunity.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Rogelio Sáenz is Professor in the Department of Demography at the University of Texas at San Antonio. He has written extensively in the areas of demography, Latina/os, race, inequality, immigration, COVID-19, health disparities, aging, public policy, and social justice.

References

Ahmad

(2018, June 16). Why I quit the next door neighbor app. Medium. https://medium.com/@MzAhmad/why-i-quit-the-nextdoor-neighbor-app-fcb64bfa1eae.

Alcindor

(2012, December 12). Trayvon—typical teen or troublemaker? USA Today, 1A. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/11/trayvon-martin-profile/1761373/.

Alexander

(2010). The new Jim crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness. The New York Press.

Ali

(2014). I gentrify Bed-Stuy. Contexts, 13(1), 84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504214522018.

Alvaré

M. A.

(2017). Gentrification and resistance: Racial projects in the neoliberal order. Social Justice, 44(2/3), 113–136.

Anderson

(2015). The white space. Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 1(1), 10–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/2332649214561306.

Arnon

(2017, April 17). Why is New Orleans’ charity hospital still abandoned 12 years after Hurricane Katrina? Huffington Post. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-is-new-orleans-charity-hospital-still-abandoned_b_58f4cba5e4b04cae050dc90e.

Barrios

(2011). If you did not grow up here, you cannot appreciate living here’: Neoliberalism, space-time, and affect in post-Katrina recovery planning. Human Organization, 70(2), 118–127. https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.70.2.d4356255x771r663.

Biggest US Cities (2020a). Biggest US cities: 1960 population. https://www.biggestuscities.com/1960.

10.

Biggest US Cities (2020b). Biggest US cities: 1980 population. https://www.biggestuscities.com/1980.

11.

Billingham

C. M.

(2015). The broadening conception of gentrification: Recent developments and avenues for future inquiry in the sociological study of urban change. Michigan Sociological Review, 29(Fall), 75–102.

12.

Boustan

Shertzer

(2013). Population trends as a counterweight to central city decline, 1950-2000. Demography, 50(1), 125–147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-012-0137-5.

13.

Brenner

Theodore

(2002). Cities and the geographies of ‘actually existing neoliberalism. Antipode, 34(3), 349–379. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00246.

14.

Chronopoulos

(2011). Spatial regulation in New York City: From urban renewal to zero tolerance. Routledge.

15.

Chronopoulos

(2016). African Americans, gentrification, and neoliberal urbanization: The case of Fort Greene, Brooklyn. Journal of African American Studies, 20(3–4), 294–322. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12111-016-9332-6.

16.

Clark

T. N.

Ferguson

L. C.

(1983). City money: Political processes, fiscal strain, and retrenchment. Columbia University Press.

17.

Coscarelli

(2014, February 25). Spike Lee’s amazing rant against gentrification: ‘We been here!. New York Magazine. http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2014/02/spike-lee-amazing-rant-against-gentrification.html.

18.

Danley

Weaver

(2018). “They’re not building it for us”: Displacement pressure, unwelcomness, and protesting neighborhood investment. Societies, 8(74), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc8030074.

19.

Feagin

J. R.

(2013). The White racial frame: Centuries of racial framing and counter-framing (2nd ed.). Routledge.

20.

Florida

(2002). The rise of the creative class. Basic Books.

21.

Freeman

Cai

(2015). White entry into Black neighborhoods: Advent of a new era? The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 660(1), 302–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215578425.

22.

Fuentes-Mayorga

(2011). Sorting Black and brown Latino service workers in gentrifying New York neighborhoods. Latino Studies, 9(1), 106–125. https://doi.org/10.1057/lst.2011.13.

23.

Glass

(1964). Introduction: Aspects of change. In Centre for Urban Studies (Ed.) London: Aspects of change (pp. xiii–xlii). MacKibbon and Kee.

24.

Goetz

(2011). Gentrification in Black and White: The racial impact of public housing demolition in American cities. Urban Studies, 48(8), 1581–1604. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098010375323.

25.

Golding

S. A.

(2016). Gentrification and segregated wealth in rural America: Home value sorting in destination counties. Population Research and Policy Review, 35(1), 127–146. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-015-9374-9.

26.

Green

R. D.

Kouassi

Mambo

(2013). Housing, race, and recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Review of Black Political Economy, 40(2), 145–163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12114-011-9116-0.

27.

Green

R. D.

Mulusa

J. K.

Byers

A. A.

Parmer

(2017). The indirect displacement hypothesis: A case study in Washington, D.C. Review of Black Political Economics, 44(1–2), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12114-016-9242-9.

28.

Gustavussen

M. L.

(2018). Contending with school reform: Neoliberal restructuring, racial politics, and resistance in post-Katrina New Orleans. Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 2018(82), 94–108. https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2018.820107.

29.

Hargrove

M. D.

(2009). Mapping the ‘social field of whiteness’: White racism as habitus in the city where history lives. Transforming Anthropology, 17(2), 93–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-7466.2009.01048.x.

30.

Hobbs

Stoops

(2002). Demographic trends in the 20th century. Census 2000 special reports, series CENSR-4. U.S. Government Printing Office.

31.

Jackson

K. T.

(1985). Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization of the United States. Oxford University Press.

32.

Jay

Conklin

(2017). Detroit and the political origins of ‘broken windows’ policing. Race & Class, 59(2), 26–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396817717149.

33.

Katznelson

(2005). When affirmative action was white: An untold history of welfare in twentieth-century America. W.W. Norton & Co.

34.

Khalek

(2014, January 31). DC’s poorest residents fight displacement by gentrification. Truth-out. https://truthout.org/articles/poorest-residents-fight-displacement-by-gentrification/.

35.

Klein

(2007). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. Picador.

36.

Klein

(2018). The battle for paradise: Puerto Rico takes on the disaster capitalists. Haymarket Books.

37.

Kozol

(2005). The shame of the nation: The restoration of the apartheid schooling in America. Crown Publishers.

38.

Krysan

Couper

M. P.

Farley

Forman

T. A.

(2009). Does race matter in neighborhood preferences? Results from a video experiment. American Journal of Sociology, 115(2), 527–559. https://doi.org/10.1086/599248.

39.

Kurwa

(2019). Building the digitally gated community: The case of Nextdoor. Surveillance & Society, 17(1/2), 111–117. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.12927.

40.

Kwak

N. H.

(2018). Anti-gentrification campaigns and the fight for local control in California cities. New Global Studies, 12(1), 9–20. https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2018-0008.

41.

Levin

(2015, October 7). Racial profiling via Nextdoor.com. East Bay Express. https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/racial-profiling-via-nextdoorcom/Content?oid=4526919&showFullText=true.

42.

Massey

Denton

N. A.

(1993). American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the underclass (3rd ed.). Harvard University Press.

43.

McBride

(2015). Disasters, public policy, and urban Black communities: Urban planning and recovery during Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina. National Political Science Review, 17(1), 37–55.

44.

Mumm

(2017). The racial fix: White currency in the gentrification of Black and Latino Chicago. Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 2017(79), 102–118. https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2017.790109.

45.

Ocejo

R. E.

(2015). Bar fights on the bowery. Contexts, 14(3), 20–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504215596941.

46.

Papachristos

A. V.

Smith

C. M.

Scherer

M. L.

Fugiero

M. A.

(2011). More coffee, less crime? The relationship between gentrification and neighborhood crime rates in Chicago, 1991 to 2005. City & Community, 10(3), 215–240. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6040.2011.01371.x.

47.

Ruggles

Flood

Goeken

Grover

Meyer

Pacas

Sobek

(2020). IPUMS USA: Version 10.0 [dataset]. IPUMS. https://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml.

48.

Sáenz

(2014). Fifty years of the deferment of the dream for racial justice: From Hattie Carroll to Trayvon Martin. In Fasching-Varner

K. J.

Dixon

Reynolds

Albert

(Eds.), Trayvon Martin, Race, and American Justice: Writing Wrong (pp. 119–124). Springer.

49.

Sandoval-Strausz

A.K.

(2019). Barrio America: How Latino immigrants saved the American city. Basic Books.

50.

Schuerman

M. L.

(2019). Newcomers: Gentrification and its discontent. University of Chicago Press.

51.

Serbulo

(2019). ‘The kind of things we’ve heard keep people in the district’: White racial exclusion and the evolution of school choice policies in Portland public schools. Urban Studies, 56(15), 3293–3307. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098019842974.

52.

Shaefer

(2016, December 27). How to identify incorporated and unincorporated places in the United States. Service Objects. https://www.serviceobjects.com/blog/how-to-identify-incorporated-and-unincorporated-places-in-the-united-states/.

53.

Shaw

(2008). Gentrification: What it is, why it is, and what can be done about it. Geography Compass, 2(5), 1697–1728. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00156.x.

54.

Shinault

C. M.

Seltzer

(2019). Whose turf, whose town? Race, status, and attitudes of Washington DC residents toward gentrification. Journal of African American Studies, 23(1-2), 72–91. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12111-019-09427-9.

55.

Sullivan

D. M.

Shaw

S. C.

(2011). Retail gentrification and race: The case of Alberta street in Portland, Oregon. Urban Affairs Review, 47(3), 413–432. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087410393472.

56.

Sutton

S. A.

(2015). The spatial politics of Black business closure in central Brooklyn. In Bay

Fabian

(Eds.), Race and Retail: Consumption Across the Color Line (pp. 200–221). Rutgers University Press.

57.

Thu

K. M.

Schuller

Huggins

Redmond

(2017). Being heard, not only seen’: Intersections of tea partyism, racism, and classism in a low-income housing struggle in Dekalb, Illinois. Human Organization, 76(4), 348–357. https://doi.org/10.17730/0018-7259.76.4.348.

58.

Timberlake

J. M.

Johns-Wolfe

(2017). Neighborhood ethnoracial composition and gentrification in Chicago and New York, 1980 to 2010. Urban Affairs Review, 53(2), 236–272. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087416636483.

59.

U.S. Census Bureau (2020). Explore census data. https://data.census.gov/cedsci/.

60.

Wilson

W. J.

(1978). The declining significance of race: Blacks and changing American institutions. University of Chicago Press.