Abstract
This article examines the long-term implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the future of military neutrality in Europe, focusing on Austria—the most prominent constitutionally neutral European Union (EU) member state outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Using a mixed-methods approach, including a pair of survey experiments and elite interviews with Austrian officials involved in navigating neutrality, the study investigates whether Austria’s public and elite opinion can be swayed to reconsider neutrality and pursue more robust integration with NATO. The findings reveal a strong attachment to neutrality among respondents and interviewees, despite the heightened threat perception following the war in Ukraine and the impact of Finland and Sweden’s recent NATO accession. Specifically, no significant shift in support for abandoning neutrality is identified, even with strong EU endorsements or when demonstrating the potential economic and security incentives of such a policy shift. The results stress the deep-seated historical, legal, and emotional foundations of Austria’s neutrality and the legal complexities of amending it, implying that it is expected to remain a fundamental aspect of its national identity and foreign policy. This raises questions about the adaptability of neutrality policies in small states facing evolving regional security dynamics.
Introduction
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is said to have fundamentally challenged and changed security calculations in Europe and triggered a reevaluation of long-standing axioms. Finland and Sweden’s decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thereby abdicating their enduring position of military neutrality in Europe, appears to support this general assessment. Yet, does the largest-scale land war in Europe since the end of World War II signal the end of permanent military neutrality in the continent, and particularly—could these developments erode deeply embedded social attachments and constitutional commitments to neutrality? This article tackles this question through a mixed-methods approach, harnessing survey experiments and elite interviews within the most prominent constitutionally neutral European Union (EU) democracy outside NATO—the Republic of Austria. Austria’s neutrality is a pillar of its national identity, a post-war constitutional and public consensus prohibiting participation in foreign military alliances and limiting any scope for intervention abroad. Nevertheless, Austria has taken substantial steps to enhance its regional political and military integration since the end of the Cold War. In addition to joining the EU, it has participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, took part in the Alliance’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and contributed to several NATO-led peacekeeping forces and missions. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Austria has pledged to increase its defense spending by 70% in the coming years, with some voices calling for further intensifying relations with NATO. This process has been driven by the enhanced threat perception following the war in Ukraine and by Sweden and Finland’s historic decision to abandon their long-standing neutrality and join NATO. Recent academic scrutiny has also called for a thorough and systematic debate on the future of Austrian neutrality, with the participation of wide circles within Austrian society, as a consequence of the transformed external conditions of Austria’s foreign and security policy (Senn, 2024). Balancing Austria’s traditional commitment to neutrality and its renewed discourse on reimagining the core tenets of its defense and security policy, what are the prospects for a strategic shift in Vienna’s approach to neutrality?
This article argues that Austria is expected to remain profoundly attached to its long-standing policy of neutrality, regardless of external destabilizing factors or domestic incentives to abandon that policy in the shorter term. To explore this theme, the article employs a pair of survey experiments among Austrian government sector employees, accompanied by a new body of elite interviews with high-ranking Austrian officials presently or previously involved in shaping neutrality. The survey design evaluates the potential support for abandoning neutrality against the backdrop of external and domestic incentivizing mechanisms: An explicit EU endorsement to pursue a path similar to that of Sweden and Finland (wave 1), as well as a strong demonstration of the financial and security-related benefits of such a decision (wave 2). The results align with previous expectations, failing to demonstrate a significant increase in respondents’ support for abandoning neutrality following an EU endorsement, nor when presented with potential solid financial benefits related to the national security sphere. The interview section, incorporating expert insights gathered directly after the second wave of the survey, adds depth and sheds light on these findings, highlighting the Austrians’ deep emotional attachment to the notion of neutrality, the substantial legal challenges to modifying this policy, and the view that steps concerning regional integration (including ties with NATO) do not hinder the core tenets of neutrality. The article proceeds as follows: it lays out the concept of military neutrality and discusses the Austrian case in this context. Then, it introduces the experimental design of the survey experiments and provides a detailed outline of the results, followed by an elaborate section presenting insights from elite interviews. The concluding section discusses the implications and identifies paths for future research.
Military neutrality in the 21st century
The concept of military neutrality is a multidimensional construct pertaining to state-level behavior, which at its core means “not taking part in a war” (Agius and Devine, 2011). In the realm of International Relations (IR), neutrality has been perceived as either a commitment to long-term non-alignment, wherein a state vows not to align itself with any party in a prospective war, or the assertion of permanent neutrality, a formal declaration made by a state to the global community (Müller, 2019). Indeed, both concepts share a common denominator in the form of non-participating in a military alliance with defense commitments. However, a long-term legal commitment to refrain from taking sides in armed conflict—codified domestically via the constitution (in Austria) or through a dedicated treaty (Finland, in parts of its history, and Turkmenistan)—is typically identified as permanent neutrality. Crucially, neutrality is also distinct from non-alignment as the latter was said to constitute more of a political strategy rather than a legal commitment (Ogley, 2022: 3), and is hence looser in nature. Indeed, a permanently neutral state must also persistently affirm its commitment in wartime but also during peace by making clear that it is neutral and shall remain so.
While historical accounts of permanent neutrality date back centuries—for example, Switzerland since the 1815 Congress of Vienna (Ogley, 2022)—the adoption of neutrality has become particularly prevalent in the post-WWII era, notably during the Cold War. At its core, the modern practice of permanent neutrality entails more than a mere rejection of waging war—an approach that can be easily abandoned. As an expression of national sovereignty and domestic will, permanent neutrality also pertains to refraining from hosting foreign military bases or personnel on the neutral’s soil, placing domestic restrictions on engagement with foreign security apparatuses, and avoiding participation in any form of alliance, pact, or other binding arrangement that could develop into active participation in military engagements (Joenniemi, 1993; Senn, 2023). The spirit of permanent neutrality also involves impartiality toward belligerents in any armed conflict, at least to the extent that political leaders should refrain from openly declaring their support of any particular party to a conflict, and trade and diplomatic relations between the neutral and the parties remain intact (Goetschel, 2020; Feldman and Sadeh, 2016). As such, neutral state actors were said to possess a unique normative power, which—if credible enough—allows them to take part in international mediation efforts, or provide invaluable humanitarian aid to victims without being perceived as biased or political (Kastner, 2020). In that sense, neutral states are not value-neutral and must not be so in this war either, but rather pursue “engaged neutrality” (Gärtner, 2018). Finally, while a traditional interpretation of permanent neutrality takes into account reduced domestic military capabilities, the modern illustrations of neutrality policy (e.g. Austria, and until recently Finland and Sweden) involve a strong domestic backing and enhanced international cooperation on defense and security, aiming to strengthen defensive capabilities while openly maintaining a neutral stance.
Permanent neutrality stands in the center of this study, excluding other non-binding forms of neutrality—the ad hoc neutrality during hostilities, activated in response to a particular conflict, without long-lasting commitment (Agius and Devine, 2011), and restricted ‘neutralization’—when a state is forced by other powers to remain outside the orbit of a particular war. The same applies to a loose statement of non-belligerency, meaning an intention to avoid active involvement (Raymond, 1997).
The concept of permanent neutrality in modern IR is addressed in a vast body of literature from which three primary strands of interpretation emerge. The first is a historical and legal perspective, attending to the application of neutrality across diverse historical and contextual settings (Fox, 2023; Neuhold and Thalberg, 2019; Ogley, 2022; Vagts, 1998). This stream posits that neutrality constitutes a viable option to safeguard state interests, defined in terms of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity (Danspeckgruber, 1986). The second interpretation is the view of neutrality as a small-state security strategy—a Cold War-era policy choice preferred by many small states, a manifestation of pluralism and democratization in IR (Kruzel, 1989; McSweeney, 1987; Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1987). This body of literature explores the general stances of neutral states amid the bloc division of superpowers and their ability to maintain this position, particularly in light of nuclear armament altering the nature of conflict and the prospects of future warfare (Gstöhl, 2002; Ingebristen 2002). Finally, a third interpretation focuses on neutrality in the post-Cold War era, particularly the development, meaning, possibilities, and security avenues for neutral states in an era of cooperative security and the heightened influence of military alliances (Bebler, 1992; Rickli, 2008). Most of these works analyze the evolution of neutrality alongside significant fluctuations in European security and the context of participation in peacekeeping and NATO operations (Hanf and Soetendorp, 2014; Labs, 1992).
In addressing the notion of neutrality after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this article adopts a conceptual narrative that engages with all three theoretical strands: the historical context of the post-Cold War period, the perception of small statehood in a deteriorated regional security environment, and the importance of pooling security resources.
The societal roots of neutrality
Several strands of literature have examined the role of public attitudes toward neutrality, exploring how these are shaped by historical and cultural narratives (Agius and Devine, 2011; Lödén, 2012; Luif, 2001) and molded and fashioned through social constructivist and national identity lenses (Agius, 2006; Devine, 2008; Goetschel, 2013). Opinion formation has also been said to be transformed through the prism of domestic politics (Jesse, 2006; Kite, 2006), as well as influenced by a more rational assessment of reality in the context of the economic benefits or detriments small states possess in opting for neutrality (Bieler, 2002: 96–102; (Goetschel, 2013; Hey, 2003: 95–97). Ultimately, all these accounts share the conviction that varying perceptions of neutrality alter how this notion is formalized, transformed, and implemented in domestic and external policymaking (Beyer and Hoffman, 2011).
Indeed, this conviction is in line with the broader body of literature exploring the role of public opinion in foreign policy (Jun, 2009; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017; Peters, 2014; Tomz et al., 2020), particularly with the constructivist proposition, maintaining that strategic external stances—such as adopting, maintaining, or abandoning neutrality—reflect larger identity-building processes. A unique example of this identity-building process can be found in Cold War-era Austrian elementary schools, where textbooks signaling support for neutrality were presented as one of the state’s raison dêtre (Luif, 2016). Admittedly, this mindset can increase support for neutrality, as well as other forms of isolationism and disengagement from global affairs (Holsti, 2013: 274), but in some cases, also render it ineffective against the backdrop of the changing nature of conflict and its inherent limitations (Skelly, 2001).
From this perspective, the continuous development of neutrality is the sum of all competing accounts, visions, and perceptions about neutrality among differing segments of society, as noted by Lödén: “Which narrative is victorious within domestic debates is important for . . . the long-term construction of normative ideas in former neutral states” (Lödén, 2012). In this regard, the various forms of discursive interpretations of the costs and benefits of neutrality contribute to elite opinion formation (Devine, 2011; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017), resulting in a push for policy adaptation or even rebuke, which in turn can serve as a cue to mobilize broader public support. Indeed, considering Sweden and Finland’s recent relinquishment of neutrality for the sake of NATO membership, diverging interpretations of the rights and duties neutrality entails have contributed to the formation of the narrative signaling public opinion ripeness for this notable U-turn (Forsberg, 2024; Nisch, 2024; Weckman, 2023). This maturity had been the result of a lengthy historical process. At their core, European neutrals have been engaged in a concentrated effort of “nation branding,” creating a national image that became inscribed into their identities (Gillabert and Milani, 2020). Neutrality has been said to “play a substantive part in constructing the nation-state identity . . . both internally and externally” (Agius, 2006: 45). As such, public attitudes (e.g. on a deepening external threat after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022), are key in driving a strategic policy adaptation.
The question of Austrian attachment to neutrality speaks to a broader notion, in which profoundly entrenched policy concepts shape group identity and cohesion, often symbolizing collective values and principles (Blind, 2006; Howlett and Ramesh, 2016). To effectively gain standing, policies often rest on political trust—and particularly the wide belief that political institutions act responsibly in the collective interest (Citrin and Stoker, 2018; Hetherington and Husser, 2012). Among other prominent examples, this is particularly evident in the deep social attachment within large segments of US society to regulations concerning the individual right to bear arms, reflecting more profound principles about freedom and liberty (Cress, 1993). It is, therefore, quite comprehensible that social attachments of this sort would be immensely challenging to restructure or alter by singular events, disrupting deeply rooted fundamental social narratives.
As these narratives provide long-lasting clarity and moral and emotional grounding (Shanahan et al., 2011), every transformation in attachment to specific policies—including military neutrality—is linked with the development and change in these normative frameworks. Changes of that magnitude can occur during crises—prompting collective narrative reassessment—as evident during the Covid-19 pandemic (Mintrom and O’Connor, 2020; Mu et al., 2022), when the narrative of the supremacy of individual freedom was successfully challenged by the perceived necessity of public policy measures (e.g. lockdowns and vaccination campaigns). The political trust required to build a strong case around altering deeply rooted societal narratives that underpin embedded policies can entail, among other factors, enhanced transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) and responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005). Designed to foster support for revised key policies, applying these tools can signal shared goals and communicate potential collective benefits in the proposed change, which is critical to harness broad consensus along the lines of the Swedish and Finnish transformative support of NATO membership in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As their experiences demonstrate, transparency and responsiveness also signal dialogue and a sense of ownership (Regeringen och Regeringskansliet, 2024), making strategic changes more fathomable.
The EU’s constitutionally neutral democracies—The Austrian case
With the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO, it is possible to identify a group of democratic EU member states that engage in security links with the Alliance but have traditionally refrained from pursuing full membership, mainly due to immensely unfavorable public opinion: Austria, Ireland, and Malta. Of these, only Austria and Malta 1 are constitutionally bound by permanent neutrality. 2
Austria adopted neutrality in 1955 as a Cold War compromise between the two great powers to regain its sovereignty, inscribing this policy into its post-war constitution. According to the formula reached between Vienna and Moscow, and adopted by Washington and the other Occupying Powers, Austria was banned from joining NATO and hosting foreign military forces, bases, and armaments on its soil, in return for gaining wide recognition of its independence, preventing its division, and allowing it to enter the UN in the same year. The country’s State Treaty of 1955 (“Staatsvertrag”) explicitly prohibited all sorts of military engagement or intervention, including placing foreign forces on Austrian soil and association with military alliances (Austrian Parliament, 1955). Austria’s neutrality soon became a strategic asset. Under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Vienna positioned itself as a bridge between both sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War and famously became a hub for East-West spy games. This has enabled Vienna to play host to numerous international organizations (IOs), including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), operating in Vienna since the 1950s and 1960s, respectively, and since 1995, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in which Russia remains a member.
Despite this overarching policy, synonymous with Austrian independence (Gärtner, 2018), the meaning of neutrality has clearly evolved in this case. Austria joined NATO’s PfP program in 1995 and has participated in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council since 1997. Moreover, Austria participated in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, joined the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and played a central role in the Alliance’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). Since 2014, it has also participated in NATO’s Interoperability Platform, placing it as a significant non-NATO partner (NATO, 2023). Furthermore, a survey of more than 100 Austrian military, political, and foreign policy experts conducted by the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) in September 2023 found that 59% agreed that Austria must strengthen its interoperability with NATO (AIES, 2023). Austria has been a member of the EU since 1995, after the Austrian public overwhelmingly voted for EU membership in a June 1994 referendum. EU membership entailed integration with the bloc’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with Austria claiming a central role in the EU’s peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR). One should note that a 1998 proclamation by the Austrian Parliament held that EU commitments do not collide with the 1955 Neutrality Act. And indeed, while the CSDP framework may raise questions on Austria’s comprehensive commitment to neutrality—for example, in the case of Austria’s support for France in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, or pertaining to its obligations under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty—it is entirely distinct from full NATO membership.
The attempt to balance neutrality with active participation in global affairs has been dubbed “engaged neutrality” (Gärtner, 2018): “a strong commitment to staying outside military alliances alongside an equally strong commitment to an engaged, as opposed to passive or insular, security policy.” Correspondingly, Senn (2023) has identified four phases of development in the history of Austrian neutrality: consolidation (1955–1970), maintaining an active profile in world politics; expansion (1970 to the mid-1980s), with a very high degree of global activism; reorientation (mid-1980s to the mid-2000s), adapting neutrality to meet the demands of European orientation; and finally, stagnation, from the mid-2000 onward.
Against the background of this framing, it seems the stagnation phase has come to a close following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the first months after the invasion, then-Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer stated that Austria intended to maintain its neutrality in response to an open letter by a group of prominent Austrian figures calling Federal President Alexander van der Bellen to reexamine the merit of the country’s neutrality, which still gains the approval of a vast majority of Austrians (Deutsche Welle, 2022). In a July 2022 newspaper column, Austrian diplomat Thomas Mayr-Harting wrote that while Austrians still support neutrality, the country must invest further in its cooperation with NATO through the PfP framework and aim to modernize its Federal Armed Forces (Mayr-Harting, 2022).
Another possible path could be deepening Vienna’s ties with other militarily non-aligned states, such as Ireland and Malta, as suggested in October 2022 by Austrian Defense Minister Klaudia Tanner (euronews, 2022). Werner Fasslabend, Austria’s former Minister of Defense, said in a February 2023 interview that Vienna’s neutrality had lost its function and that under NATO’s umbrella, the country would be “in a better position to shape European security policy and will gain greater security” (AP NEWS, 2023). In October 2023, a Parliamentary debate uncovered varying approaches among several political parties, including the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), which advocated enhancing domestic defense capabilities while maintaining neutrality, and the Freedom Party (FPÖ), pushing for a more “active” neutrality policy (Vindobona.org and Vienna International News, 2023). As part of this debate, the county’s State Secretary, Claudia Plakolm, stated an “overwhelming consensus” over Austria’s neutrality, corresponding to a similar sentiment expressed by Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg in August 2023 (Swaton, 2023b). These remarks followed a March 2023 declaration on an intended increase in Austria’s defense spending by 70% in the coming years (McNeil, 2023), and an August 2023 announcement that Austria was aiming to participate in the joint European air defense initiative (“SkyShield”), entailing enhanced coordination over air defense data sharing and purchasing (BBC News, 2023). More recently, in April 2024 Austrian Foreign Minister Schallenberg visited Switzerland to discuss security and neutrality (Swissinfo.ch, 2024), and in March 2025, Austria’s newly formed government vowed to increase its defense expenditures to 2% of its GDP (Defensenews, 2025).
While these instances reflect a growing public debate on neutrality in Austria, they also exemplify how deeply this principle is entrenched in the country’s identity—an attachment not easily changed after 70 years of adherence (Fischer and Möckli, 2016; Senn, 2023). One expression of this adherence is Austria’s opposition to providing Ukraine with weapons or military aid. In a January 2023 statement, Austrian Defense Minister Klaudia Tanner and her Hungarian counterpart, Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky, agreed on jointly refraining from distributing any weapons to Ukraine (Swaton, 2023a). Despite several calls from public interest groups, including a petition published in February 2023 (Unseresicherheit.org, 2023), this policy has been maintained. At the same time, Austria has maintained an active role in the EU’s post-2022 sanctions regime against Russia (Janik, 2023).
A critical perspective on the ongoing debate about joining NATO is reflected by Austrian public opinion, which has been traditionally opposed to pursuing full membership. Post Cold-war public opinion has been decidedly in favor of maintaining neutrality, with support ranging between 63% and 77% in the years 1995–1999, while only 13%–18% expressed pro-NATO stances, according to Tiroler Tageszeitung polls (Gaertner and Hoell, 2002). When the Kosovo war broke out in 1999, support for neutrality rose to 81% and remained very high after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Meyer, 2007). Current figures have primarily followed this trend. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an Austrian Society for European Politics (ASEP) poll demonstrated a solid opposition to Vienna’s potential NATO membership, with 62% rejecting this policy change (Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, 2023). A significant public opinion poll in May 2022, 3 months after Russia invaded Ukraine, concluded that only 14% of Austrians favored pursuing NATO membership, while 75% opposed it (The Local Austria, 2022). A later poll in May 2023 preserved a similar trajectory, with 60% opposition to Austrian NATO membership (Swaton, 2023c). Finally, a March 2024 academic survey has further demonstrated that only 6.5% agreed or strongly agreed that “Austria should give up neutrality but not join NATO,” and 10% agreed or strongly agreed that “Austria should give up neutrality and join NATO” (Foreign Policy Lab—University of Innsbruck, 2024). Over 70% disagreed or strongly disagreed with these statements. The same research has also shown that only 13.5% of Austrians believed that “Austria should come to the aid of another EU state with armed troops in the event of an armed attack.” Against this backdrop, a clear picture is emerging, with the general public rejecting all forms of participation in military alliances, and demonstrating strong adherence to neutrality.
Concluding this discussion, while existing literature on neutrality predominantly focuses on its historical, legal, and strategic dimensions, as well as its societal underpinnings shaped by identity, cultural narratives, and public attitudes, there is still a limited understanding of how deeply entrenched public and elite attachments to neutrality withstand external shocks in a rapidly changing security environment—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, while new studies have begun exploring the transformation of neutrality in Sweden and Finland, less attention has been paid to the resilience of neutrality in small states like Austria, where it remains a constitutional and identity-defining principle.
Pushing for a change? The power of external endorsements and domestic benefits
Can endorsements by reliable external actors affect domestic decision-making on neutrality? Could an explicit demonstration of the benefits of abandoning neutrality alter the commitment to this policy? A considerable body of IR and Political Science literature has demonstrated that domestic decision-making on national security and foreign policy can strongly affect how various external actors communicate their stances (Agius and Devine, 2011; Jesse, 2006). One of the most effective forms of communicating organizational stances, particularly to a politically informed audience, is issuing various endorsement announcements. Public endorsement in international politics entails an explicit declaration of support for a particular cause (e.g. a candidate, policy, organization) set forth by an exterior actor and directed toward a specific audience. Depending on the audience, endorsements are examined through various lenses, such as the external actor’s credibility, reputation, legitimacy, and influence. High-profile endorsements pertaining to publicly visible debates on the global agenda attract media attention and are more likely to influence public opinion and shape national decision-making. And indeed, the literature on how endorsement by multilateral actors can shape public opinion has grown in recent years (Anjum et al., 2021), particularly vis-à-vis the widespread support for the use of force (Thompson, 2006; Wallace, 2019).
By adopting this line of argumentation, the article follows the strand of literature suggesting that the position of IOs is more than the mere sum of its member states’ positions but rather a testament to their autonomous agency in the eyes of audiences receiving the signal (Hawkins et al., 2006). According to this approach, IOs enjoy a degree of legitimacy—a belief that the organizational authority is adequately exercised and should be observed (Tallberg and Zürn, 2019)—shaped by their qualitative performance and bureaucratic efficiency. IOs also possess unique organizational reputations, relying on views regarding their capabilities, missions, and characteristics (Mercer, 2010) and a conviction regarding their future behavior and intentions (Rubinson and Hitman, 2022). In managing their legitimacy and reputation, IOs heavily engage in outreach and public relations schemes, aiming to substantialize the professional gravity of their policy recommendations (Thompson, 2006).
To best gauge how external organizational endorsements have affected Austria’s commitments to neutrality, the article focuses on EU endorsements as potentially powerful and consistent signals the EU sends on its attitude toward neutrality. The emphasis on the EU is particularly valuable, as it is a “Sui-Generis” IO whose endorsement of strategic policy is especially visible. Austria has been a member of the EU since 1995, and as elaborated above, it is increasingly engaged in the EU’s attempt to shape and promote CFSP and is deeply involved in the organization’s political, financial, and humanitarian role in supporting Ukraine. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that an EU endorsement to move away from neutrality would not fall on deaf ears in Vienna. However, in recent years, Austria’s public opinion toward the EU has become increasingly Eurosceptic, when conventionally measured through the public perception of the EU’s performance and identity, and the affection toward the EU and view of its future trajectory (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Moreover, according to the “EU Exit Index” (Gastinger, 2021), Austria is comparatively very likely to leave the EU, ranked second out of 27 member states. This logic is further reinforced by Eurobarometer survey data, according to which only 44% of the Austrian general public tends to trust the EU (Eurobarometer, 2023)—a key pillar for effective endorsement signaling. Coupled with consistent public affective attachments to neutrality, it seems increasingly unlikely that EU endorsement of abandoning neutrality would be a “game-changer” for survey respondents, as their perception of such signals is associated with the degree to which audiences see the EU as legitimate and reputable. The article expects, at least at the outset, that the effect on Austria in this regard is not substantial:
The second incentivizing component examined as part of the survey experiment considers potential economic and security-related benefits as drivers for domestic policy formulation and adoption, discussed here in the context of the future of Austria’s neutrality. This aspect of the study builds on literature depicting policy preferences as driven by actors’ core interests, with an emphasis on economic gains (Milner, 2020; Milner and Tingley, 2015) and security (de Mesquita, 2023; Shlaim, 2023), or lack thereof (Johnson, 2015). When it comes to domestic decision-making by political actors, exercising their fundamental interests means retaining political office while maximizing core goods such as income and security (Milner, 2020: 33). Reinforcing financial stability and national security posture is critical for small states, particularly if they are not part of a defensive alliance, as they are inherently more susceptible to global turmoil and volatility and destined to experience enhanced instability (Long, 2022). Vulnerable actors, small unaligned states, have been thought more likely to be exposed to external aggression and ensuing domestic instability, which can be mitigated through enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation as an alternative to NATO membership (Hanf and Soetendorp, 2014; Karsh, 2012; Rickli, 2008). Nevertheless, Austria’s geographic insulation, fenced by NATO members and distant from Russia’s borders, has historically shaped its security outlook, making the immediacy of external threats less salient. Security concerns are directly linked with economic vulnerability, making small states more dependent on more powerful actors and requiring diversifying economic partnerships, with the EU at the centerpiece of Austrian policy in this regard (Panke, 2015). When viewed against Austria’s Eurosceptic sentiment and its public attachment to neutrality, the country’s almost absolute economic and security-related reliance on the EU is not expected to convince respondents that further economic and security gains can be extracted from abandoning neutrality. The rationale for this expectation is that according to the Austrian public perception, neutrality has never gotten in the way of economic prosperity, with Vienna ranking among the top 8 EU member states in 2023 according to GDP (PPP) Per Capita terms (Eurostat, 2023), and surrounded by six neighboring NATO member states. As neutrality has historically been seen as compatible with Austria’s economic success, public attachment to neutrality is not framed as an economic liability, but rather as a principle that exists independently of economic prosperity. Consequently, perceived economic incentives alone are unlikely to outweigh the deep cultural and identity-based foundations of neutrality. It is, therefore, expected that the effect of economic and security-related benefits on the views of the respondent will not be considerable:
Evaluating endorsements and benefits: Experimental design
To evaluate the support for H1, H2, and H3, the article introduces a pair of survey experiments among Austrian government sector employees. The first wave of the survey experiment took place in February 2024, among a sample of 78 participants (N = 78), aged 21–60 with higher education background, who reported to be employed within the Austrian “government sector,” according to a Prolific pre-determined panel. 3 The selection of government employees as the sample for this survey experiment is premised on their relatively greater familiarity with institutional processes and mechanisms compared to the general public (Dellmuth et al., 2022)—a more fine-grained approach compared to the more traditional public opinion outlook. While not necessarily specialists in foreign policy or national security, government employees are more likely to encounter the operational dimensions of policy formulation and implementation and, in some cases—the broader strategic considerations that underpin state decision-making—affording them a modestly more informed perspective on neutrality policy. This relative positionality is valuable insofar as it offers insights from a segment of the population that bridges the gap between expert policymakers and the general public.
The task determined for the respondents was to read a mocked-up newspaper article discussing the positive view of the EU toward the Swedish and Finnish abandonment of neutrality and pursuit of NATO membership, intending to distinguish whether an EU endorsement can garner support for shifts in support for Austria’s neutrality. Mocked-up articles have been applied to study public opinion on IOs (Greenhill, 2020; Greenhill and Reiter, 2022) and allow precise tailoring of content to reflect a clear and unambiguous endorsement, fleshing out variations in language and framing and capturing temporal specificity—components that genuine statements cannot fully mirror. The respondents were randomly assigned to receive either a baseline version of the article, without any attribution for endorsing abandoning neutrality (Control), or a treatment condition with an EU endorsement (Treatment A)—see Table 1.
Survey experiment (wave 1)—control and Treatment A.
Of these 78 participants, 52.6% (n = 41) were given an EU-endorsement treatment, and 47.4% (n = 37) were placed in the non-treatment group (see Table 2).
Endorsement or no treatment crosstabulation.
After reading the article, the respondents were asked to indicate their support for abandoning neutrality on a 0- to 100-point scale (using an adjusting slider scale). They were then requested to fill in a unique code received only upon completing their assignment. Each link was only accessible for a single survey completion, applying IP identification to ensure ethical participation. Appendix 1 outlines the wording of the mocked-up newspaper article. 4
The second wave of the survey experiment took place in May 2024 among a sample of 89 participants (N = 89) with the same age and educational background, also registered with Prolific as employed within the Austrian “government sector.” Using a unique Prolific ID, verified against IP addresses, these respondents were confirmed not to have taken part in the first wave. Of the 89 participants, 46.0% (n = 41) were given a mocked-up newspaper article, supporting an abandonment of neutrality for benefits related to national security, and 54% (n = 48) were presented with the same article, highlighting the financial and economic benefits of abandoning neutrality (see Tables 3 and 4). Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 outline the wording of these articles. As in the previous wave, after reading the article, the respondents were requested to give an assessment between 0 (fully support maintaining neutrality) and 100 (fully support abandoning neutrality).
Survey experiment (wave 2)—economic versus security benefits.
Survey experiment (wave 2)—economic versus security benefits.
Before outlining the results of the survey experiments, a short explanation of the methodological limitations of this research approach is helpful. First, one must acknowledge that conducting a survey experiment among public sector employees poses a risk of the emergence of a social desirability bias, as they may be inclined to provide responses that align with perceived expectations or societal norms. Moreover, some respondents may experience fear of retaliation—that is, potential repercussions for expressing their opinions openly, even on an online survey platform. It is also plausible that the hierarchical public sector structure may impact the willingness of employees to express dissenting views, particularly if they believe their responses could reach higher levels of management. Relatedly, the prevailing organizational culture may influence the extent to which employees feel comfortable sharing their opinions openly, as addressing government employees on this sensitive topic may lead them to infer the intent behind the survey and alter their responses accordingly. Finally, while government sector employees are a more refined group than the general public, a substantial degree of variation is expected concerning their professional affiliation. Admittedly, not all government sector employees are top foreign policy officials with access to senior decision-making on neutrality, and some may well hold positions in generalist government offices or other public sector jobs. Nevertheless, the group that constitutes “government employees” is in a better position to internalize and evaluate the formal line concerning Austria’s policy in this regard compared with the general public. Moreover, to address the view of senior decision-makers, the article introduces elaborate elite interviews with top officials with direct access to Austria’s neutrality policy. To cope with some of the other concerns raised above, the article applied several mechanisms to mitigate the validity and generalizability of the results, including ensuring confidentiality in the survey structure and communicating transparently with participants about the purpose and use of the survey data.
Results—Moving the needle on neutrality?
As an estimation of the results of the first wave (EU endorsement), an independent samples t-test was utilized to compare the assessment scores between the EU endorsement and no-treatment groups. No significant differences were identified in the scores for no-endorsement and EU-endorsement conditions (see Table 5). According to the expectation of H1, these results suggest that EU endorsements did not significantly affect the group of government employees’ views concerning military neutrality. Figure 1 summarizes the overall results of this wave.
T-test and independent samples test—wave 1.
Results for EU endorsement compared to no-endorsement (Austria).
To assess the results of the second wave of the survey (H2 and H3), an independent samples t-test compared the assessment scores between version 1 (security-related benefits) and version 2 (economic benefits) groups within the sample. Similar to the first wave, there were no significant differences in the scores for version 1 (M = 46.88, SD = 36.27) and version 2 (M = 42.90, SD = 28.94), as depicted in Table 6. In line with H2 and H3, these results suggest that the altered-motivations versions of the newspaper article did not affect the level of support among the respondents (see Figure 2). 5
T-test and independent samples test—wave 2.
Results—security benefits versus economic benefits.
Neutral at all cost? Insights from elite interviews with Austrian officials
A new series of elite interviews with current and former high-ranking Austrian officials, directly engaged with the issue of neutrality, shed further light on the solid trend portrayed in the results above. These interviews took place in person in Vienna in June 2024, directly after the second wave of the survey experiment, designed to allow expert reflection in understanding the results and their correct framing, and providing more granular insight into the structural dimensions of Austrian neutrality. More broadly, elite interviews offer a qualitative measurement of past strategic decision-making, providing an outlook into complex processes and contextualizing high-level policy (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Mosley, 2013: 196–208). The interviews presented here offer a crucial strategic outlook on the most acute and structural tenets of Austria’s defense and security and, indeed, national identity, making them ideal for analyzing neutrality in this case.
The first theme emerging from the interviews relates to the perception of neutrality as a core component of Austrian self-definition, both on a national level and on an individual level, hence making it particularly unlikely to change in the near future. As noted by Austria’s former Minister of Defense (1990–2000) and President of the National Council (2000–2002), Dr. Werner Fasslabend (interviewee 1): The model of neutrality has become deeply accepted by the Austrian general public, synonymous with the country’s regained independence nearly 70 years ago, and an integral part of modern Austrian identity.
Further strengthening this view, General (Ret.) Günther Greindl, former Director General for Policy and Security Cooperation in the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Military Representative to NATO (interviewee 2), highlighted the logic of emotional attachment: Most people are against abandoning neutrality, and it hasn’t changed. The general public is mostly opposed on emotional grounds. Austrians like neutrality because we were always thinking that we can survive alone, and indeed, during the Cold War we managed to get our freedom, and since then . . . the attachment became solid, and it has become . . . a core component of national identity that we don’t want to lose.
A presently serving government official well-versed in the details of Austrian neutrality (interviewee 3) pointed out this argument as well: After World War II, we saw the creation of the Austrian Nation. Until then, we considered ourselves German. It was then that neutrality became linked with Austrian identity. The shift in public opinion (after the war in Ukraine) is small, because neutrality is part of our identity.
A former (retired) official who served in the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung), interviewee 4, opined in the same direction: Neutrality cannot be changed that easily. After 70 years, changing it means it would have to be uprooted, as it is so deeply entrenched within how Austrians understand their country.
A second element arising from the interviews regarding the slim chances of revoking neutrality is the legal complexity of constitutional amendments, making abandoning neutrality more difficult than in the case of Sweden and Finland. As interviewee 1 notes, Sweden and Finland didn’t have neutrality in their constitution before joining NATO. For us, it’s very difficult to change the situation: A two-thirds majority is extremely hard to achieve in any case, let alone in such a consensus-based theme.
Interviewee 1 also emphasized that elections or a simple political process “cannot alter this core position.” Interviewee 3 reiterated this position, adding that external political processes (e.g. the reelection of former US President Trump in November 2024) cannot affect the Austrian perception: Chances are not high that Trump affects the Austrian mindset. People think that neutrality is strong and effective. It might trigger a small change, but this is just too complex in the context of the required majority.
In this context, interviewee 4 added that any political process presently taking place in the country (i.e. the rise of extreme right parties) cannot alter the Austrian position either: It hasn’t changed anything up to now, and I don’t think it could change something moving forward . . . a fundamental change is not in the cards.
A third narrative concerns the reformulation of the notion of neutrality in the 1990s, after Austria’s accession to the EU and enhanced cooperation with NATO through the PfP program. According to this view, the commitment to neutrality was so ironclad, that Austria’s turn to strengthening ties with NATO was never perceived as conflicting with neutrality. Interviewee 2 explains, adding a future outlook on Austria’s path: I was part of the government when we signed PfP, and we said that we’re operating with NATO to gain interoperability; it’s cooperation on voluntary grounds, and it’s not a policy shift. A neutral state should cooperate with its surrounding states. All of our neighbors except Switzerland are NATO members, so we should do it.
This corresponds with Austria’s decision to amend its Federal Constitution in line with its EU membership and the institutional frameworks that ensured, specifically defining the boundaries of neutrality (Art. 9A): “Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory.” Interviewee 1 views the resulting status as “anything but neutrality”: In the 1990s, we changed the definition of neutrality to focus on core components: no alliances, no troops. With our membership in the EU, Austria could gain a higher status: everything besides NATO membership. That was my position all along.
Interviewee 3 agrees, to the extent that restrictions should be placed on Austria’s relations with NATO so that the core structure of neutrality remains intact, with the emphasis on providing another state with actual decision-making capabilities: It would be hard to take the bilateral relationship much further. There’s PfP, Skyshield [A European initiative to enhance protection against aerial threats] . . . and many other initiatives. I think this stops where another country could hit the button for us.
Interviewee 4 concludes, “Doesn’t matter how people present this, Austria never agreed to anything that may be interpreted as discrediting its neutrality, and I find it hard to envision how it will,” indicating how neutrality can serve as a euphemism for sovereignty. Relating to the essential differences in approach between Sweden and Finland—which opted for NATO membership after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and the contemporary Austrian mindset, interviewee 1 emphasized divergent geographical proximity considerations as key: As it became clear that Russia was adopting a hostile sentiment . . . Finland considered its massive border with Russia, and Sweden—as it always has—was thinking ahead strategically, fearing a Russian break into the Baltics.
He also alluded to what could possibly amend, in a future scenario, Austrians’ approach in this regard, maintaining his emphasis on geographical proximity and strategic thinking: In Austria, no one fears an invasion from the East . . . As long as they [Russia] stay east of the Dnieper River, that wouldn’t change the Austrian sentiment. But if they Odessa and reach the Danube, Moscow’s direct influence would reach Vienna and pose a real strategic dilemma.
Interviewee 3 also shares the view highlighting the importance of the geographical proximity, opining that “The western part of Ukraine is quite close . . . and in some bleak scenario if the Russians decide to invade, they’ll do it anyway,” and interviewee 4 concludes, “The Irish feel that they’re far away and secure [alluding to the fact that Ireland, the EU’s other large neutral state, is approximately 3000 kilometers away from the Russian western border], but we don’t have that luxury.”
Indeed, the elite interviews outlined in this section offer a rich and unique insight into the scope of possibility for Austrian neutrality. The interviewees’ perceptions align with the results of the survey experiments in underscoring a deeply ingrained commitment to neutrality, highlighting a pervasive attachment to this policy and resistance to change. More than anything, the interviews emphasized that neutrality is deeply woven into the fabric of Austrian national identity, with roots extending back to the post-World War II era and the Cold War. Eventually, this emotional entrenchment positions neutrality as more than a policy choice, but rather as a defining element of Austrian self-conception, with significant legal hurdles set in place to protect from change. Looking forward, the interviews underscore the critical role of geographical proximity in shaping Austria’s adherence to neutrality. Unlike Finland and Sweden, whose NATO membership was driven in part by a perception of direct exposure to Russian threats, Austria’s geographic distance from Russia is seen as justification to reduce the immediacy of security concerns, diminishing the urgency for abandoning neutrality and reinforcing its perception as a sustainable, low-risk policy. While the war in Ukraine has heightened regional security concerns and redefined NATO’s relevance, the interviews highlight that the broader view in Austria still remains that the conflict is sufficiently distant to avoid fundamental domestic shifts. This notion—combined with significant constitutional hurdles and deeply embedded emotional attachment—reduces incentives for deserting consensus around neutrality.
Conclusion
A commitment to military neutrality is deeply embedded within Austrian society, and seven decades of successful adherence to this policy has helped Vienna avoid substantial challenges to its territorial integrity and national security while contributing to its sustained economic prosperity. Neutrality has become a bedrock of Vienna’s identity and self-determination, even though it has gradually become somewhat detached from the growing insecurities on the European continent, exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. With Russia’s war against Ukraine, Sweden and Finland’s sharp U-turn on neutrality has prompted a genuine discussion within the Austrian sphere regarding the durability and effectiveness of the country’s strongly consensual commitment to neutrality. This article has empirically assessed the likelihood of an authentic readiness to reevaluate military neutrality in Vienna, potentially signaling a strategic pivot toward a more profound engagement with NATO. Through a series of survey experiments with Austrian government sector employees and elite interviews with Austrian officials directly involved in shaping the country’s neutrality policy, the article demonstrated that Austria’s strategic posture and prevailing position within the European security architecture still reflects broader societal values and historical contexts, despite the increasingly acute regional threats at hand. According to this mindset, neutrality is incompatible with pursuing intensely closer ties with NATO, regardless of the valid potential benefits overturning this long-standing policy may entail. In Gärtner’s words, “As long as NATO sees itself as a military alliance and Austria as neutral, membership in NATO remains impossible” (Gärtner, 2018: 140).
More broadly, this article contributes to the larger understanding of neutrality by illustrating its complex role as both a strategic and identity-driven construct in small-state foreign policy. The Austrian case shows how resilient neutrality can be, even under strong external pressures (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership), underpinning that neutrality is much more than a pragmatic security strategy, but rather an anchor biding together the cultural, social, and legal foundations of the state’s raison d’être. The understanding that deeply embedded policy concepts—that is, the attachment to neutrality—can resist external pressures and adapt to changing insecurities is also powerful when attempting to assess small states’ foreign policy more broadly.
To further reinforce the conclusions of this investigation, future work could offer a deeper investigation into the resilience of the legal mechanisms that underpin Austria’s commitment to neutrality and the mechanisms by which they render policymaking. While legal barriers are designed to raise the bar on policy shifts, they can also infiltrate the normative and political space, as constitutional provisions are reflections of wide societal conventions made in a particular historical context. Furthermore, mapping the various interest groups that shape and sustain the commitment to neutrality and attempt to erode this vow is particularly warranted, as advocacy can play a significant role in domestic politics vis-à-vis national security strategy.
Footnotes
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the participants of the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (April 2024), the IASEI-NYU workshop on European Integration (March 2024), the West Point International Security Seminar (February 2024), the Critical Perspectives on NATO workshop (May 2023, Newcastle University), and the annual meeting of the Israeli Association for International Studies (June 2023) for their invaluable comments, which significantly improved the article. The author is also indebted to Lior Herman, Daniel Weiner, Joseph H. H. Weiler, Tal Sadeh, Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price, F. Peter Wagner, Simon Pratt, and the Austria Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES).
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
