Mairi MacDonald: The presidential election results are in, and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (or IBK, as he’s known in Mali and in the Malian expatriate community) has been confirmed as the new president.
Where should he begin to tackle the challenge of rebuilding his country after six months of foreign military intervention and almost eighteen months of profound political crisis?
Berny Sèbe: Mali has been going through traumatic events in the last couple of years, and the new president’s priorities should evidently be to address the long-standing issues that made possible not only a coup d’état but also the de facto partition of the country. These include, but are not limited to, the deep-seated mistrust of the populations of Northern Mali towards their Southern rulers. In 1960, Northerners had the traumatic experience of seeing “Black” officials replace “White” masters (i.e. the French) as their rulers overnight. The experience worsened when it became apparent that the new rulers were less benevolent than their predecessors, and were trying to impose on them by force a country which many in the North saw as artificial, or simply alien. This led to a vicious circle of uprisings and state repression, igniting a spiral of violence which has continued in one way or another until today. The violence has left deep scars in the social fabric of the country, especially in the North where memories of atrocities committed by Malian troops (from the South) are still vivid.
Against this backdrop of a deeply fractured country, IBK will need to rebuild trust in the state and institutions of Mali and to reconcile Malians among themselves – or at least provide an environment which will allow Malians to talk to each other and to accept the peaceful compromise which, hopefully, they will soon find. This means that IBK will have to rebuild a strong and functioning state apparatus that can be fair to all its citizens and able to protect everyone living in its territory, regardless of where they live. This includes creating conditions that will allow the return to normal in everyday life, especially in terms of personal safety and economic activities. He will also have to address issues of corruption that have tended to undermine the central authority in the past: the rule of law needs to be re-established in all regions. In order to achieve this goal, he will have to tackle the question of Northern Mali as a top priority. In any case, he is bound to do so by the Ouagadougou agreement of 18 June 2013, which states that his new government must commence negotiations with communities and armed groups of the North within sixty days of taking power. This means finding an acceptable and workable compromise with the political and/or armed groups which contemplated a separate destiny for Northern Mali in 2012, while refraining from implementing what would appear as a de facto partition, which would inflame minds in the southern half of the country. IBK has quite rightly identified the reconciliation of Malians among themselves as his key priority. This is the key to unlocking a variety of other issues, which will soon become pressing – especially restarting the economy.
MacDonald: Le Monde, in an editorial dated 15 August 2013, gives credit to French president François Hollande for the timely conduct of presidential elections in Mali. Le Monde said that by organizing these elections so quickly, Hollande succeeded in a second, political, gambit: to enable the reestablishment of a legitimate authority to head up the country.
Is this a fair assessment? If so, and if the credit really is due to the French president, do you think this has any implications for the legitimacy of new president IBK?
Sèbe: From the outset, there was certainly a risk of seeing France playing a neo-colonial role in Mali, and this is one of the reasons why François Hollande was so keen on repatriating French troops as soon as terrorist groups had been ousted from Northern Mali. In fact, the repatriation of troops started even before Malian troops had redeployed across the North. This also explains why he pushed so hard backstage to ensure that the presidential elections would take place in July as planned. The credit should not be given entirely to the French president, though, because interim President Dioncounda Traoré also made a decisive contribution to putting the democratic process back on track in a deeply traumatized country. Without the transitional government, nothing could have been achieved.
Some in Mali will object to France having played such a significant role in the rebuilding of the country's state structures – not least, the Islamist groups who seized control of the northern half of the country in 2012. Yet, the overwhelming majority of the Malian population, especially in the densely populated areas of the South, was in favour of the agenda advanced so forcefully by the French president. Before the election, many would probably have liked it to be postponed until the autumn to give more time to hand out ID cards to potential voters and to take into account more effectively the opinion of Malians based abroad. However, now that the election has taken place in generally good conditions, and IBK seems to have achieved an overwhelming victory, his legitimacy does not appear to be threatened. But he will have to meet high expectations from everyone, so to keep this legitimacy he will have to act swiftly and effectively. Time is of the essence.
MacDonald: In their article for this issue, Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim suggest that because political actors – and competitors to IBK – such as the Co-ordination of Patriotic Organizations in Mali (COPAM) reject negotiated settlements with the rebels on principle, one of the great challenges to Mali’s new government will be precisely this issue of whether and what to negotiate – and with whom. Do you agree? What do you think Keita’s government is going to have to do to surmount domestic – presumably southern – opposition and open negotiations with the rebels?
Sèbe: This seems a fair appraisal of the situation. On the one hand, negotiation with non-terrorist groups is highly desirable to find a political outcome to the crisis, and seems to be the only way of strengthening the military gains achieved, with French help, since January 2013. On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling in the South that the North and the Tuaregs have already been able to get too much preferential treatment as a result of past uprisings, and that a tough line is needed to avoid giving what is seen as further privileges to those who are perceived as rebels who are eternally dissatisfied with what they get (to which a majority of Tuaregs would object that they are only struggling to redress a congenital imbalance inherited from an unfair decolonization process which left them empty-handed at independence). The president’s margin of manoeuvring is therefore extremely thin – not to say non-existent – given that the two views appear almost irreconcilable. Moreover, they have been growing further apart over the last half-century. IBK’s challenge will be to find an arrangement which is acceptable to all parties, and which holds water on the long run.
MacDonald: What do you think of COPAM’s theory that the French objective, through MINUSMA (the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), is to force the government to sign an agreement with the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) that will effectively divide the country in two (north/south) by granting some form of recognition to Azawad?
Sèbe: For domestic political reasons, some Malian political actors might have an interest in trying to present the French government as a sorcerer’s apprentice, interfering with the country’s internal affairs. To increase pressure as much as possible on terrorist groups in the far north of the country, the French army sought to avoid military clashes with MNLA fighters when it spearheaded the reconquest of the areas where the MNLA had remained more or less militarily operational, or at least retained some influence. This allowed Operation Serval to draw upon the intimate knowledge of the region that the MNLA fighters have. For its part, the MNLA saw the political benefit it could gain from presenting itself as the main actor in the struggle against terrorist groups there. By avoiding confrontations with MNLA fighters, the French army may have played into the MNLA’s political hands and this could have led some observers to conclude that the French were playing the “Tuareg card,” as they have been regularly accused of doing since the independence of the country (viz. Modibo Keita’s accusations during the 1963 Tuareg rebellion). However, President Hollande’s stance on the occasion of the Ouagadougou negotiations has clearly dispelled any possible doubt: the French government stands by the legitimacy of Mali as a single country, and wants non-terrorist groups of the North to work effectively with the new government to find a negotiated outcome to the crisis, while avoiding any form of partition.
MacDonald: If that’s far-fetched, what do you think the new government in Mali is going to do about Azawad’s declaration of statehood? Does it have to acknowledge Azawad, or has the MNLA lost so much steam that Mali can effectively ignore the self-styled new state?
Sèbe: The new Malian government will almost certainly ignore the independence claims of this self-styled new state of Azawad. Militarily, it can afford to ignore Azawad because it has regained (with foreign help) control of most of the territory of the north. More importantly, IBK certainly could not afford the political price of such a climb-down in the South. Southern Malians are attached to the country’s motto of “Un peuple, un but, une foi,” and this is incompatible with separatist claims. The MNLA no longer possesses the military or political clout to impose such a requirement as a sine qua non to the opening of negotiations. By agreeing to the confinement of its troops and the redeployment of Malian troops and administration (article 7 of chapter 2 of the 18 June 2013 Ouagadougou agreement), it has lost a key bargaining chip – but it had very little choice, given that its ranks had thinned over the previous months as a result of lack of funding and political impetus and of the military superiority of Islamist jihadi groups and later of the troops in charge of reconquering the region. The Movement had little option but to work with French and African troops, but this has not reinforced its military position. It certainly strengthened the sympathy of the French, who have traditionally been receptive to Tuareg arguments in the past. However, they could not lose sight of the demands of realpolitik and take the risk of siding with the MNLA to support, even implicitly, the partition of the Malian state.
MacDonald: If and when the new government does seek to negotiate about the fate of Northern Mali, which group or groups do you think it should focus on first, and why?
Sèbe: The obvious group which comes to mind in the first place is MNLA, because of its historical relevance (it has claimed to take over from a variety of groups or movements which have been fighting the central government since Malian independence) and because it was leading the efforts to create an independent state of Azawad. However, this should not preclude discussions with other groups, such as HCUA (Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad) or the MAA (Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad), or even the moderate elements of other groups such as Ansâr ud-Dîn (or what remains of it, given that many of its members have joined now the HCUA), provided they agree to give up any formal link with international terrorist groups. Obviously this excludes AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) from the picture.
In any case, it must be noted that, in view of the opening of negotiations with the new Malian administration, the MNLA, HCUA and MAA have already achieved a rapprochement, which led to the release of a joint declaration in Nouakchott on 9 August 2013.
MacDonald: When several of our authors were last in Mali, there was doubt that French forces were fully in control of the north of the country. Has that changed? Is MINUSMA therefore going to inherit a stable military situation?
Sèbe: Controlling vast expanses of desert territory such as those of Northern Mali certainly poses specific challenges: extended lines of communication, scarce local resources and the sheer size of the territories to master, as well as the stubborn determination of the terrorist groups or cells operating in the area, all contribute to making it impossible to measure exactly the level of control achieved by any military force (or even simply a state). The French army was certainly not in control of every square inch of the territory at any one time, but it did effectively control the nodal points of the region – namely key towns and lines of communication. Terrorist groups tried to wreak havoc on the cities of the region with suicide bombings shortly after their retreat, but these attempts were short-lived. A few artisanal improvised explosive devices were placed shortly after the jihadist retreat, but they quickly ceased to pose a real threat to military communications. The quasi-disappearance of terrorist activities in the region, and the complete absence of any spectacular act on election days testifies to the loss of operability of terrorist groups in the region, and conversely reflects a high level of control by French and later MINUSMA forces. MUJAO promised spectacular actions to interfere with the presidential election, but these remained empty threats. This tends to indicate a complete loss of capability in the region. It remains to be seen if this impotence is definitive or only temporary.
MacDonald: Let’s shift focus to what the international community can and should do to help Malians – northern and southern – to find a way towards stability and greater material prosperity.
Bøås and Torheim point out that because the attack on the In Amenas gas field in Algeria in January 2013 appears to have been planned and organized in Northern Mali by sometime-AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, some elements of the international community are justifying their ongoing interest in Mali by the need to prevent the state and the Sahel in general from becoming a new training ground for the forces of global Islamist jihad. Do you see this happening?
Sèbe: This was one of the key selling points of the interventionist school of thought (with France at the forefront of the movement), in its attempts to justify foreign interference to help Mali reconquer its northern territories. Ultimately, this approach was designed to help raise funds for, and support of, concerted action: it internationalized the problem, turning it into an issue for the global community instead of limiting it to Mali and its closest allies. It made solving the Malian question a problem for the concert of nations because of the threat that Islamist jihad poses to many countries around the world – obviously in the West, but also to China, for instance, which has to face its own struggle against Islamic fundamentalism.
This argument helped France secure some limited but useful logistical help to its Operation Serval, and probably increased pressure on potential donors on the occasion of the conference on Mali which took place in Brussels on 15 May 2013: beyond humanitarian considerations, international security is a certainly a good selling point when it comes to securing foreign help at a time when all Western governments are in the throes of budgetary restrictions.
MacDonald: If they’re right, they warn that such justifications might well make hunting “terrorists” the primary goal of international involvement, rather than the quest for pragmatic long-term solutions to the region’s – and the Malian state’s – conflicts. Do you think this is a real danger? If so, how should Europeans and North Americans who are concerned for the Sahel try to influence their governments to act in the region?
Sèbe: There was such a risk when Operation Serval started and there remained the risk of seeing French troops bogged down in the sands of Northern Mali fighting an elusive but resilient enemy. This worst-case scenario did not happen in the end, so now that the election has taken place and that a legitimate administration is taking control of the country, the spectre of such a danger is disappearing. This does not mean, however, that the West and the international community at large should lose sight of what ought to be their ultimate goal, which is to foster the development of a sustainable form of stability in the region, based on a long-term approach which places human development (on a social, cultural, political, and economic level) at the heart of its preoccupations.
MacDonald: What about the idea that the predominance of African troops in the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) force that will take over from France in MINUSMA will, itself, help to reorient peacekeeping operations to regional objectives – such as lasting solutions to regional conflicts – over the anti-terrorist goals that may appeal more to some European and North American governments? Do you think this can happen and if so, how?
Sèbe: The African takeover of MINUSMA is a very positive development. It demonstrates at long last that African countries are now able to coordinate between themselves to ensure the stability of their own continent, even if this means acting militarily. It will certainly help make sure that African views on the subject are not forgotten in the implementation of the peacekeeping plans. If the military capability of the ECOWAS force is enough to keep the northern territories stable, then it will be a positive development not only for Mali itself, but also for the African continent as a whole.
MacDonald: Jonathan Sears’ article in this issue suggests that one of the problems that any government will face in Mali is that the traditional approach to governance, which relies on the cooperation of elites, will not work to resolve this crisis because it is, among other things, one of disconnection between Mali’s political class and the general population. Do you see any signs in Mali of government realizing that its traditional, elite-centred approach is inadequate to the task it faces? Or do you think that those elites command sufficient authority even with the rebel populations that they can deliver legitimacy to Mali’s central government?
Sèbe: This is a problem with deep historical roots in Mali. The fact that so many candidates in the presidential election were eminent members of the traditional elite (with many former prime ministers and ministers competing, as well as figures such as the former president of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa), and of course the fact that the new president is a former prime minister (1994–2000) and a former president of the National Assembly (2002–2007), says a lot about the modalities of access to power in Mali, even after a series of political events which shook the country to its roots.
It will be IBK’s main challenge to ensure that he still enjoys the support of Mali’s traditional elites (without which it would be difficult to govern), while at the same time appearing to make a clean break with the past, offering hopes that the country will now move on from its traditional oligarchic practices.
MacDonald: This reliance on elites – and the resulting lack of government legitimacy with many of Mali’s diverse communities – poses a real problem for international aid donors, too, because donors’ contacts must include or even be limited to governments – automatically members of an elite. Do you think that bilateral donors (other states) should be adjusting their strategies to help Malians in view of recent events?
Sèbe: This is evidently an avenue to be explored, though it needs to be done with the approval of the government of Mali, which needs to see it as a positive improvement rather than a breach of its sovereignty. But it would make sense to do so given the precedent of aid to the northern population being redirected to other beneficiaries for ideological reasons or because of personal greed. This was already the modus operandi of some non-governmental organizations that operated specifically in Northern Mali, but the deteriorating situation in the North as a result of jihadism in the area made it impossible for most of them to keep working in the region.
MacDonald: One consideration that must surely be relevant for most, if not all, regional and extra-continental powers considering how to help the Malian government restore its authority is the potential for revenge attacks by the various Islamist groups involved in the north. Many of these already have long tentacles and loose alliances, through al Qaeda and other networks, with local troublemakers in Nigeria, France, and elsewhere.
Do you see any signs that this concern has restrained powers from intervening? Do you think renewed threats, such as the one from Belmokhtar and MUJAO, will constrain the actions of foreign powers or otherwise skew how they try to support Mali?
Sèbe: This consideration could lead some governments to consider their position vis-à-vis the Arab and Islamic worlds more carefully, and to adapt it accordingly. This is particularly true of France, which contains large Muslim communities originating mostly from its former colonies. Some argue, for instance, that President Chirac stood against the Iraq war in an attempt to please his Muslim constituents. However, France has remained extremely active in the Arabo-Muslim world, adopting often-controversial positions at the beginning of the Arab Spring, and then intervening militarily in Mali in spite of the fact that French citizens have been for several years the largest contingent of hostages detained in West Africa at the hands of Islamist groups. Though for some time this factor might have led the French government to act with more caution, it has now lost most of its relevance, because bowing to hostage-takers or even a minority of activists at home appears to be a short-term view that will only bring about more trouble and impotence in the long term. After a period of hesitation which reflected an attempt to initiate a break with the confrontational strategy adopted by his predecessor in the second half of his term, President Hollande has seemingly come to the conclusion that endless bargaining and procrastination were not an effective strategy in this case. Ironically, this evolution is similar to that of Nicolas Sarkozy, who first tried to negotiate in cases involving French hostages, before adopting a hard line with the failed attempts to free hostages in the summer of 2010 and in early 2011, which all ended in bloodshed. Likewise, President Hollande finally ordered his military to operate in an area where seven French hostages were reputedly under threat of retaliation in case of a French intervention. On the basis of past experience, threats, especially if it seems highly probable that they will be executed, have been an incentive to act more promptly, rather than a deterrent.
MacDonald: What do you think France will do now in relation to Mali? What do you think France should do?
Sèbe: France will probably want to cash in on the evident military success of Operation Serval, and will try to avoid appearing too exposed in the country’s internal affairs for fear of being accused of reviving the old customs of Françafrique. This will be particularly important in the eyes of President Hollande, who made it one of his presidential pledges that he wanted to “normalize” relations with francophone African countries, and put an end to any form of incestuous relationship. That said, France will certainly press the newly elected president to find a reasonable exit strategy to the situation in the Azawad region, which would allow the return of peace and stability in Northern Mali (i.e. giving satisfaction to some of the demands voiced by the MNLA and other rebel groups), while at the same time preserving the country’s integrity and avoiding the development of a new independent state in West Africa, which would be a jump into the unknown.
France should ensure that it remains vigilant towards the actual actions of the Malian state and military in the North: beyond the traditional rhetoric of reconciliation and appeasement, it needs to make sure that this program is really implemented on the spot and that the military, humiliated by its defeats in 2011 and 2012, is not seeking revenge against civilian populations now that they it has been brought back to the North by virtue of foreign intervention. The temptation might be strong to seek its due on innocent victims, or at least to mistreat them, and this would be the worst new start one can think of. France also needs to pay due attention to the claims made by Tuareg groups, and especially by the MNLA which chose in February to fight alongside French troops when Operation Serval reached the Adagh region. MNLA has declared that it did not want to fight French troops which were intending to expel terrorist groups from the region, and this constructive attitude needs to be rewarded by a clear political blueprint which gives due recognition to the movement’s claims which are compatible with the existence of Mali as a country. The former colonizing power, which knows local ethnic dynamics better than any foreign power, has a duty to ensure that no ethnic group is harassed in its own territory as a result of racial and political feuds. France has to play the role of a moderator in a situation where passions run high, and should ensure that the post-electoral period, and beyond, is not marred by any outburst of violence which would re-open wounds. France will also need to use its position in the world, especially as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to ensure that international help is forthcoming to help speed up the rebuilding of the country and to make it durable.
MacDonald: William Moseley’s article states “rebuilding livelihood security in Northern Mali should be a key priority for the newly elected government.” Not only is this a humanitarian imperative, it is also an essential step towards stability. Do you agree that this should be a high priority? If so, how should the international community support such efforts?
Sèbe: I fully agree with this appraisal. There can be no real improvement in the state of Mali if the situation in the northern half of the country does not return to some form of normality in everyday life. Nomads need to be able to resume their life with their herds without fear of being harassed (or even gunned down) by (para)military or jihadi groups. People living in towns and cities need to feel that the state will not let them down if they stand against those who wanted to replace the country's secular tradition with sharia law. Above all, all communities living in Mali need to feel protected by the state and its representatives. It is vital that the spiral of violence which has embittered inter-ethnic relations since independence be halted, and that memories of past violence can be overcome – not forgotten, because this is simply impossible, but at least neutralized as an obstacle to reconciliation. This will come only if the central government pulls its own weight to ensure that the right officials are sent to the North (and that they do not perceive this duty as a punishment) and that they effectively control the country so that rebel groups can no longer infiltrate the region, and nomads no longer feel scared by those who are meant to protect them.
MacDonald: Drawing lessons from the history of the sham democracy of Mali’s first post-independence government (that of Modibo Keita and the US-RDA), Robert Nathan emphasizes that stability requires the new government – and its international donors, partners and backers – to find ways to narrow the gap between “political discourse and practice” and to build internal confidence in democracy. Do you see any signs that Malian politicians have recognized this need, let alone begun to address it? Again, should the international community be engaging with Mali to steer its nominal democracy towards real performance?
Sèbe: For obvious reasons, the campaign for the presidential election has been focusing much more on the country’s unity than on rebuilding a trustworthy state that offers equitable representation to all Malians. Yet, IBK’s nomination speech on 4 September 2013 included, alongside its emphasis on national reconciliation and unity, a significant section on the fight against corruption and the need to achieve good governance and transparency. This is indeed a key aspect of the rebuilding of the Malian state: corruption needs to be eradicated in the whole country, and as far as the North is concerned, state-sanctioned violence should be robustly condemned so that the dominant discourse of atonement and reconciliation put forward by IBK and some of his competitors during the presidential campaign, and now presented as a cornerstone of the new president’s action, is more than mere wishful thinking.
The international community can certainly remind the Malian authorities of sad precedents in this area and make the delivery of further help dependent upon real progress: this is the price to pay to avoid the “cyclical repetition of crises in the North of the country,” to quote IBK himself.
MacDonald: What should international observers of Mali and the Sahel be looking for over the next few months: first, as signs of trouble with potential to involve other countries, whether neighbouring or not; and second, as signs of hope?
Sèbe: Obviously, the resurgence of terrorist activities in Northern Mali or neighbouring countries would be a worrying sign, especially because Saharan borders have been notoriously porous and the potential for such violence to be contagious is high. It would also stop (or at least hinder considerably) all efforts to stabilize the region, including the delivery of emergency aid to the populations most in need. It would stop or delay efforts to redevelop viable economic projects in the area, ranging from fostering the pastoral economy to restarting tourism, which is a notable source of income and employment. Though it would not be as dangerous as a resurgence of terrorism in the area, a situation of status quo would also be worrying because it would carry with it the prospect of another deterioration of the situation, and possibly another uprising leading to further violence.
Signs of hope would be the conclusion of an agreement with the MNLA and all the moderate groups in the region. Ideally this agreement should carry with it the promise of disarmament, and should be adhered to honestly by all parties involved. This would considerably relax the political atmosphere in the North, and would make the implementation of developmental plans possible. The official announcement by IBK of the launch of the assises nationales du Nord only five days after he had taken the oath of office is indeed a positive sign: it sends a strong message and demonstrates the commitment of the new president to the conduct of negotiations which will address the long-standing issues undermining the stability of Northern Mali. We now have to hope that his political action will match the high expectations that his election has raised.
