The different faces of power in European Union–Russia relations

Introduction

While one of the core issues in politics and international affairs, power is among the most difficult concepts to grasp. Different schools of thought have defined power in diverging ways and increasingly it has been acknowledged that power is not a one-dimensional concept, but one that works at different levels, in various ways. It is surprising that power in relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) (or by extension ‘the West’) has often been the subject of analysis, but has rarely been studied systematically. ¹ The lack of critical reflection over conceptual issues of power has frequently led to reductionist views, narrowing power to a very limited context (e.g. energy dependence) and using one-sided concepts of power (e.g. coercive capacity or ‘normative power’). Tuomas Forsberg has indicated the need to look at power in EU–Russia relations differently and to approach the concept in a more nuanced and differentiated way (Forsberg, 2013). This article seeks to rethink power relations between Moscow and Brussels in terms of Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy of power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Their categorisation of power is by no means the only possible or ultimate one, but it has the advantage of integrating different theoretical approaches to power and therefore encompassing a wide spectrum of interpretations, looking at power in its various disguises of ‘compulsion, institutional bias, privilege and unequal constraints on action’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 62). Barnett and Duvall present a taxonomy of power distinguishing between compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power (see the next section). This article uses their framework to obtain a better understanding of EU–Russia relations. In other words, the purpose is to bring the complexity of power back into the scholarly debate. First Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy is applied to EU–Russia interaction in the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis that started in 2014. In the last section, their multi-dimensional framework is used to understand the dramatic change in power dynamics that took place with the crisis over Ukraine. ² In doing so, the article seeks to understand how the annexation of Crimea and consecutive developments implied a profound shift in the nature of the power struggle between Russia and the EU.

The article seeks to make a contribution to our understanding of power in EU–Russia relations in the following ways. First, by applying Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy of power, it looks at power from different angles, without a priori singling out any particular interpretation. In doing so the complexity of power, where multiple dimensions operate simultaneously, is acknowledged. This will lead to an analysis of issues such as identity production and institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood. The point is not that those have not been studied, but these issues have not often been approached in terms of a systematic power analysis. Secondly, the analysis seeks to understand power in EU–Russia relations by looking beyond their bilateral relations. The multi-dimensionality of power implies that power is not constrained to these bilateral relations. As will be explained in the theoretical section, power is not only exerted directly (in the bilateral relations between the EU and Russia) but also affects these relations indirectly (for example, through arrangements with third countries). In other words, to fully understand power, we need to look at both direct and indirect forms of power. In this article, indirect or diffuse power will mainly be explored through the role Russia and the EU play in their overlapping neighbourhood. The power they have over/or in the countries in between determines their power position and therefore their internal, EU–Russia, power relations. These two aspects of power are ultimately interrelated: increasing mutual concerns about the projection of power in the post-Soviet space moved from a marginal position on the bilateral agenda to a core issue of competition. Thirdly, as explained below, power is not approached in terms of intentionalities. Whether power is the result of deliberate intent, or is the unintended consequence of an actor’s position, behaviour, reputation, etc. does not matter. This is a clear added value of the model used here, because it avoids a classic trap in the analysis of relations between Russia and the EU, where the actual debate often concentrates on what Moscow and Brussels intend to achieve and on power they intend to project. Finally, this article adds a new categorisation to Barnett and Duvall’s concept of compulsory power, making a distinction between positive and negative compulsory power.

The point made in this article is that power in EU–Russia relations cannot be reduced to a single category. Their relations can only be understood in its different co-existing dimensions of power. Yet, it will be argued that the Ukraine crisis of 2014 has led Russian leaders to believe that they had lost the competition for power with the EU and the West along the dimensions which were key prior to the crisis: that of institutional power (institutional arrangements in the overlapping neighbourhood); and that of structural/productive power (hegemony of constitutive norms and production of identities). ³ This perception has prompted Russia to a change of strategy after the regime change in Ukraine in February 2014. It now gave a higher priority to a strategy of compulsory power, annexing Crimea (an act of ‘positive’ control) in a drastic surprise move and destabilising Eastern Ukraine. The latter is mainly aimed at preventing effective control by and to the advantage of the West. I will refer to it as ‘negative’ compulsory power. Importantly, this reinforced emphasis on compulsory power does not replace competition along any of the other power dimensions, that continue to co-exist.

The article is structured as follows. The first section is conceptual. It presents the four concepts of power in Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy, as a model to study the multi-dimensionality of power and gives an overview of how the four concepts of power feature implicitly in EU–Russia literature. In the next section, it is argued that the logic of competition which developed in the decade preceding the 2014 Ukraine crisis has often been mistaken for a struggle over compulsory power, while it was predominantly over institutional and structural power. The last section deals with the fundamental change in the power struggle since the Ukraine crisis, where the emphasis has eventually shifted towards a struggle over compulsory power.

Bringing the complexity of power back in

This article starts from the assumption that power is a complex phenomenon that operates along different dimensions for all actors. Different forms of power are not mutually exclusive but all operate simultaneously. To get rid of a priori assumptions about which types of power are relevant in EU–Russia relations, our analysis will be guided by the taxonomy of power of Barnett and Duvall (2005), that integrates diverging theoretical approaches to power and thus transcends major debates in International Relations (IR).

There are three major reasons why Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy is particularly useful for studying EU–Russia relations. First, by acknowledging the plurality of concepts of power, their model allows to bring nuance and the complexity of power back into the debate. Secondly, the different forms of power are not mutually exclusive: Barnett and Duvall consider all of them to be present in all social relations. They operate simultaneously. Finally, their model does not presuppose intentionality. Power may also exist if an actor does not have the explicit intention to exert power. This is important to note for our study of EU–Russia relations, as the debate is to a great extent obscured by assumptions of intent. A substantial part of the analysis of EU–Russia relations interweaves power with the assumed intentions of both actors. It is important to realise the significance of this. In the rather dominant ‘normative power’ ⁴ approaches, the EU’s ambition to diffuse its norms to third countries is conventionally seen as driven by its intrinsic attachment to these norms (the EU acts as a ‘force for good’), not as driven by an intention to project power. Using the taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall means that it is not per se relevant whether the EU ‘intends’ to project its power or not. On the contrary, power is studied in terms of the de facto complex effects it produces.

Barnett and Duvall define power as ‘the production in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). They conceptually distinguish forms of power along two dimensions, reflecting major theoretical debates in IR. A first dimension has to do with ‘the kinds of social relations through which power works’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). They take either the form of interaction or of constitution. In the former case power is an attribute. Social actors are assumed to be given, pre-constituted. In the case of constitution, power is ‘a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and capacities’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). Social relations themselves constitute meaning. A second dimension refers to ‘the specificity of social relations through which effects on actors’ capacities are produced’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). As explained below, they are either socially specific and direct (assuming an immediate connection) or socially diffuse and indirect.

These two analytical dimensions lead to the following matrix of four concepts of power, summarised in Figure 1. Each concept will be explained below and it will be highlighted how it has featured in the literature on EU–Russia relations (with a focus on the analysis before the 2014 Ukraine crisis).

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Figure 1.

The taxonomy of power of Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48).

The clearest example of work on EU–Russia relations that focuses on compulsory power are structural realist analyses, that look at relations in terms of how capabilities allow one actor to control the action of the other. Balance of power approaches, presenting an analysis in function of zero-sum games and spheres of influence fit this category most neatly (see for example Mearsheimer, 2014). However, it should be stressed that compulsory power does not imply that we are simply looking at military capabilities or high politics. Articles focusing on the leverage generated by Russia’s capacity to shut down gas pipelines to Western Europe are equally focusing on compulsory power (see for example Baran, 2007; Paillard, 2010).

One of the major biases is that a large part of the literature has one-sidedly focused on aspects of compulsory power in EU–Russia bilateral relations, looking at the capacity of control in direct interaction between both actors. Moreover, compulsory power ambitions have often been attributed predominantly to Russia. As noted above, the country was often approached as a Realpolitik actor, driven by interests and seeking to maximise power. Many authors put a heavy emphasis on the threat Russia represents through its compulsory power (see for example Lucas, 2009). On the other hand, a substantial part of the literature considered the EU to be a fundamentally different actor: power neutral or merely a norm promoter, soft or normative power (see for example Emerson, 2009; Timmins, 2002). Moscow was seen as an actor that seeks to put pressure on neighbouring states in a forceful way and aims at direct control of the other, for example through restrictive trade measures or military threats, while the EU was presented as merely diffusing its norms without aiming at control over its neighbours. Similarly, Russia was perceived as trying to exert power over the EU through direct control over gas supplies, another form of compulsory power, this time in direct relations with EU member states. As a result, other categories of power have often been neglected and actions by the EU have implicitly been assumed to be power-neutral.

Institutional power approaches have been particularly strong in the field of energy, focusing on the interdependence between the EU and Russia (see for example Proedrou, 2007). This interdependence is of an asymmetrical nature and – in line with Keohane and Nye (1989) – is seen as creating a greater Russian control over outcomes, implying potentially higher costs for the EU. A considerable part of the literature has also focused on the diverging institutional arrangements both actors tried to set up in their overlapping neighbourhood. In particular the connection between the EU’s Eastern Partnership and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union has received considerable scholarly attention over the last years (see for example Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012). Yet, many authors have been reluctant to analyse the power aspects of this institutional arrangement. It is mainly with increasing tensions over Ukraine and mounting pressure on the country to choose between EU-centred and Russia-centred rivalling initiatives that scholarly attention on power aspects grew. Yet, several authors have studied aspects of institutional power in EU–Russia relations long before the Ukraine crisis. The very idea of diffuse, indirect constraining effects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership is strongly present in for example Haukkala’s work on EU normative hegemony (Haukkala, 2008, 2010, 2015), though his concept has elements of structural power as well. Tolstrup (2013) confronts the EU’s democracy promotion with Russia’s negative external influence on democratisation in the post-Soviet states (Tolstrup, 2013).

There is a stream of literature that has analysed EU–Russia relations (or broader the position of Russia in Europe) on the basis of structural and (less) of productive power, but most of this was rather in the margin. A large part of the literature focuses on fairly stable structures of subordination – thus tending towards a structural power analysis – in terms of centre and periphery (for example Browning and Christou, 2010; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012), of modernity and backwardness (Neumann, 1998), or of post-modernity and modernity (for example Klinke, 2012). Also, the idea of ‘othering’ has been used to analyse Europe–Russia relations (Browning, 2003). Thomas Diez has used the concept of ‘othering’ in his critique of normative power discourse, arguing that power is inherent to this representation, because it constructs categories of Self and Other, in which the latter is represented for example as inferior or as an existential threat (Diez, 2005: 628). Several scholars have studied identities in EU–Russia relations (see for example DeBardeleben, 2012; Sakwa, 2011, 2012; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002; Tsygankov, 2007), though not all look into the power aspects. Neo-Gramscianist approaches equally cover structural power, approaching hegemony as not only coercion but also consent (see also Diez, 2013). Structural power also shapes the ‘self-understanding and subjective interests’ of actors and can ‘constrain some actors from recognising their own domination’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 53). For the same reason, Haukkala’s work also contains a structural power dimension. Interesting new work exploring these theoretical horizons was produced by Morozov (2015), who brings in post-colonial theory to analyse the dialectic of the subaltern and the empire. He sheds new light on the tension between the Eurocentrism which Russia has internalised and its semi-peripheral position in Europe. In practice, it is not always easy to classify EU–Russia literature in terms of structural and productive power. Partly this is due to the rather limited theorisation in studies of EU–Russia relations. Also, Barnett and Duvall note the overlap between productive and structural power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55). For these different reasons, this article will look at both types of power generated through ‘social relations of constitution’ jointly (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 48).

In this article, the taxonomy of power will be operationalised in the following way. Power through direct interaction (compulsory power) is explored by looking at direct bilateral EU–Russia relations, both in its material, symbolic and normative resources. Power through indirect or diffuse interaction (institutional power) is explored through EU–Russia interaction through the institutional arrangements they make in the overlapping neighbourhood. This choice is justified by the fact that this was the main area of contest and concern between both actors. Self-evidently it does not exclude other forms of institutional power, such as costs following from asymmetrical interdependence or control over multilateral institutions. Power through constitutive relations, direct (structural power) or diffuse (productive power) will be considered jointly. The focus of both constitutive forms of power will be on the production of identities, be it in stable hierarchical or fluctuating, contingent forms.

The following analysis makes a comparison between power relations before and since the 2014 Ukraine crisis. It explores the neglected power dimensions of EU–Russia relations before the crisis – institutional, structural and productive – arguing they are key to understanding the logic of competition between Moscow and Brussels. The article then investigates how the events of February 2014 in Kyiv have prompted Russian leaders to invest in a strategy which favours compulsory power, changing the balance between different types of power, albeit in a predominantly negative way of preventing full control by the Euro-Atlantic community. The analysis is in the first place a theoretical reinterpretation of power in EU–Russia relations, underpinned by references to relevant policy documents and discursive practices.

Two additional conceptual and methodological points should be made in advance. Because the EU comprises 28 states, and different institutions, it is to some degree a ‘disaggregated actor’ (Cross and Karolewski, 2017: 7). Before the Ukraine crisis of 2014, these actors were often highly divided on Russia. Russia has often been one of the most divisive issues within the EU and it is clear that bilateral relations between individual member states and Moscow are crucial to understand EU–Russia relations (see David et al., 2013). This article acknowledges this differentiation and will refer to the EU’s dividedness where relevant. Yet even when divided, there are enough reasons to treat the EU’s foreign policy as a whole and the EU as a ‘normal actor on the international stage’ (Cross and Karolewski, 2017: 4), on the grounds of the common policy it developed towards Russia and the dialogue it engaged in, but equally because of a degree of commonality of images on which this policy was based. In no way, is this meant to underplay the diversity within the EU or contradictions within its policies.

Secondly, this analysis focuses both on direct and indirect dimensions of power between the EU and Russia. The latter implies focusing on the relations between those actors and their neighbouring states, because the institutional arrangements and identity production in the neighbourhood inevitably have implications for the power of Russia and the EU. Yet the purpose is not to make an analysis of these relations (EU–neighbour; Russia–neighbour) themselves, but only to study them as indirect power dimensions between Russia and the EU.

In the following section, the neglected power dimensions in the study of EU–Russia relations will be highlighted. It is argued that before the Ukraine crisis institutional, structural and productive forms of power co-existed with forms of compulsory power, but did not receive equivalent scholarly attention.

Analysing power before the Ukraine crisis: the neglected dimensions of institutional, structural and productive power

Challenging this imbalanced approach to power, this section attempts to demonstrate that, until the crisis over Ukraine of 2014, the essence of the competition between the EU and Russia was not solely about compulsory power (as capacity of direct control over the other actor). While compulsory power was definitely present and at times very visible (for example in the energy conflicts of 2006 and 2009), the struggle over institutional, structural and productive power was equally if not more important. In other words, the power relations between Moscow and Brussels were characterised to an important degree by their capacities of indirect control over the conditions in which they operate (institutional power) and by their capacities to produce identities and structures of subordination (structural power). Within these power relations the EU found itself in a rather hegemonic position and Russia was – throughout the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis – increasingly contesting and challenging this institutional and structural hegemony.

The Ukraine crisis: a shift to ‘negative’ compulsory power

Above it was suggested that the competition between Russia and the EU up to the start of the Ukraine crisis was to a large extent situated along the often-neglected dimensions of institutional and constitutive forms of power. The events in Ukraine in early 2014 came after a long process of culmination of tensions in EU–Russia relations (Haukkala, 2015), but produced a radical change in the nature of their struggle for power. The ousting of Yanukovych and the change of regime were seen in Moscow as a crucial defeat in this competition over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood and over identity production. The pro-EU choice of the new regime in Kyiv paved the way to the signing of the Association Agreement and shattered Russia’s hopes for Ukraine to join the EEU. The fear that Ukraine would become part of a Western sphere of influence, was seen as harming Russia’s vital interests. In reaction to the regime change Russia radically shifted its strategy towards one of gaining direct control (annexation of Crimea) and preventing ‘the West’ from taking control (destabilising and polarising Ukraine). The dominant logic was one of a geopolitical zero-sum game. In the framework of the taxonomy of power, this radical change of strategy may be understood as the result of Russia’s understanding that it had to react forcefully and display strong compulsory power as it was losing out on other (institutional and structural) forms of power. Also, Haukkala sees the developments over Ukraine in line with the longer-term conflict over institutional arrangements in post-Cold War Europe: ‘the crisis in Ukraine is in fact a proxy conflict between the EU and Russia. It can also be seen as a parting of ways with Russia clearly putting its foot down and renouncing its willingness to find its place in the unipolar EU-centric Europe’ (Haukkala, 2015: 37). Putin justified this shift of strategy towards compulsory power means, as a pure and inevitable reaction: ‘… the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today. … But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally. … Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.’ (Putin, 2014)

The perception that Russia had ‘lost’ Ukraine with the regime change, prompted a Russian strategy based on two forms of compulsory power. With the annexation of Crimea Russia resorted to direct control over territory to safeguard strategic interests and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the West. With the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine, Moscow primarily aimed to prevent the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over the country, thus withholding from it the privileges that a closer association with Ukraine would otherwise deliver. In other words, it sought to make Ukraine a liability, rather than a benefit for the West, backed by a rhetoric of Ukraine becoming ‘a failed state’ (Vladimir Chizhov, Russian Ambassador to the EU, quoted in Pop, 2014). This form of preventing control can be labelled ‘negative’ compulsory power.

The choice to play the radical card of annexation and destabilisation dramatically altered the nature of the power competition between Russia and the EU, shifting the emphasis from institutional and structural power to compulsory power. But they are not exclusively Russia’s power game. Relations between Russia and the EU/Euro-Atlantic Community on both sides are coloured significantly stronger by different forms of compulsory power. This can be seen from the sanctions the EU and the US imposed and Russia’s retaliation measures, as much as from the military build-up on both sides of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern borders. These actions reflect the wide spectrum of instruments that may be categorised under ‘compulsory power’. It goes without saying that this does not imply that these diverging instruments used by both parties are equivalent or comparable.

Self-evidently the dramatic change in the nature of the power struggle does not imply either that power relations among other dimensions have come to an end. In other words, the (negative) compulsory power dimension has not become the exclusive one, but has received a new impulse along with continued competition over other forms of power. Institutional power competition continues as before, with Russia and the EU pursuing their respective regional integration projects. The EU signed Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2014 and took further steps in the field of visa liberalisation. On the Russian side, the Eurasian Custom Union was rebaptised the EEU in 2015 and reinforced with the membership of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The same holds for structural and productive power. In the field of norms, the EU saw the developments in Ukraine as a legitimation of its norms and proof of the hegemonic consent it received. It reinforced its self-equation with a European identity and embraced Ukraine more strongly as a European country, further increasing the gap with Russia. In an increasingly influential ‘paleoconservative ideology’ Russia distanced itself from ‘false’ Europe and reinforced its civilisational claim that it is the representative of genuine European values (Morozov, in press), for which it also seeks support in certain radical right circles in EU countries. Furthermore, Moscow reinforced its counter-hegemonic stance. Foreign Minister Lavrov seized several opportunities to declare the advent of a ‘post-Western world’ stating that the liberal world order ‘was pre-programmed for crisis right from the time when this vision of economic and political globalisation was conceived primarily as an instrument for ensuring the growth of an elite club of countries and its domination over everyone else’ (Lavrov, 2017).

Conclusion

Power, however hard to define, is complex and appears in many different disguises. In essence, the increasingly acrimonious relations between the EU and Russia in the years preceding the Ukraine crisis of 2014 were driven by a logic of competition over institutional arrangements in the overlapping neighbourhoods and over recognition of identities. Yet, a considerable part of the literature has studied EU–Russia relations in this era exclusively in terms of power as the capacity of direct control of one actor over the other.

This article sought to bring the complexity of power back into the debate by using Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy of power, suggesting that four different types of power – compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive – operate simultaneously. Both before and since the Ukraine crisis power operated along different dimensions. In the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis, other dimensions of power than compulsory power received limited attention, while those were key to understanding the relations between Russia and the EU. First ‘institutional power’, the capacity to control the conditions of the other actor indirectly, was at the heart of the competition. This appeared most strongly in rival institutional arrangements in the overlapping neighbourhood (Eastern Partnership versus EEU) and in competing norm diffusion. Secondly the power relations were strongly characterised by ‘structural power’ – the capacity to produce and recognise identities, such as Europeanness, within fairly stable structures of subordination – and ‘productive power’, whereby mutual constitution happens in diffuse and historically contingent networks. In both fields, the EU held a hegemonic position, which Russia chose to contest and to challenge.

The developments of early 2014 led to a radical change in this power struggle. Self-evidently, the competition for power continues along all four dimensions. But the change in regime in Ukraine in February 2014, following the Euromaidan protests, led Russian leaders to believe – in a geopolitical reading of the events – that Russia had ‘lost’ Ukraine, and that Moscow had been unsuccessful in its competition with the EU over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood (institutional power) and over normative hegemony and identity production (structural and productive power). The ousting of Yanukovych and the pro-Western choice of the new government in Kyiv confirmed that Ukraine had become anchored more firmly in Western and EU-led institutional structures than ever before (institutional power). The Euromaidan protests had proven the EU’s identity politics successful, elevating the EU to the symbolic alternative for an unwelcome post-Soviet identity linked to Russia (structural/productive power). Still within this geopolitical framing, this prompted Russian leaders to a radical shift in strategy. While the struggle for power continued along all dimensions, Russia made a surprise move of drastic compulsory power, annexing Crimea and stirring up the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. It can be argued that Moscow pushed back on the front where it had not lost the battle. This led to a new logic of confrontation, based on enemy-like structures, in which both sides resorted to power instruments aimed at direct control through very diverse instruments such as annexation, destabilisation, sanctions, retaliation, military build-up. Since Russia’s strategic objectives are mainly about preventing the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over Ukraine, this could be seen as a form of ‘negative’ compulsory power. It goes without saying that all this does not imply that other forms of power have lost their relevance. In the field of institutional power, Russia continues efforts to increase control over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood: the ECU was reformed into the EEU. Armenia, a state which like Ukraine had to make a choice between economic integration with Moscow or Brussels, joined the EEU in 2015. In the field of structural and productive power, Russia has reinforced its neo-traditionalist or paleoconservative ideological stance, making a civilisational claim that Moscow represents the genuine values of Europe and positioning itself as a leader in the arrival of a post-Western world.

All this implies that a pluralistic approach to power retains its usefulness, also in times of direct confrontation and conflict. This is precisely where this article sought to make a contribution. Using the taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall, it brought a differentiated and multi-dimensional concept of power into a field where the concept of power has traditionally been mono-dimensional. Doing so adds nuance and deepens our insights into EU–Russia relations and the various settings of power. Moreover, as a more nuanced and multi-dimensional understanding of power highlights different aspects of power competition, this also contributes to understanding why perceptions in Moscow and Brussels diverge as much as they do.

The taxonomy of power was theoretically further refined by adding the concept of ‘negative’ compulsory power, as a way of preventing control by competing parties. This concept is particularly useful to understand Russia’s current policies in Eastern Ukraine, primarily aimed at preventing the Euro-Atlantic community from obtaining beneficial control over the country. It goes without saying that also this negative compulsory power coexists with a wide array of differentiated forms of power.