NORAD does not need saving

In 2014, with ostensible prompting from Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s office, two parliamentary committees in Ottawa studied North American strategic defence. As the Globe and Mail reported in May, “The governing federal Conservatives appear to be trying to gauge the Canadian public’s appetite for joining the U.S. ballistic missile defence program, defence watchers say.” ¹ As Canadians renewed this decades-long debate and weighed the arguments for and against participation in missile defence, it was not surprising that the assertion would, as in the past, be made that Canada needed to participate in such a program in order to “save” the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Thus, it should not have been unanticipated that, among the arguments the Senate committee made in its June 2014 report endorsing Canadian participation was a need to repair the two countries’ “seamless defence partnership” within NORAD. ²

The command does not need saving, however, and discussions that weigh participation in missile defence too heavily in terms of the need to preserve the binational command unnecessarily shift the debate from the real issues involved in the future of continental strategic defence that confront Canada. Rather, the focus should be on whether or not Canada needs to be protected by the missile defence system (a point that the Senate committee strongly emphasized) and what it needs to do about its own air defences that fall under NORAD’s operational control.

NORAD has proven to be a remarkably resilient institution. From its inception, it has adjusted to and effectively accommodated dramatic changes in the international strategic environment and corresponding developments in American and Canadian defence policy. It has, in particular, withstood a series of fairly dramatic developments that began on 11 September 2001. Just as Ottawa and Washington envisaged in the 2006 renewal of the binational NORAD accord that removed its expiration date, the command can now be expected to continue indefinitely as the centrepiece of Canada–US security relations—whether or not the Harper government signs Canada on to missile defence. To be sure, in recent years there was reason to doubt NORAD’s longevity. It was at the heart of the 9/11 calamity when, postured to respond to air threats arising from outside the continent, it was unable to prevent the air attacks that began within it. While its capabilities were rapidly expanded and reconfigured to deal with the new dangers, differences between the US and Canadian governments began to emerge. Washington delegated authority to military officials in the NORAD air defence system to order the destruction in US airspace of hijacked aircraft if there was insufficient time to reach the civilian leadership. But such authority was extended only to certain US generals or flag officers, not to Canadian generals, even though it was a Canadian general who coincidentally was in charge at NORAD headquarters on 9/11 and famously gave the order to “generate, generate, generate.” Ottawa, for its part, delegated authority to no military officials, reserving the decision in an emergency to the government.

The differences seemed to be deepening when the Chrétien government pointedly ignored the strong signals emanating from Washington inviting it to join in a restructuring that might have turned NORAD into a binational homeland defence command. Rebuffed, Washington proceeded in 2002 to create its own entity, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the first American combatant command that had as its area of operations the North American continent. Canada followed suit with its own military restructuring, which initially involved a homeland defence command, Canada Command. Not only were NORAD’s tasks and principal structures left unchanged at the time, but the organization seemed to be in danger of being left out as the two homeland defence commands turned to one another as natural partners and interlocutors. The two governments, in the wake of their obvious inability to reach an agreement, rushed to create a high-profile Binational Study Group based at the NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. The effort fizzled entirely, although not before the group issued a final report that included a discussion of not only strengthening NORAD but also downgrading it to a secondary command that would support USNORTHCOM and Canada Command.

There followed the most visible disagreement in recent years between Ottawa and Washington over North American strategic defence, a dispute that appeared to be capable of threatening NORAD at its very core. The George W. Bush administration, after withdrawing the US from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, proceeded to deploy a limited missile defence system in 2002 to protect the US from attacks by rogue states such as North Korea. After initially agreeing in August 2004 that NORAD (and thus the Canadians in Colorado Springs) could support the missile defence system, Canadian prime minister Paul Martin announced in February 2005 that Canada (and thus NORAD) would not participate directly in its operation.

As recounted by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, Bill Graham, then minister of national defence, was expecting a painful discussion when he reached Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy secretary of defense, (and legendary neo-con hawk), to inform him of the Martin government’s decision. However, Wolfowitz, described by Stein and Lang as “Rumsfeld’s ruthless deputy” and “chief Vulcan,” “surprised Graham with his response.” He told the minister that “he fully appreciated the Canadian position and decision, that he understood the delicacy of the matter in Canada. In a respectful way, Wolfowitz emphasized that the U.S. was going ahead with the project regardless and didn’t need Canada in [ballistic missile defence (BMD)] from an operational perspective. With some generosity he told Graham that the US would remain open to continuing discussions with Canada if ‘you change your mind. We will keep talking to you about BMD.’” ³

In the meantime, Colorado Springs adapted in a smooth and accommodating manner to the two Canadian decisions. This was not the first time that NORAD had to adjust to the domestically driven peculiarities of Canadian defence policy. Although not quite “seamless,” procedures were put in place in the NORAD/USNORTHCOM operations centre allowing the Canadians to continue to have, alongside Americans, the key roles in warning and assessment, while standing back from the decisions to deploy the missile defence system, which would be taken by Americans wearing USNORTHCOM hats. But the nagging question arose of how enduring these arrangements would be, especially as the US brought on more missile defence related systems. It might grow increasingly difficult to fit the Canadians and NORAD in. And might the US eventually lose its patience with Canada? These questions seemed especially germane when, contrary to some expectations in Canada, missile defence was far from abandoned by Washington once the Bush administration left office. Indeed, in February 2013 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel suddenly announced that, in response to the growing threat from North Korea, 14 new interceptors would be added to the 30 already in place in California and Alaska. Moreover, for a number of years, Washington has been working with allies overseas to bring them under the protection of missile defence systems, a policy Ottawa has supported within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This has left Canada in the odd position within the Western alliance of closely supporting missile defence but not fully benefiting from it.

Does the Harper government’s new interest in missile defence mean that it is worried about NORAD’s future? If so, it need not. Not only have the US and Canada managed to work out and adjust their differences, but the future of NORAD as both a strategically valuable and enduring icon of US–Canadian defence relations appears to be more assured than at any time since 9/11. Contrary to the fears of some in Canada, the BMD train has not left the station as far as NORAD is concerned. Indeed, for its part, the United States appears willing to wait for Canada to get on board at its leisure. This mutually comfortable situation is possible for two reasons. First, Washington is already getting all it needs from Canada on BMD through NORAD. Neither Canadian territory nor airspace is required to make the system work, although Canada could in the future contribute its territory to improving the system by hosting sensors or even interceptors. Put simply, as had been made clear in the American response to Ottawa’s 2005 decision, the continued Canadian reluctance to fully embrace a BMD role for NORAD does not threaten US national security interests or impinge upon American freedom of action when it comes to the missile defence of the American homeland.

Second, and critically, the Americans in Colorado Springs responsible for strategic defence are anxious to continue to fit the Canadians in. In other words, they want NORAD to work and have continually put in place the arrangements to keep it working, in spite of the Canadian government’s reservations about missile defence. Several years ago, a senior Canadian government official, seeking to explain how Canada remains embedded in NORAD despite the country’s quite limited contributions, said that the Americans simply had acquired “the habit” of working closely with Canadians. ⁴ It is a powerful habit; there is no sign of their losing it any time soon. In particular, as new missile defence elements have come online, the Americans have made sure that the Canadians would not be squeezed out of the warning and assessment function, NORAD’s core role. This has been made possible by the slow growth of limited US missile defence systems; NORAD could adapt at the behest of the Americans. This might no longer be the case if the US quickly moved to a thick system. But that is not in the cards. This oddly persistent American habit of wanting the Canadians in should not in the least be taken to mean that, in the age of missile defence, national lines are being erased in Colorado Springs, that the uniforms don’t mean anything anymore. After all, the missile defence system is solely in American hands. Moreover, there are plenty of screens in the NORAD/USNORTHCOM operations centre that the Americans keep the Canadians, even in their privileged position, from viewing. The point simply is that the Americans have embraced ways to work around those limitations that allow NORAD, and its personnel of both Canadians and Americans, to retain the command’s warning and assessment function. There is no sign that this is going to change any time soon. ⁵

Meanwhile, USNORTHCOM hasn’t swallowed up NORAD, as some feared would happen a decade ago. While USNORTHCOM did meet expectations in establishing a working relationship first with Canada Command and then with the Canadian Joint Operations Command that subsumed Canada Command, there still is no indication that this relationship is going to eclipse the binational command. A “Tricommand Agreement” has been put in place. Since the 2006 renewal, NORAD has a new responsibility for “maritime domain awareness” that has taken it beyond its exclusively aerospatial tasks. Since the US Navy tends to approach maritime domain awareness from a global, forward projection perspective and because, in both the US and Canada, responsibility for maritime homeland security and defence is already shared by a wide range of military and civilian organizations, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Coast Guard, and the Royal Canadian Navy, it was unclear from the beginning what specific role NORAD would play. It can be said, though, that NORAD officials are quite aware of a key structural limitation. The command is a passive recipient of maritime information and cannot “task” others to provide it. NORAD officials have been considering a series of proposals to address this challenge. If they are eventually approved by the two defence establishments, i.e., if NORAD receives “tasking” authority of some kind or other, it will be a strong signal that the command’s role in maritime domain awareness will endure and strengthen. At the same time, should NORAD’s new maritime role not significantly expand, or should it eventually be decided to forego even a modest maritime role for the binational command, bilateral maritime homeland security relations between the US and Canada will still continue through existing linkages between respective national agencies. NORAD’s continuation does not depend on the adoption or expansion of this still uncertain role.

Although Canadians can today be more confident about NORAD’s future, notwithstanding their government’s position on BMD, it is still a good thing that the two parliamentary committees have called North American defence into question. It is time for a debate in Canada not about any side effects of potential Canadian participation in the system, such as “saving” NORAD, but about whether Canada wants to be protected by the system against missiles that might be directed against it in the future by North Korea, Iran, and perhaps other states.

It will no doubt come as a surprise to many Canadians that they may not be protected by the US missile system. Doesn’t that old US “involuntary guarantee of Canadian security” R.J. Sutherland identified in the pages of International Journal long ago extend to protection against missile strikes? Doesn’t the missile defence work like the air defence in the Cold War? ⁶ Well, no. A Soviet bomber detected over northern Canada could have been headed to either Vancouver or San Francisco. It was in the strong interest of the Americans to intercept it, in cooperation with their Canadian partner in NORAD, as early as possible. On the other hand, today’s US missile defence system can assess the trajectory of incoming missiles; the defenders eventually will know what the targets are going to be before the impact. The American in command will have to choose whether to attempt to intercept.

Surely the Americans would not allow a missile to strike Vancouver, some might suggest. That is not quite as clear as it may seem—especially when one takes into consideration that the more “shots” the defence takes with its interceptors against an incoming missile the greater the chance of destroying it. For now there are only going to be 34 interceptors available. Depending upon the circumstances, then, saving Vancouver would come at the cost of decreasing the protection available for American cities. The USNORTHCOM commander might still give the order, if only because Vancouver is close to the US border. Such a decision would be in line with vague public statements made by US officials, indicating that the Canadian border areas would fall under the protection of the system. But the only way to provide a guaranteed level of protection for Canada, especially for cities away from the border such as Edmonton, would be for Canada to join in the system.

But surely the North Koreans or Iranians would not strike at Canada? The best answer to that is another question: How sure are you, especially since Canadian territory, unlike that of the US (and major US allies overseas), does not more securely fall under the coverage of a defence system? While mulling over how much protection they want from North Korean and Iranian missiles, Canadians should pause to consider at the same time how much their major urban areas need fighter coverage against hijacked aircraft. Here, too, there may be a surprise in store for many. Before 9/11, Canada’s air defences under NORAD’s aegis, like those of the US, would have been postured to deal with threats entering North America, with fighters based at Bagotville, Quebec, and Cold Lake, Alberta. And after the attacks, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), like the American, extended its coverage, by locating CF-18 s at Comox, British Columbia and Trenton, Ontario. Unlike the US Air Force, however, the RCAF has now largely defaulted to its pre-9/11 levels, leaving southern Canadian cities without immediate fighter coverage. This may be fine; Canadian cities may not be prime targets for hijackers, and improved airport security and intelligence gathering may have blunted this threat. But here, too, the question is “How sure are you?” and that question should be part of the national debate.

The preoccupation with NORAD’s structures and how Canada fits in has allowed advocates for a Canadian missile defence role to argue that Ottawa should say yes to missile defence for the sake of preserving NORAD and, by symbolic extension and by implication, close bilateral defence relations with Washington—regardless of what Canadians think about the strategic benefits and technological feasibility of missile defence. These advocates also point to the inconsistency inherent in Canada’s support for missile defence for the NATO countries in Europe while at the same time holding to its continued opposition for a similar capability for Canada itself. But as noted, from the American perspective, NORAD can accommodate bilateral differences over missile defence. Washington is more bemused than upset about Ottawa’s position on missile defence, a position that seems to suggest that the Canadian government favours it for any part of the world other than Canada.

For their part, critics of missile defence have been allowed to cast the Canadian decision to stay out of the business as a litmus test of Ottawa’s willingness to buck American pressure simply for the sake of preserving NORAD regardless of the technical and strategic shortcomings of the program and, for some critics, its adverse arms control implications. For this group, saying no to ballistic missile defence is all about reinforcing the internal and external perception of Canadian sovereignty and independence vis-a-vis the US, regardless of the implications for the future of NORAD.

Both sides need to focus on the key substantive point about Canada and missile defence. What Canadians should be debating is the protection of Canada. The real issue is not whether Washington will continue to welcome close continental defence ties with Ottawa through NORAD. The Americans have made it clear in word, and especially in deed, that they will. Rather, the question is whether Ottawa is prepared to take the next steps with regard to missile defence, as well as in support of the less discussed but no less crucial air defence mission, so that NORAD can better protect Canada.

The Senate committee suggests a number of ways for Canada to partner with the US in North American missile defence or, failing that, to augment Canada’s contributions to other aspects of continental defence, such as space surveillance or the maritime dimension, in order to compensate for not directly participating in missile defence. ⁷ However, the easiest ways for Canada to participate directly in North American missile defence, and thus to provide for its own protection against the missile threat, would be to simply make a financial contribution and detach personnel to the missile defence sites in the US. While it is easy to imagine an interceptor or two being painted to bear the RCAF’s roundel and initials, or the well-known Canada word mark with the flag, that probably would not be necessary. There is considerable pressure in the US Congress to build an additional interceptor site in the US northeast. If that happens, it would offer a special opportunity for Canadian involvement either at the site or through the deployment of a sensor in eastern Canada.

Whatever the nature of Canadian participation on the ground, it would open the door for Ottawa to propose to Washington that North American missile defence become, as was originally intended before Canada got cold feet, a full NORAD mission. This would entail first, an adjustment of the procedures for allocating interceptors to targets (the “algorithm” it is called) to a binationally acceptable level of protection for Canadian cities. Second, in the NORAD/USNORTHCOM operations centre, Canadian officers, like their US counterparts, would be able to recommend in the case of attack the release of missile defence intercepts, and a Canadian general on duty as the assessor of an attack would be able to make that decision.

NORAD will be fine without a direct Canadian role in missile defence. Rather, Canada should become directly involved in missile defence to protect itself. To be sure, direct Canadian participation in the missile defence system under NORAD’s aegis would enhance the role of the command in bilateral security relations and have a positive impact on overall US–Canada security relations; but such a change in Canadian policy is not necessary to assure NORAD’s continuance. And as it takes steps to participate directly in BMD under NORAD, Ottawa should also address the present deficiencies in Canada’s air defence posture. It is not, then, the future of the storied binational command that Canadians should be focusing on; rather, it is the future of Canada’s ability to protect itself from the traditional air and new missile threats that endanger its national sovereignty and security, the future of NORAD notwithstanding.