School Crisis Management

Abstract

Purpose: This study aims to analyze a school’s crisis management and explore emerging aspects of its response to a school crisis. Traditional linear modes of analysis often fail to address complex crisis situations. The present study applied a dynamic crisis life cycle model that draws on chaos and complexity theory to a crisis management case, and further imbued the dynamic model with core aspects emerging from the school’s crisis response to understand crisis management. Method and Analysis: The study was conducted at one Midwestern PK-12 school. A combination of case study design to guide data collection in a systemic manner and grounded theory to guide data analysis was administered. Multiple data sources were collected through semistructured interviews, focus group discussion, and review of crisis plan from members of the crisis management team and selected non–team members. Open coding, axial coding, and selective coding strategies were employed to allow for emerging themes with which a constant comparative analysis was used to compare against existing theoretical frame. Strategies for enhancing trustworthiness were discussed. Findings: Findings suggest that (a) the dynamic crisis life cycle model is useful in perceiving and addressing the school crisis and its aftereffects but it also has potential constraints in the sequential design and (b) flexibility, collaboration, and self-correcting mechanism emerge as important aspects of crisis response in strengthening existing understanding of crisis management from which a dynamic responsiveness model is developed. Discussion of the findings, implications for research and practice, and limitations of the results are provided.

Keywords

crisis management crisis response leadership chaos theory complexity theory

Introduction

In the daily administration of schools, the only certainty is that there is no certainty. Administrative work has been characterized by such complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity (Mintzberg, 1990; Peterson, 2001) that any seemingly minor event may lead to disorder and turbulence in a school system (Griffiths, Hart, & Blair, 1991). Ever-changing technologies used by schools and students contribute to further dynamism in school cultures (Kruse & Louis, 2009). In this context of constant adjustment, schools are more likely to face unexpected crises that take place at schools such as a number of shooting incidents in middle and high schools. A recent national report on crime and safety in public schools indicates that from 2009 to 2010, an increasing number of middle and high school students experienced violent crime in school and about 90% of public schools recorded at least one violent incident (Robers, Zhang, Truman, & Snyder, 2012). As such, it is crucial and imperative for schools to be better prepared for the unexpected as many schools have repeatedly demonstrated vulnerability to crisis (Coombs, 2007; Lonigan, Phillips, & Richey, 2003).

Despite general access to crisis planning resources provided by the U.S. Department of Education’s Emergency Planning website (Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, 2010) and the attention to school crisis management, conventional framework of crisis management remains inadequate because the nature of crisis has been redefined by a new set of essential characteristics¹ that represent the complex and unpredictable nature of crisis in an increasingly volatile world (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Consequently, traditional approaches to crisis management often fail to address such crisis situations due to a typical maldesigned crisis plan that is generally featured by linear, routine, and comparatively uninformative simulation exercises in which participants do not internalize lessons (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Over time, this may lead to an unclear or out-of-date emergency plan, a lack of direction in gathering essential information, and a vulnerability to unproductive debate that might slow or derail problem solving during a time of crisis (MacNeil & Topping, 2007; Robert & Lajtha, 2002), resulting in a lack of preparedness for crisis response.

As organizations struggle among unprecedented uncertainties, leaders and scholars are seeking theories, models, and practical methods suited to the dynamism of crisis situations (Goldberg & Markóczy, 2000). A number of studies apply Fink’s (1986) crisis life cycle model to crisis management as a way to decompose a crisis into linear phases (see Boudreaux, 2005; Howell & Miller, 2006; Simola, 2005; Wooten & James, 2008). However, such linear model may be insufficient in explaining the nonlinear nature of a crisis and as such may require reconceptualization from a more suitable perspective. This study builds on Fink’s (1986) crisis life cycle model to crisis management and further extends the model using chaos theory and complexity theory (Cohen, 1999; Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 2005) to strengthen our understanding of a school crisis. Unlike the classical scientific view of management, which assumes linear causality and applies reductionist approaches, chaos theory and complexity theory address both the volatility of crisis and the nonlinear and changeable nature of an organizational system. This expanded model provides a more viable and detailed framework to understand the dynamic nature of a crisis that occurs during the crisis life cycle in a constantly changing environment. This study, in contrast to traditional ways of crisis management using linear approach (Hart, Heyse, & Boin, 2001; Roux-Dufort, 2007; Shrivastava, 1995), proposes a shift in perspective from linearity to a more organic approach to managing emerging crises in a school system (Murphy, 1996; Lagadec, 2004; Robert & Lajtha, 2002). While a number of studies attend to the topic of crisis management in a more conventional manner,² to date, little, if any, empirical research on crisis management applies the lens of a crisis life cycle model that is grounded on both chaos and complexity theories in educational administration (Allen, Marston, & Lamb, 2001).

To address the research gaps, this study aims to (a) investigate the school crisis management from an integrated dynamic crisis life cycle model and (b) improve the understanding of the model by way of incorporating emerging aspects into a dynamic responsiveness model that may aid in the management of a school crisis in a more “biological” (Lagadec, 2004, p. 160) manner. In the following sections, a rationale of complexity thinking is introduced, followed by an introduction to the dynamic crisis life cycle model and a discussion of key concepts of chaos and complexity theories as they apply to crisis management.

Conceptual Framework

A Practical Way of Thinking About School Crisis Management

School crisis is defined as a traumatic event associated with a school—whether occurring inside or outside it—and is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, urgency (Krauss, 1998; Seeger, 2002), and ambiguity in cause (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Simola, 2005). A school crisis involves all school community members, extending, at times even beyond students, employees, and their families to others who have a special interest in the school’s welfare; it affects not only the school community but also the overall community and society (Liou, 2009). Conventional ways of addressing crises often fail because they attempt to reduce the degree of complexity in a crisis by classifying the level of uncertainty, controlling for all possible factors, and determining causes and effects (Keene, 2000; Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Turning away from such attempted reduction of complexity, scholars and practitioners are seeking new paradigms to make sense of complex, unexpected events and to unpack the nature of complexity and uncertainty (Ellis, Almor, & Shenkar, 2002; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).

A growing body of research on complex systems (MacIntosh & MacLean, 2001; Marion & Bacon, 2000; Mason, 2007) and complexity management (Maguire & McKelvey, 1999; McMillan, 2008) suggests that complexity thinking is a useful tool to interpret dynamic organizational behaviors, which organizations should embrace (Weick, 2001). This line of research discourages managerial control and predictions (Stacey, 2001), revealing that organizations that can act in unconventional ways, that is, restructuring themselves, encouraging innovation and creativity using complexity thinking, outperform those that have undertaken a traditional scientific management approach (Axerod, 1999; Pepper, 2002). Furthermore, the notion of organizational sensemaking at both macro and micro levels (Coleman, 1999) helps understand how organizations reorganize and restore efficiency through complexity thinking as a way of responding to dynamic environments. A tightly coupled organizational system (macro level) tends to discourage innovation (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2003) and have more barriers to mechanisms of self-reorganization (Coleman, 1999) as the system lacks the capacity for efficient interactions among subunits (micro level; e.g., individuals and subgroups) which allow for the flow of nonredundant and novel information necessary for organizational learning and adaptation. Conversely, a loosely coupled organizational system allows subunits to act spontaneously and flexibly for diverse access to information in meeting challenges in a dynamic environment without tightly constraining one another (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2003; Weick, 2001). As such, micro-level sensemaking plays a critical role in the performance and adaptation of an organizational system; and the macro-level organizational structure creates its unique routine in which subunits engage in different levels of sensemaking (Liou, Grigg, & Halverson, 2014; Weick et al., 2005).

Although a shift in understanding dynamic organizational behaviors to complexity thinking is promising, complexity thinking is still understudied as it applies to the field of education. The following presents steps of conceptual building block that rationalize how this study formulates its guiding framework–a dynamic crisis life cycle model in understanding a school crisis.

Crisis Management, Theory, and the Dynamic Crisis Life Cycle

Given that school crisis is thus reconceptualized by its nature of dynamism, complexity, and unexpectedness, it is important to reexamine approaches to crisis management. A number of scholars (Boudreaux, 2005; Howell & Miller, 2006; Simola, 2005; Wooten & James, 2008) use Fink’s (1986) crisis life cycle model to understand an organizational crisis and its management by way of a linear and intelligible approach rather than a nonlinear pattern of thinking (Coombs, 2007). However, such linear approach may constrain an organization’s capacity to tackle the unexpected as crises increasingly become complex in nature. Therefore, this study approaches crisis life cycle using complexity thinking’s perspective in an attempt to fully capture dynamic features in addition to the linear manifestation of a crisis itself. This section is fourfold: (a) Fink’s crisis life cycle, (b) rational of using chaos and complexity theory, (c) major concepts of chaos and complexity theory, and (d) dynamic crisis life cycle model. The first three parts are essentialities to the formulation of the dynamic model.

Fink’s crisis life cycle model

Fink’s (1986) crisis life cycle model is the baseline model used to construct the dynamic model. It consists of four linear stages: (a) prodromal crisis stage, (b) acute crisis stage, (c) chronic crisis stage, and (d) crisis resolution stage.

The prodromal crisis stage is the warning stage of a crisis. Sometimes a prodrome may be oblique and not easy to detect, and sometimes the prodrome is apparent but no action is taken and then the acute crisis stage occurs. Crisis management aims to identify early warning signals for a crisis because “[i]t is much easier and more reliable to take care of the problem before it becomes acute, before it erupts and causes possible complications” (Darling, 1994, p. 6).

Once a crisis evolves into the second stage—acute crisis stage—there is no return, and a school organization can almost never recover without loss and resulting damages. One major difficulty in managing a crisis during this stage is the speed at which damages intensify. Successful crisis management aims at conducting damage and need assessments to ensure that all involved parties are aware what is happening and that all can participate in responding to the crisis.

The chronic crisis stage is also called the “clean-up phase of a crisis situation” (Darling, 1994) or “damage containment” (Mitroff, 2005). It is a period of self-audit, of self-recovery, and of healing. Successful crisis management uses this stage wisely for further crisis management planning. It is important for an organization to “identify its vulnerabilities and learn from the failures and successes of its responses” (Paraskevas, 2006, p. 893).

In the final resolution stage of a crisis, an institution may undergo the processes of resolution and learning (Mitroff, 2004). Successful crisis management seeks to discern and present new issues and events arising from the crisis, recognizing those that may constitute the prodrome of an oncoming crisis. Effective resolution is crucial to preparing for—and avoiding, if possible—a ripple effect.

Rationale of using chaos theory and complexity theory

Chaos theory and complexity theory provide specific concepts for applying complexity thinking to the understanding of dynamic organizational behaviors that are nonlinear and unpredicted (Gharajedaghi, 2006). The concept of chaos theory is frequently conflated with the concept of complexity theory. However, despite their similarities, the two theories approach complexity from different directions: Chaos theory identifies complex patterns of organizational behaviors, viewing them as chronologically nonlinear, whereas complexity theory simplifies complex organizational behaviors by recognizing the self-renewal mechanism (Goldberg & Markóczy, 2000). Historically, complexity theory was rooted in chaos theory (Fitzgerald, 2001). To build on chaos theory, complexity theory extended the concepts of chaotic order—chaordic (Fitzgerald & van Eijnatten, 2002)—to and beyond organizational systems. That is, organizational behaviors that are seemingly nonlinear and unexpected act chaotically but are also orderly, based on the underlying patterns of chaos (Kauffman, 2000) that facilitate the renewal of an organizational system (Holbrook, 2003; MacIntosh & MacLean, 2001) into a new chaotic order. Chaos theory explains organizational behaviors embedded in the systems to which complexity theory endeavors to apply. Thus chaos and complexity theories are best regarded as complementary concepts; through complexity thinking they provide compatible views of the ways in which organizations and systems operate (Smith & Humphries, 2004).

A growing body of scholars call for a chaos and complexity perspective on crisis management as crises are perceived as the norm rather than exceptions by managers in most of the organizations (see Murphy, 1996; Robert & Lajtha, 2002; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998; Snowden & Boone, 2007). This view may help school leaders approach crises in a more realistic way. Hereafter this study uses chaos and complexity theory as a single, integrated concept for addressing research inquiries into school crisis management and crisis response. In understanding the theory, major concepts of chaos and complexity theory that are germane to this study are specified in the following section.

Major concepts of chaos and complexity theory

This study draws on five major concepts, found in most research literature on chaos and complexity theory (Blair, 1993; Gilpin & Murphy, 2006; Griffiths et al., 1991; Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002), that assist in bringing the theory to bear on crisis management and response.

Nonlinearity characterizes the nature of a dynamic organizational system that is neither predictable nor can be described with causal, deterministic patterns (Seeger, 2002). Educational contexts are considered complex systems in which events and organizational behaviors do not occur in a linear causal fashion; rather, the interactions among different local agencies operate in nonlinear ways and create unpredictable changes (Finch, 2004).

Sensitivity to initial conditions, or the so-called butterfly effect (Stewart, 1989), refers to the potentially vast influence of any minute action. Any minor change in initial conditions can lead an entire system into a chaotic state (Larsen-Freeman, 1997) as in the oft-cited example of the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil setting off a tornado in Texas (Lorenz, 1963). Waldrop (1992) explains the concept in this way: “Tiny perturbations won’t always remain tiny. Under the right circumstances, the slightest uncertainty can grow until the system’s future becomes utterly unpredictable—or, in a word, chaotic” (p. 66).

Strange attractors constitute an underlying order, a deep structure that constrains erratic organizational behaviors (Murphy, 1996) but that operates neither from a fixed point nor in a linear way (Seeger, 2002). In other words, attractors are latent regulators, inherent principles to which unpredicted behaviors of a chaotic state will always tend to return, as they constantly regress into a bounded range. These principles may lead organizational change but may also pull erratic organizational behaviors back to an equilibrium point.

The bifurcation point, or so-called edge of chaos, is a point at which movement in the organizational system can either break down the system toward chaos or stabilize it in a new state of order (Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002). At this stage, the system behaves in a relatively stable manner until turbulence enables it to reach its threshold, become unstable, and fall out of equilibrium; in turn, loss of equilibrium helps the system gain input or energy from the environment and produce unexpected results. This stage is a critical point in the development of an organization in that it generates new energy for the organization either to be innovative or to stabilize, becoming resistant to further stimulation.

The feedback mechanism provides an opportunity for an organization to reorganize itself into a unique system because a chaotic and complex system will never find itself twice in the same situation (Thietart & Forgues, 1995). Different inputs into the organization will generate various distinct outputs that become the next input status for the organization. Negative feedback can lead the system into stability because it dampens changes and pushes the system back toward its original state (Glass, 1996; Thietart & Forgues, 1995). Conversely, positive feedback exposes the system to chaos by amplifying changes, thus leading the system far from its original state (Oliver & Roos, 2000). Negative and positive feedback mechanisms act simultaneously as countervailing forces on the system.

The following section explains how these theoretical concepts can be incorporated with the features at each stage of a crisis life cycle to enrich our understanding of crisis behaviors.

Dynamic crisis life cycle model

Although Fink’s (1986) crisis life cycle model is useful for understanding the processes and stages of a crisis, not all crises manifest themselves with the same pattern, however, even if an organization is ready for them. Although a crisis management plan may help reduce risk and uncertainty to some degree, when a crisis intensifies and becomes complex in nature, organizations may need to prepare not only for a more comprehensive crisis management plan but also for the impact of the crisis’ amplifying effect. To determine appropriate practices for managing crises that do escalate, this study proposes a dynamic crisis life cycle model that integrates major concepts of chaos and complexity theory with Fink’s (1986) crisis life cycle model.

In a chaotic world, those in any position of responsibility must realize that, as Fink (1986) puts it, “anytime you are not in a crisis, you are instead in a pre-crisis, or a prodromal mode” (p. 5). At the prodromal stage of a crisis, events or issues may constitute small and undetectable perturbations in the internal and external organizational environment, or influxes (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). These phenomena are not always predictable in nature (Murphy, 1996), but they are triggers, and they send out early warning signals (Mitroff, 2004). If the initial conditions allow influxes to grow, then these issues will gradually amplify to become a crisis. As the crisis expands, growing in intensity, the organization will no longer maintain its status quo, and the crisis will progress to the acute stage that is characterized by the norm of disorder. The organizational system is able to dissipate entropy³ to some extent, however, by holding to its structure; the dissipative structure (Prigogine, 1989) of an organization is characterized as an “island of order in a sea of disorder, maintaining and even increasing its order at the expense of greater disorder in its environment” (p. 398).

At a certain moment during the acute stage, the organization begins to operate under the influence of a strange attractor, which leads the organization to function under a new set of principles. Once the organization has begun to move according to these principles, it reaches a bifurcation point, at which “the dissipative structure may either break down leading to the demise of the organization or break through to one of several new states of order” (Paraskevas, 2006, p. 894). When an organization has “broken through” to a “new state of order,” it has undergone a form of regeneration, renewing itself through a self-organization process shaped by the constraining effect of strange attractors. This type of self-organization is made possible by the organization’s perception of the crisis and its internal response, rather than reliance on an external control mechanism such as a structured crisis management plan. Once the organization has taken a definitive path, toward either breaking down or breaking through, it begins to internalize all reactions and to manifest new properties (Waldrop, 1992). At this point, the organization moves to the chronic stage with a new look. If the process of self-organization is successful, the crisis will progress to the final resolution stage, returning the organization to a state of normality and balance.

The whole process of crisis management and self-organization can be a key learning experience, serving as input that feeds into the organization, informing its norm of response to subsequent crises. Thus the life cycle of a crisis is a dynamic change process through which, over time, an organizational system learns. The present study uses this dynamic model as a framework to analyze a school’s crisis management and response and to further improve the understanding of the model by major themes that are emerging from internal response to the crisis.

Research Design

The present study aims to understand a school’s crisis management and response as well as theorize the proposed dynamic crisis life cycle model. As this research inquiry process involves the exploration of the study case as well as the generation of theoretical framework, I propose combining both case study design to guide data collection (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2013) and grounded theory to guide data analysis (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Strauss (1987) suggests that the integration of case study and grounded theory is suitable for the development of analytic generalizations that contribute to theory building. A single case study allows for collecting rich and in-depth data through a case study protocol that systemically gathers key information as well as reflects its idiosyncrasy of the case (Stoecker, 1991); a grounded theory approach enables the emergence and (co-)construction of meanings around the phenomenon of interest from multiple perspectives and recognizes the researcher’s role in constructing interpretations (Charmaz, 2006). Through systemic data collection and an iterative process of comparative analysis of theory and evidence from which substantive theory is developed and refined in supplementing the theoretical framework, I am able to reduce the risk of deductive reasoning as a way to improve the conceptualization of the framework (Strauss & Corbin, 1994).

The study was conducted at one Midwestern PK-12 school. The sample school was purposively selected (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) in that the characteristics of the sample are more important than the quantity of the sample (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Wilmot, 2005). As the field of crisis management research is still understudied in education, practitioners and scholars suggest that one practical way to strengthen our understanding is to learn from successful cases so as to accumulate a collection of instructive knowledge that may teach organizations how to cope more effectively with the unexpected crises (MacNeil & Topping, 2007; Sapriel, 2003). In understanding successful cases of a school crisis management, a sample set of schools was selected based on recognition, both by local practitioners (including the school’s central office, school administrators, and teachers) and by informed education scholars at a local research-intensive university, as successful in managing past school crises. The study further narrowed the sample to one school, which was nominated repeatedly by practitioners and scholars and was reputed to have a successful record of responding to a school crisis.

Prior to data collection, the reliability of the instrument was tested by conducting a pilot study at one K-5 elementary school located in the Midwestern suburban area. Issues and barriers were found during the pilot implementation process, such as the need to identify key members involved in data collection, in order to effectuate the recruitment of participants. Another issue related to the modification of interview protocol was also addressed to better help interviewees identify the purpose of the questions and thus narrate their experience in relevant ways. For instance, the question “What have been your reactions to the event?” was modified to “What was your first reaction to the chaotic event at that time?”

Data were collected in spring 2009. The study participants involved the crisis management team, including school principal, assistant principal, guidance counselor, and school psychologist; two teachers; and one selected teacher who was a non–team member but was involved in the crisis management process to capture how both team members and non–team members reflected on the crisis event. Demographics of the study participants are provided in Table 1.

Table 1.

Demographics of the Study Participants.

Participant ID Code	Position	Gender	Years of Working in the School	Years of Working in the District
A	Principal^a	F	31	33
B	Assistant principal^a	M	16	16
C	Guidance counselor^a	F	28	29
D	School psychologist^a	M	30	30
E	Upper grade–level teacher^a	F	11	13
F	Middle/high school teacher^a	M	25	25
G	Upper grade–level teacher^b	F	20	22

Members of the school crisis management team. ^bInformal team member but was involved in the response to the discus incident.

I collected data from (a) a set of semistructured interviews with the crisis management team members involved in the response to the crisis; (b) an informal focus group discussion with two of the team members—the principal and counselor and one non–team member—and one selected teacher, who has also experienced this crisis incident; and (c) a review of the crisis management plan that was briefly provided in the staff handbook. Each interview lasted up to 1 hour and was audio recorded and transcribed verbatim with an informed consent from the interviewees. During the interview, participants were provided with a description of a school crisis and were encouraged to recall the event associated with the crisis and assess the overall response to the crisis from their own experience without losing too much factual information (Tipton & Krause, 2007). This approach is commonly adopted in both complexity and crisis management research (e.g., Gentilucci, 2007; Luhman & Boje, 2001; Mitleton-Kelly & Puszczynski, 2012; Sapriel, 2003; Stacey, 2001). The informal focus group discussion took place after the set of interviews focusing on the reflection on the school crisis response. In this type of retrospect study, a smaller group size of three (triad) provides room for enhancing the level of completeness of individuals’ memories through connecting important pieces of information retrieved from others (Berg, 2008), which serves as a widely used evaluation strategy on the validity of the event (Mmari, 2006). The crisis management plan was embedded in the staff handbook and was more like an overall guideline rather than an action plan. Pamphlets or handouts for emergency drill were not available as the drill was not scheduled on a regular basis. As there are limited empirical data and research base on the analysis of a crisis plan in the field of education, the study looked for key components that are mostly discussed in the literature on crisis management as the analytic strategy, such as roles and responsibilities, action plan, notification systems, and available resources to be deployed. I drew on previous studies around chaos theory and educational administration (Blair, 1993, 1997) to design the semistructured interview protocol and a set of open-ended questions for the focus group (see Appendix A).

I took an iterative process to analyze the data gathered from the case: reading and memoing, describing, classifying, and interpreting (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Prior to data analysis, the data were managed using NVivo10 software (QSR International, 2012) to facilitate the coding process. The analytic process consists of three main coding strategies: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. In Phase 1, I use open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1994) to identify categories that are relevant to the phenomenon of a school crisis with an aim to let the data emerge its underlying pattern (emic coding method; Strauss & Corbin, 1994) and also to avoid researcher bias (i.e., etic codes). For example, the description “It took about a week for things to get back to somewhat normal but we made sure that we kept support to the coaches and those team members and close friends” was coded into several codes: a week long, event, normality, support, team members, most affected actors, and aftermath.

In Phase 2, I conduct axial coding to relate the categorical codes with each other into high-order concepts through a combination of inductive and deductive thinking. This approach allows me to look for generic relationships between contextual paradigm and these codes while retain the value of theoretical comparison. I use the dynamic crisis stage as an analytic angle to constantly examine whether the emerging codes occur at corresponding stage of a crisis in relation to contextual paradigm (e.g., stage, conditions, strategies/tactics, and interactions among actors; Strauss, 1987). For example, at the initial prodrome stage of the crisis where there seemed to be no sign of a potential crisis, the crisis team recalled that there might have been a safety issue around the discus area that might have led to the discus incident. Such relation was then classified into a concept of nonlinearity. Table 2 presents the classification of concepts.

Table 2.

Example of Codes of Concepts of the School’s Crisis Management.

Selected Concept	Description of Concept	Selected Descriptive Code	Coding Paradigm
Nonlinearity	Less likely to predict the situation	Unexpected; undetectable; coincidence	Stage; condition
Sensitive to initial conditions	A sense of the safety issue	Prevent from happening; detecting; signals	Stage; condition
Strange attractor	A supportive school culture	Attended to the family; supportive culture that was built and shared	Stage; consequence; condition
Feedback mechanism	Reflecting on the crisis event	Discussed what could have done to prevent this from happening; improve communication	Stage; interactions among actors; strategy/tactics

In the third phase, I employ selective coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) based on the identified relationships to gain a more in-depth understanding about key concepts that may facilitate the development of existing theoretical framework. As the life cycle of a crisis is time sensitive and requires an effort of retaining potential amplifying effect during crisis management, I focus on the understanding of crisis response as a key internal process of crisis management, as opposed to external implementation of a crisis plan, as a way to supplement the sequential path of a dynamic crisis life cycle. I look for relations between the process of dealing with the crisis and aspects that are involved with managing the crisis at different levels of analysis (individual, group, and system). For example, when the crisis team encountered difficulties in reaching the district for immediate help, the team turned to other schools for support they needed the most. The linkage between such crisis response in action and emerging theme of adapting to the conditions constructs an aspect that does not appear in the existing framework but plays a key role in the process of managing the crisis, which may improve the framework with a more comprehensive understanding. Table 3 presents the selective codes around the process of crisis management. Finally, I compare the concepts obtained from the coding process with the major concepts of existing dynamic crisis life cycle model to validate and further theorize the understanding of the model (Gough & Scott, 2000).

Table 3.

Selective Coding of the School’s Crisis Response.

Concept	Description of Concept	Selected Descriptive Code	Coding Paradigm
Flexibility allows adaptation and innovation
Adaptation	Thinking strategically	Think of something that could help our kids immediately	Individual/within-group level
	Acting in timely manner	We did not have time to lay out everything, we took necessary actions	Individual/within-group level
	Modifying priorities	Don’t be so rigid that you can’t adapt it midstream; we made adjustments	Individual/within-group level
	Leadership	Had a meeting; discuss priorities and risk	Individual/within-group level
Innovation	Challenging existing practices	Go by the book; took necessary actions	Individual/within-group level
Innovation	Creating novel methods	Try different ways of handling situation like this	Individual/within-group level
Collaboration enables meaningful connectedness
Resource accessibility	Identifying and seeking useful resources	Asking question of others; seeking useful suggestions	Cross-group level
Openness	Open to suggestions	Being open	Cross-group level
Communication	Interacting with team and/or key actors	Talk to each other; communicate with other schools	Cross-group level
Communication	Exchanging ideas	Communicate with other schools	Cross-group level
Self-correcting mechanism shapes the system’s performance
Diffuse feedback system	Monitoring weak links	Did not get support they needed from the district	System level
	Restructuring connectedness	Take another route	System level
	Reallocating resources	Adjust the plan in case something different happens; calls to other schools for support	System level

I took the following strategies to improve this study’s trustworthiness: multiple sources and methods, case study protocol, member checking, detailed case description, and analyst (investigator) triangulation. I used various data collection methods (interviews, focus group discussion, and document review) obtained from a range of sources (different interviewees) to allow for multiple perspectives in strengthening the credibility of the study. Since there were two or more data collectors on site, interobserver reliability needs to be addressed. This study used a semistructured, open-ended case study protocol (Yin, 2013), followed by a guided-conversation procedure as an effort to (a) systemically ask questions in an unbiased manner and (b) keep both the investigator and interviewee on track while interviewing. Member checking (Charmaz, 2006) was conducted with the interviewees in the midst and toward the end of the data collection and analysis. The interviewees were asked to review the major themes extracted from the analysis and then postinterviews were conducted to confirm the fit between the themes and the participants’ reported experiences. This study provided a detailed case description for readers to feel that they have experienced the case, contributing to the transferability of the study (Stake, 1995). Finally, the study transcripts and findings were reviewed by the other interviewers, experienced qualitative researchers, allowing for ongoing discussion around emerging issues. In addition, I invited one academic scholar from business field and one clinical scholar from counseling psychology as external reviewers to interpret and evaluate the study findings in order to enhance analyst triangulation.

The Case of Archstone School

The case of a crisis event (Appendix B) took place at Archstone School (a pseudonym) located in a suburban Midwestern school district where the population is around 5,000. Archstone School serves about 300 PK-12 students with 30 full-time teachers. The school district has been known for its academic excellence and an atmosphere of caring and support within the school itself and the community as a whole. The student population was comprised of 80% White, 9% Hispanic, 4% Asian, 3% Black, and 4% Native American and other. Approximately 25% of the student population received free or reduced-price lunch. Around 20% of the student population was identified with disabilities and 16% as English language learners. More than half of the teaching staff had taught for at least 5 years. The school principal and superintendent had been working in the district for at least 10 years and were respected by both faculty and community members.

School Crisis Management

This section attempts to explain the Archstone crisis management case from the lens of the proposed dynamic crisis life cycle model. The purpose of this analysis is to elucidate the process of a crisis and the complexity of its nature.

Prodromal Crisis Stage

There was no perceivable prodromal crisis stage for this crisis event. From the perspective of those involved, the discus event happened without a clear and expected precursor that might be a warning signal for the emergence and maturity of the event. Mr. Thomas underlined the nature of the discus event in this way: “This was totally unexpected and was a total coincidence.” The crisis team members and teachers also perceived the nature of such an event as unexpected from the individual as well as group interviews. Thus, the crisis revealed its nonlinear nature.

Given that a crisis is unpredictable, it is likely that any small and undetectable problem may trigger the crisis without a clear warning sign. In fact, Mr. Thomas’s reflective description of the crisis offers evidence suggesting a subtle signal of an influx, an unsafe situation that could constitute the emergence of the crisis (i.e., sensitive to initial conditions). After the incident, Mr. Thomas reflected that he could have done more to prevent the crisis from happening because he now perceived a safety issue relating to the discus practice area. According to Mr. Thomas,

The only thing that has come up since then is whenever you have a discus event, even then they have already started putting up cages around the discus area where you throw a discus because it can go any other trajectory. . . . This could be something that you have to be careful on. So there was a recognition of school safety that to put a screen, a metal fencing around the area so that people don’t walk there while someone is throwing a discus. (Principal, February 2009)

The safety issue perceived by Mr. Thomas could be regarded as a crucial factor in detecting the emergence of the crisis, though it only became apparent after the fact. The assistant principal reported a similar concern, arising when Mr. Thomas first mentioned the discus area problem to her after the crisis incident. Although it might seem from this description that the principal and assistant principal could have predicted the discus accident, given that they subsequently perceived insufficient safety in the environment, in fact they had not perceived that safety was uncertain prior to the accident. Thus, the difference between the school’s discus practice area and the safety barriers erected at discus competition areas must be considered a minute, imperceptible perturbation, not sufficient in itself to attract attention, much less to trouble the equilibrium of school life. The assistant principal described her thoughts on the safety issue in this way: “This [the discus crisis] was totally unexpected. We could have done something around the discus area to prevent this from happening. We have talked about that but things just happened unexpectedly” (February 2009). Though no one perceived it as such, the difference between the school’s discus area and safer discus areas constituted an undetected signal, a very slight “uncertainty” that did indeed grow as unusual weather conditions developed and students began moving in atypical patterns across the busy practice field.

Acute Crisis Stage

Damages and loss, caused by the unpredicted trajectory of the discus and the undetected signal that allowed the crisis to grow, moved the crisis to the acute stage. This is the most intense stage of a crisis, but the extent to which the crisis team can respond may influence the crisis’ magnitude. Anything is likely to go wrong at this stage. It is imperative at the acute crisis stage to control and contain the amplifying effect of the crisis, acting in a timely manner. In this case, the media and modern technology (e.g., cell phones and text messages) soon caused rumors, speculation, and panic to flow among students and families. It would have been difficult to correct misinformation if perturbations had traveled, uncontrolled, throughout the community (Kowalski, Petersen, & Fusarelli, 2007). Mr. Thomas recognized this spreading effect and proactively seized control of information, creating informational statements for students, their families, and the media.

We started to take the written statements, [and] then from there we came up with the statement for the press and decided that as a principal, I would be the spokesperson to deal with any of the press and media contacts and media calls because by then the news media found out about it and it was going be the lead story on the ten o’clock news so we had to have the statement prepared. . . . One of the things that you do in a crisis situation like this is we had a written statement that we gave to every teacher to read to the classes that told about the incident. (Principal, February 2009)

Timely action taken by the crisis team reduced levels of uncertainty during the crisis. The crisis team was able to dissipate entropy (i.e., the amplifying effect and disorder possibly caused by fast-spreading media and technology) with actions that held the organizational structure together, reinforcing the authority of the school to define the situation. Despite the fact that Mr. Thomas directed a written statement for this crisis situation, it was not clearly stated in the crisis management plan that the team should prepare a statement of this kind for the press and/or media.

The dissipative structure mechanism enabled the organization to operate under a few strange attractors that led the organization to function under a new set of ordering principles, with Mr. Thomas and school-authorized support personnel positioned as facilitators of recovery from the crisis. Although the school’s primary governing principles had been academic and athletic values prior to the crisis, staff roles and school values shifted toward new norms in the process of responding to the crisis. Principles of personal support began to direct school life during the crisis through prioritizing internal communications, and staff became primarily emotional supporters. These shifts were changes to new norms, but they were grounded in stable tendencies of school staff members—such as being supportive—as well as underlying values of the school community, such as support and care. Thus the degree of disorder was dissipated and a new order was established to bring the organization to equilibrium as the crisis progressed to its end. These strange attractors were supported by (a) self-initiated internal communications within the school; and (b) a supportive norm of school culture. The school had an internal communication protocol that was activated in case of an emergency, like fire drills, bomb threat, tornado, and school closing, which however was not indicated in the crisis management plan. Rather, the crisis team deployed an immediate action of communication to contact those most affected.

We [crisis team] had an emergency meeting right after the incident that night discussing the next steps. We decided to call both families and the teams who saw. We know we had to do this immediately. . . . The [crisis management] plan was somehow disappointing as the level of detail in the plan was missing so we had to prioritize our decision making. (Assistant Principal, February 2009)

In addition to initiating the meeting and contacting key actors, Mr. Thomas expressed how the crisis team not only informed the families of those most affected but also provided them with support during the process of crisis management:

First of all, we attend to the family of the young lady that it happened to and then the family of the [student] who threw the discus and then the teams that saw. We had counselors working with the teams right away that night and then the next day. We had grief counselors there. We had the team. We were there early. We invited any friends of the individual and provided support to them . . . the whole day that day we had people available to help support to see if anybody wasn’t feeling right. And also for teachers too that have known her. . . so we spent a lot of time that whole day trying to see if anybody that needed support and needed help. . . . It took about a week for things to get back to somewhat normal but we made sure that we kept support to the coaches and those team members and close friends. (Principal, February 2009)

Immediate and ongoing support for everyone in the school strengthened the fundamental norms and values of the school, which were provided by the school crisis team and support staff. Although the discus crisis brought rapid turbulence to the school and its community, existing norms of supportive behaviors sustained the school culture, which in turn stabilized the dynamic system. Mr. Thomas expressed how the supportive culture helped mitigate the instability of the school and its community during the crisis:

I think it was part of the culture at that time, too. Be supportive of each other and the adults in the building to support each other. And it was a large school but still everybody knew each other and it just cast a shadow on the school for a few days. The supportive culture was built and shared by members of the school over time. (Principal, February 2009)

The school psychologist also described the supportive effort in reducing the sense of panic and uncertainty among the students and their families:

We immediately identified those who needed help on their mental needs, and those who needed to be assessed and maybe need intervention to recover from the incident. We have community mental health resources available for the school to provide short-term and long-term services. (February 2009)

The school “provided grief support to students, teachers, and families after the incident. We also visited those affected families to give them support,” said the school counselor (February 2009). A funeral service was held after one week, and a memorial fund in the girl’s honor was established as a way of special remembrance, as described by Mr. Thomas:

We had a funeral that took place so we had to prepare for that and students got out of classes and attended the funeral so we worked with the families as they made some of their decisions. The main thing was, we stressed to people, to honor her memory, to move on, and that was [what] she would have wanted—a memorial [was] started in her honor. I think that would be something that we learned from that and tried to at least honor her memories in some fashion and tried to keep on going. (Principal, February 2009)

The supportive culture in this crisis situation operated as key strange attractor stemming from an underlying order (Seeger, 2002) and working to unite and reorganize the school from chaotic order to normality (Thietart & Forgues, 1995) at the acute crisis stage. According to Mr. Thomas, it was “the culture thing that it doesn’t just reside in the leadership team, the whole staff needs to be aware of this, talk about it and be part of the culture” (February 2009). Without the underlying order, the school might still stay in chaos, with resentment, selfishness, and other fragmenting cultural elements dominating school life. Thus the culture of support, maintained by the school staff, can be seen as a latent resource for strengthening the crisis response of Archstone School.

Chronic Crisis Stage

Before entering the chronic crisis stage, the school directed crisis management toward a route of stability instead of a state of disruption. In this case the school did not deconstruct itself at the edge of chaos during the crisis. Rather, the school responded to its crisis in a beneficial manner; its support staff and supportive culture mitigated the degree of chaos and also curbed the rate of change during the acute crisis stage. Moreover, the school administered negative feedback—strengthening a culture of support and care—into the dynamic system to push the system back to its original state by generating a new set of behaviors and principles that then became a norm of order at the chronic crisis stage as it helped the school further address the lasting effects of the crisis.

One important course of action taken at this stage is the process of reflection and self-analysis, promoting “learning from the failures and successes of its [the organization’s] response [to the crisis]” (Paraskevas, 2006, p. 893) and “analyzing what went right or what went wrong” (Darling, 1994, p. 7). The school reflected on what might have triggered the crisis and learned from its successes and mistakes. Mr. Thomas articulated the crisis team’s reflections in the debriefing meeting:

After it finished, we debriefed as an administrative team and we talked about what could have been done to prevent this from happening. We discussed what steps should be taken in that area of the discus that people could have done differently. And whoever was coaching the student that was throwing the discus, as soon as there was not a good alert announcement [system], it was time to stop what you’re doing and go inside. That [the alert system] was not very loud and clear and [we] needed to make sure that whenever people would hear that, stop what you’re doing immediately, drop anything that you have in your hand. Similar to a fire drill. Stop what you’re doing, go inside, and also think about what are safe routes so in case something strange would happen. I think that was the main thing that we talked about. We talked about how to improve our communication. We discussed the whole incident. We went step-by-step and let that [public] announcement good [sic] [about] how was it handled in the media. How do we work the funeral arrangements? So we debriefed out all of that. (Principal, February 2009)

The debriefing process reflected on two especially significant aspects of crisis preparedness. First, the school needed to improve infrastructure, such as (a) the broadcasting alert system, which needed repairs; and (b) additional fencing around the discus area. Second, internal and external communications and the memorial process were important efforts managed by the crisis team, but they could have been executed better. Learning from mistakes and past experiences (Kouzes & Posner, 2007) is a valuable outcome of reflection. In a crisis situation like this, mistakes that are not resulting from recklessness are allowed as these experiences enrich the school’s crisis response learning, which is defined as “no-fault learning” by Mitroff (2005). In this case, the reflection process generated self-assessment that helped the school regress toward its original state with a new look, meaning that the school has gained experience, learned lessons from the crisis, and prepared itself to manage crises in a new, practical way.

Crisis Resolution Stage

At the final crisis resolution stage, leaders and the crisis team aim to build their capacity for more accurate and successful crisis management through the process of self-organization. Self-organization can help improve the system in its ability to detect the prodrome of an oncoming crisis; this is the main goal of crisis management at this stage, as it takes into account the preceding three stages of the crisis. In this case, although the crisis team did not explicitly describe how they would predict an oncoming crisis, they did point to the process of debriefing as a method of reflection that may help them amend the organization, improving its responsiveness to crises. Mr. Thomas underlined the importance of the debriefing process as productive reflection in the aftermath of the crisis:

The debriefing process is really important to review what worked and what didn’t work. What would we do differently than the next time. To reflect back on that and say maybe we ought to change that [facilities, process, etc.]. Or that didn’t work very well or here are some things we forgot. (Principal, February 2009)

In addition to reflection on better hypothetical responses to the discus event, the team members identified change in themselves, discussing how the experience could help them in the future to be more cautious and aware of an emergent prodrome. Mr. Thomas captured the change in this way:

We spent a while remembering what we’ve changed but we certainly talked about what could we’ve done. . . . We’ve had a new understanding of what we must prepare for in the future. We talked about the changes in the plan, communication techniques, and any kind of report from the staff community about the areas that may cause problems. (Principal, February 2009)

One teacher commented on how the information learned from the crisis experience could be used to manage school crises in the future: “We’ve definitely learned more through that [the crisis] because it provided us with so much more valuable experiences than those drills we’ve had. We’d be able to incorporate what we’ve learned into our existing plan, protocols, and manuals” (Teacher F, February 2009).

The efforts that the crisis team made, such as immediate internal communications and maintenance of a supportive culture, moved the system from turbulence to a new state of equilibrium. These endeavors, which can be considered input into the organizational system, undoubtedly helped the school manage the crisis situation. But even beyond ameliorating the immediate situation, the process of effectively responding to a crisis may have a favorable impact on the capability of a crisis management team, the strength of crisis management, and thus the effectiveness of crisis management in the long term (MacNeil & Topping, 2007).

Emerging Aspects of Crisis Response

Crisis response, in a chaos and complexity sense, operates as a throughput process, a coherent series of input and output mechanisms, in an open, organic, and dynamic organizational system such as the school and its community. The throughput process worth a thorough investigation because input, such as attempted solutions to particular crisis situations, leads to output, which creates the context of potential future crises. Emerging aspects of the throughput process may affect a crisis response and thus influence crisis management in the long term. This section presents aspects of the throughput process emerged from the case that the crisis team brought together in response to its crisis management. The section also examines the school’s crisis management plan as a postunderstanding of its relevancy and usefulness.

Flexibility Allows Adaptation and Innovation

Flexibility is necessary in most crisis situations. It allows subunits (i.e., members and agents) to act contingently on complex situations, based on independent judgments. Flexibility also encourages team members to take on crisis leadership roles (Mitroff, 2004); in crisis leadership, members practice risk taking, proceeding by trial and error. In this case study, Mr. Thomas led the crisis team strategically, according to the judgment and decisions of the crisis team, simultaneously facing the obstacle of ineffective support from the school district. Although it is clearly stated in the school’s emergency plan⁵ that if a teacher hears of an incident such as death or injury of a student or staff member, she or he is required to contact the administration immediately (Staff Handbook), the district displayed a lack of urgency to communicate with the school in the first place, along with a lack of flexibility in taking action. When Mr. Thomas debriefed the district and tried to reach other schools for extra help, the district sought to follow a predetermined plan of action that did not provide prompt support. Multiple team members mentioned the difficulty of communicating with the district, described by Mr. Thomas in the following way:

It happened during the evening and after school. . . . People [had] almost all left. I had a hard time reaching the central office and I had to debrief them before calling for others’ [other schools] help. We felt that our hands were tied. . . . It was very clear that the district wanted a crisis plan. They wanted something ready to go by the book. (Principal, February 2009)

The district’s slow response did not impede the crisis team’s reaction to the situation, however. Instead, the crisis team was willing to take on leadership roles and responsibilities, acting strategically to adjust priorities. The school counselor captured some important elements of the team’s flexibility and leadership priorities in this way:

When we couldn’t get direct help from the district, we needed to think of something that could help our kids immediately. We had a meeting and everyone sat down to discuss the priorities and risk of reaching other schools and how to get more support from other school counselors. We did not have time to lay out everything. We took necessary actions. (School Counselor, February 2009)

One of the teachers involved in the crisis situation expressed the lack of constructive support from the district:

The procedure was clear but that was back when we were practicing the emergency safety drills couple years ago and we were told to act according to the plan but this was a real situation. We should be allowed to try different ways of handling situation like this. (Teacher E, February 2009)

While facing obstacles in addressing the crisis, the team was able to think strategically, make adjustments to reset its priorities in a timely manner, and take a risk in pursuing a management route that diverged from the district’s prescriptive plan, which requires the attention of the district administration. To have a crisis plan is beneficial; however, in a situation of this kind, a rigid procedure for crisis management may fail to address urgent issues that arise during the crisis situation. The assistant principal expressed the importance of having a crisis plan but also emphasized the need to be flexible in a crisis situation:

Every day would have an unexpected event. The key is to have a procedure in place. This is what you’re going to do. You try to plan for every scenario. You are not going to have every scenario. But I think to at least try to anticipate some of those things and get prepared. If you are effective, you will anticipate some of these issues and you have plans in place and then implement it and stick to your plan. Don’t feel that the plan has to be so rigid that you can’t adapt it midstream. (Assistant Principal, February 2009)

Extrapolating from everyday teaching experience, a teacher echoed the assistant principal on the relationship between preparedness and flexibility:

I think that’s something I learned as a teacher, that you are never sure what you’re going to see that day. And if you don’t have some standard operating procedures, I think you are in trouble. But I am not saying that we have to follow the plan. We made adjustments and we did a lot of things to help our kids. (Teacher F, February 2009)

Reflecting on the school’s emergency plan, the crisis team also took another flexible action in handling the crisis situation in terms of filing a report of an injured student. The plan indicates that staff involved in the handling of a student who is injured, will need to fill out an injury/incident report form as soon as possible after the incident (Staff Handbook). Although it is important to report the incident in file, it is more imperative to contact the team for immediate assistance. Instead of writing a report immediately, the coach contacted Mr. Thomas for urgent help.

The crisis team expressed the importance of a crisis plan and also the need to act flexibly, adopting novel approaches, when the plan’s effectiveness faltered. Adaptation helps a team recombine their existing knowledge and skills with their learned experiences (Kauffman, 2000), creating a scaffold for productive innovation. This process of adaptation requires the collaboration of crisis team members.

Collaboration Enables Meaningful Connectedness

Collaboration emerges from interviews as the second key aspect influencing the processes and outcomes of crisis management. It requires team members to collectively prioritize crisis response actions (Gentilucci, 2007). Collaboration also fosters a mind-set of modesty and openness, even as it enables the team to act as a group of strong leaders. Gentilucci (2007) suggested that “[c]onsulting with others should not be seen as a weakness but as an act of strength that can reduce stress and improve the quality of crisis decisions” (p. 327). A crisis team should encourage collaboration as part of the crisis response process, communicating openly so as to capitalize on the useful expertise of team members.

In this case, Mr. Thomas pursued collaborative action by soliciting the advice of others in addressing the crisis situation. A leader may fear looking incompetent or losing the respect and compliance of the staff; however, Mr. Thomas regarded advice seeking pragmatically, as an opportunity to collect information from valuable human resources (Liou & Daly, in press):

I think you have to keep calm and also seek information and input from others instead of thinking, “It’s all me. I am the one on the top of the chart. I have to make all the decisions.” I would be willing to go in and say, “Hey, OK, what do you think we should be doing here? Or, Some ideas? Or, Is there anything we’ve forgotten, anything we’ve left out? Is there somebody we haven’t had contact with?” (Principal, February 2009)

Mr. Thomas perceived himself as shared leadership, in making decisions during crisis response. He was willing to initiate the process of seeking advice, and he invited the team to brainstorm together, collectively identifying useful resources and next steps.

Facilitating a norm of collaboration may empower individual members of the team to take responsibility for decision making. The team should not only identify key sources of expertise of the crisis team but also be open to the suggestions of such outside resources. Mr. Thomas further expressed how he felt about seeking advice: “I think being open, asking questions of others . . . that was important, and maintaining calm . . . and keep your emotions in check especially when you are appearing in front of the public” (February 2009). The sense of openness in seeking resources from others was commonly identified by the team members, including the assistant principal and school counselor. As the counselor expressed it, “I think Mr. Thomas really encouraged us to ask for more help, more support [from other schools] and I think we were all on the same page to seek any useful suggestions and bring it to the team” (February 2009).

Collaboration efforts occurred not only among schools in the district but also within the school itself. An upper grade–level teacher commented on how she collaborated with colleagues in not only supporting each other but also helping their students grieve:

We would talk about . . . how do other teachers deal with the kid. You tried to help kids, which you have to do. Part of the thing was to teach students how to grieve. They are young, they are invincible, they are not used to death. How do they grieve? What was the appropriate way to grieve? How can you grieve? How to still go on with your life? . . . We talked to each other, gave support to each other, because you have to think of the teachers that may have had the impact. (Teacher G, February 2009)

Information flow within and between the schools was handled well by the crisis team. The team members concur with the initiative taken to reach out to other schools for help. A teacher involved in the crisis management articulated in this way:

We noticed that we need more immediate support for our kids. We had to do something immediately before the instruction arrived from the district. So we bent the rules and took the initiative to communicate with other schools. Everyone did a great job in collecting useful information and help important to our school. (Teacher E, February 2009)

However, the need for collaboration during a crisis situation was not stressed or even mentioned in the school’s emergency plan. Despite this lack of statement written in the plan regarding the need for collaboration when necessary, the school crisis team could make timely decisions to collaborate with one another, such as seeking and sharing useful information.

Given the fact that one has limited time and resources for responding to dynamic crisis situations, it is imperative to recognize the need for collaboration, to encourage leadership responsibility, and to prioritize appropriate actions based on certain degree of flexibility. Both flexibility and collaboration emerge to be the essentials of crisis response, allowing the system to perform self-correcting mechanism in order to adapt to dynamic challenges.

Self-Correcting Mechanism Shapes the System’s Performance

The self-correcting mechanism operates in the form of a diffuse feedback system (Segel, 2000), which allows restructuring of the connections among members and reallocation of resources as needed. The mechanism depends on flexibility and collaboration. The system must perform flexibly in order to create new ways to restructure itself, and it must also take collaborative action in order to maximize the use and distribution of human resources. The diffuse feedback system serves as screening that monitors the system’s performance and signals weak links among members (Comfort, 1999) that may hamper self-correction. If a weak link was identified among members, the system would engage the self-correcting mechanism to make proper adjustments according to the situation at hand. In turn, the system would learn from its past and ongoing experiences of restructuring its connectivity, internalizing the acquired knowledge as input, and shaping prospective crisis response.

In this case, Mr. Thomas and the crisis team were able to act contingently on the situation when they experienced difficulties in reaching the district for support. The team undertook a series of timely actions that began reducing risk and uncertainty immediately, meanwhile working at the district’s pace to coordinate efforts with the district and other schools. Given the difficulty of communicating with the district at that time, however, the team decided to sidestep administrative procedures, even though required in the crisis plan, in order to facilitate communication and gather needed information and support from other schools. The school counselor described the support received from other schools:

We alerted [the district]. We did that because we needed help from other schools. After all the calls to the district you know there were not a lot people there. We needed to make decision . . . and we made calls to other schools and then we got other schools to send over some grief counselors to help support the students. (School Counselor, February 2009)

The assistant principal stressed the importance of self-redirecting when facing obstacles in addressing crisis situation: “Clearly, it was not working in terms of getting support we needed from the district. And it’s really important to take another route when the communication [with the district] is ineffective” (February 2009). At this point, the weak link in communication between the district and the school was immediately identified while the team attempted to operate according to the rigid structure of the crisis management plan, so the team was able to adjust connectivity between the district and the school. Restructuring the connections enabled the team to redirect its communication channels, bypassing the district as a nexus of communication and connecting itself more directly with helpful resources at other schools, and as such resources would no longer be fixed at one site (the district) but rather distributed across those most needed (the area schools).

Reflecting on the school’s emergency plan, it did not explicitly inform the school staff as to the “how” if administration cannot immediately provide timely response and/or support as it only listed the formal process (i.e., contact the administration and wait for the administration’s course of action through e-mails) without considering a situation like this that is complex, nonlinear, and unpredicted. The crisis team would be able to self-correct the plan and acted accordingly in this case.

Far from questioning Mr. Thomas’s credibility, members of the crisis team focused on Mr. Thomas’s ability to make necessary adjustments and productively redirect the team’s efforts: “He [Mr. Thomas] knew how to manage the team and to get people to work in the right place. He made sure that we are all informed and we knew what to do to deal with the situation” (School Counselor, February 2009). Knowing what to do helped the team adjust what had impeded its crisis response and seek ways to solve problems despite obstacles. Mr. Thomas reflected on the team’s ability to respond to the crisis promptly, contingently, and flexibly:

You have to be able to react quickly. You can’t react quickly if you don’t have ideas of what to do and then also have a plan for communication. I think it helped to have a plan, a written plan of what you do and what you should do but I think you have to be willing to adjust the plan in case something different happens. (Principal, February 2009)

The degree of connectivity may influence the extent to which the crisis team responded to the crisis situation. When there was a weak connection that hindered members from using a network of communication and support, leaders and the crisis team identified the gap, made necessary adjustments to bridge it, and restructured the connectedness that allowed for better flow of information. The three emerging efforts during crisis response are interdependent and interrelated in nature as successfully performing one depends on the degree of coordination with the others. The team has demonstrated its capacity for responding to crisis dynamism by (a) flexibly adapting the crisis plan to fit dynamic crisis situations, (b) collaboratively distributing needed resources among and between members and schools, and (c) continuously monitoring potential weak links to enable the self-correcting mechanism. The results suggest that these core aspects act as guiding principles in managing dynamic crisis situations that encourage complexity thinking in action.

Discussion

This study attempts to address the gap in empirical research on school crisis management from the lens of a dynamic crisis life cycle model and to further propose a dynamic responsiveness model to crisis management from the study case. This unique and untapped approach holds its potential for future research on crisis management; it also adds to existing theoretical base around crisis management.

The Affordances and Constraints of the Dynamic Crisis Life Cycle Model

This study used the dynamic crisis life cycle model as a theoretical foundation for investigating a school crisis case; however, it also has constraints in the design of sequential path. Consistent with previous studies on crisis management (Boudreaux, 2005; Darling, 1994; Howell & Miller, 2006), crisis life cycle model is widely used and accepted in most of the research literature as it follows a sequential path (Coombs, 2007; González-Herrero & Pratt, 1996) through distinct stages (Fink, 1986; Kotler, 1991) that presents a simplistic, yet effective way of understanding a crisis life cycle. It also illustrates how a crisis changes over time and the end of its life cycle lingers beyond the death of the crisis. However, such sequential analytic approach may constrain the way in which an organizational system evolves over time when facing nonlinear, unexpected, and yet unavoidable changes, which may nevertheless weaken the system’s capabilities to adapt to its internal and external environments as any crisis can never manifest itself precisely by distinct stages of life cycle. Initiating a shift in crisis management from a linear to dynamic approach may lead to higher cognitive load (Sweller, 1988) of individuals in problem solving as individuals who are used to linear thinking may fall short in making innovative connections between seemingly unrelated concepts/factors to address problems. The crisis team thus plays important role in helping individuals reduce cognitive load by imbuing complexity thinking in day-to-day decision making as individuals solve nonlinear problems.

An Emerging Dynamic Responsiveness Model of Crisis Management in Support of Organizational Resilience

Dynamic responsiveness to crisis life cycle

Although the dynamic life cycle model offers a more in-depth understanding of a crisis, as relating its sequential path to crisis management, it often fails to provide practical guiding principles for addressing complex crisis situations. The study results suggest three core aspects (i.e., flexibility, collaboration, and self-correcting mechanism) that are essential for overcoming the weaknesses identified in applying the sequential dynamic model during the response of complex crisis situations. Given the importance of the three essential aspects, this study further proposes an emerging dynamic crisis responsiveness model (see Figure 1) that takes into account not only the linear sequential path of a crisis (crisis life cycle) and nonlinear complexity thinking (chaos and complexity theory) but also the core aspects of crisis response that are positioned in the center of the model as the throughput process of crisis management. The notion of responsiveness further emphasizes the importance of efficiency, meaning the ability to solve challenging problems in a timely fashion. Figure 1 presents the emerging model that highlights crisis response as the core course of action in managing crises. The dynamic responsiveness model, grounded by empirical data, provides a useful theoretical lens through which organizational system and its subunits may better make sense of dynamic environments, which in turn may help build stronger resilience throughout the process of organizational change.

Figure 1.

Model of dynamic responsiveness to crisis life cycle.

Resilience in the state of chaordic

The present study sheds new light on the discussion as to the extent to which an organizational system engages in enough degree of flexibility to allow for change yet enough degree of stability to prevent it from total disarray. This paradox calls for a higher degree of agility in crisis responsiveness on the part of both crisis team and members at all levels of organization. This suggests that an organizational system may better sustain in a chaordic (Fitzgerald & van Eijnatten, 2002) state—being chaotic and orderly at the same time—in order to constantly redirect itself until the system reorganizes into a new state of order. Corresponding to previous studies on crisis management that suggest such chaordic organizations may boost their capacity for resilience, robustness, and evolvability (Gilpin & Murphy, 2006; Martin-Breen & Anderies, 2011; Pavard, Dugdale, Bellamine-BenSaoud, Darcy, & Salembier, 2007), this study further underlines the importance of embracing complexity thinking as it may influence the extent to which an educational system is equipped with complexity awareness and responsiveness rather than confining its capacity for managing crises to the linear, distinct stages of a crisis life cycle.

Inspect the Expected

Many scholars have recommended that schools to have a crisis management plan in place for emergencies (Brock, Sandoval, & Lewis, 2001; MacNeil & Topping, 2007; Pitcher & Poland, 1992). Consistent with this statement, this study further suggests an ongoing plan monitor to keep the crisis plan up-to-date, accessible, and implementable for all school members. In this study, although the school has its crisis plan, the crisis team did not entirely follow the plan; rather, the team acted spontaneously according to the situation, which suggests that the school’s crisis plan has room for improvement. For example, the plan is not clear in terms of within how many days after an incident a teacher should file a report. Second, it is unlikely for the teacher to file a report while assisting a seriously injured student. To adjust the plan, one suggestion might be that such a report can be filed as a voice recording, which could save more time to deal with current crisis situation. The school may need to pay more attention to examples like this and other unidentified, yet problematic issues and conduct a regular assessment and evaluation of the plan with complexity thinking in mind. A resilient and sustainable organizational system should possess the capacity to inspect what is expected in the plan and adjust the plan according to the inspection results. As complexity thinking accounts for crises’ real effect and practical challenges they present, a complexity-literate school system would experience less fear and more confidence in the face of crises.

Limitations, Implications, and Conclusion

Delimiters and Research Implications

This study provides limitations and suggestions for future research. While the implications of this single-case study may not be generalized across different settings, important insights learned from the study are transferable. That is, although this study provides theoretical examination and practical implications from a successful crisis management case, the core concepts, aspects, and proposed model may serve as an applicable framework that is transferable to studies on school crisis management in other settings. Future studies including a larger sample of schools may generate more diversely applicable recommendations regarding crisis response practices. More attention needs to be paid to the examination of the crisis plan in accordance with the crisis response as this would enable schools and districts to manage a school crisis from sequential and nonlinear perspectives. Moreover, the field of crisis management studies faces a challenge in that researchers are often prevented from witnessing crises or collecting crisis data firsthand (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). This challenge leads the analytic strategy of most crisis management research to a post hoc nature, offering only limited approaches to examining crisis management in its entirety and in action.

This study suggests the following areas of crisis management for researchers interested in chaos and complexity theory. For instance, research might explore how school crisis response varies in the training of crisis management teams. Scholars could also study how crisis management and response change and evolve over time from past experiences in addressing multiple crises. Moreover, studies could explore conditions and factors such as emotional intelligence that enable and/or inhibit a school system to respond to different stages of a crisis and in what way leadership necessary for crisis situations takes action in shaping a crisis response culture. Finally, it would be worth investigating the extent to which initial conditions have impact on emerging behaviors of a crisis. These areas deserve research attention to further verifying the study model, understanding the nature of a crisis according to the theory, and refining the process of crisis management in the field of education.

Implications for Practice

Despite the limitations of this study, some practical implications and recommendations may be transferable to benefiting school systems that attempt to better their crisis response and improve their crisis plans and teams from the dynamic responsiveness crisis life cycle’s perspective. Current training programs emphasize “working the plan as written, rather than improvising as necessary” (Gentilucci, 2007, pp. 238-239). Training practices should be cognizant of the dynamic nature of a crisis and its life cycle, enabling greater tolerance of unpredictable turbulence in the school system. As there are a great many details in designing a practical, research-based model for crisis management, I highlight the following three Rs (readiness, response, and reflection) as practical courses of action for school systems to respond to potential emergent change before, during and after a crisis.⁶

Readiness

Readiness underlines how well a school prepares for a crisis situation prior to any potential crisis. The first step is to identify a list of key members and their responsibilities at both school and district levels from which different types of crisis team may form according to the nature of a crisis, such as key central office leaders and managers, school principal (and assistant principal, if applicable), school counselor and psychologist, teachers, school nurse, social work, secretary, maintenance staff, and librarian. The team should also be able to identify and respond to imminent warning signs and continuously look for potential connections between seemingly unrelated issues/factors such as severe destruction of property, serious physical fighting and self-injurious behaviors, severe rage for minor reasons, and possession or use of weapons. Second, although the crisis team in this study did not find the previous drills helpful in actual crisis situations, they acknowledge that those drills need to be more applicable and allow room for necessary change. Therefore, it is important to schedule and prepare ongoing drills for all staff and crisis team within and across schools with a detailed focus on the nature and impact of a crisis, reviewing existing crisis plans for different types of crisis, examining crisis communication, managing grief and loss, providing community support services and psychological preparation for caretakers. The drills may better include scenario planning, a cost-effective strategy suggested in most crisis management practices, for different crisis situations, such as suicide, shooting, stabbing, weapon, intruder, rape, racial tensions, natural disaster, and so forth. The drills may also involve an objective staff member overseeing the drills and providing feedback to the crisis team. Schools may in turn develop a scenario-profiling tool, including a wide range of up-to-date exercises and experiments in different crisis situations, in conjunction with simulation technologies.

Response

Specific responses are critical and required for any given crisis circumstance. Communications is key response procedure during crisis; it requires flexibility and collaboration in action. It is critical to maintain reliable networks of communications in order to effectively reach needed support, manage potential detrimental effect such as rumors, and communicate with parents, community, and media using technology (e.g., telephone, intercom, megaphone, electronic telecommunications, walkie-talkie, cellular telephones, and any alarm systems), voice and hand signals, and other code messages based on different types of crises and threats. One important preparation during communications is to have a sample of written statements⁷ and informational handouts⁸ ready for different crisis situations. Crisis team and all school staff should keep in mind that clear announcements of a crisis, collaborative advice seeking, and innovative and useful strategies are main goals in response to a crisis. Policy-wise, a school system may set general rules for how members interact and communicate with one another both internally and externally but may not strictly dictate these rules during complex crisis situations.

Reflection

In the postcrisis phase, reflection in the form of debriefing, follow-up evaluation, caring services, and crisis anniversary is an important course of action for consideration. Conducting debriefing at the conclusion stage of the crisis helps critique the effectiveness of crisis management. The school may then conduct a long-term follow-up evaluation (e.g., self-assessment survey) of the crisis management as a way of feeding input back to the crisis response system. It is also critical to provide caring services for not only those most affected but also those caretakers as they may also experience stress, fatigue, and any emotional impact as a result of responding to a crisis. Psychological preparation for crisis team is an area that requires further attention in crisis management (Brock, 2009). It is highly recommended that a school constantly conduct periodic reviews as a way of monitoring the crisis plan to make sure it stays up-to-date and relevant regardless of whether or not the school has been in crisis situations. Finally, the school may plan for crisis anniversaries for special remembrance.

Conclusion

There is no one-size-fits-all practice for crisis management. School systems with individualized, organic crisis response systems are able to develop a sense of readiness to engage in recognition of a dynamic life cycle of a crisis, chaotic events, chaotic order, new and reorganized order, norms of chaos and complexity thinking, and chaos awareness (Tetenbaum, 1998). With consciousness of the dynamic responsiveness crisis life cycle embedded in a school system, a school crisis management team and all school members will not only make more timely and productive decisions but also constantly self-renew existing knowledge and experience during crisis situations as they respond to one chaotic event after another.

Footnotes

Appendix A

Appendix B

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Yi-Hwa Liou is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California, San Diego. She received an MS and a PhD in Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Her research focuses on the capacity and connectedness of educational leaders in managing dynamic challenges such as school crises, educational reform, and organizational change from a nonlinear organizational theory’s perspectives, as well as the use of social network theory and analysis. She aims to bridge theoretical understanding to the world of leadership development, school reform, and policy reflection to understand several complex areas of organization-level research in education.

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