Symbolic power in diplomatic practice: Matters of style in Brussels

Introduction: the qualities of the ideal diplomatist

‘These, then, are the qualities of my ideal diplomatist,’ Harold Nicolson wrote in 1939: ‘Truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty, loyalty. […] “But,” the reader may object, “you have forgotten intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and even tact.” I have not forgotten them. I have taken them for granted’ (Nicolson, 1988 [1939]: 67). This article investigates some of such taken-for-granted facets of diplomatic culture: discernment, reputation, and charm. Focusing empirically on the European Union diplomatic circles in Brussels, the paper brings into focus the symbolic resources that a social field like diplomacy neither teaches nor explicitly demands, but which ‘belong to the attributes attached by status to the position it assigns, the qualifications it awards and the social positions to which the latter give access’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 26). The question is not who has charm but what does the resource called charm comprise: what are its components, how is it acquired, and what work does it do for those who ‘have it’ as well as those who don’t? That question can help discern the social facets of diplomatic practice that have hitherto received scant empirical analysis.

The analysis proceeds in three steps. The following section outlines the conceptual argument. Drawing on the interdisciplinary work on specifically transnational fields of power in elite policy-making settings, it explains why we need to systematically examine diplomatic practice beyond formal state institutions. The point is not simply that we should consider settings like international organizations in addition to states. We should also move beyond the general term of governance, which remains bound to institutions, to investigate the everyday social rules for the production of rules in diplomacy (Dezalay and Garth, 2002: 311; Kuus, 2014a). Daily cultural practices are not an icing on the cake but a constituent component of power relations, in diplomacy as much as elsewhere. These practices need to be studied in their dispersed, routine, and pre-reflexive character. The study of diplomacy can gain considerably from more detailed analyses that look beyond the governmental settings of inter-state relations into the social fields that frame and support international politics.

The subsequent section turns to the empirical example of European diplomacy, by which I mean EU-level diplomatic practices, whether these be intergovernmental negotiations or the work of the union’s own civil service. Using primary empirical material from 110 interviews with 73 professionals who work in or around the EU external relations machinery, mostly in Brussels, the section begins to unpack how these resources operate: their social bases, rules of conduct, and effects. In particular, it stresses that EU diplomatic practice is not reducible to inter-state negotiations. The union’s new diplomatic service has, or is in the process of acquiring, an institutional culture and a field of power of its own. Given the weight of the EU in diplomatic negotiations around the world, we need to understand how that field works.

The final section puts the empirical and conceptual arguments into a dialogue to make two points. First, it highlights the ways in which the focus on symbolic capital – and more generally, on informal social relations rather than formal institutional structures – enables us to better grasp the daily texture of diplomatic practice in Europe and beyond. Second, it underscores the ways in which our understanding of that practice would benefit from an enhanced dialogue between IR and related fields. The example of EU diplomacy is particularly illuminating in this respect because it exemplifies a practice that is increasingly transnational and thereby differs from the customary national settings that have hitherto received most attention in the specialist literature.

Locating diplomatic practice

Diplomacy is traditionally understood as a state-based affair. In the words of Ernest Satow, written nearly a century ago but still used today, diplomacy is ‘the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states […] or, more briefly, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means’ (quoted by Roberts, 2009: 3). Seventy years later, Hedley Bull likewise underscores the centrality of nation-states and national elites in diplomatic practice. Knowledge production in that field, he writes, derives from ‘day-to-day personal dealings with the leading political strata in the country to which the diplomat is accredited’ (1977: 175). Today, it is widely acknowledged that diplomacy involves actors other than states and this complicates the practice (e.g. Bjola and Kornprobst, 2013; Cooper et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2011; Sharp, 2009). However, the study of diplomacy remains focused on inter-state and inter-governmental relations, even when these are mediated by international organizations. Analytically, diplomacy still seems to fit into and reinforce the notion of the international as a patchwork of states (see also Cornut, 2015).

If diplomacy is mostly about territorial entities called states, diplomatic practice mediates the conventions and hierarchies based on national contexts. Its analytical toolbox then centers on categories like national interests, identities, and cultures. This view obscures the transnational resources and relationships that are not territorial and do not derive their power and legitimacy primarily from the institutions of the state (Sklair, 2001). It also privileges formal institutional structures over informal features of daily cultural practice and thereby simplifies the social relations through which any policy machinery works (Greenhalgh, 2008: xii; Shore and Wright, 2011: 4). We learn a great deal about putative national interests but little about other power dynamics, such as class. In Europe, even though the complicating influence of EU institutions is recognized in theory, the visions of Europe’s political future habitually take the nation-state as the starting point (Bialasiewicz, 2009). Despite their supra-or post-national tinge, these visions start from the national as the basic unit of analysis. Scholarship is too often trapped in a geopolitical imagination that casts the territorial state as the self-evident container of diplomatic practice. This lingering simplification of the spaces (the ‘where’) of diplomacy, even in the context of growing interest in the field, narrows our understanding of the practice (the ‘how’) of the field.

In recent years, an interdisciplinary body of work on diplomacy as a broader social practice has emerged as a result of two converging trends. The first of these is the growing attention to the practices rather than scripts of international politics – this special issue is a part of that effort. The second trend, closely related to the first but less visible in diplomatic studies and IR theory, is the weakening of state-centrism across the social sciences, and especially in human geography. ¹ There is now substantial work on the spatial relations and imaginaries that frame and underpin international politics but are not necessarily territorial in character (Agnew, 2007; Dodds et al., 2013). This work does more than draw attention to different territorial scales of politics – Europe instead of the nation, for example. It rather moves beyond territoriality to bring different subjects, spaces, and terrains of struggle into the analysis. The underlying effort is to situate and contextualize diplomatic practice more closely in the social spaces in which it operates (Jeffrey, 2012; Kuus, 2014a; McConnell et al., 2012; Neumann, 2013; Shimazu, 2012). To grasp the messiness of practice – what happens rather than what is supposed to happen – we must open up our understanding of where it happens.

The cumulative effect of these two bodies of work, one on practice and the other on spatiality, is to illuminate the untidy quality of diplomatic work and the need for context-sensitive empirical studies of that field of practice. Diplomacy comes into view as less state-centered and formalistic, and more place-specific and social (see Wiseman, 2015). In particular, loosening the analytical link between diplomacy and the territorial state enables us to investigate informal social realms beyond and underneath formal institutional structures. We can then discern the dynamics of ideology and class that remain oblique in the accounts that rely on the concepts of nation and state. These dynamics are particularly important in the study of transnational regulatory institutions (e.g. Dezalay and Garth, 1996, 2002; Goldman, 2005; Kuus, 2014a). Such institutions operate in part through power struggles among national groups, but those groups pursue specifically international capital. The terms of the competition are transnational, and there are many potential uncertainties and mistranslations surrounding individual positions (Dezalay and Garth, 1996: 317). The task is to bring formal institutional structures and informal social practices into one analytical frame. ²

Today’s Europe is richly instructive of such transnational dynamics. Along with the transformations of political space, European integration remakes the symbolic resources of the continent’s political elites from capital based on national connections to one that combines national and supranational circles. This shift is not just a matter of national elites negotiating their interests; it also involves a new heterogeneous class of transnational political actors in Brussels who have multiple vested interests in the integration processes (Georgakakis, 2010; Shore, 2000). When investigating symbolic power in these settings, the task is to avoid both a state-centered perspective, as well as the equally problematic view that national resources and viewpoints get converted into transnational ones in a direct or clear way (Dezalay and Garth, 2002: 8). Everyday practice in Brussels is not a mere footnote to the big-picture accounts of inter-state negotiations; it must be an object of investigation in its own right (see Lequesne, 2015).

Composing composure in Brussels

Symbolic and cultural capital is generally analyzed in national settings, where it is easier to discern. When it comes to Brussels, we know that certain educational trajectories, such as degrees from elite universities or prestigious American law schools, furnish professionals with the connections and style that constitute important assets in that city (Georgakakis, 2010; Kauppi, 2005). In some ways their professional habitus remains national; this is one of the reasons why the EU has no state-like elite. In other ways, although EU civil servants have been shaped by national social fields, in Brussels they develop specifically EU-level social and symbolic capital.

A discernible suaveness is a part and parcel of diplomatic culture, which was closely linked to the upper classes until the 20th century. To this day, Iver Neumann (2012: 11) points out, there is a ‘lingering expectation that diplomats will hail from the upper echelons of their societies, and will have the easy social ways of the naturally superior.’ Although far from everyone commanding or even seeking these ways, they remain the stylistic center of gravity in diplomatic practice. ‘I see it every year,’ a language teacher at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry remarks to Neumann (2012: 98). ‘They come in wearing jeans and even with stripes in their hair. […] And they all end up the same.’ Those who do not acquire the right style leave. In Brussels, EU civil servants tend to come from well-to-do highly educated families or what French sociologists call the nobility of the robe (noblesse de robe) (Ban, 2013; Cross, 2010; Georgakakis, 2010). ‘We are dealing with elites’ is pointed out by interviewees as a way to underscore the urbane cosmopolitanism of EU institutions.

This urbane style cannot be taught in a few courses; it takes years to instill and is best acquired through upbringing. Professional training does not erase the importance of primary socialization and may indeed accentuate it. As material discrepancies lose importance in the constitution of class – in the differentiation between the upper and middle layers of the bourgeoisie, for example – issues of style and taste become more accentuated (Bourdieu, 1984). As formal diplomatic training has become more regulated and homogenized within and between nation-states, the effects of primary socialization in the family home have become more important as means of social differentiation (Neumann, 2012: 135, emphasis added).

Today’s Brussels is a particularly fascinating scene of such intangible matters of style because of the specific institutional and social configurations there. Within a few years after the Big Bang enlargements (in 2004 and 2007), which increased the number of the member states from fifteen to twenty-seven, EU institutions increased their workforce by a fifth (Ban, 2013). By the end of the decade, the immediate impact of this influx of new civil servants, often from the new member states of Central Europe, was over; procedures and expectations had stabilized and a ‘new normal’ had been found. Yet both at the beginning of this study in 2007 and at the end of it in 2013, the reverberations of this wave of recruitment were still being felt in Brussels. The post-2004 states were still called new, in part because professionals from these states still functioned as relative newcomers in the overall milieu of the European Quarter. A period of transformations was still underway. ⁵ The patterns in which social relations stabilize now will be felt for years to come. This post-enlargement period is thus an important object of analysis; it is a touchstone by which to illuminate long-term social processes in Brussels. This account thus pays particular attention to the east–west lines of identity/difference in Brussels. The claims are not about the new states as such though. Although this analysis is anchored in the example of new and old member states, the analytical focus is on symbolic power and diplomatic practice more generally.

The tensions and struggles over the terms of professional practice in EU institutions are especially pronounced in the sphere of external relations, now that the EU is building up its own diplomatic corps (the European External Action Service or EAS). The service is a uniquely transnational institution, in which staff is transferred to it from other EU bodies as well as the diplomatic services of the member states. Its institutional culture cannot be modelled on any national one. That culture is being forged in Brussels now out of intergovernmental and inter-institutional compromises (see Lequesne, 2015). A European diplomat reflects: ‘At EAS, we are not in the stage yet where we have our own style. I’m not sure whether we want to have it. Maybe this [ambiguity] is built into the institution. Maybe it’s too early to tell.’ There is a geography to the efforts to forge a European diplomatic style; that style incorporates elements from different parts of Europe and reflects, in part, the power relations among these places. Given the ambiguity of what the newly minted European diplomats are to represent or embody, the union’s foreign corps bring the symbolic struggles over cultivation and sophistication into a particularly sharp focus.

Conclusion: transnational fields and interdisciplinary lenses

The next task is to specify what this complicated primary material can reveal about diplomatic practice and the ways of studying it in and beyond Europe. This paper argues that elucidating symbolic struggles around presence and style in the diplomatic profession allows us to discern relations and hierarchies beyond formal institutional structures. By pointing to dynamics other than nationality – social class here – that lens complicates the idea of national agendas and interests in diplomatic practice (on the dynamics between practicality and rationality, see the introduction to this special issue). The point is not that states are unimportant – state institutions codify a great deal of the symbolic capital analyzed by Bourdieu. The point is rather that we must keep the role of formal institutions (state or otherwise) as a question and not as an answer. The analytical toolbox then becomes better capable for considering group and interpersonal dynamics other than national interests and identities. This more open frame enables us to specify the composition and function of resources like presence, poise, and composure. It also shows power and domination to be an integral part of political practice. ⁷ The constitution of a transnational diplomatic field in Brussels is a patterned process. It overlays differences understood in lateral terms (as national cultural traits) with those conceived in hierarchical terms (as class distinction). Explicit attention to these dynamics enables us to acquire a more nuanced view of diplomatic practice in Brussels.

Such a toolbox necessitates further cross-disciplinary engagements between IR and the other social sciences (such as geography, anthropology, and sociology), that have traditionally paid more attention to informal social relations outside state institutions. Analyses of social practice from these ‘other’ disciplines are integral parts of – rather than auxiliary additions to – the study of diplomacy as a social field. ⁸ The task is not simply to dip into ‘other’ literatures but to hold different kinds of knowledge in a relation of dialogue. Such interdisciplinary engagements, both conceptual and methodological, would enable us not only to answer questions better but also to ask better questions (more open-ended ones that are better attuned to the complexity and creativity of social practice).

In particular, the more open analytical frame destabilizes the taken-for-granted central position of nationality and the national perspective in the study of diplomatic practice. The point is not that we abandon that concept but that we do not always start with it. Too often, the questions asked about Brussels are formulated so as to fit them into pre-existing answers about (territorially defined) national cultures and interests. Much care is taken not to generalize between states and nations, but all that effort is contained within the sweeping generalization that makes national interest and identity the axis of analysis. There is much debate on the appropriate balance of power among states, but that discussion further entrenches territorial conceptions of politics and belonging. The ‘where’ question contributes to practice theory by directing us to look in different places for power: to study not only offices and meetings in national and intergovernmental settings but also receptions and dinner parties in transnational circles. For IR theory, the lesson is that the ‘where’ of political practice requires closer attention (Agnew, 2007; Kuus, 2014a, 2014b). The map of diplomatic practice is more textured than a map of states (analyzing the ‘where’ of diplomacy practice can substantially illuminate the ‘how’ of that practice, and the other way around). This can help diplomatic studies overcome their lingering state-centrism; the tendency to analyze identity and difference primarily in national terms.

The concept of the field is helpful because of its capacity to theorize lateral and hierarchical difference at multiple levels; to delineate how national origin, institutional location, and perceived social position fit into and transform diplomatic practice in Brussels. An analysis of the field does not allow us to outline a neat set of causes (why a policy outcome occurred); it rather enables us to develop a deeper understanding of the causal structures that tilt the field of policy practice in particular ways. Causality works on this terrain not in terms of clearly identifiable causes but in terms of conditions of possibility (also see Cooper and Pouliot, 2015). No one factor, such as the size of a country or the professional styles of its professionals, can be identified as the cause of particular developments. Rather, multiple processes work together to make some outcomes more likely and others less so. The task is not to construct checklists of actors or causes – states, ranks, styles, whatever – but to think about diplomacy as a structured terrain of practice. A protagonist’s position in the field does not cause specific practices but it leaves dispositional traces that make certain practices more likely (Pouliot, 2013: 56). The analysis does not allow us to predict certain outcomes but it helps us to grasp the multiple forces that produce any specific outcome (Sayer, 1992: 110).

This kind of work must be empirically attentive to the ambiguities and contradictions of social practice. In it, empirical nuance is not a token context added to existing conceptual frameworks; rather, the theoretical argument about practice requires that nuance, and emerges through it (Bueger, 2014: 384). Greater sensitivity to the inevitably ambiguous empirical material would enable practice theory to better capture the emergent and messy quality of everyday diplomatic practice (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014). To emphasize contingency is not to condone relativism or shy away from analysis. ‘To interpret an event as ambiguous or as having multiple meanings,’ Andrew Sayer (1992: 222) writes, ‘is not to admit just any interpretation for not all interpretations would recognize the ambiguity. Ironically, if we are to do justice to ambiguity we cannot interpret it in just any way.’ Thus, such an analysis must tread carefully around claims of clear trends; the task is to illuminate the necessary ambiguity of transnational diplomatic practice.

The wider import of the Brussels milieu lies in its capacity to explain symbolic struggles in bureaucratic settings. As the institutions and fields of policy-making and analysis become more transnational, their operation requires careful empirical work that takes the specifics of these fields seriously. Everyday practices in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or private regulatory institutions differ from the EU, but those settings too are transnational in ways that cannot be modelled after national governmental or business circles (Dezalay and Garth, 2002; Kuus, 2014b). In these institutions too, we know a great deal about national interests but less about the symbolic resources through which these interests are modulated. An approach that does not start with national habits and identities can yield a discussion of diplomacy that is less imprisoned in a teleological narrative of state sovereignty (or its demise), more attuned to the ways in which small daily habits connect to grand architectures of power, and more mindful of the deliquescence of continuity and change in diplomatic practice, in Europe and elsewhere.