Status Competition: The BRICS’ Quest for Influence in Global Governance

Introduction

It was in the 1990s that the world witnessed significant changes in the international world order. Some changes occurred in the global system which resulted in the demise of the bipolar world that marked the arrival of unipolarity in the international system. These changes came about with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was discredited by the liberal capitalist regime led by the United States. It also brought to an end the only alternative force that was present against western influence and attention was directed towards international institutions such as human rights, the promotion of democracy and economic liberalisation. Liberalism began to be injected as a zeitgeist and the idea of global governance gradually began entering the realm of world affairs as a new approach to manage international affairs. This resulted in favour of the west’s political ambitions of managing the world collaboratively by making efforts to solve problems in the world (Stephen 2017, 483). In other words, we can understand that there emerged a system where the imposition of the ‘west over the rest’ became more significant in the international system. More particularly, the United States had an overarching influence in the United Nations (UN) that was considered the pinnacle of global governance (Weiss 2016, 8). The rise of Brazil, China and India as emerging economies in the global platform, and its significance in terms of global governance in recent times, however, cannot be contested. Each of these economies is engaged in acquiring a larger role at the regional and global levels. Given their rise alongside their large populations, these countries’ convergence with those industrialised countries points to the fact that theirs is a story of significant success in absolute and per capita terms. However, their engagement with the global economy and international institutions and the promise that it presents at the moment seems benign. On the other hand, seen from the power transition point of view, it also seems that there would be an inescapable scenario where the risk of conflict since the decline in terms of power for those who have been at the top would like to counter and preserve their position of power at the top vis-à-vis these emerging challengers (Kahler, 2013, 711). It is upon this background that this article’s attention is focused on emerging powers and their role in global governance. With a few preliminary comments on global governance and the role of emerging powers in it and the emerging shift in power (power transition), the article will turn its focus on status competition in the international system. These factors will be the foundation upon which the role of the Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) grouping will be assessed as having an impact in global governance and whether their rising influence will be a competition for status that will inevitably lead the path towards conflict.

Financial crises in the West and in the East had brought substantial changes in the way the ordering of the international system worked. These crises brought about a significant change in the outlook of organising and regulating the economy. As a consequence, rising powers have begun, especially from the Global South, to play a more significant role in reforming the global economic and political aspects of governance. This has brought with it a critically distinct possibility where there could be a regime change in the sphere of global governance (Gray and Murphy 2013, 184). What we can understand through these changes is that the world is passing through a transformative period that is evidenced by the fact that the rise and decline of great powers are indeed an important aspect in terms of the study of global governance. The dominating position that the United States once held and although still in its control, we are now witnessing a significant slide in terms of its power and influence over world politics. Rising powers such as China, India and Brazil with their increase in wealth, power, influence and ambition have brought with them newer forms of struggle and conflict between the established and emerging powers in the world (Ikenberry 2014, 1).

Global governance and the debates surrounding it in recent times are often portrayed as a realm of confrontation and conflict rather than one in which interest-alignment and multilateral arrangements are strengthened. Globalisation, which was often considered a certainty that could result in the establishment of a new liberal world order during the post-Cold War era, became weakened, and there was a phenomenal rise in terms of the risk of conflict. During the year 2014 at the sixty-ninth General Assembly of the UN, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon cautioned about the rising level of crises and there would not be many who would disagree with that assertion (Pegram and Acuto 2015, 585). James Rosenau in the opening passages of his book Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics succinctly states that while hegemonies are declining and challenges to that authority are on the rise, failing military alliances, global governance and global order have become a transcendental issue. This has brought with it an increase in space and pace of transformation, and questions about the nature and order of governance have become significant requiring critical re-examination (Rosenau 2015, 1). These developments only point towards a governance deficit that has provoked a critical re-examination amongst practitioners and academics. Whether this points towards a renewed interest in global governance is debatable since it is a topic that receives minimal attention during political discussions, and for the most part, global governance has remained within the realm of realpolitik, institutions and membership. Responses to these changes and failures in the context of multilateralism have resulted in the return to bilateralism, club diplomacy and coalitions of the willing. Yet with all its challenges and failures, there have been varied responses towards the renewal of practice-oriented discourses amongst academics and scholars within the international relations community (Pegram and Acuto 2015, 585).

Taking the cue from Rosenau and Czempiel’s work, scholars in the field of international relations began to think that the 1990s was markedly a point of transformation in its history. Global governance, according to Hofferberth (2015), presented two challenges: (i) the manner in which global problems would be studied was criticised and (ii) the measures that were adopted to solve those problems were not succeeding in their efforts (Hofferberth 2015, 599). Global governance also raises three important questions that need to be addressed, such as (i) legitimacy of the authority, (ii) democratic values and (iii) effectiveness. Unlike governance at the local and national levels, the idea of a social contract between citizens and institutions of global governance has not received adequate levels of legitimacy that would be required for action at various levels. Global governance in general visualises democratic values that seek to establish openness, accountability and fairness. The idea of global governance, however, has witnessed growing attention due to the significance of the interconnectedness of human activity and the recognition of the fact that the problems a rising through global trade and finance are indeed a matter of concern. The role of the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also brought about an increased level and need for cooperation amongst states, where the interdependence of societies and states coupled with human migration, flow of capital across national boundaries and increased levels of communication between people in remote areas have all signalled the increased need for globalisation that would regulate human activity across borders, health, climate and economic livelihoods that subsequently has resulted in the heightened attention rendered towards global governance (Benedict 2001, 155–56). However, over time global interconnectedness has come to a point where there has been a fundamental shift in terms of our capability to engage further in global cooperation. This is to say that political and economic successes that were attributed to the post-war multilateral order have now come to a gridlock or deadlock (Held 2016, 840–41). Held holds that in the post-war order, human interconnectedness grew substantially and relied more on politics and, therefore, resulting in remarkable success in terms of global cooperation. This has resulted in the need for international cooperation at a greater level. However, in areas such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, small arms trade, failed states, global poverty, global financial instability and climate change, transnational cooperation is increasingly becoming ineffective (Held 2016, 841).

The world has increasingly become globalised, complex and vulnerable in various contexts that affect its economic, political social and environmental processes. Such changes and complexities require a re-examination of power shifts and vision of deliberative democracy at the global level. What is more significant is that global capitalism has come to witness its most difficult and challenging times which have resulted due to a deeper crisis of structural, political and moral structure of global governance. This can be interpreted as an end to what is called casino capitalism and what Karl Polanyi would have referred to as another great transformation. The argument that is put forward in this context is that a simple Keynesian approach in this context would not solve the crisis that liberalism nor capitalism is facing. In contrast, Mary Kaldor says that the new Keynes must be neo-Schumpeterian. Neo-Schumpeterianism includes both the supply and demand which match with social and institutional frameworks with the techno-economic paradigm. In other words, it points to the creation of a deeply inclusive system of global governance that would involve reimagining and reinventing existing structures, institutions and norms that inform global political, economic and ethical order (Kumar and Messner 2012, 4). Given these developments, where the decline in the hegemonic status of states and the emergence of rising or emerging powers who are beginning to compete with the established powers, there seems to have emerged a scenario where competition between the two categories of powers has begun to dominate world affairs in recent times. As already noted, the rise of Brazil, China, India and Russia has had a significant impact on world politics. This article is, thus, an examination of the idea of status competition in world politics and the BRICS’ quest for influence in global governance.

Status in World Politics

The United States in its National Security Strategy (NSS) stated that the world today is witnessing the intensification of international competition in political, economic and military spheres. The National Defense Strategy of the United States clearly states that the nature of emerging competition in the world now is increased global disorder that is characterised by a decline in the long-standing rules-based international order and that it is not terrorism but inter-state strategic competition that is of primary concern for the United States. The US’ NSS points out the re-emergence of strategic competition by revisionist powers such as China and Russia who, with their authoritarian model of governance, are wanting to shape the world order (Mazarr et al. 2018, 1). In the past decade, there have been some important works that have focused on ‘Status’ in the context of world politics. These works have interpreted status-based world politics through important phenomena such as weapons systems acquisition, power transitions, wars and military interventions, participation in and the formation of international organisations, foreign policies of small states and behaviour of emerging or rising powers in international politics (Götz 2021, 228–29). Three important works amongst others provide clarity for understanding status in international politics (i) Jonathan Renshon’s Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics’, (ii) Michelle Murray’s The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism and Rising Powers and (iii) Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Schevchenko’s Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy. Renshon presents a rationalist instrumentalist approach, Murray suggests a constructivist approach while Larson and Schevchenko draw from the theory of social identity (Götz 2021, 229).

In international relations, status refers to the standing or rank in a status community. Position, perception and social attributes attest to the idea of status in international relations. Status can also be seen broadly as having a social role where status can generally mean standing or rank and status as identity or membership in a community where it could mean status as a major power (Renshon 2017, 33). Status also relates to the relative standing of a state vis-à-vis others in a deference hierarchy. This means that a state cannot move up the ladder unless the other goes down. Renshon also states that status can even be a club good which means being a member of a group. Yet he asserts that positionality is critical since the status that is associated when becoming a member of a group is fixed, it eventually lessens when additional members are added to the group (Renshon 2017, 34). Status, on the other hand, is not based on the possession of resources for power as it is dependent on the recognition of that power by others. Thus, it makes status as conforming to perception and social factors that are accrued only by intersubjectivity (Renshon 2017, 35). States often seek recognition from a specific group of states rather than all states in general in terms of status (Renshon 2017, 140).

Larson and Schevchenko say that status is both a club good and a positional good. Status which is similar to prestige also carries with it the rank order. Similar to a group’s status that is derived from the traits that are valued in its society, so is a state’s international stature that is dependent on its particular attributes such as its military, economic and social power, diplomatic skill and technological development. Generally, people are willing to be at a higher position in terms of status than at lower one. Higher status is often attached to pride and self-esteem, and in the contemporary world, people want to be identified with their country as being able to have a higher status in the world owing to its achievements and victories. Therefore, status is hierarchical in nature, and members of a group who are in the lower position are treated disrespectfully and inattentively. It is this same principle of status that is applied in the context of international relations or relations between states where states with higher ranking expect deference from those with lower status (Larson and Schevchenko 2019, 3). Status is, therefore, a positional good which means that when one group’s status declines the other groups will grow. Status seen from a neorealist perspective would refer to military prowess that is demonstrated through victory in war over a major power. On the other hand, mere possession of superior military power may not lead to acceptance, respect or status. The Soviet Union’s efforts towards geopolitical expansion and military competition during the Cold War did not necessarily make the United States accept it as an equal in the international system. Thus, efforts towards attaining status may largely be symbolic in that it seeks to influence others’ perception of their raw material capabilities (Larson and Schevchenko 2019, 4).

Looking at status dynamics in international politics, Michelle Murray offers her arguments through the constructivist approach where social construction of status categories and the ideational bases of status claims are given consideration. Murray builds an impressive theory that emphasises on the desire for status with particular attention accorded to rising powers (Götz 2021, 237). Murray develops a constructive model of recognition that stands in contradiction to those models that predominate international relations scholarship on status in world politics. Collective beliefs that have often dominated a state’s ranking through valued attributes as argued by Larson and others have thus made it possible to compare a state’s relative standing with that of those status markers. Recognition thus makes it central to this argument because even though those identified markers of status may be achieved, such accomplishments must be recognised by other high-status actors. Status, thus, in this approach is subjective and not intersubjective as it is based on recognition. It is also based on others’ perception of the actor’s attributes and achievements in that regard and how responses to that value are considered by the other actor (Murray 2019, 45). It is worth recounting William Wohlforth’s arguments on unipolarity and status competition in this context. Wohlforth argues that when there is an even distribution of power in the system, then status hierarchies will be more ambiguous and status misperception is more likely because the conditions as it would present itself under these circumstances will make it difficult for states to discern the differences in terms of their relative standing. However, on the other hand, he argues that if the distribution of power is more stratified, then there will be less competition over status (Wohlforth 2009, 30). What is illustrative of this argument put forward by Wohlforth is how recognition makes way for the role of responsiveness in terms of the way status and status competition are thought about by scholars in international relations. Status recognition is thus about the accurate perception of valued characteristics that help in determining social status. In this model, identities are formed before a state’s interaction with others in the struggle for status. Thus, status, according to this framework, is recognised identity and not the acknowledgement or knowledge of or acceptance of a state’s capabilities. Although a state might have the capabilities, it still cannot assert its social status unless it has received the recognition and identity that in turn would allow it to exercise that authority that it seeks to use. Recognition would also mean that the identity of the state is constructed, thereby allowing it to practice that which was not present before. Murray is also careful to note that the process of identity formation is an uncertain path and states cannot know beforehand whether their desire to be recognised will be realised or not (Murray 2019, 46).

The insufficiency that material capabilities have in terms of explaining status and the politics surrounding it in the international system is, thus, reflected in the constructivist approach to understanding status in world politics. Status is also not stable. Peace and stability, therefore, in the twenty-first century will depend significantly on international status politics (Clunan 2014, 274). As noted earlier, history is witness to the rise and decline of major powers. However, what draws our attention on a more serious note is that rising powers are beginning to engage in international politics in a more significant way that is leading to shifts in power from those who had established the current norms of the international order. More interesting is the fact that these rising powers are also engaged in the process of seeking status in the international system. This fact of seeking higher status by the emerging powers can be agreed as having the potential to create conflict between the major and emerging powers. Emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil are engaged in the quest for influence and power in the international system and will they be able to modify the international order that would favour their quest for status. Some of the predominant questions that have dominated this discourse is whether the quest for status can be accommodated without violence and if so, how? (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth . 2014, 3–4).

Rising Powers and Status Competition

Events at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in the year 2009 were evidence of the fact that no longer could the United States and Europe decide on issues that had significance at the global level. Countries such as Brazil, China, India and Turkey are all emerging powers whose distinctive national interests may not easily accept those conditions that may be adopted by the established powers. This particular development in world politics has been due to the phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy that is followed by the rise of India as a major economic power and the rise of commodity produces—Russia and Brazil that have come with large demand for energy and raw materials. These developments came with the financial crisis that came between the years 2008 and 2009 in which the emerging markets continued to grow while the developed states faltered. Subsequently, the G7 and later the G20 were created to address the financial crisis in which the latter included Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa. Earlier in 2003, Goldman Sachs predicted that the BRIC grouping would surpass the share of the global GDP of the G6 by the year 2040 but now it seems poised to reach that mark by the year 2032. How will this rise affect the existing world-order global governance? (Larson and Schevchenko 2014, 33–34).

Over the last decade, the world has witnessed tremendous change in terms of rising powers’ engagement in global governance, which has come about due to the large transitions of power from the Global North to the Global South. There has also been a rise in the salience of informal groupings or status clubs in the international system. Such developments have resulted in rising powers beginning to engage more cooperatively and competitively in those areas that have significance to global governance and global financial governance that includes funding the UN and its specialised agencies, development cooperation and climate change (Parlar Dal 2019, 503). Volgy and Gordell assert that status-seeking strategies would depend on the positioning of states and the extent to which that positioning leads to dissatisfaction. Yet states such as China which are in an upward status trajectory may act differently by avoiding decisions that could pose the risk of losing status (Volgy and Gordell 2019, 525). Status in general points towards superiority and inferiority where rising powers will seek recognition from superiors and peers and deference from their inferiors. Rising powers, thus, have two objectives: (i) seek parity with superiors and peers through recognition from these actors and (ii) subjugation from inferiors through deference (Tin 2021, 10).

In line with the standard model of status competition, leaders of states who are dissatisfied with their status often perceive a gap between what ought to be and what is in terms of their standing —status dissonance. This condition arises when a state has acquired some material capabilities that are reasonably enhanced and yet not accorded recognition this may result in some form of contestation that may appear in arms race, rivalry, crises or war. These contestations will subside when states revise their beliefs about the enhanced material capabilities of the dissatisfied state or the dissatisfied state comes to terms with the ex ante beliefs of the others (Kang and Wohlforth 2012, 6). The more pertinent question that captures this debate is why do states seek for major power status? Being accorded with major power status not only provides states with added influence but also results in additional pressures to pursue policies and interests that are beyond the purview of their immediate neighbourhoods. When the major power status is accorded to a state, it is expected that it will play an important leadership role on a host of issues that relate to conflict that have a bearing on international and regional spheres. Such a status reduces certain costs that major powers require to structure order and institutional development that is needed with regard to global governance. For example, Russia’s determination to remain a major power, China’s resolve to cement its position and its capabilities to influence global governance and countries such as Brazil and India aspiring to become major powers are not simply symbolic in nature but are embedded in foreign policy strategies that seek to fulfil vital global and regional interests of these countries (Volgy et al. 2014, 61–62).

In the twenty-first century, the parallel rise of China and India has been seen as a strategic development that has significant implications for the international order. The relationship between these two countries is often thought of as having the potential to shape the emerging global order. India’s rise is a complicated one where it is seeking to develop solidarity with developing countries, develop itself as an alternative power by championing values such as democracy, soft power and non-coercive diplomacy whilst also developing hard power capabilities that are in tandem with great powers. Chinese views on India’s rise are based on its own identity as well as its political calculations that have received mixed reactions, particularly in terms of India’s democratic model of engaging with developing countries. In terms of Chinese accommodation, India’s rise seems ambivalent which is marked by partial accommodation while both countries compete with each other and cooperate with each other. India’s rise is expected to provide new avenues for China’s growth, and cooperation with India would also help Beijing avoid costly confrontation and limit the dominance of the United States in what appears to be a multipolar world. China is, however, reluctant to accommodate India’s aspirations for great power status where distrust and competition, asymmetry of power and perception continue to shape their relationship (Pu 2017, 148). While these rising or emerging powers are engaged in complex relationships that are marked by mutual distrust, ambivalence, competition and in some cases rivalry, these emerging powers have also been capable of creating multilateral institutions that have sought to project themselves as alternative to the existing international world order and have also sought to exert or assert their influence in global governance. In this context, the BRICS has been one mechanism that has brought cooperation amongst these emerging powers to the forefront of establishing itself as a counter or alternative to the existing international order. The role of BRICS is significant in that it has sought to establish financial institutions that would support developmental projects for developing countries and also play an important role in global governance. The establishment of the New Asian Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are examples of such efforts towards this end.

Brics and Global Governance

One of the defining features of the current international environment is that of rising competition amongst great powers and emerging powers where trans-regional integration initiatives and new threats to the international security order are gradually transformed by these changing events in the world. Emerging markets and developing economies have begun to play a significant role in these changes that are occurring, and there is an increasing trend of cooperation between these emerging markets and developing economies that appear in the form of South–South cooperation. While the crisis within the existing traditional system of global governance is becoming increasingly obvious, that is evidenced by the failures of the World Trade Organization, IMF the Bretton Woods Institutions in various aspects, there is an ever-growing gap between the actual role played by emerging markets and developing economies and their ability to engage in the decision-making process of global institutions. Despite their growing economies, these countries’ (emerging powers) political voices have remained limited, and as a result, to date there has not been much change in the existing international order (Duggan et al. 2021, 2). It was after the proposal made by the foreign Minister of Russia, Yevgeni Primakov in 1996, that a new doctrine of multipolarity was announced that would serve as the catalyst for the creation of the BRICS. The proposal focused on enhancing relations with China and India that would result in the establishment of a triadic relationship for economic cooperation between these three countries that would grow into an alternative to the Western-led world order that was established in the post-Cold War era (Duggan et al. 2021, 3). Ever since its creation in the year 2008 and the subsequent inclusion of South Africa in 2011, there has been a deepening of cooperation amongst the BRICS countries and they have sought to play a significant role in areas such as finance, economy, trade, health, science, innovation, security and development. Through the development of its own model of institutions, the BRICS has begun to engage with international institutions through catalytic engagement approach that would support and stimulate changes in the international system (Shelepov 2018, 49). The BRICS countries have in general supported and committed themselves to principles of multilateralism, international law and active cooperation with international and regional organisations, and the UN. Aspirations of India, Brazil and South Africa to be included as members (permanent) in the UN Security Council suggest that the BRICS has increasingly stressed for reform of the UN, more particularly its Security Council. The BRICS has also emphasised the central role of the G20 in reforming the global economic and financial system in which emerging economies’ voices such as itself must receive greater representation in international financial institutions. Among others in terms of financial matters, the BRICS has strongly supported the efforts to achieve a balanced, strong and sustainable growth by the G20. In addition, the BRICS has also engaged with the World Health Organization (Shelepov, 2018, 25–53), more particularly its efforts during COVID-19. With its own financial institutions such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Agency (CRA), BRICS has also established its own alternatives to the existing international financial institutions. These developments made by the BRICS suggest that its role in global governance is gradually gaining momentum.

Given these factors, the BRICS in general is seen as a new force that has the capacity to define the rules of the game in terms of global governance and has to a certain extent changed the agenda and approach of global institutions. Although the BRICS countries differ from each other politically, culturally and demographically, these countries, however, share in common the aspiration to be rule makers rather than rule takers within the context of global governance. While they have placed emphasis on various issues such as hunger, disease, poverty, sustainability of the global economy, food security, promotion of responsible use of biofuel, and support to developing countries in terms of technological and financial needs that would contribute to the development of their infrastructure have all been on the agenda of the BRICS (Duggan 2015, 17–18). In the context of global governance, the rise of BRICS and its significance is its efforts to alter the liberal model of development. This could suggest that their rise has brought limits to the promotion of liberal democratic values and more particularly in terms of global economic governance. The main challenge that appears from the BRICS to the liberal system of global economic governance is the nature of the composition of these economies themselves and they differ in many ways from the Western economies that had created the present system of global economic governance. Four fundamental differences are identified in this regard: (i) the implementation of interventionist policies, (ii) the prominence of sovereign wealth funds in internationalising domestic capital, (iii) the creation of national champion enterprise and (iv) a more embedded approach to managing finances in terms of its regulation and allocation through state-controlled banks. Successes seen in many of its initiatives have made the BRICS to adopt the role of a revisionist power within the global economic governance. These have resulted in the creation of a workable economic alternative where the state-led aspect of the BRICS economies that include the management of its currencies, export-oriented interventionism and active industrial policies appears as a direct challenge to the neoliberal notions of economic governance, and more particularly in the context of the Washington Consensus policy of the Bretton Woods institutions of development (Duggan 2015, 20–21).

The BRICS is a grouping that has been, on the one hand, accepted as a challenge to the existing US-led world order that is leading to political and economic instability. On the other hand, many would also agree that the US’ hegemonic power is still active, and given the fact that the BRICS countries all have domestic problems and challenges that need to be addressed amongst themselves, this leads us to believe that the BRICS grouping needs to build trust amongst themselves first to build a strong alternative to the existing US- led liberal world order (Kingah and Quiliconi 2016, 1). Any discussion about global governance cannot be done in the absence of the elephant in the room—the United States. The US’ ties with almost every country across the world are evidence of the fact that no other country in the world can match such influence whatever their capabilities might be. In particular, not one among the BRICS has such influence as the United States, which points to the crucial aspect of legitimacy and acceptance of any given actor both at the global and regional levels. The problem here is even though Russia, China and their BRICS counterparts may complain about the US’ influence through its liberal values in terms of political and economic issues, nonetheless even these countries are involved within this liberal looping that makes it difficult to delink themselves from this arrangement that is built upon the liberal and capitalist models that form the foundations of modern political economy (Kingah and Quiliconi 2016, 5).

Conclusion

Transformation in world politics and the international order cannot come through economic engagements or changes alone it must also include geopolitical transformations where leading developing economies must be capable of giving the South a greater voice in the international order that would challenge the Western and more particularly the US’ hegemony (Keily 2015, 15). Seen from the perspective of status competition, the BRICS is indeed a major grouping that has the potential to challenge the Western-led liberal world order. Yet many limitations hinder this prospect of becoming an alternative to the existing world order. In general, the BRICS’ engagement in world politics thus far in the context of global governance has primarily been focused on economic matters, and their engagement in the context of global governance has also been in this direction. The establishment of financial institutions does seem to show some promise, yet the limitations surpass their potential.

Status is an important aspect of world politics. It emphasises the aspect of recognition of power by peers and by great powers or major powers in the international system. There is no doubt that BRICS is building its capabilities that would in later years bring such recognition, but it suffers from conflicts that are from within. For instance, BRICS countries are unevenly matched (it is not to say that Western powers are evenly matched) in terms of their economy, military and influence at both the regional and global levels. Additionally, China and Russia are authoritarian and autocratic, whereas Brazil, India and South Africa are practising democracies. Among them, the larger three countries (China, India and Russia) have conflicts that appear in terms of territorial disputes that are nowhere near the prospect of finding a solution. The most important aspect that conforms to this paper’s argument is that these three powers, China, India and Russia, are themselves engaged in status competition. We argue that with these challenges, the grouping, although having the potential to engage effectively in global governance, would merely play a secondary role in the Western-led liberal world order.

In terms of its quest for influence in global governance and over developing economies, the BRICS, as noted earlier, is playing a significant role in finance-related matters, although it has identified other issues of importance. What we would like to posit is that the BRICS engagement at the global platform must rise to the level of engaging in providing collective security to its member countries. We suggest that BRICS countries must develop an organisation that would be with similar standing to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is interesting to note that except India, which has a specific force called the Indian peacekeeping force and has engaged in peacekeeping missions overseas as a single-country effort, none of the other countries in the BRICS grouping have engaged in such an effort. Therefore, BRICS must (although a highly ambitions proposition) look at avenues for creating an instrument that would promote the creation of a common force that would provide collective security for member countries in times of crisis. Such a formulation may project the capabilities of the BRICS amongst developing countries and thereby create a pathway for its stated objective of an alternative world order.