Geopolitical Transformation in Eastern Mediterranean;Restructuring Role of Greece and the Impact of Abraham Accord

The Newly Emerging Eastern Mediterranean Structure

The Mediterranean Sea interconnects Europe, Asia and Africa and is directly linked to America and Australia through the North Pacific Ocean, taking on enormous geopolitical significance and privileges, especially for the European Union and other world’s greatest powers (Tziarras, 2019, p. 6; van der Putten, 2016, p. 337). For the West, there exist vital interests in the Mediterranean which are related to ‘energy security … regional stability, the containment of religious extremism, the prevention of mass migration and the protection of Israel and other friendly regimes’ (Dokos, 2000, p. 95).

After the First World War, the composition of countries and governments in the Mediterranean region underwent grave changes and impacted, for the next century, the geopolitical map of the Mediterranean region especially in its eastern coasts that are stretched along Greece, Turkiye, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Palestine.

Right from ancient times, the Mediterranean Sea has been recognized as a main strategic waterway and shipping route of the globe. In addition to its unique connectivity privileges and transit links through water, the Mediterranean has been bestowed with enormous hydrocarbon resources especially gas reserves, doubling its geopolitical significance (Antreasyan, 2013, p. 29; Tsardanidis, 2019, p. 74; Ulusoy, 2020, p. 425). According to an estimate by the US Geological Survey, the Eastern Mediterranean held 1.7 billion barrels of oil and 3.5 trillion m³ of natural gas in 2010 (US Geological Survey, 2012).

The geopolitical significance of the giant gas reserves in the Mediterranean including the Zohr Field (with estimated reserves of 850 billion m³), Leviathan Field (with estimated reserves of 605 billion m³), Tamar Field (with estimated reserves of 200 billion m³) and Sakarya Field (with estimated reserves of 540 billion m³), has been multiplied in recent years (Associated Press, 2019; Demiryol, 2020; Gorgulu and Dark, 2017, p. 130; Reuters, 2021a; Tanchum, 2020). For example, Leviathan and Tamar gas fields which are among the largest deep-water reserves found between 2001 and 2010 (Ozertem, 2016, p. 363), have provided Israel with massive geopolitical advantages which could turn it into ‘a regional gas power, significantly changing its geo-strategic position’ (Antreasyan, 2013, p. 29). A similar privilege is envisaged for Egypt that can turn the Arab country into the energy hub of Africa and even the Mediterranean.

From amongst the Eastern Mediterranean littoral states, Greece and Turkiye own the largest territory and possess the longest coastlines in the region; notwithstanding, since the 1910s, they have been at loggerheads and serious disputes over the sovereignty of some Aegean Sea islands, demarcation of maritime zones and the issue of Cyprus. Such differences pushed the two countries, on several occasions, to the brink of military confrontation. In fact, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, its territories including in Eastern Mediterranean were divided and became the source of disputes and tensions in the region. The two world wars also led to geopolitical changes in the Mediterranean as the Dodecanese Islands (such as Rhodes and Lesvos) were ceded to Greece after the Second World War and the ‘United States was pushed into the forefront of the Mediterranean defense line’ (Roucek, 1953b, pp. 77–79).

The Hellenic Republic in Southeast Europe has numerous islands in the Aegean Sea neighbouring Turkiye. Greece, as the cradle of the Byzantine civilization, was under the control and rule of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries (from 15th to 19th century) but was able to gain independence in 1832 after a decade of revolutionary fighting. In 2021, Greece celebrated the bicentenary of the start of the revolution against the Ottomans. From its independence to the post-First World War era, Greece witnessed many major developments. Ultimately, the Greeks overthrew the regime of colonels in the 1970s and established the present Hellenic Republic.

In neighbouring Turkiye, after the Justice and Development Party came into power in 2003 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan who later unveiled a new geostrategic military doctrine entitled ‘Blue Homeland’, relations between Ankara and Athens entered a new stage of tension and confrontation and put the two countries on the verge of conflict in 2020. ¹

One year earlier in 2019, the Neo-Democracy Party emerged victorious in Greece’s general elections and Kyriakos Mitsotakis became prime minister and pushed the country closer to the West. Overcoming Greece’s financial crisis, he could attract the support of the USA and the European Union against provocations by Turkiye while making his most efforts to pull the country out of the economic crisis of the 2010s. Mitsotakis, a Harvard graduate and son of the most prominent political family in Greece, established close relations with the administration of US President Donald Trump as well as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and paved the grounds for consolidating bilateral links (with the USA), trilateral engagement (with Israel and Cyprus) and quadrilateral cooperation (with Israel, Cyprus and the USA) in the strategic Mediterranean region.

Such partnerships as a major part of the newly-emerging Eastern Mediterranean architecture entered a new stage after the signing of the Abraham Accords in August 2020 and the subsequent Israeli reproachment with some Arab countries such as Bahrain, Morocco and the UAE. In fact, coalition-building in the Eastern Mediterranean was further expanded and consolidated with the contribution and support of these Arab states such as UAE and Saudi Arabia to the new architecture of the region mainly in security and energy aspects.

Coalitions of the Eastern Mediterranean were formed to cement military and security cooperation in the region and beyond as an initiative by Greece and Israel under the USA’s backing and encouragement, which aim to isolate Turkiye (and possibly Iran). In fact, the primary motivations of such alliances in the Mediterranean Sea are the ‘common perceptions of Turkiye as a security threat and energy-related interests’ (Tziarras, 2016, p. 407) which can be seen—at least in part—as a ‘balancing act in the face of Turkiye’s regional power projection’ (Tziarras, 2019, p. 6). This coalition changed the geopolitical equations of the Mediterranean region and engaged new trans-regional players in the security and military structure of the neighbourhood.

The present article is an effort to explore the newly-established Eastern Mediterranean structure and the increasing number of trans-regional players in the Mediterranean equations with a focus on Arab engagement after the Abraham Accords. This research hypothesizes that with a new pro-Western government in Greece and in the light of unwavering USA support for Israel in the region, which resulted in the conclusion of the Abraham Accords in the last days of Trump, relations between Tel Aviv and Athens expanded expeditiously in all areas of mutual interest and concern, especially in energy and security and new trans-regional players were brought in the new geopolitical structure of the Mediterranean with the ultimate goal of sidelining Turkiye. This article briefly studies developments leading to the formation of a new geopolitical structure in the Eastern Mediterranean and analyzes the consequences of such a fundamental transformation in the region.

The Geopolitical Significance of Energy and Security in Eastern Mediterranean

The importance of the Mediterranean Sea has been already researched by many scholars. Roucek (1953a, p. 347) describes the Mediterranean as ‘the most important highway in history’ which links the Orient with the Occident and Europe with Africa for the ‘commerce of goods and culture and in military rivalry’. He highlights the geopolitical significance of the Mediterranean for the USA and specifically for Britain which, in the past, viewed the Mediterranean Sea as the shortest maritime way and ‘empire route’ to Asia (mainly India and other British colonies) and East Africa and maintained a submarine base and a naval fleet in the Mediterranean before the Second World War to protect its interests in Egypt, Palestine, Gibraltar, Suez Canal, Malta, Cyprus and the British Isles. As explained by Roucek (1953a):

[O]n an average day in normal times, there were about 140 British ships moving through the Mediterranean, and about 45 loading and unloading at Mediterranean ports. Some were bound for England with oil from Iraq and Iran, with Egyptian and Indian cotton, with oranges from Palestine, iron ore and fertilizers from North Africa, and wool, tin ore, rubber, and quinine from the eastern islands beyond India. Eastbound ships were carrying British cotton cloth, machinery, bunker coal, tools, and other manufactured goods to all parts of the east. (Roucek, 1953a, p. 352)

Such a great role was further reinforced after the Cold War when oil and gas resources were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, which ‘created new dynamics in the field of geo-economics and can act as a catalyst for stability and cooperation or for confrontation and conflict’ (Tsardanidis, 2019, p. 73).

Roucek (1953a, p. 347) emphasizes the geopolitical significance of the Mediterranean as ‘an area where imperial interests have always met-especially in the backward Middle East and its peripheries’. According to Roucek (1953a, p. 348), the Mediterranean geopolitics has three main aspects in historical, economic and strategic terms which drew the world’s biggest powers (i.e., USA, UK, France, Russia and Germany) to the region. They set up military bases to secure their interests, especially in Greece and Cyprus. In fact, the Second World War, which stripped Britain and France of their colonies around the Mediterranean, changed the geopolitics of the Mediterranean as the USA ‘was pushed into the forefront of the Mediterranean defence line’ and ‘opened the way to the great power shift that tended to keep the United States there’ (Roucek, 1953b, p. 79).

The geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean enjoys strategic relevance in two aspects of ‘energy’ (and economy) and ‘security’ (and military). ‘Energy-related interests’ and ‘security threat’ are the two main elements of the geopolitical transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean in the face of growing number of alliances in the strategic sea (Tziarras, 2016, p. 407; Tziarras, 2019, p. 5).

The Mediterranean Sea is rich in undersea hydrocarbon resources, which takes on further commercial and economic significance for the neighbouring energy-hunger Europe. The gas fields in Egypt and Israel, with reserves of respectively 850 and 805 billion m³, are the Mediterranean’s largest discoveries of gas which could be exported to Europe, through Cyprus and Greece, and partially save it from energy dependence on Russia (Stergiou, 2019, p. 11).

In this respect, Israel, Greece and Cyprus signed an agreement in the second day of 2020 in Athens to transfer gas under the Mediterranean Sea to Greece and then other parts of Europe. If and when completed, the so-called EastMed Gas Pipeline will become the world’s longest undersea pipeline with a maximum capacity of transporting 12 billion m³ of gas per year and is primarily calculated to become operational with a 6-billion-euro finance by 2025 (Nicolas, 2020; Stergiou, 2019, p. 17). However, the project is now facing real impediments after the Biden administration informed Israel, Greece and Cyprus in January 2022 that the pipeline is ‘not economically viable’ and Washington no longer supports its construction due to environmental concerns (Tugwell & Georgiou, 2022).

The giant gas project raised the outcry of Turkiye which believes the pipeline passes through its territorial waters and therefore ignores its equal rights to exploit natural resources in the Mediterranean. Ankara responded by ‘engaging in a series of measured exercises of gunboat diplomacy, sending exploration and drill ships into Cypriot waters, each with naval escort’ (Tanchum, 2020).

The geostrategic implications of the EastMed project were so significant for Turkiye that it immediately struck, days before the signing of the pipeline agreement in Athens, a maritime deal with Libya to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from Turkiye’s southern shore to Libya’s northeast coast which fell en route the pipeline and created a hypothetical barrier to the project. Ankara issued a harsh statement hours after the signing of the EastMed agreement in Athens and threatened that any project without the presence of Turkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean is doomed to failure (Michalopoulos, 2020).

Even though Egypt has not yet joined the EastMed gas project, Cairo unveiled an initiative in March 2021 to transfer Israel’s gas to Greece through Egypt. Such an announcement sparked protest from Cyprus as it was excluded from the gas transmission plans in the Egyptian proposal according to which Egypt’s gas pipeline would be connected to Crete Island and then transshipped to Greece’s Alexandropoulos Port to enter the country’s (liquified) gas grid, opening its way to other parts of Europe (Ellinas, 2021).

Egypt’s initiative has two overwhelming advantages for Greece as the proposed route for the transport of gas falls within the precincts of their shared EEZ; this will neutralize Turkiye’s efforts to sabotage the project as Ankara can hardly claim that the pipeline falls within its EEZ with Libya; additionally, the pipeline linking Israel to Egypt would pass through land rather than maritime routes and would cut the huge costs of undersea piping and could attract more investors.

Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Italy, Jordan and Israel formed the Cairo-based ‘Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum’ as a ‘real game changer for Egypt, Greece and Cyprus … to build a regional gas market as well as coordinate efforts’ against Turkiye (Farouk, 2019). Stergiou (2019, p. 26) observes that the ‘broader geostrategic procedures’ of the Gas Forum reflected ‘the common perceptions of the countries involved regarding the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean to their national security’. The Gas Forum and the EastMed project ‘reinforced Ankara’s sense of encirclement’—something Ankara views ‘as elements of a larger effort to box in Turkiye on the margins of the Mediterranean’ (Demiryol, 2020) ‘dashing Ankara’s in-progress plans to become a regional energy hub’ (Tanchum, 2020).

The geostrategic significance of the alliance between Greece, Israel and Cyprus is so much immense for regional and trans-regional players that the USA Congress passed a bill in support of the so-called 3+1 Coalition (Greece, Israel, Cyprus plus the USA). The ‘Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019’ was tabled by Robert Menendez to confront ‘Turkiye’s illegal actions’ in the Mediterranean (US Congress, 2019). The bill placed the 3+1 cooperation initiative at the centre of the new strategy of the United States in the Mediterranean and mandated the US Departments of Energy and State to establish a joint energy centre and conclude cooperation agreements in the area of energy and security with Greece, Israel and Cyprus.

Concurrently, the US Senate lifted arms sanctions on Cyprus and authorized the US Department of State to offer military aid and sell weapons to Cyprus. With these measures, the USA could obstruct the role of Russia and Turkiye in the energy and security structures of the Mediterranean and Europe and shake the age-old bonds between Russia and Greece and Cyprus. ² In this respect, the USA requested that Cyprus exit the 2015 agreement with Russia, which provides access to Russian warships of the Cypriot ports (Samaha, 2019).

In 2019 and under the Trump administration, the Greek government aligned itself with the USA which was planning to strengthen its strategic links with Greece, Israel and Cyprus in the Mediterranean. The US administration, in the first place, rendered material and spiritual support to cooperation among them on expanding energy connectivity. The USA agreed to construct an LNG terminal in Greece’s Alexandroupolis and an underground LNG storing facility in Kvala Port to turn American iced LNG cubes into gas for delivery to Bulgaria and into the European heartland through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria (IGB). Under this plan, Greece turns into an entryway for US natural gas to Europe, where 25 percent of oil and gas is traditionally supplied by Russia. It is in fact ‘aimed at stopping Russia’s influence from advancing to the Mediterranean Sea, but also Chinese expansion into the Balkans and further north via links being established on the northern Greek coast’ (Tzimas, 2020).

Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, said during his visit to Greece in 2020 that the USA aimed to help Europe to ‘increase its capacity to have a diversified set of energy sources, not to be dependent on Russia’ and possibly China. In 2019, Pompeo visited Israel and underlined the importance of ‘increased cooperation to support energy independence and security and to protect against external malign influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East’ in particular Russia, China and Iran (as cited in Tsardanidis, 2019, p. 79). ³

Security and military developments since 2019 and particularly the 2022 Ukraine war have doubled the geostrategic gravity of the Eastern Mediterranean beyond the issue of energy which will be discussed in the next section.

Greece and the New Politico-Security Discourse in Mediterranean Geopolitics

The geopolitical and geostrategic significance of Greece and its islands in the Mediterranean has been already emphasized in its role as ‘a natural bridge between the energy-rich Middle East and energy-consuming Europe’ (Tsardanidis, 2019, p. 75). Such a role in previous decades has resulted in the formation of coalitions and alliances in the region, which have highlighted the important role Greece can assume in creating a new regional and trans-regional security-military architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This role was taken and consolidated by the conservative Neo-Democracy Party that won Greece’s parliamentary elections in 2019. Those elections are considered a historical twist as the Hellenic Republic was pulled out of the 2008–2018 financial crisis and the Neo-Democracy government succeeded in expanding its political and commercial ties with the outside world and attracting American, Israeli and Arab investors. Such a big achievement was made thanks to Neo-Democracy’s leadership and contribution.

Several months after Mitsotakis came into power on 08 July 2019, the new government in Athens signed the updated military agreement with the USA—the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) of 1990. Based on the provisions of this agreement, American forces are given authorized access to several military bases and locations on some Greek islands.

Greece and the USA had clinched two more defence cooperation agreements in 1986 namely the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreement (DICA). The MDCA was renewed in the form of a second Protocol of Amendment in October 2021 when Greek foreign minister visited Washington to attend the third round of mutual strategic dialogue which made the agreement permanent between Greece and the USA. They described the deal as ‘durable enough to allow for Greece and the USA to advance security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond’ (Pamuk, 2021).

In a letter by the US Secretary of State to the Greek Prime Minister, Antony Blinken pointed to the possibility of expansion of US military bases on other Greek islands other than Crete such as Skyros. The US forces are currently based and trained in Volos (Georgoula Camp), Alexandroupoli (Giannouli Camp), the Litochoro Firing Range and Souda Naval Base to strengthen US ‘geopolitical and strategic footprint’ in the Mediterranean Sea (Nedos, 2021a). ⁴

Here is how Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, in an interview with Kathimerini, describes the geopolitical significance of the defence deal with the USA:

Firstly, the USA, as it looks to Asia and withdraws from Afghanistan and Iraq, is committed to stationing and deploying forces on Greek soil for at least the next five years and possibly for a much longer period. This presence further shields our country from external threats.… If a country plans to attack Greece, it must take seriously the fact that American troops are stationed in our country.… It is extremely positive for our national interests that the USA attaches particular importance to our country. It sees Greece as a country that can play a leading role in the Western Balkans and their accession to the European Union. They also treat us as a bridge between the Middle East and the [Persian] Gulf with Europe. The particularly good relations we have developed in recent years with Israel and the major Arab countries play a key role. (Nedos, 2021c)

Nedos (2021b) wrote in an opinion in Greek newspaper Kathimerini that ‘significantly, it is the first time the deal refers so clearly to a reciprocal decision to safeguard security, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity against actions that threaten peace’—a clear reference to the US support for Greece in the event of a probable Turkish aggression.

Several days before extending the MDCA, Greece signed a 3-billion-euro defence pact with France to purchase frigates and Rafael jets as well as support in the event of an ‘external threat’. The MDCA and Greece’s military pact with France were described by Ellis (2021), a prominent Kathimerini columnist, as ‘deterrence’ against Turkey in alliance with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and the United States. Ellis (2021) praised Greece alliance with Egypt, Cyprus, Israel and the UAE under the support of Washington and said it would certainly ‘affect the balance of power and place Athens firmly in a pro-Western strategic network in a region where America’s gradual departure is leaving a void that must be filled’ (Ellis, 2021).

Such opinions demonstrate the depth of change in the nature of security and geopolitics in the Mediterranean and beyond that would isolate Turkiye and further empower Iran adversaries in the region. Greek diplomatic sources were quoted as saying that Athens’ military arrangements in the Mediterranean are essentially geared towards countering the ‘expansionist policies’ and ‘Turkiye’s threat to start a war with Greece over the extent of its continental shelve and its maritime boundaries, further shielding Greece’s territorial sovereignty’ (Ekathimerini, 2021c). The reference to ‘Turkiye’s threat’ is derived from a statement by Turkish government threatening military confrontation if Athens extends its territorial waters from the present six miles to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea which Ankara would consider as a casus belli.

Turkiye and Greece have held, so far (until 22 February 2022), 64 rounds of the so-called ‘exploratory talks’ since 2002 with the objective of drafting a framework agenda for beginning formal negotiations to settle long-standing maritime boundaries dispute and other differences such as the demilitarization of Greek islands (Maltezou, 2021). Leaders of the two countries have met several times to ease the tension. However, differences remain between the two neighbouring states in areas such as migration and refugees, military provocations, energy exploitation and human rights. The main points of contention between Greece and Turkiye are the dispute over maritime zones (mainly EEZ) and airspace, the Cyprus issue, hydrocarbon research activities in the Mediterranean, the issue of the demilitarization of the Greek islands and the treatment of minorities (Tziarras, 2016, pp. 413–415; Tziarras, 2019, p. 6).

The USA investment in four military bases of Greece on Crete Island constitutes another important aspect of the Mediterranean geopolitics. Within the framework of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, the USA military has been given full and permanent access to Greece’s Souda Bay Naval Base on Crete and a rotating presence in three other locations including in Stefanovikeio, Alexandroupolis and Larisa Air Base (Ekathimerini, 2021a). Additionally, the Greek military has proposed 22 more locations to the US Army to choose for the deployment of more American forces and logistics.

Nedos (2021a) believes although such a huge military investment by the USA in a NATO ally’s territory appears normal and natural, it is further aimed at easing ‘Washington’s worry of a deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations at a time when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can no longer be viewed as a steadfast ally of the West’. Such a view has been echoed by the National Herald that describes the expansion of USA military presence in the Mediterranean as being part of Greece’s national operational plan to ‘counteract Turkish aggression’ (The National Herald, 2021).

Stronger USA military presence in the Mediterranean bases of Greece also serves the security interests of Israel and its Arab allies such as the UAE and Egypt that have unstable relations with Turkiye and Iran. The USA military movements in the Mediterranean have been complemented by major military drills conducted jointly in the Mediterranean by regional and transregional actors.

Earlier in March 2021, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier arrived in the Mediterranean and held several joint drills which the Hellenic Armed Forces described as demonstrating ‘the important role held by Greece and the United States in the defence and security of the wider region of the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ (Ekathimerini, 2021b).

An annual joint military exercise called ‘Noble Dina’ coordinates anti-submarine warfare practice and search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean with the participation of Greece, Israel, Cyprus and France (Claus, 2021). Aljazeera described the drills as a ‘sign of increased cooperation among countries that increasingly view Turkey as a rival in the Mediterranean’ (Aljazeera, 2021).

Egypt, Greece and Cyprus attend annual ‘Medusa’ wargames in the Mediterranean in the light of ‘the growing partnership and military cooperation between the Egyptian armed forces and brotherly countries, in addition to showing the combat capability and the high level of training to meet the growing challenges in the Mediterranean region’ and ‘to protect our economic objectives outside our territorial waters in cooperation with other friendly countries’ (Eleiba, 2019; Farouk, 2019).

The Abraham Accords, Greece and Implications for the Mediterranean

Before the introduction of the Abraham Accords in 2020 and its impact on the political, security, military and economic architecture of the Mediterranean, the countries of the region had adopted in 1995 the Barcelona Declaration, within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, to maintain peace, security and shared prosperity for the Mediterranean through bilateral partnership agreements and economic, political, security, social and cultural ‘baskets’ (Chourou, 2007, p. 194; Schlumberger, 2000, p. 247).

The Barcelona Declaration, while emphasizing the establishment of a common area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean, called for the realization of ‘a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement’ of the Middle East conflict which could contribute to ‘turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity’ (Barcelona Declaration, 1995, pp. 2–3).

The Barcelona Declaration mechanism to establish peace in the Mediterranean and the Middle East through economic integration and politico-security cooperation did not bear remarkable fruits and ultimately failed in practice (Bauer, 2013, p. 1; Junemann, 2003, p. 46; Spencer, 2002, p. 138) as Turkiye–Greece tensions did not ease and Israeli–Palestinian conflict did not end in the face of ‘neglect of key Arab sociopolitical structures’ and ‘inherent contradictions’ in the Euro-Med Initiative and the fact that ‘the policy goals of sustainable, socially-balanced economic development and democratisation contradict the vested interests of the ruling elites’ (Schlumberger, 2000, pp. 248–259); Yet, new crises arose in Syria and Lebanon as two major littoral Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the absence of ‘successful EU intervention in the Middle East peace process’ (Junemann, 2003, p. 46), which deprived Israel of the diplomatic, economic and political advantages of joining the Euro-Mediterranean club (Tovias, 2007, pp. 218–219), the Abraham Accords triggered hope for the settlement of broader conflicts and disputes in the Middle East between Israelis and the Arabs. It also raised the prospects of stronger politico-security cooperation and economic integration and partnership between oil-rich pro-Western Arab states of the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean countries—something the Euro-Mediterranean Initiative failed to realize. In 2007, Harders (2007, p. 54) recommended that military and security cooperation in the Mediterranean should be considered only ‘after a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process’ and the Abraham Accords provided this opportunity in 2020 with the mediation of the USA that had opened its way to the Mediterranean in 1940s.

Since the 1940s, Greece has been considered an ally to the USA which managed in 2020 to secure more interests not only for Israel but also for Greece with brokering Abraham Accords, which mended relations between Israel and Arab states of the Middle East which have been always ‘one of the most vital [strategic] portions’ of the Mediterranean (Roucek, 1953b, p. 85). As suggested by Roucek (1953b, p. 82), the supreme significance of the Mediterranean to the USA is more of a military and not commercial nature as the Mediterranean offers a potential ‘strategic gateway’ into Eurasia and the Middle East, containing Russia, Turkiye and Iran—the three strongest regional actors and players. ⁵

The Abraham Accords, as indicated by Jones and Guzansky (2017, p. 398), created a ‘tacit security regime’ to confront ‘Iran and Islamic extremists and mounting uncertainties about future USA strategy and engagement in the Middle East’ (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020, p. 379); and therefore, it was condemned outright by both Iran and Turkiye (Strategic Comments, 2020).

The Abraham Accords was perceived to be contradicting the causes of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which made any normalization of relations with Israel conditional on an overall peace agreement between Israelis and the Palestinians—something the Palestinians were keen to prevent ‘as a last, desperate bargaining chip against Israel’ (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020, p. 380).

The Abraham Accords encouraged the USA to offer more military incentives to the UAE and Bahrain—home to US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, the headquarters of the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and a support base for the US Central Command (CENTCOM)—just in the same manner Washington boosted military sales and aid to Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.

The UAE sought guarantees from the USA for the sale of advanced arms such as F-35 fighter jets in the face of what they perceived as ‘Iran’s phobia’ which in the words of Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘forced the Emiratis to consider a relationship with Israel with fresh eyes’ (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020, pp. 381–382).

Even though Saudi Arabia did not join the Abraham Accords, Riyadh agreed to contribute to the ‘tacit security regime’ structured in the Mediterranean Sea in the form of participating in military drills orchestrated by Greece. In March 2021, six Saudi F-15 fighter jets landed for the first time on the Greek island of Crete to attend ‘Eye of Falcon 1’ joint military drills alongside the UAE, France, the USA and Cyprus (Panoutsopoulou, 2021).

A similar joint military drill was organized by Greece in September 2021 with the participation, for the first time, of the Royal Saudi Land Forces paratroopers, UAE Special Forces, the Egyptian Army’s El-Saa’ka (Thunderbolt) Forces and the Greek Joint Special Operations Forces.

Greece hosted a massive joint military exercise in the Mediterranean codenamed ‘Iniochos’. The Iniochos drill series first began in the late 1980s in Greece and was later decentralized in 2015. It attracted participation in ‘Iniochos 2021’ from the Spain, Cyprus, France, the UAE, Israel, Canada and the USA. Austria, Egypt, Jordan, Romania and Slovenia attended the drills as observers (Kokkinidis, 2021). Bowman and Brobst (2021), from the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, believe that Iniochos wargames carry ‘an unmistakable message to Iran that it has failed to isolate Israel’ and help Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv ‘to build a more diplomatically unified and militarily capable coalition’ against Tehran.

In 2021, Israel hosted a massive, multi-national aerial exercise of military forces from USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Greece and India—the largest and most advanced drill in a series of biennial Blue Flag exercises in the Mediterranean. Israel’s Air Force chief Amikam Norkin said the military drill was of ‘utmost strategic importance’ as ‘we live in the most complicated environment, with threats … from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran’ (Gross, 2021).

One month before the Blue Flag manoeuvre, special forces from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Greece conducted another joint military exercise dubbed Hercules-21 in Peramos, Greece. Arab News reported that the drills aimed to ‘enhance joint cooperation between the two countries [Greece and Saudi Arabia], exchange experiences and concepts, and raise the level of combat readiness to confront regional challenges’ (Arab News, 2021). Concurrently, another joint military drill was hosted by Egypt from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the USA, Cyprus, Greece, Pakistan and the UK, along with 13 countries as observers (Jordan Times, 2021).

Military drills in the Mediterranean involving Arab littoral states of the Persian Gulf are perceived by some analysts as transmitting a signal to Turkiye and possibly Iran especially after the conclusion of the Abraham Accords (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020). Helou (2021), citing a Turkish defence analyst, believes that such military exercises run counter to Turkish interests and have made it isolated in the region, driving it to repair its damaged relationships with Israel, Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular.

In 2021, Greece delivered a battery of Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems and deployed 130 personnel in Saudi Arabia in a deal described by Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias as ‘a contribution to the wider security of the energy sources for the West’ (Reuters, 2021a). The Chief of Staff of the Greek Armed Forces said cooperation between Greece and Saudi Arabia will contribute to ‘ensuring stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East’ (Ozcan & Durul, 202). In October 2021, the Supreme Council of Cooperation was established between Saudi Arabia and Greece aimed at bankrolling 5 million euros in investments in telecommunications, energy, tourism and defence sectors (Papadopoulos, 2021). The scope of cooperation between the two countries was described by the Greek government spokesman as of ‘strategic character’.

In February 2021, ministers from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain gathered for the ‘Philia Forum’ in Athens alongside Cypriot and Egyptian officials to show support for Greece in the Mediterranean.

The UAE and Greece were able to bolster bilateral ties even stronger than Saudi Arabia. In August 2020, the UAE sent an F-16 squadron to Crete as a ‘demonstration of solidarity’ amidst growing escalation between Turkiye and Greece over maritime boundaries and hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020, p. 383). The Hellenic Navy frigate ‘Hydra’ docked in the UAE’s Zayed Port, 170 km away from Iran’s Abou Mousa Island. Greece and the UAE signed a strategic partnership agreement which obligated them to assist each other in case of a threat to their territorial integrity. The pact was described by major Greek media outlets as ‘the most significant agreement’ Greece has experienced since the end of the Second World War (Iddon, 2021).

The Abraham Accords was negotiated at a time the UAE was shifting its foreign policy approach from ‘soft power’ to ‘smart power’ through ‘greater intervention, participation, and action’ (Al Ketbi, 2020, p. 391). Such a change could be traced in the UAE’s intervention in Yemen, Syria and Libya as well as its participation in military drills in the Eastern Mediterranean. Al Ketbi (2020, p. 397) explains how the Abraham Accords provided the opportunity for the UAE to fill the ‘vacuum’ created by the decline of USA power in the Middle East:

The Abraham Accords may prove to be a turning point in this context, helping both the UAE and Israel deepen and enhance their shared interests and strategic cooperation with a view to promoting regional security, overcoming common challenges, and effectively engaging in the US policy of ‘burden-sharing.’ The Accords may catalyze the consolidation of the USA–Israel–UAE alliance and unlock great potential in the region. (Al Ketbi, 2020, p. 397)

Such cooperation between the USA, Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain seem to aim at ‘rebalancing of power’ and would bring ‘potential benefits’ for the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Israel as they share ‘similar strategic perspectives on the regional environment … [and] are wary of the ambitions of Tehran and Ankara’ to extend their influence across the Arab world (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020, pp. 382–386; Strategic Comments, 2020).

The role of Greece in this new architecture created as one of the main implications of the Abraham Accords is undeniable. Forbes in a 2021 report questioned Greece’s power to maintain a balance in its foreign relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and Iran in the face of the new geopolitical developments in the Middle East after the Abraham Accords (Iddon, 2021).

Conclusion

The USA officially entered the Mediterranean region in 1940s under the North African Campaign (in 1942), the formal announcement of the US Navy’s Mediterranean program (in 1946) and the establishment of the Truman Doctrine concerning Greece and Turkiye (in 1947) which ‘forced the United States to recognize the necessity of maintaining a position of power and influence in the Mediterranean’ and take over the position from Britain (Roucek, 1953b, p. 80).

The Navy of the USA remained the most powerful force in the Mediterranean as a major hub for the US military power in Europe after the Second World War. The US Army with a ‘Mediterranean Mandate’ currently holds its Sixth Fleet (Naval Forces Europe-Africa) and other military presence permanently in Greek ports. This indicates the significant role of Greece in regional equations.

The Eastern Mediterranean is currently at the centre of focus of major developments in view of the increasing influence of the USA, rapprochement between Israel and some Arab states and stronger involvement of trans-regional allies in the military-security equations of the Mediterranean.

When Euro-Med Initiative of 1995 failed to realize the goals of the Barcelona Conference to integrate Arab Mediterranean states into Europe particularly economically, the geopolitics of the Mediterranean shifted to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the Abraham Accords.

In other words, after a two main ‘metamorphoses’ in the 1990s (Euro-Mediterranean Initiative) and the 2000s (Arab Spring) in the Mediterranean region (Bauer, 2013, p. 1), Abraham Accords led to massive geopolitical changes in the relations between the Middle East and Europe. One such significant change was the reshuffled role of Greece in imperative shifts in power relationships in the Mediterranean region with implications for the Middle East.

The Abraham Accords also changed the long-term pro-Palestine approach of Greece towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As studied in detail by Agnantopoulos (2007, p. 359), Greece had valid reasons for adopting a pro-Palestinian approach and ‘unreserved support for the Palestinian cause’ as it voted against the 1947 Partition Plan in favour of Palestine and did not establish full diplomatic relations with Israel for 40 years, ‘consistently criticizing Israel’s ‘expansionist’ policies and calling for a ‘fair’ solution which would acknowledge the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinian people’ (Agnantopoulos, 2007, pp. 359–361). ⁶

However, during the period Abraham Accords was being formulated and after its conclusion by the Trump administration, Israel became the main military and economic partner of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean; Israel and Greece formed bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral coalitions and alliances and held several military drills in the Mediterranean; they signed a multi-billion-euro agreement to transfer Israel’s gas to Greece; Israel signed a 1.5-billion-euro 20-year agreement to set up an International Pilot Training Center for the Hellenic Air Force which also included the supply of ten M-346 aircraft, the maintenance of T-6 aircraft, as well as the provision of simulators, training and logistical support for Greece army.

The sudden increase in Greece–Israel ties and Greece’s insatiable appetite for stronger relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the Middle East in view of the weakening association of Turkiye with the USA, Israel and France could be an immediate consequence of the Abraham Accords, which marked the beginning of a shift in the geopolitical shape of the Mediterranean.

Before the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, Turkiye felt it was being left out of not only the ‘energy game’ but also the emerging regional order which, in view of the Mediterranean military drills, aggravated Turkiye’s threat perception. As Gillespie (2013, p. 133) stated, ‘the rising prominence of relatively new political actors seeking to exert national or regional influence’ in the Mediterranean is changing the scope of developments in this part of the world. One such new actor is the Neo-Democracy government in Greece which is strongly shaping the politico-security discourse on the East Mediterranean geopolitics. This article illustrated how Greece is restructuring the Mediterranean geopolitics through active engagement in the energy and security initiatives of the region under the full backing of the USA.