Jean Leclercq,Modern Psychology,& Structural Hermeneutics

The methodology of psychohistory as a new science

Leclercq was a Benedictine monk associated with the Abbey of Clervaux in Luxembourg (Leclercq, 1975a: p. 7). His initial research in medieval history proceeded by way of historical criticism that was philologically and theologically informed. His interest in psychology emerged later in his career:

For a long time, any medieval studies were concentrated on political events, but in our own century they have been extended to economical facts, the evolution of thought, and finally the development of mentalities, and today, still more horizons are being opened up by the application of psychological methods. (Leclercq, 1976c: p. 270)

As an example of a mentality, Leclercq (1976c) refers to the “Biblical mentality” of the middle ages (p. 278). Leclercq (1976c) visualized psychohistory as having a special focus not on mentalities but on individual authors, on “the ‘person’ behind the text,” whereas a “‘history of mentalities’” would aim “at studying the collective mental in an attempt to grasp the basic springs of social life” (pp. 274–275).

Leclercq’s initial reflections on adopting theories from modern psychology for reference in historical research begin to appear around 1973 with his proposal of a specific method that he believed would inaugurate a science he called psycho-history (Leclercq, 1975a, 1975b, 1976b, 1976c). As indicated by its name, the science of psycho-history that Leclercq proposes is both psychological and historical: “the requirements of historical criticism are now to be connected with those of psychological criticism” (p. 287). Leclercq (1976c) elaborates:

psycho-history must prove itself worthy of both scientific psychology and scientific historiography. History without psychology ceases to be human; psychology applied to the past heedless of any historical method would be very shaky. But if the two disciplines are used in complementarity, then they can enlighten us as to the behavior of a person of the past and, to some extent, that of a contemporary. Psycho-history is then, a tandem of psychology and history. (p. 270)

With respect to the application of contemporary psychological theories to texts of the past, Leclercq (1976c) indicates that a psychohistorian might proceed as a theoretical pluralist: “the representatives of the different psychological disciplines, or of the different schools within the disciplines do not easily collaborate. However, it is to be wished that the historian should work with several of them” (p. 274). It could be that Leclercq was generally inspired in this project by a psychological study of Bernard of Clairvaux authored by Robert Stepsis (1973; see also Leclercq, 1990: p. xiv). Stepsis (1973) interpreted the works of Bernard through the lens of the personality theory of Abraham Maslow (1954, 1968). Other historians who integrated psychoanalysis into historical research likely also served as inspirations, for example, Bruce Mazlish (1971) (see Leclercq, 1973: p. 476n1).

At times, Leclercq describes the appproach of psychohistory as ‘clinical’ in nature. On one hand, he characterizes the work of the clinical psychologist as in part historical (Leclercq, 1973: p. 476). On the other hand, Leclercq (1990) also describes the historian who employs the method of psychohistory as adopting a clinical outlook: “What we need is some sort of clinical judgment…. Such is the aim of psycho-history” (Il faudrait essayer de porter sur lui une sorte de jugement clinique…. C’est à cela que tend ce qu’on nomme aujourd’hui la « psycho-histoire ») (p. xiv; for the French, see Leclercq, 1976b: p. 8). In some texts, Leclercq speaks of this clinical outlook on the part of the psychohistorian in a very literal way. For example, referring to a writing by Rathier of Verone, Leclercq (1976c) states: “Were we to examine [the work], we should be able to state whether or not the author was neurotic, and if so, what was the form of his neurosis and how did he manage to integrate it into a happy spiritual life?” (p. 281). In other texts, Leclercq speaks of this clinical outlook on the part of the psychohistorian as a kind of metaphor. For example, a psychohistorian might have recourse to various psychological theories when interpreting texts in the same way that a clinician might have recourse to various personality theories when attempting to understand a client: regarding the process of “describing certain psychic phenomena,” Leclercq (1979) writes that, “these can fitly be interpreted by other [psychological] methods provided that the medievalist remains sufficiently independent of them to give as much respectful and faithful attention to the text upon which he is working as a psychologist or psychiatrist [gives] to his client” (p. 3). Elsewhere, Leclercq (1983) refers to “interviewing” texts in a similar clinical way (p. 662). In either respect (whether a psychohistorian literally or metaphorically adopts a clinical outlook), Leclercq (1976c) is aware that, unlike a clinician, a historian is unable to obtain immediate confirmation that a psychological interpretation of a person in the past is valid: “It is well known that a psychoanalyst, as he comes gradually to have a clearer vision of his client, must submit this subjective insight to the reactions of the person himself. Such dialogue and verification is impossible when dealing with persons of the past” (p. 271). Even so, Leclercq (1976c) contends that a psychohistorian might be able to understand a person in the past “better than he knew himself” (p. 280).

Referring to his study of medieval monk William of Saint-Thierry, Leclercq (1976c) remarks, “I was able to hazard a tentative reconstruction of his personality” (p. 275). Leclercq (1973) also considers such historical figures as the monk Othloh of Saint-Emmeran, the hagiographical Life of St. Stephen of Obazine, and the philosopher Peter Abelard (1973: pp. 478–485). Leclercq (1973) maintains that the application of psychological theories in these “three cases” is “useful” for suggesting new questions, for enabling a new form of objectivity, and for facilitating the consideration of subjective motivations with respect to how such persons responded to events and circumstances (p. 485). Regarding new questions suggested by modern psychology, Leclercq (1979) elaborates that, “The use of certain [psychological] schemes and vocabularies may serve as working hypotheses to ask the texts questions one would never have thought of merely with the aid of methods used in purely historical criticism” (p. 3).

Leclercq indicates in passing that one ‘clinical concern’ of a psycho-historian is with the ‘psychological integration’ of the person under consideration. For example, with respect to Gregory the Great, he writes: “He still has temptations, episodes of timidity, and inhibitions, but at the same time he achieves such psychological integration, interiorising his crises so lucidly, that in a society troubled politically… he is able to remain peaceful” (Leclercq, 1973: pp. 486–487). Leclercq (1990) writes in a similar way of Bernard:

Applying psychological methods to Bernard of Clairvaux can reveal in him more or less conscious mechanisms and motivations which he did not always express and then lead us to assess the facts in the light of the christian values he declared he served. Is it possible for us to know to what extent he integrated his psychism and his intentions? (p. xiv)

Leclercq also interprets historical records of interpersonal correspondence in this quasi-clinical way. For example, in a letter written by a monk to another monk who had been seeking advice, Leclercq (1973) discerns in the communication an effort to help the monk receiving the advice to “get back his balance, his inner harmony” (p. 487), to recover “accord not only in the religious sphere, but in the whole person” (p. 488). Regarding this exchange, Leclercq (1973) adds: “it is nice to think that in medieval monasticism there was a kind of psychotherapy; counselling by correspondence or in consultation” (pp. 489–490). Importantly, Leclercq (1976c) also cautions researchers against reducing medieval spiritual discourse to contemporary naturalistic psychological theories:

when we are dealing with religious men, and Christians in particular, the problem, or more exactly, the mystery already formulated by St Paul of the relation between free will and the grace of God prohibits us from reducing all spiritual experiences to mere psycho-somatic mechanisms. (p. 287)

Observations on modern psychology

While describing the method he proposed to develop psychohistory as a science, Leclercq (1979) makes frequent references to different paradigms or schools of thought in modern psychology: “We cannot reduce modern psychology to a single unity, for it is legion: there are numerous and varied ‘psychologies’” (p. 1). Leclercq (1979) recognizes psychology as a science, but he indicates that trusting only in one particular methodology can result in a kind of quasi-religious belief system: “Let us admit at the outset that every ‘psychology’ is a system of beliefs and, therefore, requires, so to speak, a faith” (p. 4). At times, Leclercq will focus on one particular psychological theory or another. He refers, for example, in a generic way to “depth psychology” (Leclercq, 1973: p. 476; see also 1976c: p. 280) and he suggests that social events in history might be assessed in terms of the “psycho-dynamic energies” that are released in response to circumstantial conflicts (Leclercq, 1973: p. 478). By such psychodynamic energies, Leclercq (1976c) indicates that he is in part referring to the expression and release of emotions such as “irritation” or “joy” (p. 285). Different psychological theories (psychodynamic or otherwise) might be understood to ‘illuminate’ the data under consideration in different ways: “Jungians and Freudians shed a different light” (Leclercq, 1976c: p. 274).

Leclercq (1976c) cautioned against simply projecting a contemporary psychological theory back into the past:

it would be an easy way out simply to project uncritically Freudian, Jungian, Rogerian, behaviourist and other such schema onto people who differ in many ways from those men and women whose behaviours were both the starting point and the final objective of these new methods of interpretation. (p. 270)

As an example of such a questionable projection, Leclercq (1979) states that some Jungian archetypes may not have valid application in a medieval context (p. 3). However, Leclercq also does not hesitate to describe medieval authors in terms of contemporary psychological terminology. For example, in the letter mentioned above that was sent by one monk to another, Leclercq (1973) concludes from the exchange that “in the monasteries of the middle ages” some “sort of Rogerian counselling was practiced” (p. 489). Similarly, Leclercq (1976c) describes the “spiritual father” depicted in the dialogue De interiori domo as “a clear-sighted psychotherapist” (p. 281). Leclercq (1990) approaches Bernard of Clairvaux in the same manner, describing the saint as a “psychotherapist” of sorts (p. 69). Bernard’s effort as a ‘therapist’ is exemplified in his letters to his friend William of St. Thierry in which he communicated “an extremely keen psychological and spiritual analysis of both William and himself” (Leclercq, 1990: p. 71). Yet Leclercq (1990) immediately qualifies his description of Bernard in these terms in order to avoid an anachronism:

If we have any right to consider Bernard as a psychotherapist, it is in the sense that he did spiritual therapy. He was more concerned with intentions, problems of conscience, than with psychological problems. What counted in his eyes were intentions, the faithfulness of each person to himself and to God. It was, so to speak, a committed, and not an impersonal, therapy because he was involved…. He used his talent, duly controlled, as well as his passions in the service of the spiritual consultations he provided in his letter to William and many another. (pp. 74–75)

Regarding his reference in this passage to Bernard’s focus on self and God, Leclercq (1990) is noting the importance of growth in self-knowledge for Bernard (and therefore that some kind of psychological knowledge can be obtained through self-reflection) (p. 78; see also p. 82).

“Structural hermeneutics”

During the course of making comments on various theories in modern psychology when describing his method of psychohistory, Leclercq also makes a few statements that are indicative of his own theoretical outlook in contemporary psychology. First, he contends that the methodology of psychology today should to some extent be interdisciplinary and interpretive. Second, he emphasizes that psychology today should have a cultural focus, as well as (potentially) a religious focus. Third, Leclercq adopts a specific structural perspective in psychology. I will explore each of these topics in this section.

Regarding the first point concerning methodology in psychology, Leclercq suggests that psychology today should engage other disciplines and maintain an interdisciplinary orientation. He writes:

these different psychologies—physiological psychology, behaviourism, neo- behaviourism, Gestalt psychology, introspection, developmental or genetic psychology, phenomenology, structuralism, as well as Jungian, Freudian, neo-Jungian, and neo- Freudian methods—must necessarily work in collaboration with other human sciences such as history, sociology, linguistics, and comparative studies in religion. All this offers the inquiring mind a very complex network. (Leclercq, 1979: p. 1)

Leclercq also suggests that the methodology of psychology should proceed in an interpretive manner: “To what extent can modern methods in psychology be applied to the interpretation of historical facts and events?” (Leclercq, 1973: p. 476, emphasis added). A researcher's approach to psychological interpretation might proceed by adopting a particular psychological theory as a hermeneutic: “To what extent can a psychoanalytic reading be made of political phenomena in the middle ages?” (Leclercq, 1973: p. 478, emphasis added). Regarding his indication that modern psychology should be inherently interpretive, Leclercq (1979) observes that, “in fact, practically every form of contemporary psychology implies some element of hermeneutics and, so to speak, of exegesis” (p. 1). It is understandable that Leclercq (1976c) would therefore propose some general hermeneutic criteria:

Not all documents lend themselves to psychological interpretation. And those which can be interpreted, must not be forced to say more than they actually contain. The psychiatrist must be constantly listening to the patient. In the same way the historian must remain faithfully attentive to the text, otherwise he risks, by his interpretation, causing the “agony of the text”, emptied of its primitive significance, or smothered under a heap of alien intepretations for which it was merely a pretext. In such cases, the texts become nothing more than mirrors reflecting our own projections…. (p. 273)

He cautions again shortly thereafter that when attempting “to understand… characteristics of medieval psychology, we must be careful not to judge it by alien norms” (Leclercq, 1976c: p. 279). In terms of an interpretive approach, Leclercq (1976c) further recommends that any text being interpreted should be situated in relation to other texts written by the same author as well as in relation to the tradition within which the author works: “Not only must the text itself be questioned, but also any related or parallel texts which may help in the interpretation, taking into consideration the tradition on which they depend” (p. 273).

With respect to the next point on research emphases, Leclercq indicates that psychological interpretation today should have a cultural emphasis. This is evident not only in light of his research on monastic culture (see Leclercq, 1982a), but also in that he explicitly observes that any process of psychological interpretation will occur within the context of a cultural mentality:

there are two types of factors in any psychological science: the results of clinical observation, and the results of interpretation of such observations. This interpretation is always dependent on a given culture and marked by the presence or the absence of religion. (Leclercq, 1976c: p. 272)

Psychology as a discipline for Leclercq is thus not only inherently interpretive, but also cultural in the sense of requiring reflection on the cultural presuppositions employed when carrying out the task of psychological interpretation. However, Leclercq (1976c) also indicates that any psychology carried out as a cultural endeavor also bears upon putative transcultural psychological elements: “we must distinguish in any psychological theory those elements which, being specific to one given culture, are irrelevant to another, and the transcultural elements universally applicable for all times” (p. 273). Approaching psychological research in this way might lead a person to differentiate the cultural and transcultural dimensions of human beings:

“understanding” also requires an effort to interpret men of the Middle Ages, and this, not according to a society, cultural elements and theories of men belonging to other ages and milieux, but according to the transcultural human facts which psychological sciences permit us to perceive…. the fundamental psycho-dynamics are the same throughout the ages, including our own…. It is lawful, then, to interpret these facts in keeping with certain schema — be they Freudian, Jungian or other — having some universal value. (Leclercq, 1976c: pp. 276–277)

In addition to the ‘psychodynamic facts’ interpreted by the psychological sciences, Leclercq (1976c) also refers to religious faith as a transcultural element that can be present in diverse “individual mentalities” (p. 276). I will discuss this distinction between transcultural and cultural psychological domains further below.

In connection with cultural psychology, Leclercq also frequently refers to religious psychology as a field in psychology. For example, he writes:

In the field of psychological disciplines, various and sometimes opposing trends and schools of thought have freely developed. For example, in Europe in particular, not only are there divergences between those who are in favor of psychoanalysis and those who are not, but there are also various conceptions and ways of practising it…. Religious psychology is also expressed in varying vocabularies, even among Christian thinkers, not to mention others. (Leclercq, 1976c: pp. 270–271)

Leclercq (1976c) observes that religious psychology is found in both medieval and contemporary contexts: “the religious psychology of monastic writers in the Middle Ages is akin to present-day religious psychology in that it is a developmental psychology” (p. 289). With respect to the medieval context of religious psychology, Leclercq (1976c) observes its presence in letters between monks where one served as a “spiritual counsellor” for the other: In one such instance of correspondence, a particular monk is said to exhibit a “refined practice of religious psychology” that serves as “a real psychiatric consultation” (p. 281). As an example of contemporary religious psychology, Leclercq (1979) cites the work of Antoine Vergote whom he describes as “an authority on religious psychology today” (p. 3; see, for example, Vergote, 1966, 1969).

As a further point regarding medieval religious psychology, Leclercq (1976c) differentiates the developmental perspective of monastic or claustral psychology from the perspective adopted in scholastic psychology:

when studying spiritual authors, we shall be led to a last observation which confirms in a particular field, a distinction which I have had opportunity of proposing elsewhere in a more general way: just as, especially from the twelfth century onward, there is coexistence of two distinct theologies—not separated nor necessarily opposing—: a claustral or monastic theology, and a school theology—scholasticism—, so are there also two psychologies. Scholastic psychology, legate especially of Aristotle, is lacking in the notion of the development of a personality, an ontogenesis of the psyche, which has a function comparable to that of embryogenesis in the formation of the organs of a human being. (p. 288)

Leclercq (1979) elsewhere contrasts scholastic and claustral psychologies as respectively involving abstract and concrete approaches to discourse (p. 2). In his remarks on religious psychology, Leclercq (1979) does not cite an example of contemporary claustral psychology; he indicates that this kind of research in general is rare in the contemporary milieu because most forms of modern psychology are not religious in nature but rather “anthropocentric” and “none will admit initially that there may be in man some more-than-human values” (p. 2).

Leclercq (1979) indicates that his own perspective in modern psychology might be understood as a kind of structural psychology: speaking of a human being, he writes,

I prefer to think…. that he is structured psychologically by the interaction of his environment and his endowments. If we adopt this last hypothesis we admit that a man’s endowments and his environment are structurally distinct. The more or less harmonious interplay of these distinctive structures results in a totally new structure, the individual personality. (p. 6)

The psychological structure at hand is threefold: one structure relates to the interior constitution and needs of a person and another structure relates to that person’s environment. Together, these two structures result in a unique composite personality structure. The kind of threefold structure Leclercq proposes in this regard is different from the structural psychology of Titchener (1898) and also exhibits features that are distinct from the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss (1963, 1976) as well as the linguistic structuralism discussed by Piaget (1970).

For example, in terms of the interior contributions to personality structure, Leclercq (1976c) refers to “psychological structures” such as “the passions” considered in treatises of medieval moral psychology “influenced by the Aristotelian philosophical tradition” (p. 279). Such treatises, in his estimation, proceeded with “a premature moralisation” of “pre-moral psychological phenomena” (Leclercq, 1976c: p. 279). Regarding interior human needs, Leclercq (1979) writes: “we may posit human needs as being on three levels: the physiological, the psycho-sociological, and the spiritual” (p. 4). In referring to physiological, psycho-social, and spiritual domains, Leclercq’s outlook on this point comes close to the biopsychosocial clinical model of Engel (1977, 1980), especially as developed with an emphasis on spirituality by contemporary authors such as Aamar et al. (2015) and Plante (2012). Leclercq’s focus on a kind of hierarchy of needs is evocative of the personality theory of Maslow as referenced by Stepsis (1973), mentioned previously. Such interior needs, for Leclercq (1979), comprise a human domain that is transcultural: “Man’s needs are univerally the same. It is the orchestration of these needs which changes. Hence the necessity of elaborating a theory which considers man as a composite being fashioned by the interaction of his natural endowments and his environment” (pp. 4–5).

While common interior needs constitute a transcultural structure that contributes to the partial development of one’s personality, a local environment contributes a cultural structure: “we may, and I think we must, admit that as human beings we have certain needs which in interaction with our environment form our personality. The determinant factors in man’s environmental experiences are those he has in his own family and culture” (Leclercq, 1979: p. 5, emphasis original). In these various remarks, Leclercq indicates that personality emerges out of the ‘interaction’ between interior and exterior structures as an ‘orchestration’ and ‘more or less harmonious interplay’. In terms of personality structure, Leclercq (1976c) refers to the multiple “levels” of “mental structure” signified in the writings of Aelred of Rievaulx who exhibits a “complex” personality (p. 286).

Leclercq (1979) indicates that such a theory of structural psychology might be presupposed when interpreting historical texts:

we may affirm… that any interpretation of the psyche, be it modern, medieval, or of any other age, will be a function of our basic psychological premiss…. if we approach man as a being with specific needs interrelating with environment, then history has much to teach us…. [History in this sense] is seen to be a study not only of the inter- relationship between man’s endowments and environment but also of the way in which human needs are orchestrated. (p. 6)

Further, a remark of Leclercq (1976c) indicates that he understands this theoretical psychology to be inherent to the method of psychohistory: “it is absolutely necessary to consult the whole of [an author’s] works, according to an order which is at once chronological and in keeping with the different structural levels of expression in the different texts” (Leclercq, 1976c: p. 288). Leclercq (1979) states that he himself presupposed this theoretical framework in his effort to interpret the personality of Bernard of Clairvaux:

It is this theory of personality construction by the interaction of endowments and environment that I would like to apply to the medieval psyche as manifested by the love literature produced in twelfth-century France by monks, particularly St. Bernard of Clairvaux. (p. 7)

Review

In this discussion, I examined the various remarks of spiritual writer and medieval historian Jean Leclercq. I explored Leclercq’s proposal of a methodology for psychohistory, various observations he makes concerning modern psychology, and his own theoretical outlook in contemporary psychology. I described Leclercq’s theoretical outlook as a structural psychology. In this viewpoint, the structure of the psyche is understood as a composite personality structure that results from ongoing interaction between innate structures and environmental structures (where such environmental structures involve the family, culture and religion). This theoretical psychology, situated within an interdisciplinary perspective, might be presupposed as a hermeneutic when conducting research. Because of his emphasis on both structure and interpretation, the program of study that Leclercq proposes can be taken up today as a kind of interdisciplinary structural hermeneutics (regarding this phrase as used in cultural sociology, see Alexander & Smith, 2002). Such a research approach has application not only in psychology and history (as Leclercq originally envisioned), but also in anthropology and sociology, as well as in the clinical professions.