Abstract
Elections are considered to be the hallmark of democracy. Free and fair periodic elections ensure that people choose their representatives who, in effect, would ensure that the voice of the ordinary people is reflected in the policymaking process. What if the choice of voters is restricted? What if an ordinary individual with good intent does not find the whole process of election conducive? Money in elections is an impediment which prohibits candidates with small capital to contest with those who can bear huge expenditure, afford illicit finance to influence voters and candidate selection process. It is an undisputable fact that elections are gradually being more expensive. The scholars in this book unanimously agree that illicit finance to influence the electoral outcome can seriously threaten the legitimacy of electoral democracy. This book has explored conventional and non-conventional methods of money flow in elections. There are seven chapters in the book that discuss the different aspects of the role of money in elections.
The scholars in this book have adopted various methodologies to analyse the connection between the role of money and elections in India. Ethnography, comparative study, empirical data, survey, interviews and archival research are the methods employed by the scholars to investigate how electoral democracy is being affected by the use of money.
Eswaran Sridharan and Milan Vaishnav in the chapter ‘Political Finance in a Developing Democracy: The Case of India’, have primarily employed the comparative method and compared the reforms carried by the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the Parliament since 1947 until 2017. They highlight the fact that though India has a very powerful constitutional institution called Election Commission, which acts as a constitutional body to conduct free and fair elections, various guidelines provided by the ECI are violated, and rules regarding capping of financial expenditure are one of them. ECI has limited the maximum amount of money (₹70 lakh, as of now) that can be used by a candidate during his/her election campaign in order to curb the money power and ensure that equal opportunity is available to all. The scholars have mapped the journey of legislative and ECI initiatives to curb the menace of black money and illicit financial transaction in the elections. Despite several such attempts, due to weak implementation and lack of strong political will, this menace continues. Sridharan and Vaishnav start with the reforms during 1947–1990, 1990–2003 and 2003–2017. They also give special emphasis on reforms under the regime of National Democratic Alliance Government led by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi. Tax scrutiny and electoral bonds were two key changes brought by this regime to regulate the financial flow in the elections and party fund. However, in the absence of any limit on party spending, donation and public funding, the rules and regulations merely remain a piece of paper.
Neelanjan Sircar, in the chapter ‘Money in the Election: The Role of Personal Wealth in Election Outcomes’, has primarily used empirical data to analyse the role of money in electoral democracy. He has extracted data from 2003 to 2015 to establish his claim. He then goes on to formulate and test hypothesis through data. He argues that it is the wealth and personal financial capacity of the candidate that matters the most during the process of selection of the candidates. Wealth is utilised to fill the party coffers for different purposes. To finance the campaign trail effectively and efficiently, the party needs funds in a large amount and wealthy candidates are one of the critical sources through which the party raises fund. Michael A. Collins further argues on the same lines and says that established and dominant political parties help the small parties who are in alliance or want to be in the coalition. The smaller parties in order to get the financial help have to compromise on various fronts, including filing a candidate from a particular constituency, seat sharing, ideology and so on.
In the chapter on ‘Builders, Politicians, and Election Finance’, Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav attempted to probe into the relation between builders, politicians and election finance. They made some interesting observations about the production and consumption rate of the cement industry during the election. They have used empirical data from April 1995 until March 2010, for a total of 180 calendar months per state. They look at the cosy dynamics that exist between big firms who are in the business of construction and the politicians. To get a favourable policy, real estate and firms donate a massive amount to different political parties who in turn make real estate policy keeping in mind the interest of all those big firms who have made the donation during the election time to the party.
Both scholars found that access to adequate land is the need of the hour to the newly emerging construction companies and firms. The control of the land still lies largely in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians, and, therefore, a cordial relation is very much required between the politicians and builders. This is done by making donations and financing the expenditure incurred by a party during the election through various means, directly and indirectly. His hypothesis is that when election dates are announced, the cement production interestingly goes down. The only possible reason could be that a massive chunk of money is directed towards the management of the electoral campaign and party funding.
Michael A. Collins, in the chapter ‘Navigating Fiscal Constraints: Dalit Parties and Electoral Politics in Tamil Nadu’, presents an ethnographic account of the electoral campaign and investigates the relation between finance and success of any specific party, particularly the small organisational parties. He has paid special attention to understand fiscal constraints for Dalit parties in Tamil Nadu. He primarily talks about the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) party in Tamil Nadu and its compulsive relation with All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMD) and other Dravidian parties for finance. The money constraints for small parties like VCK in Tamil Nadu went on to an extent wherein September 2007, VCK leadership passed the Velachery Resolution, which dissolved the party structure and solicited fresh applications from previous office bearers as well as new party members. The membership drive was designated, in part, to attract influential non-Dalits to join the party by offering them plum posts. This, of course, riled many longitudinal VCK cadres. If a party is small and does not have a sound financial backup, it has to liquidate its ideology to be in alliance with a well-established party.
Lisa Bjorkman and Jeffrey Witsoe further make an interesting observation by making a distinction between ‘gift giving rather than Vote-buying’. Simon Chauchard gives a very detailed analysis of costs in Indian elections. He provides an ethnographic account of every minute expenditure that is incurred by the political parties during election campaigns. The expenses range from vehicles for transportation, cost related to erection of stages, podium, flowers and garlands, posters, pamphlets, beverages such as tea, water, cold drinks and juice, TV screen, power consumption, rent for venue, guard and security charges, to expenditure on chairs for the audience, arches and barricades, hiring of loudspeaker, and so on. Using statistical analysis and survey methods, Jennifer Bussell attempts to uncover the nexus between those who take charge of the office and those who control the office from the backdoor.
This book provides a detailed account of how money operates during elections in India. It gives a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.
