Driving liberal change? Global performance indices as a system of normative stratification in liberal international order

Abstract

The existing literature on Global Performance Indices (GPIs) is mostly dominated by unit-level analyses focused on specifying the relevant properties of the GPIs and the motivations of state actors in being influenced by GPIs. This article advances a systemic approach, which conceives of GPIs as collectively constituting a system of normative stratification in International Relations (IR). By bringing together the literature on GPIs with the relevant IR literatures on international hierarchies and status-seeking, we identify the structural attributes of the GPI-based system of stratification, how these structural attributes shape the distribution of normative status positions among states, and how this distribution is likely to condition the pursuit of status by states. In particular, we argue that the disaggregated structure and relative ranking of states, respectively, generate status ambiguity and immobility, which both dissuade states from seeking higher moral status through improving their scores in the existing indices. We illustrate the patterns of status ambiguity and immobility present in the GPI-based system of stratification through an empirical analysis of the scores and rank positions of the United States, European Union (EU) members, and “rising powers” in five different indices in the past decade.

Keywords

international rankings liberal order normative hierarchy status-seeking

Introduction

Global performance indices (GPIs), providing cross-national comparisons of state performances, have exploded in number in the past two decades. A growing literature stresses that these measures exert significant influence on states by setting standards and thus shaping state policies and strategies (Cooley and Snyder, 2015; Davis et al., 2012a; Kelley and Simmons, 2015, 2019). While noting the “power” (Kelley and Simmons, 2019) of GPIs to impact state strategy and policy, a large number of GPI scholars have expressed serious reservations about their use (e.g. Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Merry, 2011, 2016; Meyer, 2002). Much of the criticism has focused on the definitional biases and strategic use of indices. Critics have flagged GPIs’ reliance on questionable methodologies and data (e.g. Broome et al., 2018; Jerven, 2013), distortion of public policy objectives (e.g. Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Merry, 2016; Surminski and Williamson, 2014), and, relatedly, structural biases against certain actors and policy choices (Fougner, 2008; Lowenheim, 2008; Permanyer, 2013). More structural critiques, generally inspired by Michel Foucault’s opus, have analyzed GPIs as both a form of knowledge and technology of global governance (e.g. Best, 2017; Davis et al., 2012a, 2012b; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Merry, 2011, 2016; Miller and Rose, 2008). Among these scholars, indicators have been criticized for stripping meaning, context, contradictions and ambiguities from the measured phenomena to generate deceptively clear, robust and comparable “data” (e.g. Davis et al., 2012a, 2012b; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Merry, 2011, 2016); for masking theoretical assumptions, power relations, and ideological commitments in the seemingly “neutral” use of numbers (e.g. Best, 2017; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Merry, 2016); and for thus distorting the very reality and concept they are intended to reflect (e.g. Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; Merry, 2016).

In this article, we develop a systemic approach to the study of GPIs. In brief, we advance a conception of GPIs as collectively constituting a system of liberal stratification in International Relations (IR)—a system that positions states in relations of superiority and inferiority largely in accordance with the normative premises of liberal international order (LIO). Unlike the index-level or state-level analyses that are focused on how the characteristics of indices impact state responses in particular policy-making contexts, we are interested in the broader systemic question of whether GPIs, as a stratifying collective of liberal indicators, are motivating states to perform according to liberal norms and indicators. Ours is thus a question of systemic significance in an era of mounting illiberal challenges (e.g. Adler-Nissen and Zarakol, 2021; Cooley and Nexon, 2020). Our systemic approach also differs from the structural critiques of GPIs as a form of knowledge and technology of global governance, discussed above. We are interested in identifying the specific structural characteristics of the current stratifying system of GPIs. These structural characteristics, we argue, are manifest in the overall arrangement of indices and the ordering of states vis-à-vis one another. We question whether and how these particular structural characteristics are motivating politically relevant states and groupings, such as the United States, European Union (EU) and its member states, and non-Western “rising powers,” to satisfy their normative status aspirations within the LIO rather than by turning to alternatives.

In the first part of the article, we develop our systemic approach to GPIs by bringing the existing literature on GPIs into conversation with the scholarship on international hierarchies and status-seeking. We first build on the argument that GPIs stratify states by generating comparative public information about relative state performance in different issue areas. By drawing on the literature on international hierarchies, we identify two key structural attributes of GPIs as a system of stratification—its relative (zero-sum) construction and its disaggregated structure. We then expand on the claim that GPI hierarchies function as potentially effective tools of social pressure on states (Cooley, 2015; Kelley and Simmons, 2015, 2019; Towns and Rumelili, 2017). By drawing on the literature on international status-seeking (Snyder, 2020; Terman, 2020; Ward, 2017b), we argue that these two structural attributes of GPI system - its relative and disaggregated construction – do not necessarily direct states into seeking higher status through improved liberal performance. Relative ranking systems often generate “status immobility,” which is likely to discourage lower ranked states from seeking to improve their scores, instead, leading them to contest the existing indices and their underlying liberal normative frameworks. In turn, the disaggregated structure of the GPI system generates “status ambiguity,” which is likely to lead states to flaunt the salience of indices and issue areas where they are more favorably ranked, rather than seeking to improve their status in indices where they are less favorably ranked.

In the second part of the article, we provide preliminary and illustrative empirical support for these claims about status ambiguity and status immobility and their likely effects on the future of liberal order. We analyze the distribution of status positions among the United Stated, EU members, and “rising powers” through five authoritative GPIs covering different central issue areas in the LIO, namely the Human Development Index (HDI), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII), Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), and the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI). Overall, two trends are indicative of status immobility in the past decade: first, the 10 top ranked states remain the same across years and different indices to a remarkable degree. Second, and more remarkably, even though rising powers have significantly improved their performance in terms of absolute scores, they have not experienced a proportionate rise in rankings. As for status ambiguity, we observe that the rank positions of the United States and the EU members vary vis-à-vis one another across these five indices. While we do not provide a systematic unit-level empirical demonstration of our argument that status ambiguity and immobility in the GPI system of stratification indeed disposes United States, EU members, and the rising powers to pursue status through alternative means, where possible, we point to available case-study evidence in the literature that is supportive of our claims.

In conclusion, we summarize our findings and briefly propose possible pathways for structural change.

GPIs and normative stratification in the LIO

In a recent contribution, Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021) argue that discontent with the LIO is driven by dissatisfaction with the LIO as a recognition order. The LIO is resented both in the core and the periphery because it has failed to elevate actors to the high-status positions they believe they deserve. This argument underscores the importance of taking seriously the role that GPIs play in constructing hierarchies between states. In other words, apart from their impact on policy, or their effects as tools of liberal governmentality, the broader role of GPIs in the maintenance and contestation of the LIO demands emphasis.

We develop our conception of GPIs as a system of normative stratification in LIO, first of all, by establishing the conceptual connection between GPIs and liberal norms. As already recognized by many scholars, GPIs are not mere technical measures. They link various aspects of state performance to broader normative goals (Cooley, 2015: 2), and in doing so, they not only enshrine norms in specific measures but also ascribe moral value to specific policy outcomes (Broome and Quirk, 2015). Currently dominant GPIs are predominantly backed by Western and liberal institutions (Kelley and Simmons, 2019), and thus largely reflect the normative priorities of the LIO, for example, open markets, democracy, individual human rights, rule of law, and transparency (see e.g. Cooley and Nexon, 2020 for a recent discussion). They influence liberal policy decisions about the allocation of foreign aid, investments, and sanctions. As underlined by structural critiques, they also operate on the basis of liberal techniques of governance, by shifting power from political actors to technical experts (e.g. Best, 2017; Merry, 2011); constituting states and other rankees as self-managing actors and thus enabling “government at a distance” (Miller and Rose, 2008).

Recognizing the conceptual connection between GPIs and liberal norms in this fashion does not mean that we also take GPIs to be accurately reflecting norms or functioning as instruments of normative progress. To the contrary, we are in agreement with the critical literature on GPIs that the ways in which GPIs concretize norms reflect strong definitional biases. What we stress is that based on such skewed concretizations of norms, GPIs establish a system of stratification among states; that this system also has effects that are independent of the definitional biases; and that these effects are worthy of separate study. In other words, our systemic approach analytically distinguishes a la Waltz (1979), international structures (in this case, GPI system) from the level of interacting units, (individual GPIs), which compose the structure. We claim that the characteristics of the GPI system also dispose states to certain behaviors, in addition to the effects of individual GPIs.

Prior scholarship recognizes that individual GPIs establish relations of normative superiority and inferiority among states in different policy areas and also restructure the power and authority relations between them (Broome and Quirk, 2015; Towns and Rumelili, 2017). This arises from the fact that GPIs assign each state not only a numeric score, which provides a measure of how well a state fulfills normative standards in an issue area, and but also a rank position, which measures how well a state is doing in relation to others. Our systemic approach to GPIs stresses that these rankings of states by individual GPIs in different issue areas also add up to a collective system of stratification. This system, constituted by multiple indices, issue areas, and state actors, has specific structural qualities, which, as we will explain below, arise from the way in which indices and states are juxtaposed vis-à-vis and with one another.

The literature also mostly suggests that, despite the definitional biases of various indices, their rankings play a functional role in driving policy reform. Rankings direct the attention of policymakers to how well a country is doing in relation to others (Cooley, 2015: 13; Kelley and Simmons, 2019), and provoke state reactions to being compared as inferior or superior to other states. These publicized hierarchies prod states to improve their scores, not solely out of principled commitment to norms but also in order to outperform their rivals (Cooley, 2015: 5; Kelley and Simmons, 2015; Towns and Rumelili, 2017). The literature has furthermore established that states in general are more reactive to rankings established by more authoritative actors (Broome et al., 2018; Kelley and Simmons, 2019), that certain states are more reactive to rankings than others (Cooley, 2015), and that states are more reactive to being ranked inferior vis-à-vis certain states rather than others (Doshi et al., 2019).

However, these unit-level analyses that seek to explain variation in policy responses fall short of addressing the broader significance of GPIs in the maintenance and contestation of LIO. For that it is necessary to focus on the GPIs as a collective, on the characteristics of that collective, and on whether and how it prods politically relevant states and groupings toward compliance with liberal indicators. Our systemic approach to GPIs allows us to address these questions. In the remainder of this section, we bring the literature on GPIs into closer dialogue with the literatures on international hierarchies and status-seeking to identify status ambiguity and immobility as key structural aspects of the GPI-based system of stratification. We also theorize the ways in which these structural characteristics are expected to condition how states pursue higher status in those hierarchies. Then, in the subsequent empirical section, we focus on analyzing how status ambiguity and immobility are manifest in the distribution of rank positions among the United States, EU members, and rising powers—actors whose (non)compliance with liberal indicators is of key significance for the future of LIO—in various indices over time.

GPIs as international hierarchies

There has not been sufficient engagement between the literatures on GPIs and international hierarchies (Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; on normative hierarchies, see especially Adler-Nissen, 2014; Epstein, 2012; Towns, 2010, 2012; Towns and Rumelili, 2017), although the stratificatory aspect of GPIs closely connects the two fields of study. Insights drawn from the literature on international hierarchies directs our attention to two key structural aspects of the ways in which GPIs stratify states.

The first is that GPIs collectively constitute a disaggregated and heterarchic system of stratification. Hierarchy-centered research in IR differentiates between single-ranked orders, where there is “one axis of superordination that runs through the entire system” and multiple-ranked systems, or heterarchies, characterized by varying and tangled relations of super and sub-ordination in different functional domains (Donnelly, 2009). This is a useful distinction to employ in understanding how GPIs stratify states in the broader international normative order. While each GPI constructs a single-ranked hierarchy among states in a particular issue area, collectively the rapidly increasing number of GPIs has come to constitute a heterarchic structure, where every state is independently assessed and varyingly ranked on the basis of multiple norms, by multiple institutions, and according to multiple criteria. This heterarchic structure affects the distribution of status positions among states, such that the system has multiple tops rather than a single top. It generates status ambiguity both within (intra-domain) and across (inter-domain) different normative issue areas; it makes it possible for a state to attain higher moral status in some norms and indices than in others. Status ambiguity is greater when rankings in different domains are of roughly equal significance, and less when ranking in one domain is more determinative of a state’s overall status position. Regardless of this variation, heterarchic structures allow states to compensate for their low status in some issue areas with higher status in others. This complicates overall assessments of normative superiority and inferiority.

The second structural aspect is that GPIs construct a relative system of normative stratification. Generally, ranking systems are of two basic kinds: An “absolute” ranking creates set benchmark standards that all states could theoretically meet (Towns and Rumelili, 2017). Such rankings generally set out a limited number of status positions—for example, high/medium/low—and position states into these categories based on how well they meet the benchmark standard, independently of the performance of other states. “Relative” ranking systems, in turn, rely not on set benchmarks but only on the performance of other states (Towns and Rumelili, 2017). In such rankings, it is not possible for all states to attain a top classification even in theory, as the ranking is premised on lining up states from best to worst performer, and even small differences in absolute scores can translate into relations of moral superiority/inferiority (see also Broome et al., 2018).

Ranking systems are unit-level attributes in that each GPI independently adopts its own ranking system. While some indices categorize states also based on absolute benchmarks, for example, Freedom House distinguishing between Free, Partly Free, and Not Free polities, most GPIs adopt a relative rather than an absolute ranking system. The preponderance of relative ranking has, however, also turned zero-sum relativity into a structural attribute of the GPI system. A relatively ranked system of stratification is more likely to be characterized by greater status immobility, because upward mobility requires not only the improvement of a state’s own performance but also outperforming higher ranked states. This status immobility manifests itself in the inability of states to attain higher rank through improved scores and in the stability of the rank positions of states over time.

In sum, the IR literature on international hierarchies directs our attention to two structural aspects of GPI-based system of normative stratification; first, its disaggregated and heterarchic nature, which is generative of status ambiguity, and second, the preponderance of relative ranking, which is generative of status immobility. In the following section, building on the IR literature on status-seeking, we theorize the potential effects of these structural attributes on state responses. While our level of analysis is systemic, our argument nonetheless rests on assumptions about state responses in terms of how structural features trigger status-seeking behavior. The following section should thus be read in that light.

The GPI system as a terrain of status-seeking

GPIs are relevant for states’ pursuit of and competition for moral status in IR, we contend. The growing literature on status in IR has recently turned its attention to moral status—a socially recognized position of moral superiority vis-à-vis others using shared normative criteria. High moral status is a source of power and self-esteem. It allows states lagging in material capabilities to shape international political agendas on normative issues (De Carvalho and Neumann, 2014; Manners, 2002) and to attain positive distinctiveness as a “good state” (Beaumont and Towns, 2021; Towns, 2010, 2012; Wohlforth et al., 2018). Conversely, actors with low moral status face stigmatization and naming/shaming domestically as well as internationally (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Towns, 2010, 2012), and always bear the burden of proof in justifying themselves and their actions. Even though not all states care equally about moral status or about their positions in GPI hierarchies, it is becoming increasingly difficult for states to claim high moral status without reference to some GPI ranking.

The GPI system generates its structural effects through activating status motivations of states and disposing them to engage in certain status-seeking strategies rather than others. In addition to seeking higher moral status as a means of power and influence, states’ status motivations are also activated by emotional reactions generated by GPI rankings. High rank positions generate pride and self-esteem, while low rank positions evoke shame and undermine self-esteem. Depending on the salience of the index or how widely the ranking is publicized, these emotional reactions may either affect only the relevant political/bureaucratic elite or also politically mobilize the broader society. These emotional reactions cut across the different pathways, that is, domestic, elite, or transnational, through which GPIs influence policy (Kelley and Simmons, 2019).

These status motivations coexist with a wide variety of index-related as well as domestic political and bureaucratic factors, as identified in prior scholarship. As we are interested in identifying the structural effects of GPIs as a system of stratification, we do not engage with the question of whether status considerations or other factors (such as cost of policy adaptation) determine state responses. As in all systemic approaches, we approach structural effects as realized in the context of variation at the state or domestic levels.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) in social psychology stresses that actors adopt different status-seeking strategies under different structural conditions to maintain or restore the positive distinctiveness of their in-groups compared to the out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The three most common SIT strategies—status mobility, competition, and creativity—do not perfectly correspond either to the general IR context (for different applications, see Larson and Shevchenko, 2010; Ward, 2017a) or to the available strategies in GPI system. However, we find SIT’s general emphasis on the multiplicity of status strategies that transcend the binary “acceptance or rejection” of the social order and the connection SIT makes between structural conditions and status strategies helpful for our theorization. As summarized in Table 1 below, we identify five status-seeking strategies whose prevalence ought to vary with the structural features of the liberal GPI system (see also Rumelili and Towns, 2020).

Table 1.

GPI structural features and state status seeking strategies.

GPI structural features	State status-seeking strategy
Status mobility	Strategy 1: playing by the liberal rules. States seek higher status by improving scores in all major indices.
Status mobility/ Status ambiguity	Strategy 2: selectively playing by the liberal rules. States seek higher status by improving scores in some indices while ignoring lower status positions in other GPIs
Status immobility/ Status ambiguity	Strategy 3: highlight favorable liberal indices. States seek higher status by enhancing the salience of indices where these states are more favorably ranked.
Status immobility/ status ambiguity	Strategy 4: create alternative and more favorable indices. States seek higher status by creating alternative indices (with different indicators), thus achieving higher rank in the same normative issue area.
Status immobility	Strategy 5: reject liberal indices in championing competing norms. States seek higher status by rejecting liberal indices and championing alternative and competing norms.

GPI: Global Performance Indices.

In a GPI system primarily characterized by status mobility, in which social mobility in the indices is attainable for all states, we can expect states to be more inclined to play by the rules and adopt policies in order to rise in rank (Strategy 1). Policy elites will be disposed to avoid shame and generate self-esteem by demanding and implementing policy changes that are likely to translate into higher status positions. If the GPI rankings are more widely publicized, then there will also be a strong demand among the public to attain collective self-esteem through policy change, and political actors will be disposed both to mobilize this demand and to respond to it as means to generate broader public support. However, when faced with a GPI system characterized by a mix of mobility and ambiguity, states actors may get creative. Multiple normative issue areas and indices in the GPI system allow more than one state to enjoy and claim leading status, even if they do so in different normative issue areas and/or indices. In such a terrain, in addition to an overall strategy of mobility, states may opt to ignore their lower status positions in some indices to instead focus on improving their scores on other indices (Strategy 2).

GPI systems characterized by status immobility may in turn encourage other sets of status-seeking strategies among states. As Snyder (2020) has underscored in the context of international human rights promotion, prolonged occupation of low status positions and repeated exposure to shaming can drive resentment and backlash. If elites and publics perceive status immobility or a status “glass-ceiling” (Ward, 2017b: 3) in specific indices, they might be dissuaded from further efforts to gain higher status in those indices. Likewise, prolonged occupation of low status positions and repeated exposure to shaming can drive resentment and backlash (e.g. Adler-Nissen, 2014; Snyder, 2020; Towns, 2010; Ward, 2017b). States may thus be prompted to pursue alternative ways to achieve positive distinctiveness either within or outside of the current GPI-based system of stratification. We suggest that status immobility prod states toward three alternative sets of status-seeking strategies.

If the GPI system is characterized by a mix of status immobility and status ambiguity, states will likely pursue Strategies 3 and 4 identified in the table. Strategy 3 entails seeking to enhance overall status by increasing the social salience of the indices where the state in question is more favorably ranked. On the other hand, states may get creative and invent alternative indices which assess performance on the same normative issue areas but with different indicators, indicators that rank them more favorably (Strategy 4). However, as Terman (2020) underscores, “chronic status deprivation” can ultimately dispose actors to reject the system, contest the underlying liberal norms, and seek a positive identity through championing alternative and competing norms. In other words, when status mobility in the overall GPI system is blocked, states can also adopt what Ward refers to as a rejection strategy (Ward, 2017b), seeking higher status by championing alternative and competing norms (Strategy 5).

In sum, the structural characteristics of the GPI-based system of stratification matter because they dispose states to adopt certain status-seeking strategies rather than others. In particular, status immobility and ambiguity allow and dispose states to seek and attain high status without necessarily improving their performance according to the indicators in particular GPIs. As indicated in the above table, under conditions of status mobility, status ambiguity disposes actors to Strategy 2 rather than 1, and under conditions of status immobility, toward Strategies of 3 and 4 rather than 5. Having now discussed the theoretical assumptions about state behavior that lead us to believe that the structural features of the GPI system matter, we will return to our main aim: examining the structural traits of the liberal GPI system. In the next section, we provide illustrative (and thus limited) empirical evidence for the presence of status immobility and ambiguity in the liberal GPI system by analyzing the distribution of status positions between the United States, EU, and “rising powers” over the past decade in five key indices.

GPIs and status competition among the United States, EU members, and “rising powers”

For the maintenance of the LIO, the continued commitment of the United States, EU members, and the so-called “rising power” to liberal norms is critical. Although there is considerable variation in normative performance among individual EU member states, given the EU’s collective weight as an integrated market and political entity, the EU as a collective comes closest to combining the power and purpose necessary for taking on the role of liberal leadership if abandoned by the United States, as was the case during the Trump presidency (Kavalski, 2013; Wagner, 2017). The potential for the EU’s liberal leadership renders the following question about the GPI-based system of stratification significant: Is it structured in a way that disposes the EU, its members, and the United States to a race to the top? In addition, how the GPI system of stratification structures the normative status aspirations of “rising powers” is at least as important, given their potential to translate their growing economic and political weight into norm contestation (e.g. Cunliffe and Kenkel, 2016; Kavalski, 2013).

The answers to these questions revolve around the degree of status ambiguity and immobility in the system. If the decentralized and disaggregated structure of the GPI system has led to status ambiguity between the United States and EU members, then this would allow both the United States and European elites and societies to enjoy high normative status without needing to improve their performance. They can enjoy status simply by flaunting the indices where they are more favorably ranked in relation to the other. Similarly, if the GPI system of stratification is characterized by status immobility, then it exposes the elites and societies in “rising power” countries to prolonged shame and status deprivation. It would be encouraging them to seek positive distinctiveness by contesting the indices and their underlying normative frameworks.

A full empirical examination of the structural features of the GPI system would demand an even more extensive analysis of a larger number of indices over a longer time period than the scope of this article allows. To provide a preliminary assessment of the presence and extent of status ambiguity and immobility in the context of the status competition between these actors, we have analyzed the scores and rank positions of 49 states, which together comprise the collective membership of the EU, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and G20, in five illustrative indices, over roughly a period of 10 years. Given the absence of an agreed-upon definition, we have chosen to include in the category of “rising powers” states that are members of the G20 but not the EU or OECD, that is, China, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, Russian Federation, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. Although our sample size is small, we have selected five distinctive GPIs that are central in the LIO, namely the HDI, the GII, the CPI, the GCI, and the CCPI. Because of the range of norms these indices represent, they are suggestive of a broader pattern.

The analysis is conducted in three steps.¹ First, the states that occupy the top 10 rank positions in each index is analyzed to assess mobility in high-status positions between 2010 and 2017. Second, the United States and EU members’ rank across indices over roughly the same period are compared to assess status ambiguity. Finally, we turn to the mobility prospects of non-Western “rising powers” and analyze the critical relationship between (absolute) score and (relative) rank.

Top performers

For each of the five GPIs, we have listed the states that have occupied the top 10 rank positions during 2010–2017. Crucially, there is very little variation during the period. Only 16 countries have ever occupied a top 10 position in the HDI, 14 countries in the GII, 14 in the CPI, 22 in the CCPI, and 14 in the GCI. What is more, most of the top performers are the same countries across GPIs, resulting in a total of only 33 countries having attained a top 10 position in one of the five indices during the period.

The bar graph in Figure 1 above shows the number of times a country has attained top 10 positions in different indices in the 2010–2017 period (8 being the highest possible figure). As Figure 1 shows, a narrow set of mostly European countries occupy these prestigious rank positions consistently across different issue areas. Switzerland and Sweden have consistently been in top 10 positions in all five indices across the eight-year time period, except for two times when they fell off the top 10 category in one GPI. Other consistently high performers across GPIs include the Netherlands, Denmark, Singapore, Norway, Finland, and Germany. Compared to these mostly European countries, the United States lags behind; it has been in top 10 positions only in the HDI and the Global Corruption Index. Non-European OECD countries such as United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand are generally consistent top performers in one index out of the five but not in the others.

Figure 1.

States and top 10 status in different indices (2010–2017).

Consequently, at high-status positions, the GPI system of normative stratification clearly exhibits a high degree of status immobility. A narrow set of mostly small liberal states are consistently recognized and rewarded for their normative performance. Except for Slovenia in the GII, there is not one example of a country within the scope of our empirical analysis which has moved into the top 10 from a lower status position and retained that top position. Neither China nor Russia appears once in the top 10 in any of the five indices.²

There is evidence that the GPI system motivates these few liberal states which consistently enjoy high-status positions across multiple indices to pursue Strategy 1. In Sweden, for example, the Swedish Institute of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is tasked with providing an overview of 20 of the more reputable rankings, providing an annual report in which Sweden’s progress or regress is compared and tracked, on the premise that Sweden should rank well in all indicators (Svenska Institutet, 2020: 32). However, as we will explore further below, the occupation of these high-status positions by mostly the same states year after year is likely to generate status deprivation among “rising powers,” which consistently find themselves at lower levels in the hierarchy despite improving their absolute scores.

Disaggregated normative hierarchies and the US vs EU status competition

We have identified the highest and lowest rank positions attained by the United States and the individual EU member states in these five different indices within the 2008–2017 period and plotted them in Figure 2. The concentration of the points along the x = y line indicates that the countries have not experienced a significant variation, rise or decline, in their rankings in these five indices over this period. Moreover, it shows that the status hierarchy between the actors remains largely consistent. In some indices, the United States consistently outperforms most EU members; and in others, a hefty majority of EU members maintain consistent rank positions above the United States. So, even our illustrative sample of five indices shows that there is no clear positioning of United States and Europe as normatively superior or inferior with respect to one another in the overall GPI system of stratification.

Figure 2.

The United States and EU members: highest and lowest rank positions in different indices.

While not specific to the five indices analyzed, there is suggestive evidence in the literature that status ambiguity in the system allows normatively backsliding Western states to deflect shame and retain positive distinctiveness by publicizing those issue areas where they are favorably ranked (Strategies 2 or 3). For instance, Hungarian government officials have repeatedly lashed out against democracy rankings such as those provided by the V-Dem Institute or Freedom House, rejecting their “questionable methodology” and “liberal bias” (Albert, 2020), while uncritically reproducing rankings, such as the “Global Financial Centres Index,” UNICEF’s “Child Welfare Ranking” or the Swiss Institute for Management Development’s “World Competitiveness Ranking,” where Hungary fares well (e.g. MTI-Hungary Today, 2021; Schonviszky, 2020).

“Rising powers” and status mobility

To determine whether “rising powers” are able to attain status mobility in the GPI system of stratification, we have compared the percentage change in scores with the change in rank percentile³ attained by the eight “rising powers” under study in the five different indices across the indicated time periods. As indicated in Figure 3 below, with the exception of South Africa in the GCI, all have improved their absolute scores in the four indices of HDI, GII, CPI, and GCI. However, these improvements in scores have not translated into a proportionate rise in rank. In the HDI, GII and CPI, none of the rising powers have been able to attain a rise in rank that is proportionate to the rise in their scores. In several cases, some rising powers have even experienced a decline in their ranking despite the improvement in their scores. The most dramatic increase in rank has been achieved by Saudi Arabia in gender equality, rising from the 135^th to the 49^th most gender equal state. In the GCI, India, Indonesia, and Russia have been able to increase their rank percentiles more than the percentage increase in their scores.

Figure 3.

Rising powers change in score and rank in different indices.

Thus, even though the “rising powers” analyzed have improved in the indicators that various GPIs use to assess progress, this improvement has not translated into a proportionate rise in rank and thus status in the GPI-based system of stratification. When the rank positions of the United States, EU members, and “rising powers” are compared with one another over time, apart from a few exceptions, we see that rising powers have not been able to surpass either the EU members or the United States in these indices. Thus, the GPI system of stratification has so far provided little possibility for “rising powers” to catch up with and outperform their Western counterparts in liberal normative hierarchies.

There are indications that Russia and China are increasingly resorting to Strategies 4 and 5 in the face of this status immobility. Russian officials routinely characterize ratings of corruption, political freedoms, and economic development as ideological instruments of a rigged, US-dominated Western hegemony (Tsygankov and Parker, 2015). When China’s position on Transparency International’s CPI dramatically deteriorated in 2014 in spite of a highly publicized anti-corruption drive led by the government, Chinese officials dismissed the value of the index by claiming that it is inconsistent (McKirdy, 2014). More dramatically, after decriminalizing “milder” forms of domestic violence in 2017 within the normative framework of traditional Orthodox family values, Russia has aligned with the Vatican, the Organization of Islamic States, and a number of other nonstate and state actors in attempts to change international standards to reflect an illiberal vision of the appropriate treatment of women (e.g. Stensvold, 2019).

In sum, the distribution of status positions among the United States, EU, and “rising powers” in the context of these five indices is indicative of a broader pattern of status immobility and ambiguity in the GPI-based system of stratification. The top positions are consistently occupied by a narrow set of Western liberal states. The status hierarchy between the United States and the EU members varies with the issue area. Importantly, the significant strides that “rising powers” have made in absolute scores have not been translated into a proportionate rise in relative rankings, and hence they remain below Western states in all normative status hierarchies.

Concluding discussion

Despite their in-built biases and limitations, GPIs provide liberal institutions with valuable tools to prod states in the direction of liberal normative maintenance and improvement. Because states care about status, the scores and rank positions that GPIs assign to states can generate status anxieties, which can then be channeled into efforts to improve performance in for example, development, competitiveness, and gender equality, albeit in the highly skewed way in which these normative goals are operationalized in the indices. In order to assess the capacities and limitations of GPIs as tools of policy change, the existing literature has focused on the characteristics of indices and patterns of policy-making in states. In this article, we have analyzed GPIs as collectively constituting a system of normative stratification, identifying structural properties of the system and how these systemic properties are likely to condition the collective responses of different categories of states.

In particular, we have identified two structural aspects of the GPI-based system of stratification, which shape the distribution of normative status positions among states and thereby condition state responses. The first is the disaggregated structure of the system, wherein the assessment of states on the basis of multiple norms and by multiple institutions generates status ambiguity, complicating overall assessments of normative superiority and inferiority. The second is relative ranking, which creates competitive zero-sum hierarchies prone to status immobility. We have demonstrated empirically in a sample of five indices that these structural characteristics have led to a rather static system of stratification. Top status positions circulate among a narrow set of Western liberal states. Whereas the status hierarchy between the United States and EU members varies across issue areas; non-Western “rising powers” have not achieved meaningful mobility despite considerably improved performance in absolute terms.

We have claimed that these structural characteristics of the GPI system and the resulting distribution of status positions characterized by status ambiguity and immobility are likely to undermine the potential efficacy of GPIs in the maintenance of the LIO. Status ambiguity allows and encourages actors with potential for leadership in LIO, such as the United States and the EU members, to work on increasing the salience of indices and normative issue areas where they are already more favorably ranked, rather than aiming at an overall improved normative performance. Status immobility discourages rising powers with high-status aspirations from the GPI-based status competition, and leads them to contest the indices and their underlying normative values.

While our systemic approach has less explanatory power at the level of individual indices and states, it sheds light on broader structural factors shaping the collective relationship between GPIs and states, factors which were hitherto unexamined. In an empirical literature dominated by unit-level analyses, the novelty of this article lies in its preliminary demonstration of some structural patterns in the distribution of status positions, and we hope that it will pave the way for more comprehensive analyses of these structural patterns. In addition, our findings could be expanded upon with in-depth case studies on how the structural conditions we have identified are reflected in unit-level dispositions, focusing on how comparative information about rankings generate status concerns among the policy elite and public and how these concerns are used in the justification of various policy responses toward indices.

Structured as such, liberal GPIs are likely to eventually lose their relevance and credibility. While the creation of new indices, by themselves, would not be sufficient to bring about structural change, there are certain ways in which the status ambiguity and immobility in the GPI-based system of stratification can be diminished. For example, the construction of an aggregate index, which would compile the performances of states across different liberal issue areas, would reduce status ambiguity, especially if it achieves a dominant position in the system of stratification. This would push states toward improving their performance and ranking in this aggregate index rather than increasing the salience of indices where they are more favorably ranked. In addition, the dissemination of data in ways that activate status-based comparisons between politically relevant actors (such as the United States vs EU, Russia vs China) would enhance the salience of the normative competition between key players in IR. And finally, if indices which measure improvement in absolute terms rather than relative performance achieve preponderance in the system, this would reduce status immobility and encourage low status actors to remain within the liberal status competition.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and Benal Nazli Ustunes, Ezgi Elci, and Alfred Oduro for their research assistance.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: The research for this article was funded in part through funding from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, grant KAW 2013.0178.

ORCID iD

Bahar Rumelili

Notes

Author biographies

Bahar Rumelili is Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of International Relations, Koç University, Istanbul. Her research focuses on ontological security theory, international hierarchies, European identity construction, conflict resolution, and the interaction between the EU and Turkish politics and civil society. Her articles have appeared in journals such as European Journal of International Relations, Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of International Relations and Development, and the Review of International Studies.

Ann E. Towns is professor in political science at the University of Gothenburg and a Wallenberg Academy Fellow since 2013. She heads GenDip, a research program on the intersections of gender and international hierarchies in diplomacy (), awarded a Bertha Lutz Prize from the ISA in 2018. Towns is the author of Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society (2010, Cambridge), co-editor with Karin Aggestam of Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation (2018, Palgrave), with articles in International Organization, EJIR, Review of International Studies, and many other venues.

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