Abstract
Judaism is an unapologetically monotheistic religion, and the Shema of Deuteronomy 6:4 is cited in support of this view and yet the Shema is not as straightforward as it usually seems. It is easy to say “God is one” and yet far less easy to explain the precise meaning of these three words (only two in Hebrew). This is clear from the simple fact that David Michael Grossberg has been able to write a book about it.
Grossberg takes an historical approach to the question, as is required by the title. Thus he begins by noting that texts relating to God as one are uncommon before the second century BC, and when they emerge they tend to be in Greek, with Jewish authors such as Philo of Alexandria seeking to express their Jewish theology in the terms of Greek philosophy, a language with terminology and concepts that could be used. The presentation is clear and thorough. He examines Canaanite culture and religion, noting differences and similarities, as well as Egyptian culture, which is probably, aside from Israel, the only culture that embraced monotheism in the time of Akhenaten, as is well known. So Grossberg uses not only biblical and Jewish sources, but also other contemporary sources, both textual and archaeological (e.g. the Mesha stele and an Egyptian inscription from Nubia) to give a full context to Jewish monotheism.
The first part of the book (Early History) takes a chronological view, with the second chapter being given over to “One God and the Bible”. Surprisingly the bald statement that “God is one” is very rare in the Hebrew Bible and many scholars trace a development of this belief throughout the TaNaK. This is, of course, a complex task, requiring not only a knowledge of the text and of the Hebrew language, but also elements of what we might call “literary archaeology”, whereby the scholar needs to identify different literary strata in order to establish the most accurate text (by means of textual criticism) and the possible dating of the texts, which is by no means straightforward. Grossberg maps the development of Old Testament thought, concluding that the idea that only one God exists may enter the biblical texts in the time of Josiah, although the idea of the unique nature of YHWH begins earlier, leading into a belief in the incomparable nature and then “divine solitude”, issuing in statements in Isaiah that “there is no other”. There are inevitable cruces interpretum in the exegesis of the text, not all of which does Grossberg consider (there is only so much space). So he considers the Dead Sea Scrolls and Septuagint in order to consider whether there was a version of the Hebrew text that predates the Masoretic text, and the tricky phrase “sons of Elohim/Israel” in Deuteronomy 32, noting that earlier texts in no way seek to denigrate other gods, which suggests a culture that was content to acknowledge the existence of a multiplicity of gods, whilst insisting that Israel is to worship only one of them. This, however, gives way to “divine solitude” in due course, and certainly by the time of the Babylonian Exile. Nonetheless it remains noteworthy that the statement that God is one is not more frequent, and that the word elohim is grammatically plural in form, even though it is always followed by a singular verb whenever it refers to the God of Israel. Only in Malachi 2:10 is “one” predicated of El/Elohim.
This leads inevitably to the question of what the author meant by “one”. Deuteronomy 6:4 is difficult translate with any certainty, although the individual words are clear, but the question is one of more than translation. Does “one” refer to the number of gods, to “divine solitude” or to the nature of YHWH? Grossberg seeks to examine this by looking at the meaning of “God is one” as expressed in the Greek period, noting that Jews lived under Greek rule from the 4th to 2nd centuries BC and the influence of Greek culture lasted considerably longer. So he offers a review of the nature of God in Greek philosophy, observing both similarities and differences. For Parmenides, God was “the Existent”, which may be seen as parallel to the tetragrammaton (again a term whose meaning is not without problem/controversy), and certainly as vocalised in the first person singular in the Hebrew of Exodus 3:14 and translated in the Septuagint, which reflects Plato’s “definition” of God as “ho on” or “to hen”. However, Grossberg wisely notes that this is not the same as Deuteronomy 6:4, and neither Plato nor Parmenides refer to “heis theos”, despite sharing with Pythagoras a sense of “the one” as a fundamental principle of the universe.
The upshot of all this is for Grossberg rightly to conclude that “heis theos” originates with the Alexandrian Jews, the originators of the Septuagint (where we find Dt 6:4 translated as “Kurios heis estin”), and in this way they may have sought to combine elements of Greek philosophy with Jewish theology, thereby making YHWH the highest principle, which Philo then uses to make YHWH the only God, exactly as we find in Isaiah. As Grossberg notes, this then raises a question of whether and how an utterly transcendent and unique God can interact with a material world, which leads Philo to envisage a hierarchy of agents as intermediaries, such as the Logos, whom Philo even calls “deuteros theos”. It is perhaps a little surprising that at this point Grossberg does not seem to consider the texts from the Wisdom of Solomon that speak of the Logos coming to earth, although the use of the Memra in the Targumim comes up later.
This leads nicely to the rabbinic era and their considerations of the issue. They have the advantage (or disadvantage) of being able to react to Christian notions of the Trinity. Christian belief is not the focus of this book and the Trinity is a complex doctrine, and he seeks to present the development of the doctrine in less than a page, which inevitably misses some of the complexities before moving on to the Cappadocian Fathers and the Creeds, where things are defined with greater precision. In some ways there is a pleasing parallel between Christianity and Judaism here. Just as the TaNaK did not feel the need to define what was meant by “one God” and this was left for much later, so too Christianity did the same with its understanding of the nature of Jesus and the Holy Trinity. It is a demonstration that in religion, and not just Christianity, there is a “development of doctrine” as understanding develops and deepens.
The rabbinic approach as outlined by Grossman is interesting. Rather than say what they believe “one God” to mean, they instead denounce those who worship more than one God, whilst continuing to quote the Shema. Of course, this may be a reaction against Christian belief in the Holy Trinity as well as a positive statement of Jewish belief.
The chronological approach continues with the Mediaeval and Modern Periods, where “one” is more an ontological statement than one about numbers, and this becomes more significant with the rise of Islam, where the rabbis have another set of apparently heterodox beliefs with which to contend. Thus here we see the growth of apophatic theology within Judaism (and Christianity), so that the concern becomes more to say what God is not, rather than what he is in order to avoid the danger of positing a multiplicity of gods, which could come from the Christian belief in the Trinity or from the Islamic 99 names of Allah.
The Kabbalistic approach is then able to build on this. The complexity of Kabbalah is reflected in the title of the chapter: “One Means None (or Ten)”. Grossman rightly emphasises the difference between Maimonides and kabbalistic mysticism as found in the Zohar. This needs (and receives) a good introduction, since many of these ideas about the ten sefirot, ein sof etc. will be unfamiliar. He notes that kabbalistic mysticism has almost made an über-apophatic theology, where God is completely unknowable. There is perhaps a problem with the English language in the discussion here. God is designated as “Nothing” or “Nothingness”, which is a translation of Scotus” “nihil”, but it would perhaps help the English speaker if instead this were translated as “No-Thing”, which is more what was meant by Scotus. This would surely also reflect the kabbalistic “infinite Ein Sof” and “Nothingness”, for God can be Ein Sof if he is No-Thing.
The final chapter takes us into more modern times with Baruch Spinoza, who despite his rejection of the Bible and of revelation, nonetheless placed “God is one” at the foundation of his philosophy and Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903–1994), who rejected religion as a source of information, but affirmed it as a source of meaning or values. “Is” propositions, he said, are simply facts that can be established by proper examination, but “God is one” has no meaning in itself: it is intended as a rejection of idolatry and the intent to serve God through the Torah. It says nothing about God. Thus we can see that he also appears to embrace an extreme apophatic theology.
Grossman’s conclusions are very succinct. After a detailed examination of the evolution of the belief that God is one, he concludes in a little more than a page that whilst we may agree that this entails a rejection of idolatry, and all Jewish traditions agree here, there is no further agreement. Perhaps a little disappointing in some ways after such a detailed exploration, but his investigations can lead to no other logical conclusion.