Abstract
Daniel Pedersen has provided an intriguing and penetrating exploration of Friedrick Schleiermacher’s theology of sin. This monograph builds on and develops his earlier monograph The Eternal Covenant (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017).
In the introductory chapter, Pedersen states that traditional Christian accounts of sin assume that sin must be treated as non-being and thus “unnaturally bad,” whereas modern accounts argue that “to be and to be good are not necessarily the same thing.” Given these competing assumptions, two major avenues in modernity for understanding sin have created an impasse. Modern theology contends for “positivism about value and skepticism about nature’s relation to the good,” while traditional theology argues for “the convertibility of the transcendentals and the deficiency of sin’s determining causes” (p. 1). Schleiermacher offers an end to the stalemate. Pedersen writes (p. 2), He . . . [provides] an account of sin and its origins which is . . . causally complete together with its relation to the natural world and to the good, including that blessed communion with God to which human nature is divinely ordered—an alternative which requires none of the naivety of the unqualified affirmation of the tradition, or the folly of its flat denial.
Pedersen argues that his account makes the best use of ancient as well as modern insights. His thesis is that “all sin is, for Schleiermacher, not only of ultimately natural origin but also naturally determined”; it is an “organic whole” (p. 7).
Chapters 2–4 survey Schleiermacher’s arguments against the traditional account, while chapters 5–7 explicate his constructive account of sin.
In the second chapter, describing Schleiermacher’s rejection of the “fall of the Devil” tradition as an explanation for the origin of sin, Pedersen discerns a pattern in Schleiermacher’s argument in which he employs a traditional, Aristotelian understanding of agency and action as well as a traditional view of value in his “anti-traditional” rejection of the “fall of the Devil” explanation (p. 18). For example, Schleiermacher argues that the fall of angels “is not properly voluntary” since it is clear their decision was irrational given that they rejected God either from ignorance or while knowing he is the supreme good.
In chapter 3, Pedersen describes Schleiermacher’s interaction with the “fall of Adam” explanation of sin’s origins. For Schleiermacher, Adam’s fall was not his responsibility since he either was tempted by Satan to fall and so a passive victim or he somehow changed his nature, the latter being an impossibility for Schleiermacher. He concludes that all sin is inherent in human nature.
In chapter 4, he surveys Schleiermacher’s interaction with the concept that sin is a deficient cause. Because of the cogency of Augustine’s account of sin as a deficiency, Pedersen argues that Schleiermacher must offer an account in conversation with Augustine’s argument, which he does “by demanding a complete causal account within which even an evil will can be sufficiently explained” (p. 62). Pedersen elaborates that, for Schleiermacher, sin “is both sufficiently causally determined and defective with respect to its ideal use” (p. 68). Pedersen notes that Schleiermacher has modified but not abolished “traditional claims about the origins of sin” thus “[t]he differences that exist . . . are substantial yet specific.” That is to say, Schleiermacher agrees with the tradition that “no good nature can cause itself to become evil” while refusing to affirm that the human will is a deficient cause of the fall (p. 73).
In chapter 5, Pedersen notes that for Schleiermacher, “[t]he first humans did not become sinners; the first humans were themselves born sinners; and the cause of sin in each new generation is identical with what made the first humans sinners too” (p. 97). Regarding the nature or definition of sin (chapter 6), Schleiermacher adopts an evolutionary understanding of humanity with the earlier, animal stage (i.e., pursuit of pleasure; avoidance of pain) existing in competition with the latter stage in which humans awaken to God-consciousness. This latter stage brings with it “a higher end” which is “superadded” to the earlier, animal instincts (p. 128). Therefore, this competition between lower and higher ends explains the origin of sin. Moreover, God’s punishment of sin is purposed to eradicate sin resulting, finally, in the “complete cessation of divine punishment” (p. 165).
This work is highly technical, requiring patience, yet also very clear. Pedersen cogently argues for his thesis. He demonstrates that with his ancient and modern (evolutionary) convictions, Schleiermacher truly does move past the impasse. While not every adherent of the traditional view of sin will find Schleiermacher’s account persuasive, readers may appreciate his logical consistency. Schleiermacher’s Theology of Sin and Nature is essential reading for any student of modern theology, the theology of sin, or Schleiermacher’s thought.