Trends in Political Science Research: Economic Sanctions

Introduction

The use of economic sanctions has evolved significantly in international relations. After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson championed sanctions as a “peaceful, silent, deadly remedy,” proposing them as an alternative to military intervention. However, sanctions in the late 1930s and early 1940s contributed to the outbreak of World War II, revealing their potential to escalate conflicts rather than prevent them. Contrary to Wilson’s vision, the post-Cold War era witnessed a surge in the use of multilateral sanctions, where multiple nations coordinate efforts to apply economic pressure on target states (Drezner, 2022). Additionally, the concept of weaponized interdependence - the idea that interconnected economies can be exploited for coercive purposes - has enabled major powers like the United States and China to unilaterally impose sanctions, leveraging their significant economic influence to advance political objectives more effectively (Kong, 2019). Economic sanctions thus serve as coercive tools by which one country, or a group of countries, seeks to compel another nation to alter its behavior. The goal is to impose economic hardship on the target state, making its current policies less sustainable and more likely to change in response to the pressure. This highlights the strategic importance of sanctions in modern international relations, where economic measures are increasingly used to shape global political outcomes (Liou et al., 2020).

Unlike traditional military interventions, which are typically state-driven and direct in their approach, economic sanctions are a complex and multifaceted tool, involving not only states but also various other actors, such as international co-operation (Drezner, 2022), private enterprises (Peksen & Peterson 2022), and civil society (Rosyidin & Dir, 2020). Far from being a straightforward, zero-sum strategy of power politics, sanctions often have profound and far-reaching effects on the people within the targeted country, particularly the most vulnerable populations (Pospieszna et al., 2019; Perry, 2021; Liou et al., 2020; Park & Bridges, 2021; Raynor, 2022). These measures can exacerbate existing inequalities, deprive citizens of essential goods and services, and significantly impact human rights, creating widespread social and humanitarian crises (Liou et al., 2020; McLean & Whang, 2019). The political repercussions are equally significant, as sanctions can either weaken or reinforce the authority of the regime in power, depending on how they are implemented and the internal dynamics of the target country. Due to these complexities, the success or failure of economic sanctions hinges on several interrelated factors. For instance, the economic resilience of the targeted nation plays a crucial role, as countries with diversified economies or alternative trading partners may better withstand external pressure (Kavakli et al., 2020; Guter-Sandu & Kuznetsova, 2020). The extent of international support is also key, as widely backed sanctions tend to isolate the target more effectively and prevent it from finding loopholes or alternative allies (Erickson, 2019; Drezner, 2022; deLisle, 2022). Additionally, the ability of the sanctioned regime to forge new economic relationships with other states or non-state actors can undermine the intended impact of the sanctions. Ultimately, these conditions influence whether sanctions achieve the desired policy changes or result in unintended consequences (Erickson. 2019).

This article examines the current state of literature on economic sanctions and related concepts. It sets three main objectives: a) to explore the meaning and aims of sanctions, as well as the factors that influence their success or failure; b) to understand the connection between domestic political goals and the trajectory of economic sanctions; and c) to identify the non-economic costs associated with sanctions, considering a broader perspective. Overall, the article aims to offer a comprehensive assessment and organization of a rapidly evolving field that is often analyzed through an economic lens despite its significant social and political implications.

Decoding the Enigma of Sanctions: Factors of Success and Failure

Before analyzing the factors that determine the effectiveness of sanctions, it is crucial to look at the definitions and objectives of sanctions provided in the existing literature. A sanctions crisis begins when one or more sanctioning states (the “sender/s”) threaten to restrict economic interactions with a target state unless it modifies a specific policy. If the target complies, the crisis resolves with a policy change, reflecting a mutual adjustment. However, if the target resists, sanctions are imposed, disrupting trade until one side relents. Thus, the effectiveness depends on more than just inflicting pain on the target country, as simply maximizing costs can lead to unintended consequences and may not achieve the desired outcome or even weaken the target state’s ability to pursue the objectionable policy in question. It is equally important for senders to have clear and specific goals in mind and to communicate them effectively. Without a clear understanding of what is expected, sanctions can be less effective and even counterproductive (Kavakli et al., 2020; Drezner, 2022; Silva & Selden, 2019).

Current scholarship on sanctions argues that the extent of economic harm and political costs faced by the involved parties largely determines the success or failure of sanctions. Starting with economic factors, sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender has a comparative advantage in goods exported to the target, while they are likely to fail if the target’s export portfolio is diverse or if the target holds a comparative advantage in its own exports (Kavakli et al., 2020; Pospieszna et al., 2019). For example, Norway yielded to Chinese pressure after awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, and adjusted its foreign policy by refraining from meeting the Dalai Lama during his 2014 visit. This shift occurred because Norway’s export portfolio was not diversified, and sanctions significantly impacted its economy, reducing fish exports to China by $125-176 million and total exports by $780-1300 million between 2011 and 2013 (Kolstad, 2019). In contrast, when Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia responded by diversifying its economic relationships. It strengthened financial ties with non-Western countries, particularly China and India, and engaged in a broader strategic realignment. Russia deepened its relationships with nations like China, India, and Turkey, and actively participated in organizations like BRICS. This diversification helped Russia to reduce its dependence on Western markets and mitigate the geopolitical isolation caused by the sanctions (Guter-Sandu & Kuznetsova, 2020). Thus, the diversification of supply chains, both for imports and exports, is a crucial determinant in sanctions’ success or failure.

Erickson (2019) therefore suggests that sanctions and embargoes are most effective when used as part of a broader, comprehensive approach that includes diplomatic engagement, mediation, and efforts to address the underlying causes of norm violations. Isolated sanctions or embargoes without accompanying diplomatic strategies are unlikely to succeed in enforcing norms or compelling violators to change their behavior (Erickson, 2019; Drezner, 2022; deLisle, 2022). For instance, Russia was heavily dependent on food imports from the EU and the United States until 2014. Unexpectedly for the sender countries, the impact of the sanctions did not align with their initial expectations, as they provided Russia with an opportunity to accelerate its plan to reduce its dependence on foreign agricultural and food imports by strengthening domestic production and diversifying its imports from other countries outside of the EU - especially Brazil, Belarus, Ukraine, China, and Turkey (Guter-Sandu & Kuznetsova, 2020; Kavakli et al., 2020; Pospieszna et al., 2019). Consequently, Western sanctions were unable to stop Russia from its operations in Ukraine. On the contrary, when China seeks to induce reform via economic pressure, North Korea perceives this as a direct challenge to its political identity and resists resolutely, forcing China to either relent or induce collapse; however, when China uses economic incentives to reinforce North Korea’s domestic reform impulse, the results are more promising. Nevertheless, China still confronts North Korea’s aversion to over-dependence on one big power (Kong, 2019).

Another factor that determines the success or failure of sanctions is the role of extended dependence. Trade with the target’s allies raises the economic costs of conflict for the sender, as the allies of the target may directly intervene in military conflict and cut off trade with the sender (Chen, 2021). Or, even if the target’s allies do not intervene using force, they are still likely to punish the sender economically. Thus, potential sanctions and unfavorable trade policies further increase the economic opportunity costs of conflict for the sender (Chen, 2021). For instance, US secondary sanctions on Iran severely strained America’s ties with its European allies, who were furious that the Trump administration used its leverage over the SWIFT international payment system to unilaterally re-impose sanctions (Drezner, 2022). These secondary sanctions also prompted India and the EU to take active measures to work around US financial sanctions (Drezner, 2022). While these exchanges have not appreciably affected the extent of economic pressure, they have made US allies contemplate possible ways of bypassing future US financial sanctions. This suggests that, over time, the US’s ability to use financial statecraft could wane (Drezner, 2022; Dolatabadi, 2021). As such, scholarship on sanctions notes that when getting involved in the game of sanctions, states must consider the role that extended dependence could play in determining its outcome.

Relationship between Domestic Politics and Economic Sanctions

Though economic sanctions seem to concern a country’s international trade policy or part of its foreign policy, much of the literature on economic sanctions also discusses the role domestic politics and regime type play in determining the application of and response to sanctions.

Kim et al. (2021) highlight a notable case involving Japan and South Korea, where domestic political interests and rising anti-Korean sentiment and historical grievances (Lim & Tanaka, 2022) in Japan shaped economic sanctions as a strategic tool for the Abe administration. On July 1, 2019, Japan imposed export restrictions on South Korea in response to the South Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on wartime forced laborers. Kim et al. (2021) argue that domestic political calculations, influenced by cost signaling (Lim & Tanaka, 2022), drove Japan’s hawkish measures, with Abe seeking to secure electoral support amid challenges like the public pension crisis and data fabrication scandal. Capitalizing on anti-Korean sentiment, the Abe cabinet used these sanctions to rally political backing before a crucial election, especially since diplomatic avenues were exhausted and military force was not a viable option (Kim et al., 2021; Lim & Tanaka, 2022). Likewise, in mid-2020, India imposed sanctions on Chinese FDI and on certain imports following domestic pressure. The government’s inability to control the spread of COVID-19 or to resolve the long-standing border dispute, in addition to the loss of 20 Indian soldiers in a clash with China, led to widespread discontent. To maintain public support, the Modi government restricted China’s economic involvement in India (Ahmed & Gupta, 2021; Sridharan, 2021). And while studying the cases of the US and Brazil, Afrimadona (2021) and Novaes and Schiumerini (2021) respectively argue that sanctions are heavily influenced by domestic political interests, reflecting the broader trend of local politics shaping decisions on sanctions. Their studies suggest that lawmakers’ positions on sanctions are driven by their party’s interests, constituent preferences, and strategic calculations by congressional leaders (in the case of US) and elected leaders at the local level (in the case of Brazil). As political polarization intensifies and sanctions are causing positive commodity shocks (price increases), incumbents often keep them in place longer than necessary. This gridlock makes it difficult for the government to adjust to changing international conditions (Afrimadona, 2021; Novaes & Schiumerini, 2021). These cases illustrate how regime type influences the use of sanctions for domestic political gain: democracies are more likely than non-democratic regimes to employ sanctions as a tool to achieve their political objectives.

In addition to political actors, local business groups and interests also play a significant role in shaping the impact and course of sanctions, particularly in mitigating their financial consequences (Peksen & Peterson, 2022; Portela et al., 2020). For example, Russia countered EU sanctions by strengthening ties with certain EU business elites, supporting pro-Kremlin parties, spreading disinformation before elections, and imposing a food embargo that hurt vulnerable EU economies. The economic fallout from these sanctions, which marked a shift from the EU’s previous reluctance to target major trading partners, spurred resistance from affected businesses. In Poland, strong business ties with Russia and the heavy impact on fruit producers tempered Warsaw’s demands for harsher sanctions despite rhetoric calling for more stringent measures. Similarly, in Spain, while political leaders support sanctions against Russia, their stance is moderated by pressure from business elites and public opinion, which favor engagement with Russia (Portela et al., 2020). Peksen and Peterson (2022) also argue that lobbying by domestic firms can help target states to ease or remove sanctions. Lobbying gives target governments direct access to policymakers in the sender country, allowing them to better communicate their positions. US-based lobbying efforts provide foreign officials with valuable access to the US government, potentially softening the impact of sanctions on the target state and its domestic supporters (Peksen & Peterson, 2022). However, Early and Peterson’s (2021) research finds that this loophole may be closed if the Office of Foreign Assets Control discourages US trade with the states it sanctions by punishing both US and foreign firms for their violations, serving as a direct deterrent to other firms trading with the target.

The literature also highlights the influence of norms (Rosyidin & Dir, 2020), emotions (Beauregard, 2021), and public opinion (Sung & Park, 2022) on the implementation and effectiveness of sanctions. For instance, despite evidence of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in Myanmar, Indonesia opted for the “ASEAN way” of non-interference, avoiding economic sanctions due to their coercive nature, which can exacerbate human rights violations. Valuing regional peace, Indonesia views the use of force or coercive diplomacy as counterproductive (Rosyidin & Dir, 2020). Similarly, Beauregard (2021) has examined how values and emotions among policymakers in the US, Germany, the UK, and France limited their ability to impose broad sectoral sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Research from sociology and social psychology shows that emotions, particularly in response to traumatic events, shape collective action and foster identity through shared perspectives and norms, which influence decision-making. Sung and Park (2022) also note that while “smart” sanctions aim to target specific groups within a state while minimizing harm to the public, they often generate widespread negative sentiment. Public opinion, therefore, becomes crucial in determining the effectiveness of sanctions. Contrary to backlash theories, they argue that sanctions do not always increase public support for the target government -this depends on the leader’s handling of the situation and the policy in question (Sung & Park, 2022). Thus, beyond economics and politics, local norms, emotions, and values also play a critical role in shaping the course and impact of sanctions.

Costs and Externalities Associated with Sanctions

Sanctions are typically imposed with the assumption that the target state will bear significant costs, which will pressure it into conceding to some or all of the sender’s demands. However, scholarship on sanctions argues that this is a misconception, as the burden of sanctions is shared not only by the target state’s actors but also by the ordinary citizens of both the target and sender states (Kavakli et al., 2020; Pospieszna et al., 2019; Perry, 2021; Liou et al., 2020; Park & Bridges, 2021; Raynor, 2022). A state’s ability to endure these costs, whether as sender or target, depends on its capacity to find alternative markets for exports and sources for imports (Kavakli et al., 2020; Kolstad, 2019; Guter-Sandu & Kuznetsova, 2020; Drezner, 2022; Pospieszna et al., 2019). These economic pressures are often more intense for democratic regimes than for authoritarian ones. In authoritarian regimes, a small elite holds power, while in democracies, governments are accountable to a broader electorate. As a result, it is easier for authoritarian leaders to manage sanctions by insulating their loyal supporters from the worst effects, whereas democratic governments must address the concerns of the general population (Kolstad, 2019; Chyzh, 2022; Pospieszna et al., 2019). For instance, Russian oligarchs remain quiet even as their fortunes diminish, knowing that their wealth and influence depend on staying in Putin’s favor. Under Putin, the relationship between the state and the oligarchs has been reshaped, making their positions in society contingent on his support. These state-aligned oligarchs’ wealth is conditional on their loyalty to the regime and their continued status, wealth, and security are guaranteed by Putin’s hold on power (Chyzh, 2022). Thus, this nexus between the (non-democratic) state leadership and a few industrialists or oligarchs largely remains unaffected by sanctions and the masses end up bearing the cost.

While economic costs are significant (Kavakli et al., 2020; Kolstad, 2019; Silva & Selden, 2019), political costs also play a crucial role in the impact of sanctions (Dom & Roger, 2020). Incumbent regimes are more likely to comply with sanction demands when these sanctions increase the likelihood of losing power, particularly if they fuel popular unrest (Dom & Roger, 2020). As the cases of Japan and South Korea (Kim et al., 2021), India and China (Ahmed & Gupta, 2021; Sridharan, 2021), Norway and China (Kolstad, 2019), and Taiwan and China (Lai, 2021) show, sanctions can be symbolic. These sanctions are not imposed with the expectation of changing the target state’s policies, but to signal disapproval to both domestic and international audiences (Kavakli et al., 2020; Kolstad, 2019). Beyond political and economic costs, both sender and target states may face the burden of extended dependence on trade with certain allies as well. When sanctions are enforced, these allies may be forced to reduce trade with the target state, often unwillingly, which weakens their access to alternative markets and sources of cheaper imports (Chen, 2021). Examples of such extended dependence include France’s trade relations with Iran up until the early 2010s (Dolatabadi, 2021), and Russia’s trading ties with Poland and Spain (Portela et al., 2020). These cases highlight the broader costs associated with sanctions, affecting not only the direct participants but also their trade partners (Silva & Selden, 2019).

In addition to the immediate costs for both sender and target states, sanctions also have long-term consequences. Even once sanctions are lifted, global financial actors are often hesitant to reinvest in previously sanctioned economies. Sanctions thus cause reputational damage and complicate political and financial reintegration within the global community for the target state (Raynor, 2022). Unfortunately, the most vulnerable segments of society often bear the brunt of these costs, as sanctions can reduce government spending on disaster preparedness while maintaining funding for critical sectors such as national defense, leading to greater economic and human losses during crises (McLean & Whang, 2019). Moreover, cuts to public services can erode support for incumbent governments as their ability to provide essential goods and services diminishes (McLean & Whang, 2019).

Sanctions not only limit the ability of target incumbents to win public support, they also lead to various other negative outcomes such as environmental degradation and economic mismanagement, as seen in North Korea. Decades of industrial collapse and mismanagement have exacerbated issues like deforestation, soil erosion, and pollution, which pose national and regional security risks. These environmental problems worsen food insecurity, public health, and could lead to migration crises or cross-border environmental harm (Park & Bridges, 2021). Furthermore, sanctions also result in budget cuts, which weaken oversight and increase corruption, allowing bureaucratic agents to act independently without accountability. This leads to greater poverty, income inequality, and poor public health outcomes. As the target nation’s leaders often divert public resources to maintain their ruling coalition, this further widens the income gap and undermines political and economic stability. The subsequent rise in income inequality threatens democratic principles, as the poor bear the brunt of sanctions while wealthier groups often benefit from foreign aid and government support (Liou et al., 2020; Jeong, 2020). In some cases, sanctions have unintentionally led European countries, such as Belarus and Norway, to become more politically and economically dependent on other states (Russia and China respectively in these instances). This increased dependence has complicated the relations of Belarus and Norway with the European Union, as they diverged from the EU’s stance of imposing sanctions to reduce trade with Russia and China due to accusations of human rights violations (Shyrokykh, 2021; Kolstad, 2019). Furthermore, sanctions often exacerbate gender disparities by disproportionately impacting women. Reduced social spending, particularly on education, has a more severe effect on women, who rely heavily on public services. This leads to diminished educational and economic opportunities for women, further aggravating their underrepresentation in political institutions and career advancement. To mitigate these negative consequences, post-sanction policies should prioritize increased education spending to improve women’s literacy and labor force participation (Yildirim et al., 2019; Perry, 2021).

Worsening the situation, strain theory (Altmann & Giersch, 2021) suggests that economic sanctions disrupt a country’s political and economic structures, placing stress on social institutions and increasing the likelihood of terrorist activity. Sanctions create conditions where opposition groups may resort to terrorism to challenge state authority. Research over the past decade supports this theory, showing that the strain caused by sanctions can lead to terrorism through aid shocks, heightened grievances, increased oppression, and the expansion of black markets. It may criminalize the state, expanding black market access and increasing the operational capacity of terrorist organizations (Altmann & Giersch, 2021). The existing scholarship thus not only studies the shorter-term costs associated with sanctions but also discusses its longer-term social implications.

Conclusion

The use of economic sanctions remains a complex and evolving strategy in international relations, with their success dependent on a range of political, economic, and social factors. While the development of powerful weapons has led states to favor sanctions as a less violent means of exerting pressure, the literature shows that their impact extends beyond state actors. Sanctions are deeply intertwined with domestic political dynamics and can significantly influence internal politics. Moreover, they often have severe consequences for ordinary citizens, exacerbating issues like human rights violations, shortages of essential goods, rising terrorism, and increasing gender inequality. As sanctions continue to play a prominent role in global politics, it is essential to incorporate them into a broader strategic framework that considers both their immediate objectives and long-term implications for global stability and human well-being. Future research should focus on designing sanctions that achieve political goals more effectively while mitigating their harmful effects on human rights and vulnerable populations.