A Spectrum of Autonomy: Towards a Theoretical Framework of Strategic Autonomy

In recent years, the term “strategic autonomy” has gained significant traction, especially among states seeking to avoid being caught up in great power competitions, most notably, the US-China rivalry. ¹ Although strategic autonomy was discussed almost exclusively within a European or Indian context during the post-Cold War era, contemporary scholars have applied the concept to a much wider array of geopolitical scenarios. ² However, strategic autonomy goes far beyond managing entrapment risks. On a more general level, pursuing strategic autonomy could be viewed as a way for states to cope with an increasingly volatile, complex, and ambiguous strategic environment, which is often characterized by abrupt political changes and widespread socioeconomic disruptions on regional and global levels.

Despite the increasing prominence of the term in foreign policy discourses and academic circles, there is no authoritative definition of strategic autonomy. A survey of the literature reveals that existing studies tend to either: i) define the term in highly specific terms that may not generalize well to other contexts; ii) conceptualize strategic autonomy in overly generic terms that obscure its meaning; or iii) assume that there is already a shared understanding of the term. Scholars often use the same term to mean different things and make different arguments, which risks them talking past each other instead of engaging in direct and meaningful debates. For instance, one recent study defines strategic autonomy as “the leeway available to the strategic actor to choose, adopt, and pursue achievable ends, within a relevant timeframe, given the power capabilities available, and their effectiveness in the prevailing circumstances.” ³ In contrast, another study defines strategic autonomy (in the European context) as “the institutional capacity to independently plan and conduct military operations across the full spectrum of conflict.” ⁴ The discrepancy in the way researchers use the term leads to conceptual confusion, which prevents us from developing the concept and employing it to explain complex empirical puzzles, such as: Is it possible to argue that some actors have more strategic autonomy than others? To what extent does a state's application to become a member of an alliance, such as NATO, increase or decrease its autonomy? More generally, why are some actors more driven to pursue autonomy than others?

The primary objective of this article is to develop a precise conceptualization of strategic autonomy that is applicable to both states and strategic actors such as the EU. ⁵ To that end, the first section explores the dual historical roots of strategic autonomy and how recent scholars have defined this term across diverse contexts. It then argues that the way the literature has hitherto defined this term creates more conceptual and empirical confusion than clarity. The second section advances a novel framework, which views strategic autonomy as part of a spectrum of autonomy. According to this framework, strategic autonomy is the highest level of autonomy that any actor can attain. Consequently, the third section lays the groundwork for a comprehensive theory on how and why actors pursue strategic autonomy, by providing some preliminary answers to questions such as: First, why does the international system incentivize states to seek autonomy, besides security? Second, what are the key trade-offs that actors face when pursuing strategic autonomy?

Strategic autonomy: Past and present

One of the key obstacles toward a unified understanding of what constitutes strategic autonomy is its emergence from disparate geopolitical contexts. Specifically, it was developed and evolved within both European and Indian foreign policy discourses in roughly the same era, with strategists from each region shaping and interpreting the concept in a way that best aligns with their own unique geopolitical realities.

The full spectrum of autonomy

This section seeks to unpack the concept of autonomy, arguing that instead of viewing an entity as simply having or not having strategic autonomy, it would be more fruitful to place it on a spectrum of autonomy that ranges from no autonomy (lowest) to strategic autonomy (highest), with three levels between the two extremes (Figure 1).

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Figure 1.

The full spectrum of autonomy.

First, a political actor may fall under the direct control of a foreign power, which results in the complete loss of autonomy. This almost always occurs through military conquest, where the successful invader seizes the territory and exercises complete control over the political machinery of the conquered state, invariably disregarding the interests and needs of the local population. Thus, an actor is said to have no autonomy when it has completely lost the ability to exercise political control over its population and therefore cannot determine its own fate in the broadest sense of the term. Historically, this was the fate of many states.

A prime example is the annexation of the Kingdom of Poland by its neighbouring powers —Russia, Prussia, and Austria—during the late eighteenth century, in a series of events known as the Partitions of Poland. By 1795, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth effectively ceased to exist, as its territories were completely absorbed into the territories of the conquering powers. The state lost all autonomy, as it fell under the direct governance of these foreign powers which made decisions with little consideration for local Polish interests or needs. ³⁰ Another well-known example is Korea in the early twentieth century. In 1910, Korea was annexed by the Empire of Japan following a treaty whose article 1 stipulated that “His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes the complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea.” ³¹ This began a period of Japanese colonial rule that lasted until the end of the Second World War in 1945. During this time, Korea was ruled by a Japanese governor general, its economy was reoriented to serve Japanese interests, and its people were subjected to forced cultural assimilation. ³²

Actors can sometimes find themselves left with a symbolic level of autonomy. Symbolic autonomy represents a subtle, nuanced state of dependence that stands in contrast to the complete loss of sovereignty experienced by conquered states. While a conquered nation has clearly lost all capacity for self-determination, as it no longer exercises sovereignty over its own territory, a political actor with symbolic autonomy is allowed to maintain a facade of independence and some degree of autonomy regarding lesser matters, especially in the realm of domestic politics. This is typically done by leaving the domestic governance structures and some internal policies intact, even as the more substantive elements of statehood, particularly in foreign policy and other decisions regarding vital national interests, are dictated by the dominating state. There can be many reasons for leaving a weak state with symbolic autonomy. By allowing some minimal degree of autonomy, the patron nation can effectively control the client state without having to administer it directly. This reduces the economic and administrative burden associated with direct rule and can also mitigate local resistance by preserving some semblance of self-governance. More importantly, it often serves the international image of the dominant power, by allowing it to avoid the negative optics associated with overt imperialism.

One popular example of a state that only enjoys symbolic autonomy is post-WWII Japan. While Emperor Hirohito was allowed to remain on the imperial throne as the symbolic figurehead, it was General Douglas MacArthur who exercised real political control between 1945 and 1952 (when the Treaty of San Francisco started to take effect). During that period, the Japanese political system and society underwent comprehensive radical reforms, most notably with a new constitution that explicitly forbids Japan to have a military or use force to settle international disputes. ³³ However, as the Cold War began to heat up in the late 1940s and particularly following the outbreak of the Korean War, the US rapidly reversed course to relax its harsh occupation policies and allow more autonomy for Japan, effectively turning it into a key ally. ³⁴ Another well-known example of a state that was left with only a symbolic level of autonomy is China under the late Qing dynasty. The Chinese government during this period was coerced into signing a series of unequal treaties that began after the First Opium War (1839–1842) with the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which required China to open its ports to British trade and cede Hong Kong to Great Britain, among other demands. ³⁵ In 1901, the Qing government was again forced to sign the Boxer Protocol, which left its political system intact but severely compromised Chinese sovereignty by designating certain areas as exclusive zones for the foreign powers and allowed them to station troops on Chinese soil. ³⁶

Most actors in the international system, however, exercise a meaningful yet limited degree of autonomy. They tend to enjoy the highest degree of independence in domestic affairs and to a lesser extent in areas of foreign policy that do not conflict with the interests of more powerful nations or international norms. Actors with limited autonomy are capable of formulating and implementing policies, and of pursuing their strategic goals within the confines of their resources and capabilities. They can actively negotiate and engage in bilateral and multilateral treaties and are active participants in the global community. Nevertheless, their autonomy is considered limited because it tends to be constrained by tangible factors such as the lack of hard power, asymmetric economic dependence, security alliances, and intangible factors such as international norms and institutions. Due to these limitations, these actors often find their policy choices, particularly in foreign affairs and vital security matters, significantly constrained or even dictated by the interests of more powerful nations or pressures of international institutions. Most importantly, their lack of hard power capabilities often limits their ability to project power and influence independently, which puts a cap on their ability enforce their interests and policies on the global stage.

It is possible to argue that South Korea is a state that exercises meaningful but limited autonomy. Its dynamic economy and vibrant democratic society allow South Korea a significant degree of domestic autonomy and influence on the international stage, particularly in the realm of technology, global economics, and pop culture. It also participates actively in multilateral institutions and maintains a level of independent policy-making. However, its geographical proximity to and complicated relationship with North Korea, coupled with the significant presence of US military forces, put substantial constraints on its autonomy. More specifically, this situation requires South Korea's military-diplomatic policies to focus on its immediate vicinity and be closely aligned with US policies.

Middle powers and regional powers that closely ally with a greater power but maintain the capacity to exert significant influence in their own region are typically states with robust autonomy. While they may have independent diplomatic strategies, they usually lack the hard power and geopolitical influence to fully achieve strategic goals without any external support. Thus, they typically peg some key aspects of their foreign policy on a more powerful nation, while maintaining a meaningful degree of independence in lesser matters. The more dominant partner will invariably set the agenda for collaboration on most shared issues and common goals, but a state with robust autonomy retains the freedom to make independent decisions on issues vital to its interests. This relationship is therefore often characterized by mutual agreement and cooperation, rather than control and coercion. Overall, states that have attained robust autonomy can pursue and execute independent policies most issues that they consider critical, but often lack the capacity to implement a comprehensive and sustained strategy over the long haul.

The UK and France are two typical states that have attained robust autonomy, each striking a unique balance between alliance commitments and autonomous decision-making. While undeniably an influential actor in Europe and beyond, the UK, particularly under the leadership of Tony Blair, has chosen to align closely with US foreign policy. During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, despite considerable opposition at home and within the broader international community, the UK chose to fully back the US, which reflects their “special relationship.” Yet, even within this partnership, the UK has sometimes diverged from the US on key issues, such as its continued support for the Iran Nuclear Deal in opposition to the US's withdrawal under Trump. ³⁷

In contrast, France has hitherto exhibited a staunch commitment to an independent foreign policy approach, even at the risk of alienating its close allies. Its pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent during the Cold War and its withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966 are testaments to France's determined pursuit of autonomy. In 2003, under President Jacques Chirac, France threatened to veto any security council that would have authorized military actions in Iraq. ³⁸ Despite these independent stances, France has limited capacity to independently execute its preferred policies, evident by its repeated failures to persuade other European nations to build a military force outside of NATO's structure.

At the apex of the spectrum lies strategic autonomy, which is the most comprehensive level of autonomy. Two key factors are critical to the attainment of strategic autonomy: robust national capabilities and an independent policy orientation. First, an actor must possess comprehensive national power, including a combination of military might (usually including a nuclear arsenal), economic vitality, and diplomatic clout. Only with sufficient hard power could it ensure its own security and navigate international affairs without being reliant on external assistance. In the modern world, this often requires an actor to secure a stable supply chain of strategic resources (such as oil and rare earth) and to be self-reliant in critical industries such as the defence and chip-manufacturing industries. More often than not, the actor would need to possess a nuclear arsenal, as nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent in today's world, helping states resist being coerced by stronger powers.

An independent policy orientation is also one of the core prerequisites for strategic autonomy. Such a stance signifies the political will to act unilaterally, when necessary, despite countervailing pressures including international rules and norms. This is not to argue that they necessarily remain unentangled. While these states may still benefit from close alliances and partnerships, they are not dependent on them for their security or economic prosperity. Furthermore, attaining strategic autonomy does not necessarily lead to great power status, as being able to project power beyond its borders and be recognized as an influential international actor are not defining features of strategic autonomy. Ultimately, the essence of strategic autonomy is having the capacity to execute preferred policies on vital strategic matters at any chosen moment, despite countervailing pressures. Strategic autonomy is therefore qualitatively different from other levels of autonomy because it is sustainable over the long term, comprehensive (covering all aspects, including vital matters), and resilient even in the face of the strongest countervailing pressure.

In the modern era, the clearest example of an actor that has attained strategic autonomy is the US. Having a potent combination of military supremacy, economic strength, and unmatched diplomatic presence enables the US to exert influence across the full spectrum of international politics. With unparalleled capabilities, a dense network of alliances and military bases across all key regions, as well as an influential voice in international institutions, the US can often act independently without being overly constrained by the policies or opposition of other states. This is particularly apparent in its highly unpopular invasion of Iraq in 2003 and military intervention in Libya following the Arab Spring. A less autonomous state would have likely caved under international pressure to refrain from drastic military actions. American strategic autonomy is also evident in Richard Nixon's radical decision to abandon its Taiwanese ally and recognize the PRC as one of the five permanent members in the Security Council following Nixon's visit to China. ³⁹ In all of these cases, the US asserted its strategic autonomy by showing its willingness to take unilateral or drastic actions to defend its vital interests, even when encountering significant resistance from others (including some of its closest allies).

Similarly, twenty-first century China is an indisputable case of an actor successfully attaining strategic autonomy. The scale and scope of China's military buildup is such that some are concerned that the US will not be able to deter it from forcefully recovering Taiwan in the near future. ⁴⁰ In the South China Sea, China's continued militarization of the dispute in the face of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling starkly demonstrates its robust autonomy. ⁴¹ Furthermore, China has deftly crafted a robust network of regional and international institutions, which include the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, presenting an alternative axis to the US-centric order. However, China's strategic autonomy is most vivid in its steadfast alliance with Russia, undeterred by Western attempts to isolate Moscow following the Ukraine crisis, and unyielding even in the face of the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. Additionally, China's technological leapfrogging in key future domains like 5G and artificial intelligence not only underscores its strategic autonomy but also heralds its emergence as a formidable tech power. Collectively, China's measurable capabilities and its behaviour demonstrate that it can independently navigate international politics and shape the strategic environment, often in defiance of countervailing pressures.

Note that this spectrum of autonomy presented above, which ranges from no autonomy to strategic autonomy, only represents ideal types or archetypes. They are theoretical constructs designed to aid our understanding of the various degrees of autonomy that states can attain. These categories provide us with a highly simplified model that helps to describe, analyze, and differentiate the complex realities of state behaviour in the international system. However, the reality of international politics is far more nuanced and fluid than our model can capture. States may display characteristics that fall into multiple categories, and their positions on the spectrum may change slightly or radically over time due to shifts in domestic politics, international events, economic trends, or other factors. This framework should therefore not be taken as a rigid classification system. Any attempt to classify a specific country should be done with a recognition of these complexities and limitations, and with the understanding that exceptions and variations are to be expected.

The presented framework also makes it clear that strategic autonomy is neither a tool, nor a diplomatic approach. As the highest level of autonomy that any actor can realistically attain, it is a vital interest that many pursue to ensure their security and prosperity in an increasingly uncertain and complex environment. Strategic autonomy is therefore distinct from related (and often conflated) concepts such as non-alignment, isolationism, and hedging.

Non-alignment, a policy championed by countries like India and Yugoslavia during the Cold War, involves maintaining a position of neutrality between major power blocs. ⁴² However, non-alignment does not necessarily equate to strategic autonomy because while a strategically autonomous state can decide to remain non-aligned, a non-aligned state is not necessarily strategically autonomous. In fact, its non-aligned status may be imposed by external agents (such as buffer states between two great powers), which suggests a lack of strategic autonomy.

Similarly, hedging cannot be equated with strategic autonomy. As Seng Tan points out, “hedging is not the same as passive neutrality or fence-sitting” and should be better characterized as a foreign policy approach that involves maintaining a delicate balance in relations with competing major powers to prevent being dominated by any single one. ⁴³ States that adopt this strategy tend to maintain fluid and informal alliances, not committing entirely to one bloc or power. While a state that chooses a hedging strategy necessarily has some meaningful degree of autonomy, a strategically autonomous state may or may not choose to hedge depending on its goals.

Lastly, isolationism, often ascribed to US foreign policy during the pre-WWI period, involves a self-imposed detachment from global affairs to focus on domestic issues. ⁴⁴ While this approach may suggest a degree of autonomy, it is fundamentally different from strategic autonomy. An isolationist state shuns international engagement and seeks autarchy in as many areas as possible, whereas a strategically autonomous state engages on its own terms, actively shaping regional and global dynamics rather than merely avoiding them.

In sum, strategic autonomy encapsulates an actor's ability to pursue its national interests and uphold its values, free from the dominant influence of other states. This is distinct from non-alignment, isolationism, and hedging, which are examples of specific strategic choices an actor could pursue if it had a significant degree of autonomy.

The discussion thus far has mostly taken a state-centric view since states are still the most fundamental actors in international politics. However, we argue that the framework presented can be also extended to international institutions, from the EU to ASEAN. As international bodies are often intergovernmental in nature, their degree of autonomy is typically negotiated and agreed upon by the member states, and may vary based on the structure of the institution. Some institutions, such as the European Central Bank, have extensive autonomy to enact policies and enforce rules, while others, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, primarily serve as forums for member states to coordinate their policies. One important distinction is that because these institutions are not sovereign states, they cannot be conquered in the traditional sense and, therefore, the lowest level of autonomy for institutions should be symbolic. In theory, an international institution may reach the level of strategic autonomy, yet, in reality, such a strategically autonomous institution should be rare given that it would require a group of states to agree to provide it with significant resources and a strong mandate to act independently on the world stage. Most international institutions are expected to have either symbolic or limited autonomy. They should be heavily constrained by powerful states’ influence yet are seldom completely captured by one or a group of member states. Overall, their position on the spectrum is often dynamic and subject to change based on factors such as shifts in global power balance, changes in their membership, or reforms to their internal governance structures.

Toward a theory of strategic autonomy

While developing a full-fledged theory of how and why states pursue strategic autonomy is beyond the scope of this article, this article seeks to establish a foundation for such a theory by offering preliminary answers for two fundamental questions. First, why does the international system incentivize state and non-state actors to seek autonomy, besides security? Second, what are the key trade-offs that they usually face when pursuing strategic autonomy?

Despite their disagreements, neo-realists and neoliberals essentially agree that the anarchic structure of the international system, coupled with varying distributions of power among states, incentivize all units of the international system to behave as if they were in a self-help environment to ensure their survival. ⁴⁵ Without an ultimate arbiter, states are understandably driven to safeguard their own security. However, this does not mean that their physical survival is always under threat, or more precisely, that most states do not face existential threats on a daily basis. In fact, “state death” is rare, and scenarios where states abruptly cease to exist are even more infrequent. ⁴⁶ Given that state death results in the total loss of autonomy, we argue that before states face truly dire threats that could endanger their survival, they almost always face a gradual loss of autonomy. It therefore follows that while security is the most critical goal of any state, the more proximate goal would be to strive for more autonomy and safeguarding that autonomy. An actor that has robust autonomy can pursue a variety of goals, including but not limited to milieu goals that allow them to shape a desirable environment and safeguard their identity (often referred to as “ontological security”). ⁴⁷ This is why some scholars propose that international politics is better conceptualized as a “struggle for autonomy.” ⁴⁸ More specifically, because states are not always in threat-response mode, their more fundamental motivation would be to possess the capacity to act based on their own interests (instead of external pressures) and sustain that capacity well into the future. ⁴⁹ If offensive realism claims that any great power's dream goal would be to achieve hegemony, then a theory of strategic autonomy would likely suggest that the goal of any state would be to attain strategic autonomy.

States may face steep trade-offs when seeking strategic autonomy. The pursuit of strategic autonomy invariably involves balancing the benefits of independence against the costs and risks associated with reduced cooperation and potential isolation. For example, a state seeking to reduce dependence on a more dominant ally almost always risks straining relationships, which could potentially jeopardize access to resources or support in critical scenarios. Furthermore, achieving self-reliance in critical industries, which is a prerequisite for strategic autonomy, is a long-term and resource-intensive commitment that most states could not afford. Moreover, a too assertive pursuit of autonomy might provoke backlash from other states (often great powers), leading to increased security threats. States might also have to grapple with internal trade-offs. For instance, because the quest for strategic autonomy tends to begin in military/strategic affairs, a state would have to divert funds from other critical areas such as social development to invest in stronger hard power capabilities. Therefore, achieving strategic autonomy often involves a complex process of balancing competing interests and managing both external and internal pressures. This is why most states do not strive for strategic autonomy, as they are essentially content with middling levels of autonomy. Only the most determined and geopolitically gifted states are likely to ever attain this ultimate level of autonomy.

A comprehensive theory of strategic autonomy should identify the main factors that drive a state's pursuit of such autonomy and specify the key assumptions behind such a theory. It should take into account the different elements that affect a state's capacity and motivation to pursue autonomy, ranging from geopolitical positioning and economic strength to domestic political dynamics and technological capabilities. Furthermore, this theory should address how a state manages the trade-offs when seeking strategic autonomy, including the challenge of balancing the need for reducing costs of security with the costs of independence, which are most clearly reflected in the tension between investing in military capabilities and addressing domestic needs. It should also consider the broader consequences of a state's pursuit of autonomy, both for its relations with other states and the stability of the international system as a whole.

Conclusion

This article has examined how the literature defines the concept of strategic autonomy, arguing that despite the term's popularity, there is a lack of a shared understanding, which creates conceptual confusion and empirical uncertainty. Scholars either employ the term in highly specific ways that suit their own contexts or avoid defining precisely what they mean by strategic autonomy. As a result, strategic autonomy has become a catchall phrase that cannot be distinguished from related terms such as autarky, non-alignment, or hedging. This article advances a novel way of thinking about strategic autonomy, arguing that it belongs on a spectrum of autonomy that ranges from no autonomy to strategic autonomy. According to this framework, most actors enjoy levels of autonomy that fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Only a few that have sufficiently robust capabilities and independent policy orientations can attain strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, because autonomy plays a vital role in ensuring security and prosperity, actors should be strongly incentivized to pursue higher degrees of autonomy.

While there is no shortage of empirical studies on strategic autonomy, this article also makes the case that this concept has been undertheorized. It therefore proposes that future scholars work toward a comprehensive theory of strategic autonomy. This theory should not only explore the key factors that motivate a state's quest for strategic autonomy, but should also clarify the inherent trade-offs that states confront in their journey towards strategic autonomy. Doing so would allow us to answer why some countries, such as India, Indonesia and Vietnam, are more strongly motivated than others to seek higher levels of autonomy. Lastly, a comprehensive theory should also consider how others would react to these states’ pursuits of strategic autonomy. Such theory could equip policymakers with invaluable insights to understand the aspirations, strategies, and potential consequences of states seeking strategic autonomy, enabling them to craft more effective and context-specific foreign policies. As the global landscape becomes increasingly complex and uncertain, a deeper understanding of strategic autonomy will be essential to navigate the intricate dynamics of international politics in the twenty-first century.