Abstract
In an essay titled ‘The Logic of Reparative Substitution: Contemporary Restitution Models of Atonement, Divine Justice, and Somatic Death,’ Joshua Farris and S. Mark Hamilton articulate a largely ignored objection to the penal substitutionary atonement theory: the Somatic Death Objection. In this essay I respond to Farris and Hamilton’s Somatic Death Objection by appealing to the doctrine of original sin and the distinction between, what I call, mere consequences and penal consequences. I begin by defining the model in question: Penal Substitutionary Atonement. I then examine the Somatic Death Objection as Farris and Hamilton articulate it. Having done this, I provide two eschatologically based responses to the objection but argue that these responses are found wanting for various reasons. Finally, I turn to the doctrine of original sin and the distinction between mere consequences and penal consequences to argue that the Somatic Death Objection need not undermine penal substitution.
Among Protestants—especially those within the evangelical-Reformed tradition—the penal substitution model of atonement holds special privilege. Whether one considers hymns, sermons, or confessional documents, one notices that this model is often elevated to the status of the doctrine of atonement, or at the very least, it is considered a central model without which Christ’s atoning work cannot be understood in its biblical context. Despite its privileged position among a vocal segment of the church, the doctrine itself is not without problems. A number of objectors have drawn attention to these problematic features of the doctrine. Such objections to penal substitutionary atonement—hereafter PSA—may be classified as subjective or objective critiques. Subjective critiques concern the problematic effects that the doctrine might have on individuals or society. 1 Objective critiques concern problematic elements of the doctrine itself. 2 One objective critique of the doctrine that has received much attention from philosophers and analytic theologians in recent years concerns the definition of ‘punishment.’ According to this objection, one standard definition of punishment delineates four elements as the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to count as punishment. By definition, penal substitution cannot meet these conditions; thus, the classic penal substitution view of atonement is incoherent. 3 This particular objection has dominated much of the literature related to PSA; it is common for theologians and philosophers to expend effort strengthening the model and shoring up the model against the objection.
Encountering new objections to PSA, however, is a rare occurrence. In an essay titled ‘The Logic of Reparative Substitution: Contemporary Restitution Models of Atonement, Divine Justice, and Somatic Death,’ Joshua Farris and S. Mark Hamilton accomplish the rare feat of articulating a—to this point largely ignored—objection to the historic doctrine: the Somatic Death Objection. 4 Briefly stated, the objection goes as follows: Bodily death of human persons is the legal penalty for sin. Christ’s death pays the debt of punishment human beings owe; as such, humans for whom Christ died should not experience somatic death. Yet, humans still experience somatic death. Therefore, it would seem that, as an explanation of what Christ accomplishes, PSA fails. In this essay I respond to Farris and Hamilton’s Somatic Death Objection by appealing to the doctrine of original sin and the distinction between, what I call, mere consequences and penal consequences. 5
My response proceeds as follows. I begin by defining the model in question: Penal Substitutionary Atonement. I then examine the Somatic Death Objection as Farris and Hamilton have articulated it. Having done this, I provide briefly two eschatologically based responses to the objection but argue that these responses are found wanting for various reasons. Finally, I turn to the doctrine of original sin and the distinction between mere consequences and penal consequences to argue that the Somatic Death Objection need not undermine PSA.
Penal Substitutionary Atonement
Contrary to popular opinion, Penal Substitutionary Atonement is not one model of atonement; rather, it is a family of models. There is not one historical model of PSA; various models have been put forth over the years. These models vary in regards to whom Christ substitutes for: individuals or a group; whether the extent of atonement is limited or unlimited; whether PSA should be conceived in terms of acceptation or acceptilation; whether PSA was absolutely necessary or hypothetically necessary; whether PSA should be conceived of as being merely forensic or whether it should be conceived in realist terms; and whether Christ actually is punished or experiences what would be a punishment had it fallen upon the guilty. These variants, and perhaps others as well, can be combined to form multiple PSA models. Yet despite the manifold variety of PSA models on offer, there is—I have argued elsewhere—a common conceptual core to PSA. 6 What constitutes this conceptual core? I suggest the following:
(P1) Sin deserves to be punished by God.
(P2) On the cross, Christ undergoes, or suffers, harsh treatment from God on behalf of sinners.
(P3) Sinners avoid punishment because of Christ’s work on the cross.
(P4) God’s justice is satisfied by Christ’s work on the cross.
These four elements can be found across a wide variety of accounts of PSA ranging from those who are sympathetic to the view to those who are critical of it. Because of the similarity between the various models that often are dubbed PSA, it is best to speak of a family of views called PSA rather than to speak of one singular account of PSA.
Despite the variety of versions of PSA, Farris and Hamilton have homed in on one particular version of PSA, though they claim that the following five components are common parts of the various expressions of PSA available in the literature. 7 They describe PSA as:
(1) Christ’s atonement is necessary to his redemptive work.
(2) Christ dies as a substitute for individual, particular persons.
(3) Christ dies in order to absorb the retributive (penal) consequences of divine justice and wrath precipitated by human sin, being treated by God as if he were those individuals to whom the punishment was due.
(4) Christ’s death pays a debt of punishment.
(5) Christ’s death is a vicarious sacrifice. 8
Despite my disagreement with the claim about necessity, individuality, and penal consequences as constituting the core of PSA, I agree that many modern expressions of PSA have taken on the form described above. Thus, for the sake of argument, I will proceed with Farris and Hamilton’s description of PSA.
The Somatic Death Objection
Farris and Hamilton pose the question, ‘If Christ absorbs (and thereby pays in full) a debt of punishment for the sin of humanity, why is it that persons for whom his atonement is effectual for still suffer somatic death?’ 9 This question is at the heart of what can be called their Somatic Death Objection. Their objection can be formulated as follows:
(6) Somatic death is the legal penalty for sin (albeit, one of the penalties).
(7) By his death, Christ pays the legal penalty for sin—in full—for those for whom his work is effectual.
(8) Rendering punishment for the same offense twice is unjust.
(9) Those for whom Christ’s death was effectual still die a somatic death.
(10) It would seem that the penalty for sin is rendered twice for those who suffer a somatic death and have had Christ die as their penal substitute.
What is the defender of PSA to do in light of this objection? Farris and Hamilton say, ‘It would seem from this then that unless a defender of penal substitution denies that physical death is a penalty for sin—something, again, that we think most would be reticent to do—they have some explaining to do.’ 10
Helpfully, the authors provide a couple of potential responses on behalf of the PSA proponent. One response that can be offered by the PSA theorist is that in the case of those for whom Christ’s death is effectual, death is no longer a punishment, rather as Paul says, ‘death is gain’ (Philippians 1:21). Rightly, Farris and Hamilton point out, the fact that death is gain does not negate the harsh nature of death itself. Death, while in one sense being gain, is not a good in and of itself. No matter how hard the PSA theorist tries, death in and of itself cannot be spun in a positive light. Farris and Hamilton argue that simply removing the penal nature of somatic death is unwarranted, no matter how positive the consequence of death might be for believers. 11 In light of this claim, the authors pose yet another possibility for how Christ can pay humanity’s debt of punishment to God for sin and yet still have humanity suffer the penalty for death.
The reduplicative principle when applied to PSA says something like the following: ‘Christ dies in order to satisfy debts of punishment qua (in the capacity of) God and he dies to satisfy debts of punishment qua God’s moral law as a penal substitute.’ 12 On this way of framing things, Christ acts as a penal substitute in one case and a penal non-substitute in another. Such a view, they argue, would constitute what seems to be a form of Nestorianism. It would seem that the two natures are acting as if two persons were acting rather than having one person with two distinct acts. It would make little sense to say that the penal substitutionary act and the penal non-substitutionary act are distinct acts of the same person because either Christ pays a debt of honor or a debt of penalty, he cannot pay both. Even if such a construal could work, and even if it weren’t in fact Nestorian, it still seems problematic because Christ’s somatic death would still be part of his debt of punishment and other humans would still die bodily. Thus, punishment would still occur twice. Farris and Hamilton have posed a worthy—and by my lights an insufficiently noted—objection to PSA. What is a PSA theorist to do in light of this formidable objection?
Death is Not the End: Eschatological Responses to the Somatic Death Objection
PSA theorists have several options for how to respond to Farris and Hamilton’s objection. They could, for example, object to premise (8)—rendering punishment for the same offense twice is unjust. To pump the intuitions behind this premise Farris and Hamilton cite what Charles Hodge—one of the most well-known proponents of PSA—has to say in his systematic theology: A man condemned at a human tribunal for any offense against the community, when he has endured the penalty which the law prescribes, is no less unworthy, his demerit as much exists as it did from the beginning; but his liability to justice or obligation to the penalty of the law, in other words, his guilt in that sense of the word is removed. It would be unjust to punish him a second time for that offense.
13
The injustice of demanding payment for the liability to penalty twice for the same offense is the intuition that drives the so called ‘double-payment objection’ to limited atonement. 14 It is a formidable objection to unlimited atonement—though not an insurmountable one—precisely because it is so intuitive. The principle behind the intuition can be found throughout expositions of Reformed thought. Francis Turretin plainly states that the debt of sin being ‘so taken away from the first debtors that payment cannot be anymore demanded from them.’ 15 John Owen asks, ‘Is it probable that God calls any to a second payment, and requires satisfaction of them for whom, by his own acknowledgement, Christ hath made that which is full and sufficient?’ 16 The answer, for Owen, is obviously no. Even Reformed Hypothetical Universalists agree with the intuition; though they disagree with the application of the intuition against hypothetical universalism. James Ussher accepts the intuition but rejects it as an applicable objection in The Judgement of the Late Arch-Bishop of Armagh, and Primate of Ireland. 17 More recently Oliver Crisp has agreed with the intuition but argued that it does not apply in the case of Hypothetical Universalism. 18 Given how intuitive the notion that it would be unjust to punish someone twice for the same act is, it seems as though denying (8) is not a promising path for the PSA theorist. 19 What other routes are available? Perhaps they could deny (9), i.e., those for whom Christ’s death was effectual still die a somatic death. At first glance the denial of (9) seems far-fetched, yet in recent years there have been several philosophical proposals concerning personal eschatology that might be compatible with the denial of somatic death.
Death? Or Something Else?
Consider first Kevin Corcoran and Dean Zimmerman’s ‘Falling Elevator Model’ for how to account for the problem of resurrection identity in physicalist accounts of human beings. According to this model, immediately prior to death, bodies naturally fission into two, much like some bacteria undergo binary fission. 20 The fission of the bacteria is a ‘natural’ process, not involving special divine action, but under one version of the ‘Falling Elevator’ account, God intervenes miraculously to cause the body of the elect to fission such that the body ‘jumps’ into the afterlife while the old one says behind. The name of the model is supposed to recall cartoons in which a character survives a falling elevator by jumping out of the elevator right before it hits the ground floor. Similarly, a body survives—escapes (?)—death by being fashioned and replicated into the eschatological state prior to death.
How might the ‘Falling Elevator’ model work to answer the Somatic Death Objection? To see how, consider Mr Stark. Mr Stark is a believer and has put his faith in Christ. As such, Christ has died as a substitute for Mr Stark, thus paying the retributive consequences that were due to Stark. Following a heroic act, Mr Stark is severely injured and is on the verge of death. At his side is his close friend, Peter. Peter holds Mr Stark’s hand as Stark inches towards death. Whether the Somatic Death Objection obtains depends entirely on what happens to Mr Stark. If he dies, the Somatic Death Objection obtains. But given a ‘falling elevator’ scenario, at the moment immediately prior to death, Mr Stark’s body is replicated. One of the bodies remains with Peter, the other ‘jumps’—as Mr Stark—into the eschatological state alive and well. And thus, the Somatic Death Objection does not obtain.
Consider another model, namely, Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Simulacrum’ view. On this view, ‘at the moment of each man’s death, God removes his corpse and replaces it with a simulacrum, which is what is burned or rots.’ 21 That is, when someone dies, God replaces the original body with a simulacrum and the original body is taken into a suspended state. 22 Because the simulacrum is a perfect one, any examination of the new object would not yield any evidence that it was anything other than the original body. Now this view—which Van Inwagen does not think is likely—still holds that the person in fact dies. 23 As such it is not a fitting reply to the Somatic Death Objection.
Yet Van Inwagen’s model can be amended. Consider again the moments proceeding Mr Stark’s heroic act that puts him on the verge of death. As he lies there, holding Peter’s hand, immediately prior to death, Mr Stark’s body is imperceptibly snatched up and taken to the eschatological state. God replaces the body Peter was holding with a simulacrum of Mr Stark, though Peter does not notice. Thus, a lifeless simulacrum of Mr Stark’s body remains, but Mr Stark has been rescued from experiencing death. If so, the Somatic Death Objection does not obtain.
While at first glance both views seem similar—Mr Stark is taken up into the eschatological state immediately prior to death and does not experience death—the views are in fact different. On the Falling Elevator Model, Mr Stark’s body undergoes fission, thus the bodies are causally related. One body dies but the other does not. On the simulacrum model, Mr Stark’s body is simply replaced with a different hunk of matter. Both views suffer from significant philosophical objections. One objection to the Falling Elevator Model is that this view does not exclude cases of fission where there are two persons that are alive and have the same immanent causal connection to a previous person. In such a case there would be no way to distinguish between two numerically identical persons. 24 One problem with the Simulacrum Model is that it makes God out to be guilty of mass deception. 25 This seems to be a rather untoward consequence of the view. Perhaps there are reasons why God might be justified in misleading grieving survivors, but it is difficult to come up with a story for why he would massively deceive the human race regarding such a foundational event as death.
Aside from the philosophical objections that could be offered against such views, there is the exegetically based objection that calls us to believe that all humans—except for Enoch and Elijah and those who are alive at the time of Christ’s second coming—in fact die. 26 The author of Hebrews states, ‘it is appointed for mortals to die once, and after that the judgment. . .’ (Hebrews 9:27 NRSV). Even if Enoch and Elijah and those who are alive at the time of Christ’s second coming do not die, the majority of believers—those for whom Christ has paid the penalty as a substitute—still die and the Somatic Death Objection still seems to obtain.
Given that there are scriptural reasons for thinking that believers die (not to mention that our experience seems to confirm that people do in fact die), and that the Somatic Death Objection still looms large over PSA, what is the PSA defender to do? I suggest that one route that is open for PSA theorists is to question premise (6).
The Consequence of Sin is Death
Premise 6, you will recall, states that ‘Somatic death is the legal penalty for sin.’ This premise, I argue, is not sufficiently nuanced. There are biblical and historic reasons for believing that somatic death, in and of itself, need not be understood as the legal penalty for sin. Somatic death, I argue below, can be understood as a mere consequence of Adam’s sin. However, given other conditions, which I will explain below, somatic death* can in fact be considered a penal consequence for sin. Before I distinguish between somatic death and somatic death* and provide a just-so-story for how we might end up with two different types of somatic death in the world, it would be best to define mere consequences and penal consequences.
Mere and Penal Consequences
There are various places in Scripture where we witness a group of people experiencing hard treatment for the moral failings of others. One such example is the exile. The event occurred in two primary stages (Israel in 722 BCE and Judah in 586 BCE) as God’s judgment for Israel and Judah’s sins of idolatry, greed, oppression of the poor, and violence. 27 While these particular sins might have characterized the nation as a whole, it is clear that not everyone who was part of the nation violated God’s commandments. Consider, for example, Daniel and his friends. In the first few chapters of the book of Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, Azariah, and Daniel are portrayed as faithful Jews worthy of emulation. They act as models for how Jews in exile ought to behave among pagans. They are exemplars who avoid temptations to idolatry and stay loyal to the God of Israel even in the face of death. They are not the type of people who did anything to merit the punishment for sin which was exile, yet, they are exiled along with the rest of Judah in 586 BCE. According to Daniel’s own words, ‘the curses and sworn judgments written in the law of Moses, the servant of God, have been poured out on us, because we have sinned against you’ (Daniel 9:11, ESV). According to Daniel the sins of the nation have merited the curses and judgments spoken of in Deuteronomy 28. Those who have violated God’s laws (e.g., the Kings of Israel and Judah and its religious leaders) and those who have not violated God’s laws (e.g., Daniel and his friends) both receive the same hard treatment from God (exile) because they belong to one group, namely the Israel.
There is another biblical narrative in which those who have not committed a moral failing experience the same sort of hard treatment as those from the same group who have committed a moral failing. Numbers 32 describes such a situation. According to the narrative, 12 spies go into the Valley of Eschol, see the inhabitants of the land and become overwhelmed at the prospects of going to war with them. Only two spies—Joshua son of Nun and Caleb son of Jephunneh—believe that, with the Lord’s help, they could take the land. Upon hearing the report of the disbelieving spies, Israel becomes discouraged about the prospect of going into the promised land. As a result, ‘the LORD’s anger was kindled against Israel, and he made them wander in the wilderness forty years, until all the generation that had done evil in the sight of the Lord was gone’ (Numbers 32:13, ESV). Being made to wander in the wilderness was a punishment meted out to the older generation who had committed the moral failing of disbelieving God’s word. Yet, there are others—who were not among that generation, that did not disbelieve God’s word—who were forced to wander in the wilderness as well, namely, the descendants of that disbelieving generation. Thus, even though the younger generation did not commit a moral failing, they still experienced harsh treatment because of the sins of their ancestors. Though innocent, they experienced consequences for the moral failings of the previous generations.
How can we make sense of these two biblical narratives and the relationship between punishment and consequences? I suggest that the narratives can be explained by distinguishing between mere consequences and penal consequences. But first let us address, the nature of punishment.
Punishment, Mere Consequences and Penal Consequences
In ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment,’ Joel Feinberg argues that punishments have a characteristic called the ‘expressive function’ of punishment. 28 This expressive function is a ‘conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgements of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those “in whose name” the punishment is inflicted.’ 29 Building upon this expressive feature of punishment Mark Murphy explains that punishment has four necessary conditions:
Punishment is hard treatment.
Punishment is imposed by an authority who may legitimately impose hard treatment.
Punishment is for a failure, i.e., one is subject to punishment for failing to conform to some standard.
Punishment expresses condemnation of the wrongdoer. 30
Given these necessary conditions for punishment, Daniel and his friends and the younger generation who wandered in the wilderness could not be punished for they have not committed a moral failure and God is not expressing condemnation towards them. God cannot, strictly speaking, punish the innocent. Yet, we still need a way to express why the guilty and the innocent, who are part of the same group, receive the same hard treatment from God. I suggest that we can make sense of this situation by using the following distinctions: Penal Consequences: P, who is part of Group G, receives hard treatment (H), which expresses moral condemnation (E), by a legitimate authority (A), for P’s failure to conform to a certain standard (F). Mere Consequences: P, who is part of Group G, receives hard treatment (H), by a legitimate authority (A), because they belong to a group that has failed to conform to a certain standard (F).
The distinction between mere consequences and penal consequences allows us to say that guilty and innocent parties who are part of one group may receive the same hard treatment from a legitimate authority while denying the fact that the hard treatment is a punishment.
In the case of the exile, that hard treatment was being sent off into captivity. The idolaters and the innocent were both sent off into captivity. For the idolater’s captivity was a penal consequence, whereas for the innocent it a mere consequence. In the case of the wandering generations, both those who lacked faith and those who were not involved in the situation experienced the hard treatment of wandering in the desert. Those who disbelieved experienced wandering as a penal consequence and those who did not commit a moral failing experienced wandering as a mere consequence. 31
Original Sin
With the distinction between mere consequences and penal consequences in place we can now ask the question, what is the difference between somatic death and somatic death*? The answer to this question allows us to avoid the Somatic Death Objection. To elucidate this difference, consider the doctrine of original sin.
In Analyzing Doctrine, Oliver Crisp provides a concise outline of the doctrine of original sin. With full awareness that ‘there is no single agreed-upon definition of original sin in the Christian tradition’ Crisp details three core tenets that are common to all historic, orthodox doctrines of original sin. 32 These three tenets are shared by Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox alike:
There was an original pair from whom we all descended.
The pair committed the primal sin that adversely affects all their offspring.
All human beings after the fall of the original pair are in need of salvation without which they will perish. 33
Conspicuously absent from this ecumenical outline is the notion of original guilt, i.e., that all human beings (except for Christ, Adam, and Eve) are born in a state of guilt. If one finds oneself within a Western, Augustinian tradition, Crisp’s minimalist account likely will seem anemic. 34 It lacks several important elements, including a description of the adverse effects of the primal pair’s sins and the mechanism by which these adverse effects are communicated onto their progeny.
Jesse Couenhoven’s analysis of Augustine’s mature doctrine of original sin sheds some light on these missing elements. Couenhoven argues that there are five main elements in Augustine’s doctrine of original sin. 35 First, the source of original sin is a primal sin in the garden of Eden. This primal sin, according to Augustine, does not consist of eating the forbidden fruit. Eating the forbidden fruit was merely the expression of a disordered desire. Second, all human beings share in this primal sin because of a solidarity that exists with Adam in virtue of his role as a progenitor of the human race. As the primogenitor of the human race Adam contains within himself all future human beings. Unlike the federalism which marks much of Reformed theology, Augustine believed that solidarity with Adam consists of more than a mere legal arrangement wherein Adam has the power to break the covenant on behalf of his progeny. For Augustine, human solidarity with Adam is ontological. Third, the result of this primal sin is that all human beings are born with inherited sin. For Augustine, this notion refers to inherited guilt and a constitutional fault of disordered desire and ignorance. Fourth, the human race suffers a penalty because of the primal sin and because of inherited sin. Fifth, and finally, there is some account of how sin and the penalty are transmitted from generation to generation. For our purposes the third, namely that all humans are born with inherited sin—by which we mean inherited guilt and inherited corruption—is especially significant. Such a view—the guilt and corruption view—is not universally recognized as the doctrine of original sin despite its prevalence throughout much of Western and Reformed theology.
In recent times, a number of theologians have drawn attention to the fact that Huldrych Zwingli denied that original guilt is part of original sin. Thomas McCall summarizes Zwingli’s view as follows: (1) All humans are corrupted by the original sin of Adam, (2) this condition of original sin is the result of self-love, (3) this corruption brings utter moral ruin, but not guilt for this inherited condition, (4) all humans are guilty, but only for what they do because corruption inevitably produces actual sin.
36
The following words from Zwingli himself encapsulate his doctrine of original sin in a concise manner, Original sin, as it is in the children of Adam, is not properly sin . . . for it is not a misdeed contrary to law. It is, therefore, properly a disease and condition—a disease, because just as he fell through self-love, so do we also, a condition, because just as he became a slave and liable to death, so we are both slaves and children of wrath . . . and liable to death.
37
From this quotation, likewise, Oliver Crisp draws the conclusion that on Zwingli’s account, despite the fact that original sin does not include original guilt, a person is still ‘liable to death’ without the interposition of the benefits of Christ’s saving work.
38
Philip Schaff makes a similar observation regarding Zwingli’s doctrine of original sin. He explains, Zwingli departed from the Augustinian and Catholic system . . . He was far from denying the terrible curse of the fall and the fact of original sin; but he regarded original sin as a calamity, a disease, a natural defect, which involves no personal guilt, and is not punishable until it reveals itself in actual transgression.
39
Zwingli’s view, while representing a minority position in Western theology, is commensurate with several Reformed symbols, including the Belgic Confession, the 39 Articles of Religion, and the Scots Confession. 40
According to both Crisp and Schaff’s understanding of Zwingli, all human beings after the primal pair are liable to death, yet death does not seem to be a punishment; for, until actual sin is committed the human does not possess guilt. The human does not possess guilt, unlike on other Western accounts, because original guilt is not part and parcel of Zwingli’s doctrine of original sin. As Schaff explains, original corruption—which leads to death—is a disease or defect which is not punishable. Only actual transgressions are punishable. Thus, for Zwingli, as for Crisp, it seems that humans after the primal pair would die even without having committed actual sin; they would die in virtue of having a corrupted nature.
Somatic Death as a Mere Consequence and Somatic Death* as a Penal Consequence
Adopting the doctrine of original sin described above—what Crisp calls a moderate Reformed doctrine of original sin—we can now describe the difference between somatic death and somatic death* in terms of mere and penal consequences. Consider the following ‘just-so-story’: The primal pair commits the primal sin and thus are guilty. As such they are liable to a penal consequence, namely somatic death*. Their progeny, while not guilty until they commit actual sins, are born with a corrupted human nature. Part and parcel of their corrupted nature is that they will die. The fact that they die a somatic death is a mere consequence of being descendants of the primal pair. When the primal pair’s progeny commit actual sins, somatic death which previous to having committed an actual sin, was a mere consequence now becomes a penal consequence. We can call somatic death which is a penal consequence ‘somatic death*.’
So what is the relevant difference between somatic death and somatic death*? It is that somatic death*, unlike somatic death, includes an additional component, namely an expression of God’s moral condemnation. Let us now define somatic death as a mere consequence and somatic death as a penal consequence: Somatic Death as a Mere Consequence: P, who is part of the human race, receives hard treatment (death) by a legitimate authority (God), because they belong to a group that failed to conform to a certain standard (Adam’s family). Somatic Death as a Penal Consequence: P, who is part of the human race, receives hard treatment (death) which expresses moral condemnation, by a legitimate authority (God) for P’s failure to conform to a certain standard (by committing actual sins).
This distinction allows us to say that all humans die while denying that death always is a punishment for sin. The fact that we can affirm that all humans die while denying that somatic death always is a punishment for sin allows us to overcome the Somatic Death Objection. Let me explain.
The Somatic Death Objection: A Response
Farris and Hamilton posed the question, ‘If Christ absorbs (and thereby pays in full) a debt of punishment for the sin of humanity, why is it that persons for whom his atonement is effectual for sin still suffer somatic death?’ 41 I suggest that when Christ acts as a penal substitute for sinners, he takes on the penal consequence, somatic death*, for sinners. Thus, those who have put their faith in Christ no longer die a somatic death*. However, just because Christ pays the penal consequence for sin that does not mean that those who have put their faith in Christ no longer have to deal with the mere consequences of sin, namely somatic death. For those who are in Christ, somatic death is still a harsh consequence, but one which one ought not to expect to be removed by Christ acting as a penal substitute because somatic death is not a penalty for sin. Somatic death paired with an expression of condemnation, however, is a punishment. Because of Christ’s penal substitutionary work, those who are in Christ die but without the expression of condemnation from God.
To illustrate my proposal consider the following story. Ben and Rey both are born with original corruption in virtue of being Adam’s descendants. As such, Ben and Rey will experience the mere consequence of Adam’s sins, namely, somatic death. Up to this point, however, somatic death is not a penal consequence. Eventually, Ben and Rey commit an actual sin. Now, both Ben and Rey will experience somatic death as a penal consequence, i.e., somatic death*. One day, after being presented with the gospel, Rey puts her faith in Christ. Ben, however, continues to live in darkness and does not put his faith in Christ. Because Rey put her faith in Christ, Christ’s penal substitutionary work removes the penalty of sin, so Rey will not have to die somatic death*. Yes, Rey will die a somatic death, but without the condemnation that turns somatic death from a mere consequence to a penal consequence. Ben, on the other hand, will have to pay the penal consequences of sin. He will die a somatic death*, i.e., somatic death with the condemnatory expression.
Concluding Remarks
Returning to Farris and Hamilton’s question, ‘why is it that persons for whom his [Christ’s] atonement is effectual for still suffer somatic death?’ We can respond by saying that atonement covers somatic death as a penal consequence but not somatic death as a mere consequence. While I have employed a conceptual distinction unfamiliar—at least in terminology—to discussions about death and original sin, my response is not novel. The Heidelberg Catechism addresses the question of why those for whom atonement is effectual still suffer somatic death. Questions 37–43 relate to the paschal work of Christ. Question 40 asks, ‘Why was it necessary for Christ to humble Himself even unto death?’ The answer is that, ‘Because of the justice and truth of God satisfaction for our sins could be made in no other way than by the death of the Son of God.’ 42 Thus, question 40 teaches a form of penal substitution. Christ, has paid the penalty for sin, including death. Question 42 poses the question that Farris and Hamilton pose, though in different words: ‘Since Christ has died for us, why do we still have to die?’ The catechism anticipates that some would wonder why we have to pay a penalty—namely death—if Christ had already paid that penalty. If humans die as a penalty for sin and Christ paid that penalty, then PSA would be liable to a double-payment objection. But Heidelberg denies that the death of those who are in Christ is a penalty. It teaches, ‘Our death is not a payment for our sins, but it puts an end to our sin and is an entrance into eternal life.’ Thus, Heidelberg Q&A 42 avoids Farris and Hamilton’s Somatic Death Objection by denying that somatic death is always a penalty for sin.
Likewise, the Westminster Larger Catechism teaches that death, for believers, is not penal in nature. Consider question 85—again the kind of question that Farris and Hamilton say has largely been ignored by proponents of PSA: ‘Death being the wages of sin, why are not the righteous delivered from death, seeing all their sins are forgiven in Christ?’ The catechism answers: The righteous shall be delivered from death itself at the last day, and even in death are delivered from the sting and curse of it; so that although they die, yet it is out of God’s love, to free them perfectly from sin and misery, and to make them capable of further communion with Christ in glory, which they then enter upon.
Thus, death remains as a consequence of sin, though not a penal consequence, because it lacks the condemnatory function.
Just as telling are the words of Herman Witsius. He raises a hypothetical objection to the Reformed understanding of atonement saying, ‘But you say believers are still to die; and therefore Christ did not satisfy for them by his death.’ 43 Witsius responds, ‘By the death of Christ, death has ceased to be what it was before, the punishment inflicted by an offended judge, and the entrance into the second death, and has become the extermination of sin and the way to eternal life.’ 44 Again, death is no longer considered penal in nature, though we can still affirm that in and of itself death is not a good to be obtained.
To conclude let me reformulate Farris and Hamilton’s objection:
(6) Somatic* death is the legal penalty for sin (albeit, one of the penalties).
(7) Christ pays the legal penalty for sin—in full—for those for whom his work is effectual by his death.
(8) Rendering punishment for the same offense twice is unjust.
(9) Those for whom Christ’s death was effectual still die a somatic death.
(10) It would seem that the penalty for sin is rendered twice for those who suffer a somatic death and have had Christ die as their penal substitute.
Given that somatic death and somatic death* are not the same thing, (10) no longer follows. The penalty for sin is not rendered twice for those who suffer a somatic death and have had Christ as their penal substitute. The somatic death objection does not need to pose a problem for PSA. Of course, the response I have provided builds upon the view that original sin consists only of original corruption and not original guilt. Such a view of original sin might be a non-starter for some advocates of PSA given that the majority of Reformed theologians include original guilt in the doctrine of original sin. One need not adopt an original corruption-only view of original guilt to avoid the Somatic Death Objection though. It might still be the case that humans are born with original corruption and original guilt; thus these terms are distinctions without division. Somatic death would still be a mere consequence of corruption and somatic death* would still be a penal consequence. All humans (barring Christ and the primal pair) enter the world with original corruption and guilt, and thus from birth are liable for the penal consequences of sin. Upon appropriating Christ’s saving work, however, the penal consequence is removed and the mere consequence remains.
Summary
The Somatic Death Objection, while significant, does not undermine PSA as such. By drawing upon the distinction between mere consequences and penal consequences I have argued that penal substitution does not fall afoul in terms of a double payment objection. Humans can still die a somatic death even though Christ has paid the penalty for their sins.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Joshua Farris, S. Mark Hamilton, Andrew Hollingsworth, Derek Rishmawy, and J.T. Turner for feedback on this essay.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.