Citizen participation and bureaucratization: the participatory turn seen through a Weberian lens

Abstract

Recently, many scholars in public administration have argued for a participatory turn: the introduction of deliberative arrangements to include citizens in policymaking. In this article, the arguments and likely consequences of these proposals are assessed by using Max Weber’s classical analysis of the interplay between democracy and bureaucratization. It is argued that advocacy for a participatory turn contains blind spots. In consequence, the proposed measures are likely to increase the problems that they were intended to remedy.

Points for practitioners

The conclusion for practitioners is that direct participatory arrangements are not the panacea to the multiple problems they are often presented to be. The view through a Weberian lens urges caution on those who consider introducing such arrangements, as they might lead to a diminishing of predictability and accountability of public administration, a decrease in (substantial) expertise within government, and a general dissatisfaction with arrangements that do not provide citizens with what they were led to expect. More direct participation, then, easily contributes to the problems they were meant to remedy.

Keywords

administration and democracy administrative theory citizen participation policymaking

Introduction

In recent years, many scholars of public administration have argued for more citizen involvement in policymaking and implementation. They have pressed ‘to bring citizens back into the policy making process’ (Fischer, 1993: 36). They call for more dialogue (Wagenaar, 2011) or discourse (Fox and Miller, 1995) with citizens and thus ‘a communicative turn reconnecting public service and citizens’ (Healey, 1993; King and Stivers, 1998; Stivers, 2008: 11, 105). They invite us to see ‘citizens as practitioners’ in policymaking (Catlaw, 2007: 193 ff.), to realize the ‘citizen-ing of governance’ (Farmer, 2005: 191) and to opt for collaborative policymaking (Stout, 2013).

In short, these scholars have argued for a participatory turn in public administration. New participatory arrangements should be initiated that enable citizens to be directly involved in both the development and implementation of policies.

Several arguments have been put forward in favor of this participatory turn. It is argued that more direct citizen involvement in policymaking is necessary because the classical representative democracy has become problematic (Fox and Miller, 1995; Hirst, 1994). More participation of this type is also advocated as an answer to contemporary (or postmodern) societal fragmentation and a diminishing public spirit (Stivers, 2008; Stout, 2013; Wagenaar, 2011). There are also epistemological arguments, which imply that a dialogic development of policy with citizens accords with postmodern understandings of knowledge and leads to better results (Farmer, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2001; McSwite, 1997).

Advocates differ in their specific arguments, or combination of arguments, for a participatory turn. However, they all agree that greater civic participation is the answer to problems in the functioning of bureaucracy. Whether it is because of its connection to failing representative democracy or its reliance on a faulty epistemology, contemporary public administration has become part of the problem (Farmer, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Stivers, 2008; Wagenaar, 2011). Greater civic participation must also be understood as an answer to a crisis of legitimacy for bureaucratic public administration (McSwite, 1997). Thus, the participatory turn also implies a change in the role and functioning of public administration. Public administration should be more service oriented (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007); it should take the role of a steward (Stout, 2013) or mediator (Forester, 2009) and be a moderator of civic deliberation (Fox and Miller, 1995; Stivers 2008; Wagenaar 2011). More generally, public administration should turn to being a facilitator for and partner in civic participation.

This latter aspect of the participatory turn demonstrates that it mainly addresses the relation between democracy and bureaucracy. This is not a new, but rather a classic, question and even core theme in reflections on public administration. Remarkably, the advocates of a participatory turn never systematically relate their proposals to earlier discussions on this subject. Taking classical perspectives into account, however, might give further support to the proposals but could also bring to light flaws and blind spots. A promising candidate for such a classical view is Max Weber. Weber explicitly discussed the relation between democracy and bureaucracy in his sociological and his political writings. (In his Models of Democracy (2006: ch. 5), Held even presents Weber as the key author on this subject.) Weber’s elaboration of this relation, furthermore, is deeply embedded in an encompassing sociological analysis of modernity and a coherent normative worldview. This article, therefore, focuses on the broadly developed perspective that Weber can offer. Its central question is whether the recent proposals for more direct civic involvement in policymaking and the implied role of a public administration are feasible from a Weberian perspective, and whether there are any dangers or pitfalls in the proposals.

In Section 2, the participatory turn will be characterized and an overview will be provided of the arguments that have been given in its support. In Section 3, Weber’s general perspective on democracy and bureaucratization will be presented. In Section 4, we will look through this Weberian lens at the arguments and consequences of the participatory turn. In the concluding section, we will gather our findings to evaluate the arguments for a participatory turn.

Arguments for a participatory turn

The arguments that have been put forward for a participatory turn in public administration come under different headings. Advocates have labeled their approach postmodern (Fox and Miller, 1995), reflexive (Farmer, 1995), or social constructivist (Jun, 2006), among others. The names for their proposals, including public discourse (McSwite, 1997), dialogue (Wagenaar, 2011), the argumentative turn (Fischer and Forester, 1993), collaboration (Stout, 2013), and common ground governance (Stivers, 2008), also differ. Moreover, there are issues on which advocates disagree. For instance, should Habermas’s theory of communicative action be guiding (Fox and Miller, 1995; Kelly 2004), at least to some extent (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Wagenaar 2011), or should his ideas be dismissed (Farmer, 1995)? Should civic dialogue ideally be more harmonious (Dryzek, 1993; Jennings and Callaghan, 1993; McSwite 1997; Stivers 2008), or should it express antagonism (Fox and Miller, 1995; Wagenaar 2011)? Despite these differences, however, the works of these authors have a clear common ideal that warrants the claim that they are all advocates of the same cause: a participatory turn. In this section, a clearer picture of this common cause is first sketched. The second part offers an overview of the arguments that – in different combinations – have been given for the participatory turn.

What the participatory turn entails

The central idea of the participatory turn is that arrangements should be developed in which citizens can be directly involved in policymaking. These arrangements should facilitate true dialogue or deliberations among citizens and between citizens and administrators.

Some advocates leave it at this general level (for instance Farmer, 1995; McSwite 1997). Others present more elaborate proposals for proper or authentic deliberation among citizens and between citizens and civil servants. Here, Fox and Miller might serve as a good example. They propose the support of ‘nascent discourse formations such as policy networks, interagency task forces and consortia, negotiated regulatory constraints, adhocracies and the like’ in which dialogue resulting in new policies is central. To properly fulfill this function, these ‘democratic discursive formations’ should employ proper dialogue. ‘(D)iscipline is needed in such a discourse.’ Particular guidelines (‘warrants for discourse’) should be followed, such as ‘sincerity, situation regarding intentionality, willing attention, and substantive contribution’ (Fox and Miller, 1995: 11, 120, 157). Such lists of guidelines for proper deliberation, or of pitfalls to be avoided, are also provided by others (for instance, Catlaw 2007: 193–198; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007; Forester 2009). Although the particular items on the lists vary, the common idea is ‘[t]o bring citizens back into the policy making process’ (Fischer, 1993: 36).

This enhancement of participatory possibilities for citizens must be accompanied by a shift in the role and actions of governmental bureaucracy. Fox and Miller (1995: 111) express this shift metaphorically: bureaucratic contexts should give way to energy fields, which means that dialogue should take place not in fixed and hierarchical structures but in new and open arrangements in which new ideas and meanings can develop. Others note that according to this argument, civil servants should have abundant discretion, which is a precondition to developing policies in dialogue with citizens (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007: 153). Furthermore, members of public administration should be active in trying to involve citizens (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007: 63, 81, 97, 115, 135). These individuals also have to fulfill necessary roles to guarantee an authentic debate, to facilitate the development of new understandings of problems, and to work toward agreement and consensus. ‘(A)dministrators must design forms of participation, disseminate information, highlight issues, share responsibility, raise questions, and perhaps even serve as advocates for marginalized citizens’ (Kelly 2004: 39).

The new civil servant is often compared to a midwife, steward, mediator, and catalyst (Catlaw, 2007: 198; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007: 135, 152; Farmer 2005; Stout, 2013: 249). The public administrator, under the participatory turn, is responsible for ‘the governance of the common ground’ (Stivers, 2008: 6, 117–119). The administrator creates, facilitates, guides, and moderates civic dialogue on policy. Concurrently, citizens and administrators have to be equals (‘We are all practitioners now’ (Catlaw 2007: 196); The administrator is a ‘citizen with the rest of us’ (Fox and Miller, 1995: 158)).

The arguments for the participatory turn not only have consequences for public policymaking, but also for public administration scholarship. In fact, in their advocacy, the proper task for researchers on policymaking and public planning is often quite similar to that of civil servants. Scholars in public administration should take on forms of research in which citizens themselves can become involved in policymaking, such as action research and deliberative planning. The responsibilities of public administration scholars also encompass facilitating and moderating dialogue. (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Wagenaar 2011: 229–230). For advocates of civic dialogue on public policy, the establishment of new collaborative arrangements and the proper moderation of dialogue are of central concern. Whether the role of moderator is performed by planners, community leaders, managers, or policy analysts is not considered important (Forester, 2009: 6).

The argument of diminishing democratic legitimacy

The first of four arguments for a participatory turn calls attention to the diminishing legitimacy of representative democracy. Advocates maintain that this model of democracy has ceased to function properly. As a result of the workings of the media, people no longer freely form their preferences; votes are not won on policy alternatives but on the image of politicians; citizens do not choose on rational grounds; after elections, coalitions that do not act according to the preferences of the majority of voters rule; and citizens do not critically monitor the actions of their candidates. Representative democracy is an ideal of and a relic of the nineteenth century – it no longer works (Fox and Miller, 1995; Hirst 1994: 15–16, 43).

As a consequence of this malfunctioning parliamentary democratic system, an administrative elite is in power (McSwite, 1997: 1, 15, 217). We are being ruled by a ‘petty autocracy’ of bureaucrats (Fox and Miller, 1995: xiv) with an ‘adminicentric view’ (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007: 23). The public bureaucracy does not represent the people but determines what is in the general interest, thereby defining or creating itself what it is said to represent (Catlaw, 2007). As a result, all citizens have become detached from policymaking and administration. Only under direct forms of participation can citizens become sovereign again. A participatory turn is needed to create a democracy that can truly be called legitimate.

The argument of societal fragmentation

The second argument focuses on the characteristics of our current (postmodern) society. Bureaucracy and top-down policymaking are no longer appropriate in our age of fragmented social structures, the decentering of identities, the end of the grand narratives, and neo-tribalism (Fox and Miller, 1995: 59; Stout, 2013: 237; Wagenaar 2011: 306). In this time of deep disagreement, advocates maintain that we need a different approach. The solution is dialogue with and between citizens, preferably on more or less specific issues (Fox and Miller, 1995; Healey 1993: 253; Jennings and Callaghan, 1993: 112; Wagenaar 2011). A ‘governance of the common ground’ that encompasses proper types of civic activation and support of different forms of participation is needed to accomplish the development of flourishing political communities in which the members ‘appreciate, acknowledge and recognize one another’ (Stivers, 2008: 2, 85–86, 109, 117–119; Wagenaar 2011: 301; see also Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007 and McSwite 1997).

The argument of proper knowledge for policymaking

A third type of argument finds its cue in recent debates in epistemology. According to the advocates of the participatory turn, policymaking in contemporary public administration builds on an understanding of knowledge and rationality that is untenable. In fact, predominant understandings are misguided on three counts. First, experts in public administration – within or outside public service – fail to consider that knowledge of human affairs is always deeply entangled with meanings. To truly understand actions, one must grasp what these actions mean for the people involved. That means consulting these individuals (Dryzek, 1993: 224; 2000; McSwite 1997: 233, 377; Wagenaar 2011: 14). Second, a strict distinction between facts and values is not tenable. Claims, even claims of experts, always contain some value judgment. As a consequence, bureaucratic expertise cannot rightfully claim to be objective or neutral. In fact, values exist in multiples, and there is not a simple formula to decide which value must prevail when opposing actions imply opposing demands. Taking value-pluralism seriously requires letting all individuals with their own valuations participate in policymaking (Farmer, 1995: ch. 5; Flyvbjerg 2001: 63, 139; Fox and Miller, 1995; Wagenaar 2011). Finally, it is argued that the type of law-like general knowledge that is common in the natural sciences is not a proper example for the human sciences. Knowledge in this field can only be situational, addressing particular issues in specific settings and circumstances. Doing justice to the intricacies and complexities of specific situations, again, demands civic participation (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 160).

The argument of efficiency as dominant value

A final argument focuses on the promise of administrative expertise to provide technical solutions, quick fixes, and economical answers. The ambitions of administrative expertise and its manner of policymaking suggest a neutral approach. However, advocates of a participatory turn comment that the allegedly neutral or technical approach in fact expresses the dominating concern for a particular value: efficiency. The administrative orientation toward efficiency drives out or makes secondary other values, and it blocks creativity. It reduces political decision making to finding the most economical means to a given end and administrative behavior to rule following. To give creativity its due and overcome a narrow value perspective, bureaucratic structures should be opened, and open dialogue with citizens should be established (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007; Farmer 1995; Fischer 1993; Jennings and Callahan, 1993: 112; Stivers 2008: 27, 31, 55, 59).

In subsequent sections, we will take a closer look at these arguments and the measures that they propose. In the next section, a Weberian lens will be assembled to assist in accomplishing this task.

Weber on bureaucracy and democracy

Max Weber’s most explicit views on direct democracy can be found in his political writings that first appeared in 1917.¹ With these series of articles, he took part in discussions on the constitutional and political changes in Germany during his day. These changes involved the federal structure, voting rights, and the position of parliament. For some commentators and politicians, the solution to social and political problems was to be found in the introduction of some type of direct democracy. Among these advocates were birds of different feathers: communists, socialists, anarchists, syndicalists, and corporatists. Weber calls them snobbish and unworldly writers, ‘inkpot romantics’, and dilettantes who have romantic fantasies of communal harmony and fraternity (Mommsen, 1974; Weber, 1921/1988: 263, 306–307, 366, 443). They mistakenly believe that administration and politics can be entrusted to amateurs and misunderstand the true nature of Germany’s political problems (Weber, 1921/1988: 289, 306).

In these political writings, Weber participated in the heated debates in Germany during the final stages of and immediately after the First World War. He fiercely opposed the anti-parliamentary voices of that time.² However, the advocates for direct participation in our day and time are not arguing in favor of abolishing the parliamentary system. Therefore, to assess the arguments of these contemporary advocates, we have to turn to Weber’s broader analysis of modernity and his understanding of democratization and bureaucratization that underlie the specific comments of the political writings mentioned above.³ For clarity and space considerations, Weber’s analysis will be presented here by distinguishing four aspects of bureaucratization in relation to democracy.

Bureaucratization and the value of predictability

Modernization for Weber is largely about rationalization. Societal action increasingly becomes the subject of calculation. Standardization, planning, measurement, and procedures in all types of activities make societal processes more controllable and outcomes more predictable (Scaff, 2000: 104). In the preface to his collected essays on the sociology of religion, Weber provides an overview of areas in which modernization has taken place: in science, art, economy, and state and administration. Rationalization in the last sphere involves the development of a system of law and of modern bureaucracy (Weber, 1920/1972: 1–16). Rational law offers general rules that are clear to everybody, and bureaucracy creates predictability because of its typical characteristics, similar to fixed jurisdictions and qualified tenured employees (Weber, 1920/1972: ch. 6; 1921/1988). Together, rationality and predictability provide calculable results, similar to a machine, in the modern state (Weber, 1921/1988: 322).

Predictability is intertwined with Weber’s understanding and valuation of individual freedom or autonomy. In several of his writings, Weber presents the ideal of a self-choosing individual, such as that of the free scientist in Science as a Vocation and that of the truly free choosing politician in Politics as a Vocation (Bartels, 2009; Beetham 1985; Palonen 1999; Tijsterman and Overeem, 2008; Verhoogt 1980; Weber, 1921/1988: 505; 1922/1988: 582). For such free individuals, predictability is of value. Weber notes that there is no rational way to determine which value is supreme and what aim is most worthwhile. The sphere of values is a ‘polytheism’ or, even stronger, a world of ‘warring gods’ (Weber, 1922/1988: 609). However, one can have knowledge of the proper instruments to realize certain values or aims (Weber, 1922/1988: 607). Using that knowledge is of importance for freely deciding individuals, whether they want to be a good scientist, a politician, or follow any other vocation (Weber, 1921/1988: 551; 1922/1988: 595). For any citizen, it is important to know what to expect of the government regardless of his or her aspirations. The regulation of administrative actions by law and the bureaucratic organization of its tasks provide this predictability. Everybody finds him- or herself subject to the same public and reliable rules (Bartels, 2009: 465; Gajduschek, 2003).

Bureaucratization and expertise

Weber distinguishes several types of rationality, but the type that gives modernity its defining character is instrumental rationality, which concerns the application of the knowledge of causes and their effects. Although nobody has a grasp of all existing causal knowledge, we are certain that relevant knowledge is available and that it can be applied or presented to us by the relevant experts (Weber, 1922/1988: 594), which is quite different in the sphere of values, the sphere that Weber compares to the world of ‘warring gods’ (Weber, 1922/1988: 609). Values exist in plurality, and there is no rational way to determine which values should predominate. For this reason political issues also cannot be decided on rationally. Politics essentially is conflict – conflict in society over the means of the state (Weber, 1921/1988: 506; 1922/1988: 609). It is for this reason that Weber dismisses the fraternal ideas of syndicalists, corporatists, and socialists as romantic and naive (Weber, 1921/1988: 263, 366).

For experts to make their valuable contributions, their position must be separated from strife over values and particular interest. A strict line must be drawn between science and politics, and faithful scientists should not cross this line (Weber, 1922/1988: 601). The same goes for a dividing line between administration and politics. Public servants are recruited for public bureaucracies because of their particular skills and expertise, and they gather more knowledge during their careers spanning many years in various (often highly specialized) functions. One part of the characteristics of Weber’s understanding of bureaucracy expresses this concern for (the recruitment of) expertise. The other part addresses instruments to keep politics and administration separate: by creating employment conditions that guarantee independence from the outcome of political strife. In this manner, bureaucracy can be understood to be beyond any particular social group or class, with its particular values and interests. It might be called, in Hegel’s words, ‘a universal class’ (Hegel 1967: section 205).

Bureaucratization and routinization

Weber is well aware of the downside of standardization and regulation that give modern society its predictability. Rationalization also leads to ‘disenchantment’ and the ‘petrifying of the spirit’. Disenchantment refers to the loss of a sacred sense of wholeness and of connectedness between oneself and the world as provided by religion, magic, myth, and tradition. The result is alienation, a feeling of being lost in the world, and living in a world devoid of meaning.

The petrifying of the spirit refers to the consequences of the increasing ‘machine-like’ organization and regulation of aspects of social life, especially bureaucracies, increasingly controlling the work of their employees and the lives of those involved with them. This common tendency of bureaucratization in modern society threatens individual freedom. If it is not controlled in some way, we will end up in ‘the house of slavery’ or ‘the iron cage’ of modern life (Weber, 1920/1972: 203–204; 1921/1988: 332–333).

Such resistance to bureaucratization is possible, according to Weber. It can be provided by a ‘leading spirit’, or the innovative entrepreneur in the private sector and the political leader in the public sphere. These types of persons seek to get beyond existing routines and look for new approaches. They do not follow protocol but rather take responsibility in making guiding decisions (Weber, 1921/1988: 334–335, 525, 545–547, 559). The answer to the bureaucratic threat lies in the leading politician who can rely on popular support. In the context of mass society, bureaucracies are inevitable, but so too are leading politicians able to find support for their new ideas. Politicians must be charismatic, in the sense of inspiring and being trustworthy, to be able to realize change. To do so, they often have to rely on demagogical measures (Weber, 1921/1988: 338, 393).

Bureaucratization and the power of bureaucrats

Not only does predictability have a dark side; the same can be said for expertise in bureaucracies and the efforts to keep it clear of political interference. Administrative bureaucracies might be separated from societal politics; that, however, does not mean that they are beyond power struggles. Weber criticizes sociologists of his day who understood bureaucracy as Hegel did: as a ‘universal class’, without any interests of its own, detached from strife. Weber presents bureaucracy as a force that can be in conflict with political actors (Beetham, 1985: 64, 226; Weber, 1921/1988: 396). Bureaucrats have expert knowledge that is acquired by special training and experience in office. That knowledge provides them with power. By monopolizing his knowledge, thus turning it into secret knowledge, the bureaucrat is able to strengthen his position. In a bureaucratic society, the threat of a dictatorship of officials is always looming (Weber, 1921/1988: 333, 352–353).

Particular skills and competencies are needed to control and counteract bureaucratic power. According to Weber, bodies of direct participating citizens are very poorly equipped for this job. Bureaucracies will be able to outsmart inexperienced and poorly informed amateur supervisors. They can easily suggest successful control while remaining firmly in power, for example, by granting small successes to some of the supervisors, thereby creating discord between them. For this reason, Weber maintains in his comments on the ‘inkpot romantics’ of his day that direct democracy would not prevent but rather create a dictatorship of officials (Weber, 1921/1988: 290, 298–300), which might lead to a dictatorship of bureaucrats or special interests if one group manages to get bureaucracy under its control (Beetham, 1985: 38, 41, 56, 223; Mommsen 1974: 86, 88; Palonen 1999; Weber, 1921/1988: 332–333; Whimster 2007: 244).

For Weber, proper control over bureaucracy can only be realized through a parliament with strong political leadership. Real leaders are not only those who can break routines but also those who have the skills to lead bureaucracy and not fall into the trap of ‘negative politics’ (becoming involved in mere turf wars with bureaucracies). Furthermore, the parliament must have experts in all areas, parallel to the expertise of administrative bureaucracy. It must also have the formal powers to confront bureaucracy (for instance a right of inquiry). Without such powers, parliament is a toothless tiger that can only display ‘uninformed demagogy and routine impotence’ (Weber, 1921/1988: 289, 339–345, 250–356).

The effects of the participatory turn seen through a Weberian lens

Now that Weber’s lens is put in position, we can start using it. What are the likely consequences of new participatory arrangements in the areas on which Weber focused in his analysis of bureaucratization and democratization?

The participatory turn and predictability

One of the elements of participatory approaches is the requirement for an increase in bureaucratic discretion, for instance, through more open textured law. These measures are a precondition for deliberation and civic collaboration on public policies. An increase in administrative discretion is likely to result in a decrease in predictability – a decrease on three levels. The first level is that of the mode of decision making. When regulations grant the liberty to use participatory arrangements to develop policies, agencies have the discretion to decide which issues will be the subject of participatory projects.

The second level is that of the organization of the participatory procedure. How will the issue under consideration be defined, who has to be involved, and at what type of results is the deliberation aimed? The guidelines for an ‘authentic debate’ do not address all these issues. Even when they do, they often demand interpretation. Take, for instance, Fox and Miller’s warrant that contributions to debates should be relevant. As the advocacies for a participatory turn themselves indicate, different aims might be chosen. Dialogue might be moderated such that it is most likely to realize the best policy solutions (Dryzek). It might also aim to overcome differences and conflict (Forester). It can also focus on individual development (Stivers) or the emancipation of the worst off (Catlaw). Even when all these choices are fixed, we reach a third level of insecurity, the deliberation itself. In most communicative processes, it is very difficult to predict the decision at which any group of people eventually arrives. Together, these three levels of insecurity imply that decision making under the participatory turn will diminish the predictability of policies and accompanying regulations.

More open textured law-making and the resulting decrease in predictability of governmental action is likely to have a further negative side-effect. Because of this development, the link between political programs as they are presented in elections and the actual policies will become even weaker than they are now according to the advocates of the participatory turn. Thus, the remedy tends to intensify the problem.

The participatory turn and expertise

The central locus of knowledge for advocates of participation is not in public administration but in citizens. This shift gives a central place to the preferences and valuations of citizens and their perspective on problems. The administrator, in McSwite’s terms, will cease to be ‘a man of reason’ who is well informed and gives advice or makes the relevant decisions on substantial matters. His new role as an initiator, facilitator, and moderator of dialogue has consequences for the development and use of the expertise of the administrator. Given the new, more procedural role, an administrator with expert knowledge on the issue under deliberation might feel obliged to hold back his expert opinion. His authority as a moderator might be harmed when he starts bringing his expertise into the debate. The consequence of such actions could be that relevant input for rational policy development would be missed. This development is similar to the drain of expertise that has been witnessed in the slipstream of measures of privatization and agentification (Haque, 2001).

A shift toward a participation process facilitating public administration could also imply that in recruitment, knowledge of and skills in this field would be especially important. The typical type of experience that would be developed on the job would also be on initiating, organizing, and moderating deliberative arrangements with citizens. If one sees this as a trade-off, substantial expertise on subject issues in public administration necessarily diminishes.

The participatory turn and routinization

Advocates of participation present public administrators as professionals who initiate, facilitate, and support deliberative processes. These processes are presented as open and creative. In line with Weber’s analysis, however, the possibility must be considered that in this field, formalities, bureaucracies and routines will arise. In addition, in the process of communication, moderators and facilitators are likely to develop routines (just like real midwives do – the favorite metaphor of several advocates of a participatory turn). Routine development is, in line with Weber’s analysis of rationality, a logical element of professionalism. A rational professional seeks causal patterns and uses them to structure his/her work.

The advocates themselves suggest another reason for the likelihood that routines and formalizations will develop in this field. Administrators, in their role as facilitators and moderators, must ensure that dialogue is authentic, that the worst-off are heard, and that the common ground is governed. As in all areas of government, rules and regulations must be invoked to do so (Stivers, 2008: 110).

However, the ‘petrification’ of ‘energy fields’, dialogue, or discourse is not likely to stop at routines and regulations from the side of public administrators. Studies on the involvement of the client organizations of hospitals and public housing foundations demonstrate that participatory arrangements are likely to create new bureaucracies, namely, professional organizations that represent the clients. Serious deliberation (and negotiation) on serious issues demands the expertise, time, and involvement in which only select ordinary citizens appear to be able to or want to invest. Those who do become representatives develop into (tenured) expert professionals over time (Trappenburg 2008). There is no reason to think that such developments will not occur in public policymaking, which is the drift of Weber’s insistence that the complexity of modern life demands bureaucratic organization (Weber, 1921/1988).

All these developments, in sum, will not make new participatory arrangements the open spaces for creative and inspiring participation that attract enthusiastic citizens, as the advocates would have it. They are likely to develop into overly structured proceedings that are regularly announced and to which routinely selections of citizens will be invited. The popular interest in them will suffer the same fate as representative arrangements did.

The participatory turn and bureaucratic power

Weber’s lens brings to our attention further issues that the advocates – or at least some of them – neglect but that are likely to have an impact on the results and possibilities of civic deliberation. They concern the observation that bureaucracies are not neutral instruments but agencies with power and interests of their own.

When looking at the possible effects of a participatory turn on bureaucracy, it appears likely that the power of bureaucracy will increase. There are two reasons for this increase. First, participatory arrangements demand more open textured rules, which implies more discretionary powers for the administration. In the organization, facilitation and moderation of dialogue, administrators have abundant opportunities to steer the course of action. In communication – as teachers, mediators, and moderators all know – the outcome largely depends on the moderator. (The analogy of the midwife is rather misguided here. In maieutics, the method of delivery might vary; which child will eventually be born will not.) Above, it was already mentioned how intentions in steering dialogue can vary. Catlaw (2007) suggests that the moderator of civic dialogue has the task of ensuring that the outcome is to the benefit of the least advantaged – which means that the moderator determines who is least advantaged and what counts as a (sufficient) benefit. Forester notes that there are different approaches to dialogue: dialogue, debate, and negotiation. Each approach has its proper place and outcomes (Forester 2009: 6–7). The mediator decides what course shall be taken in each case. Fox and Miller maintain that discourse should be guarded by Habermasian warrants or rules. Contributions to the debate should, for instance, be relevant to the issue at hand (Fox and Miller, 1995: 13, 118). Does ‘policing the discourse’ (Fox and Miller, 1995: 126) not eventually demand a moderator who, in cases of disputes, determines the relevancy of contributions (i.e. how the warrants should be interpreted)?

Weber’s analysis calls to attention the fact that governmental bureaucracies inevitably have their own interests. These bureaucracies must show results, and they prefer continuity. It is very likely that these considerations have an impact on (a series of) deliberative processes. Existing research confirms the suggestion that in consultation procedures, the tactical considerations of administrators are also of importance (De Vries, 2000).

A further reason for the likelihood of an increase in the power of bureaucracy lies in the weakening position of (potential) countervailing powers to bureaucracy. For Weber, parliament was the logical countervailing power to bureaucracy. Yet, under the participatory turn, parliament is likely to become even further alienated from citizens and therefore lose legitimacy and power. The new arrangements themselves hardly have the expertise and experience that is needed to step into the gap parliament leaves behind.

Arguments for a participatory turn reconsidered

For our conclusion, we will return to the four types of argument that can be found in the work of the advocates of a participatory turn. The observations and considerations that we gathered by looking through a Weberian lens lead to the following comments.

Argument of diminishing legitimacy

New participatory arrangements were presented as a remedy for the (increasing) deficits in legitimacy of the representative model of democracy. Weber’s analysis, however, provides reasons to doubt the effectiveness of this remedy. First, alternative arrangements are likely to create an even larger distance between representative bodies and citizens. The functioning and thus the legitimacy of the representative model would then be undermined even further. This observation urges caution in introducing and implementing new direct participatory arrangements. Second, the arrangements themselves might easily be susceptible to the same types of threat as the representative model of democracy. The advocates of direct participation have not considered the fact that the mechanisms that endanger the representative model of democracy can also have an effect on their own arrangements.

A third comment starts with the observation that in the arguments for a participatory turn, legitimacy is largely identified with democratic legitimacy. This excursus into the work of Weber, however, has brought to attention other values for government, namely, predictability of administration and knowledge-based policies. In the advocacy for participation predictability and the closely connected value of equal treatment, there appears to be a blind spot. Furthermore, the effects of participatory arrangements are likely to have a negative effect on the realization of just these values. Therefore, it is far from certain that a participatory turn would strengthen administrative legitimacy.

Argument of societal fragmentation

Advocates of the participatory turn claim that civic participation in dialogue is the best answer to contemporary social fragmentation and value pluralism. Weber’s basic understanding of society and the sphere of values as fragmented is quite similar to the understanding of these advocates. In addition, his answer, one might say, also involves communication. However, he emphasizes communication not in terms of dialogue and deliberation but in terms of the convincing and even demagogic speeches of democratic leaders. Weber takes the diversity of values and the political setting of strife in which proponents of values will confront one another very seriously. The ‘compelling power of the best argument’ – the idea that the advocates take from Habermas – might not be sufficient to bring minds together. Weber sees an indispensable role for leadership in democratic decision making that is missing in the alternative view. His perspective might not be encompassing either, yet it brings to light, again, a one-sidedness in the view of the advocates.⁴

This is not the place to delve deeply into Habermas’ ideas. However, because many advocates of the participatory turn refer to these ideas, one observation must be made here. The advocates mostly refer to Habermas’ theory of communicative action, for instance, to define the rules for authentic discourse (Habermas, 1986, 1989). In his later work, Between Facts and Norms (1996), Habermas developed his theory of communicative action into a theory of state, connecting discourse to rule of law and democracy. It is remarkable that this work does not contain strong advocacy for a participatory turn. Near the end of the book, there is one remark that suggests that direct interaction between citizens and administration for policymaking might be put in place. He calls it ‘democratization of administration’ (1996: 440) (favorably cited by Breen 2012: 81; and Kelly 2004: 7). However, in the rest of Between Facts and Norms, Habermas explicitly argues against direct democracy. It is at odds, he maintains, with the development of an aggregated ‘general will’ (Habermas, 1996: 298). The democratic Rechtsstaat involves individual guarantees of, for instance, free speech and a ‘system of sluices’ – including general elections – that connect public opinion to parliament (Habermas, 1996: 354–358). In sum, Habermas appears to offer less support to the advocates of direct participation than they seem to realize (Habermas, 1996: 356–357; Scheuerman, 1999).

Epistemological argument

The third argument for a participatory turn maintains that direct civic participation leads to better policies. This claim rests on three epistemological considerations. Weber does not disagree with the general drift of any of these three points. He also believes that to truly understand social phenomena, the meanings these phenomena have for people should be considered (on his verstehende Soziologie see Weber, 1922/1972: section 1; 1922/1988: 427 ff.). He also notes that knowledge contains considerations of that which is valuable. Medical sciences, for instance, are oriented toward contributing to survival and health (Weber, 1922/1988: 599–600). In addition, he agrees that for societal issues, it is impossible to have the type of law-like knowledge that rules in the natural sciences (Weber, 1922/1972). However, for Weber, these considerations do not lead to a type of research (or well-informed policymaking for that matter) that seeks to include citizens in the process of deliberation. They do, however, demand caution: the meanings phenomena carry for people should be considered; however, in themselves, these meanings are not yet a complete explanation of such phenomena (Weber, 1922/1988: 427ff.). Furthermore, an expert should know the limits of what his knowledge can provide and show honesty herein (Weber, 1922/1988: 601). Thus, a Weberian perspective on knowledge gives us reason to doubt that epistemological considerations in themselves necessitate broad direct civic involvement in policymaking. In some cases, finding the best policy solutions might involve broad consultation (in any form); however, it also demands the input of expert knowledge. A strong focus on civic deliberation might make one blind to the value of other types of relevant input in policymaking.

Argument of instrumentality

The last argument for the participatory turn is that the value of efficiency in which bureaucracy has a strong role is dominant in policymaking. This effect is recognizable from a Weberian perspective. The focus on instrumental rationality under modernity expresses a concern for the effective and efficient realization of goals. However, two additional observations must be made. First, in Weber’s frame, this concern for an effective and efficient realization of goals in bureaucracy is closely linked to individual freedom. In a (instrumentally) rationalized world, individuals with different values and aims know what to expect of government.

Weber also sees that instrumentality has its downsides, namely, routinization and formalization. He understands the deplorable effects of instrumentality as accompanying any rational or professional action, which implies that such effects must also be expected in arrangements for public deliberation. The measures that were designed to set people free will then also become ‘petrified’ under the development of bureaucratic expertise and rules and routines in this field. In line with Weber’s analysis, it is to be expected that in time, civic deliberative arrangements will be not the grass-roots gatherings of freely deliberating citizens but an additional layer of bureaucracy. Concerned and dissatisfied citizens would then be better off if they simply used their (old model) rights of petition and demonstration to influence (elected) officials (Walzer 1999).

Conclusion

Advocates of a participatory turn herald a cause that has a sympathetic ring to it (giving a voice to the people in policymaking). An overview of the arguments of advocates surely supports the idea that deliberative policymaking by citizens and administrators is the solution to many problems. However, a closer look at this proposal through a Weberian lens gives reason to be cautious. Introducing participatory arrangements in policymaking might be less functional and even have effects that contribute to the problems that they are meant to diminish. Weber’s lens demonstrates the blind spots in the arguments.

Of course, Weber’s analysis of bureaucratization might have blinds spots of its own. However, a strong point of his perspective is his awareness of the Janus-face of developments in modern society (see De Valk, 1980, on paradoxes of modernity in Weber). In fact, his analysis of bureaucratization consists of two such twin developments: first, the realization of the value of predictability and of the danger of routinization and, second, the value of knowledge-based policymaking and its companions and the danger of formalization and bureaucratic power. Weber attempted to find a proper balance, for instance, in his proposals for a properly equipped parliament. For advocates of deliberative arrangements, additional effort is necessary to attain such a balanced position.

Footnotes

Notes

Berry Tholen is assistant professor at the Department of Public Administration, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published on administrative ethics, values in policy making, and expert policy advice in, among others, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Public Integrity, Administration & Society, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Ethnicities, and the European Journal of Migration and Law.

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