Understanding Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh

Abstract

Challenges from Islamist militants have been an integral part of Bangladesh’s political landscape since the 1980s. Islamist militancy has passed through different phases of silent and active forms, drawing inspiration from conflicts in Libya, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. A vast literature has dealt with Islamist militancy in Bangladesh, but very few works have shed light on who the Bangladeshi Islamist militants are and how they radicalize youths, whom they target for their secret mission of killings, and finally why youths choose to be radicalized, especially with the arrival of Islamic State and Al Qaeda in Bangladesh in 2013. The author conducted nearly 50 in-depth interviews with experts in Bangladesh and reviewed newspaper reports to answer these questions. This paper argues that middle-class youths with urban and secular backgrounds are increasingly being radicalized through cyber space, and diverse groups of people are targeted to carry out killings owing to their perceived ideological divergence. The idea of an apocalyptic Caliphate, a feeling of victimization, a disillusionment with the state and society, and personal distresses are all found to act as catalysts for Islamist radicalization in Bangladesh.

Keywords

Islamist militancy terrorism radicalization violent extremism Bangladesh

Introduction

Challenges from Islamist militants have been an integral part of Bangladesh’s political landscape since the 1980s and it is also evident that these militant groups are still operative (Mostofa, 2019, 2020c, 2020e). Islamist militancy has passed through different phases of silent and active forms, drawing inspiration from conflicts in Libya, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The post-2013 Bangladesh witnessed a rise of technology-savvy urban-youth-based militant groups, which has changed the militant landscape in Bangladesh. The terrific attack in the Holey Artisan Café in 2016 was the supreme manifestation of these radical groups. Apart from this horrific attack, they also carried out a series of attacks on secular and dissenting voices. The nature of the current phase of militancy is different from previous phases in terms of recruitment techniques, motivation sources, and its target for killings as well as radicalization (Mostofa, 2019, 2020b). The topic being a very recent phenomenon, very few studies have addressed the issues of which group of individuals is being targeted for radicalization, how they are being radicalized, and why they are being radicalized. Most importantly, none of the works has shed light on why the militants are targeting a particular group of people for killings. Only Riaz has tried to uncover who is being radicalized by analyzing suspected militants’ profiles (Riaz, 2016; Riaz and Parvez, 2018). This paper has addressed this gap by analyzing profiles of killed¹ and convicted militants. A vast range of literature has dealt with the subject of the causes of militancy or why people are being radicalized. Many structural issues, such as bad governance (Momen and Begum, 2006), unemployment (Ganguly, 2006), illiteracy (Momen and Begum, 2006), a dysfunctional parliament (Hasan, 2015), political opportunism (Akhter, 2010), political instrumentalization of Islam (Griffiths and Hasan, 2015), confrontational politics (Hasan, 2015), poverty (Quamruzzaman, 2010), criminalization of the economy (Barkat, 2016a), political polarization (DeVotta and Timberman, 2012) and political violence (Islam, 2011), have been identified as root causes of radicalization in Bangladesh. Apart from these causes, the growth of madrassas (Datta, 2007), external financial support (Ahmed, 2009), and feelings of Muslim victimization (Riaz, 2008, 2017) have also acted as reasons for the growth of militancy in Bangladesh. However, these works are mostly outdated, have rarely shed light on the changing dynamics of radicalization with the arrival of Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda (AQ) in Bangladesh, and mostly draw on desk-based research. Therefore, the current study represents a break-through, which managed to interview 43 experts and counter-terrorism practitioners and examine terrorists’ online propaganda materials to explore catalysts for radicalization in Bangladesh.

Theorizing the militant’s profile and roots of radicalization

Who is a militant has been a long standing question posed to researchers. Cesare Lombroso was perhaps the first who shifted the focus from the crime to the criminal in 1876. According to his thesis, a man is a criminal because of his biological and environmental background, and crime does not come from a free will. So, criminals are abnormal (Gibson and Rafter, 2006). Along the same line of argument, some characteristics can be blamed for adoption of militancy such as an ‘authoritarian personality’ (Adorno et al., 1950), ‘narcissism’ (Post, 1998), ‘anomie’ (Awan, 2008), ‘insanity’ (Pearce and Macmillan, 1977), lack of ‘cognitive capacity’ (Lezak, 1995), ‘aggressive temperament’ (Pettit, 1997), and ‘thrill and revenge seeking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Brynjar terms the psycho-pathological school as an isolated school because this school considers a terrorist in isolation and looks for deviant traits (Brynjar and Skjolberg, 2004). Sprinzak (1995) adds that along with the psycho-pathology thesis, social and political factors need to be examined as well. Building on the socio-political thesis, Bordes and Romero contend that terrorists are like normal human beings, but they are exposed to an abnormal situation (Romero, 2007). Some contemporary terrorism scholars including Sageman (2004), Crenshaw (1981), Bjørgo (2004), Veldhuis and Staun (2009), Borum (2011, 2017), and Victoroff (2005) are also supporters of socio-political and psychological factors for the growth of militancy. Schmid (2013) suggests that an attempt to find distinct features of a terrorist for extrapolative purposes is a difficult task.

Riaz (2016) concludes that ‘there is no catch-all “profiling” of terrorists for global use, but [that] one can be found in a specific country at a specific time, and that profile has analytical value.’ The above recommendation of Riaz and an attempt to find common traits of militants as by Denoeux and Carter (2009), have led the author to examine the socio-demographic profile of Islamist militants for the greater understanding of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh.

Likewise, finding reasons for becoming a terrorist is also a difficult task. It seems that any single theory is unable to explain why this happens in Bangladesh. However, the theory of humiliation can be used to understand the dynamics of militancy in Bangladesh. According to Evelin Lindner,

Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour [sic.] or dignity.. . . Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. (Lindner, 2001)

She also argues, ‘Feelings of humiliation come about when deprivation is perceived as an illegitimate imposition of lowering or degradation’ (Lindner, 2006: 171). So, a feeling of humiliation and victimization can cause terrorism. Crenshaw (1981) calls this factor grievances or discrimination. Crenshaw and Bjørgo categorize this factor as a precipitant and motivational factor (Crenshaw, 1981). Crenshaw also adds that ‘lack of opportunity for political participation’ also causes terrorism. Again, Matthew and Bjørgo both add that social and political deprivations accelerate militancy (Bjørgo, 2004; Matthew, 2012), which this author calls: disillusionment with the state and society. While discussing Islamist militancy, scholars such as Bjørgo (2004), Matthew (2012), Hafez and Mullins (2015), and Borum (2017) also add a non-negotiable ideology as an important factor for Islamist radicalization. In this case, Borum’s psychological model works best as the extremist’s apocalyptic worldview provides personal identity, a sense of belongingness, and perceived justice (Borum, 2017). Personal vulnerabilities, such as failure in finding a job, sudden death of relatives or friends, and imprisonment, act as catalysts at the individual level for accepting extremist worldviews (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Taking the insights from these theories and drawing on the fieldwork, the author has worked to profile militants and identify some catalysts (for example, feeling of victimization, disillusionment with the state and society, personal distresses, the idea of the apocalyptic Caliphate) for Islamist radicalization in Bangladesh.

Methodology

Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches have been used for this paper. A quantitative approach has been used for analyzing profiles of Islamist militants, while a qualitative approach has been used for answering other questions. The author basically attempted to collect data about those who have been killed by security forces in operations, those who travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight for IS, and those who were convicted by the courts on militancy charges. For this purpose, three daily newspapers—two English (The Daily Star and the Dhaka Tribune) and one Bengali (the Prothom Alo)—were selected. This study covers the period from June 2016 up to April 2020.

The author identified that 92 militants were killed by security forces in 30 operations, 14 gunfights and two attacks. The author also collected information about 20 militants who travelled to Syria, and 65 who were convicted on different militancy charges. Most of the convicted militants were linked either with the Holey Artisan Café attack and the killing of bloggers, or with Jama’at-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (henceforth JMB) operations. In total, information about 177 militants was collected for this study. The author also collected information about suspect militants from September 2017 to April 2020, but he did not combine information on proven militants with that on alleged militants. For the qualitative part, the author conducted 43 in-depth interviews with experts on radicalization in Bangladesh. A semi-structured questionnaire was used to interview experts and open-ended questions were asked to provide experts with open spaces to express themselves. Minichiello et al. (1990) consider in-depth interviewing as one of the reliable ways of collecting data on socio-political phenomena. Burnham and Anderson (2004) recommend that in conducting this kind of interview, the number should be between 20 and 30 persons. The author received ethics permission approval (HE17-176) from the University of New England, Armidale, Australia.

Six phases of Islamist militancy

Islamist militancy is not just a contemporary phenomenon, rather it traces back to the early 1980s. Islamist militancy in Bangladesh, based on its evolutionary process and the range of activities involved, can be divided into six phases.

The first phase of militancy covers the period from the late 1970s to 1986. This period can be described as the ‘incubation period’. At this time, the Islamist militant issue was uncommon and no activities were publicly reported. Some militants secretly started encouraging people in line with their agenda of establishing an Islamic state. It is claimed that militants of this phase were inspired by Libya and Palestine (Mostofa and Doyle, 2019). This became evident in 1989 when 48 members of the Muslim Millat Bahini (henceforth MMB) were arrested with 27 passports with visas of various countries (Sultan, 2020). In 1984, Bangladesh’s connection with Afghanistan was noticed and Bangladesh started supplying soldiers to Afghanistan (Riaz, 2016). Thus the ‘incubation period’ recorded no attacks and public activities.

The second phase can be called the ‘formation period’, which starts in 1986 with the formation of MMB and ends in 2001 with the introduction of Hizb-ut Tahrir (henceforth HT) to Bangladesh. It is observed that during this period of formation many militant organizations were formed, and their activities were publicly reported. For example, MMB was formed in 1986 by a dismissed Major Matiur Rahman, who established a residential madrassa (Islamic religious institution) in Kishoreganj where Jihad was part of the curriculum (Sultan, 2020). Adding to the list, the Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (henceforth HuJIB) was established in 1992 after holding a press conference in the national press club. It is claimed that Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) assisted the formation of HuJIB and certainly HuJIB demanded conversion of Bangladesh into an Islamic state (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2020a; Tripathi, 2015). With a similar agenda, the Hizb-ut Towhid (HuT) was established in 1994, the Shahadat Al Hiqma (SaH) in 1996, the JMB in 1998, and the Jaggrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (henceforth JMJB) in 1998; and the Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) was introduced in 1995, the Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) in 2000, and HT in 2001 (Alam, 2008; Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 2011; Rahman, 2016; Riaz and Fair, 2011; South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2020b). Most of these militant organizations were inspired by either Taliban ideology or the ideology of the Islamist Caliphate because these organizations were mostly formed by the Afghan war veterans and their followers. During this period, the prominent slogan, Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan (We will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan) was chanted on the streets (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2020b). This ‘formation period’ rarely recorded incidents of violent attacks.

The third phase started in 2001 with the bombing of a Communist Party of Bangladesh rally (Shamim, 2020) and ends in 2007 with the execution of JMB and JMJB leaders, though some violent activities had already been recorded in 1999. This phase can best be termed as the ‘operational phase’ because both the incubation and the formation phases allowed the terrorists to opt for operations. The previous two stages had supported them with sources of funding, recruitment and a strong ideological basis. This phase resulted in the killing of 156 people: cultural activists, renowned poets, judges and secular voices. On 17 August 2005, the country was rocked by a series of 459 non-fatal demonstration bomb attacks across 63 out of 64 districts of the country (Khan, 2011). Finally, these militants were caught, brought to trial, and executed by court orders on 29 March 2007 on the August 17 bombing charges (Ramesh, 2007); this brought an end to this ‘operational phase’. Barkat (2016a, 2016b, 2018) contends that Afghan veterans’ jihadi arms training, jihadi motivation, militant connections and reliable sources of funding increased the incidence of violence.

The fourth phase (2007–2013) is called a ‘silent phase’ because this period was a quiet period, due in part to an intensive military crackdown by the state, which significantly curtailed terrorist capability so that almost no militant attacks were reported (Barkat, 2016a). The ‘silent phase’ was followed by a ‘violent phase’, which began with the killing of blogger Rajib Haider in 2013 (The Guardian, 2015) and ends with a suicide bombing in Sylhet in 2017 (BBC News, 2017). During this time, 225 people were killed and another 942 were wounded. Most importantly, Bangladesh recorded the most brutal hostage crisis in its history at the Holey Artisan Café on 1 July 2016, which resulted in the deaths of 20 hostages including citizens of India, Italy, Japan and the US (Parvez, 2019). Therefore, this phase can be characterized as the most ‘violent phase’ ever in the history of Bangladesh. This phase is also unique in the sense that it was the first time both IS and AQ started claiming responsibility for killings in Bangladesh. Their direct involvement was noticed through their affiliated organizations such as the Ansar Al Islam (henceforth AAI) and Neo-JMB. This phase is also distinct for its recruitment policy and online propaganda.

The final phase is from 2018 onwards, and is characterized as a ‘dormant phase’. Militants have all gone to ground due to the crackdown on them by security forces. My own survey, which is explained in the next section, of newspaper reports reveals that 92 militants have been killed by security forces and in addition at least 65 convicted on militancy charges since June 2016. Just one security force, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), not including others – police, Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime, and Detective Branch² – has arrested 512 militants since July 2016 (Alif, 2019). So, the actual number would be much greater. Therefore, it is evident that militants have had to withdraw for a period of time, until they gain strength enough for counter operations. This ‘dormant phase’ can be characterized as a phase of restoring networks, revitalizing motivations, gaining new recruits and fund-raising. Some reports reveal that militant organizations have started raising fund through robberies (The Daily Star, 2019).

Profiles of militants and tools of radicalization

The current paper deals with a large number of militant profiles to uncover militants’ socio-economic and demographic profiles. The author’s previous work has focused on information about 90 militants. For this paper, the author collected information about 177 Islamist militants, covering educational background, occupations, gender, age, economic status, organizations they belonged to and residential areas they lived in. For 96 militants, information on education was available. This reveals that all the three streams of education³ have a share in militancy, but it is the mainstream so-called secular Bangla-medium educational institutions which produce the largest number of militants, that is, 60% (58 out of 96 militants). Surprisingly, English-medium schools, which take pride in promoting Western culture, knowledge, and curriculum also contribute 16% (15 out of 96 militants). This means that 76% of militants have come from secular educational institutions. The second set of data on suspected militants also shows similar results. This finding challenged the popularly held belief that ‘madrassas are the incubators of militants’ (Riaz, 2017), although madrassas are still vulnerable and prone to militancy as they supply 24% of militants (23 out of 96 militants). Based on 71 militants’ information about occupation, it can be argued that this wave of militancy is largely student dominated (52 out of 71 militants). Riaz had said that the largest cohort is students, but he did not mention any proportion (Riaz and Parvez, 2018).

Gender profiles of Islamist militants show that Bangladesh’s militant landscape is still highly male dominated. Males constitute 88% (142 out of 162 militants), while women constitute only 9% (15 out of 162 militants). Riaz agrees with these findings as well. As Islamist militants’ profiles show that most of them are students, this is also reflected in the age groups. Most of the militants (70 out of 125) belong to the 20–25 age group as they are mainly university students at graduate and post-graduate levels.

For the purpose of determining economic status the author resorts to the popularly held perception that students at the English-medium schools and colleges belong to the upper class and students at Bangla-medium schools and colleges are mainly from the middle class, while madrassa students are from lower-class backgrounds. Considering the traditional perception and based on a few newspaper reports, it can be argued that it is the middle-class youths who are increasingly drawn to militancy. More than half of the militants (57%, 55 out of 96) are from the middle class. A significant number of militants (23%) come from the upper class, including doctors, barristers, army majors and a banker, while 20% of militants still come from the lower class. Based on 53 militants’ economic status, Riaz claims that nearly three-quarters are from middle-class or upper-class backgrounds, while this study based on 96 militants suggests that 80% come from the middle and upper classes. The second set of data on suspected militants (n = 33 militants) shows a different trend in that the middle and upper class comprise 55%, while the lower class constitutes 45%. These findings also challenge previous studies arguing that deprivation and poverty breed extremism (Riaz, 2017).

The data also shows that a number of Islamist radical outfits including local and international militant organizations have been active in Bangladesh since 2016. Among them IS-affiliated group Neo-JMB tops all other militant organizations. Most of the militants (99 out of 176) belong to Neo-JMB, while 44 militants are followers of a locally grown militant outfit, JMB. This finding contradicts Riaz’s findings that JMB outnumbers IS. This is perhaps because Riaz’s data set is somewhat outdated and IS started its operations in 2016 (Riaz and Parvez, 2018). Another militant outfit, AQ-affiliated AAI, continues to attract youths and 21 militants belong to AAI. These militants are mostly involved with killings of secular bloggers, LGBT workers, and secular publishers (International Crisis Group, 2018). The Pakistan-based militant organization HuJIB (10) and international Islamist organization HT (10) are also operating in Bangladesh.

The profiles of 84 militants reveal that a large number come from the capital city, Dhaka (19), while 11 are from Rajshahi, another divisional district of Bangladesh. Suspected militants’ profiles show that Narayanganj (12 out of 44), which is very near to Dhaka, is the second hotspot of militants’ dens. Other fighters come from different cities of Bangladesh.⁴ This demographic study suggests that no particular area is less prone to militancy, rather it is obvious that urban youths are more susceptible to the appeal of radicalization.

The above profiling provides a general impression that urban male youths of secular and wealthy backgrounds are more prone to accepting militants’ narratives. This has started a new era of militancy. Nowadays, militant organizations’ recruitment policies also differ from those of previous militant organizations. They relying more on technological tools than did previous groups. JMB’s history shows that it primarily used traditional methods of communication such as handbills, leaflets and books. Its technological prowess was very limited. Thus, the cyber aspect has added a whole new dimension. Similarly, recruitment was formerly carried out essentially through going to madrassas, schools and mosques. It was a very traditional form of recruitment; groups targeted people who did not have jobs, giving them some money and hope for a new future. Now the major portion of recruitment is done through the internet. The people who have the most access to the internet are urban youths (Mostofa, 2020b; Mostofa and Doyle, 2019). A survey conducted by the police on 250 extremists shows that 82% of extremists were inspired by social media propaganda and 80% use Thrima, Wechat, Messenger and other apps for communication (Hasan, 2017). Interviewee no. 4 shared his experience of interviewing several recruiters.

What I have understood after interviewing several recruiters is that they post radical material on Facebook, like ‘Our Muslim brothers are getting killed in Myanmar, Jerusalem, Iraq and Syria; don’t we have anything to do?’ The recruiters follow the ones who like and share such content. Then they target them and send them other material for study. Finally, when the recruiters are confident, they meet them and assign them. [12 December 2018]

Thus, extremists use social media to find sympathizers. Interviewee no. 29 contends that extremist organizations work as a team. They try to collect members from all areas. They work in mosques, outdoors, playgrounds and madrassas [18 May 2018]. Interviewee no. 38 explained that radicalization is done both offline and online. In the case of offline radicalization, kinship, friendship and mentorship are the main motivators. There are three types of teachers: private tutors, coaching teachers and school teachers. So, both online and offline forces are active in Bangladesh [12 July 2018]. Another interviewee, no. 38, said that extremist groups are very specific in choosing their targets. Their main targets include the young people who have little Islamic knowledge and who have few familial responsibilities, and those who are sensitive about religious practices like Salat (five daily prayers), Sawm (fasting) and so on [12 July 2018]. Interviewee no. 3 said that radical groups do not target any specific group; rather, they target individuals who are somehow detached from familial bonds [12 December 2017].

So, it appears that radical groups are targeting urban male youths through online propaganda and cyber mechanisms. At the same time, religiously sensitive youths from broken and chaotic families and frustrated youths are more prone to militancy. The cyber world enables radicalizers to radicalize youths, even without establishing direct personal contact. Now, they can easily reach out to vulnerable and frustrated youths to preach their ideologies and agenda.

Targets of militants

Since 2013 Bangladesh has seen the growth of targeted killings. The researcher has explored which groups have been targeted for killings and why. Three Islamist militant groups are particularly prominent in Bangladesh: the original JMB (the mother organization of Islamist militants in Bangladesh), the Neo-JMB (aligned with IS) and AAI (aligned with AQIS, which is Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) under the leadership of Maulana Saidur Rahman (in prison), Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif (unidentified), and Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani (in prison). Their goal is to establish sharia law in Bangladesh, but their strategies and leadership are different. Therefore, their target operations are also different, although sometimes they have targeted the same group. Interviewee no. 11 said that extremists believe that Islam will be established by 2024 and they seek to kill those they consider to be impediments to establishing sharia. In doing so, they target people of secular or ‘anti-Islamic’ views (according to their version of Islam) [20 December 2017]. Interviewee no. 14 said that JMB exclusively targets Sufis because of their mystic interpretation of Islam (The Daily Star, 2016) [28 December 2017]. Interviewee no. 36 explained Neo-JMB’s targeted killing: Neo-JMB targets mainly crusaders and their version of non-believers, which include Shias, Sufis, foreigners, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists [30 June 2018]. IS has clearly mentioned these categories in its magazines (IS, 2016a). Interviewee no. 11 said that AAI has targeted seven specific groups of people: those who insult Allah and His Prophet; those who do not allow people to follow sharia law; those who are presenting Islam wrongly; those who are opposing, lowering and presenting wrongly the rulings of sharia; those who are trying to destroy Muslim social values by introducing and spreading nudity and zina among Muslim youths; those who are trying to remove sharia rulings from the existing Islamic systems, values, cultures and economics; and those who are trying to stop the establishment of sharia [20 December 2017]. AAI also warned these seven groups of people through an online leaflet (Site Intelligence Group, 2019). AAI killed them because of their anti-Islamic attitude. Therefore, they have killed bloggers, publishers, Sufis and university professors. One report suggests that 62 attacks have been carried out since 2013, killing 94 individuals (Sultan, 2015).

Drivers of Islamist militancy

It has been established that the current form of militancy in Bangladesh is highly influenced by IS and AQ, and this has mainly attracted urban middle-class secular youths. So, this project was set up in such a way that it can uncover why they are joining militant organizations. After analyzing the data, it appears that there are four factors: a feeling of victimization, a disillusionment with the state and society, personal distresses and the idea of the apocalyptic Caliphate acted as catalysts for Islamist radicalization in Bangladesh.

Feeling of victimization

Much of the literature has testified that a feeling of victimization or humiliation fosters terrorism (Agnew, 2010; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Schmid, 2013). For Islamist radicalization, this has become a prime tool for creating new recruitment. A source interviewee, who had interviewed a number of extremists in prison, said that extremists use narratives of Muslim victimization for recruitment [interview 4, 12 December 2017]. Another respondent expressed the view that Muslim youths feel frustrated and victimized when they see exploitation of Muslims all around the world. They feel that this attack is upon their own community [interview 6, 14 December 2017]. Respondent 12 shared experiences from his ongoing research that this kind of narrative affects both poor and affluent simultaneously:

My research shows that people living even in desert/char area in Bogura are concerned about the plight of Muslims, even though these people are not aware of Bangladesh society, but they have access to cyber world. These uneducated and poor people blame US for the plights of Muslims. They said that Muslims are victimized in Iraq, Palestine, Libya and Syria. The feeling of Muslim victimization is affecting not only poor youths but also affluent youths from across the world. As a result, we have seen that many young Muslims have joined IS even from England, America, and Australia. This same causation is true for Bangladeshi elite class. This sense of fellow feeling is very strong among them. So, there is no way to ignore this global politics. [21 December 2017]

It is apparent that fellow feelings are very strong among some Muslims youths. Thus, Robinson contends

The Muslim majority in Kashmir feel oppressed as they are held down by India’s martial rule, while the peoples of Iraq suffer under their rogue regime. The Muslim and Christian peoples of Palestine have experienced the greatest injustice during these past fifty years and more. These are all complicated issues, but from the point of view of many Muslims in the streets and bazaars of Muslim towns and cities across the world they represent symbols of injustice and oppression. They represent a world order in which Muslims are victims. They constitute a world order in which Muslims must organize to resist. (Robinson, 2002: 309)

This kind of feeling of victimization or humiliation is termed ‘humiliation by proxy’ (Khosrokhavar, 2005). The proxy humiliation was deliberately created by the terrorist organizations through their propaganda: ‘The Jamā’ah of the Muslims, represented by the present khilāfah, is like a single body in which the different body parts work together with a single head’ (Al-Hanif, 2015: 65). Terrorist organizations promote the idea of the brotherhood of all Muslims and urge Muslims to retaliate. The Holey Artisan Café attack was an example of it, as attackers of the Café expressed their anger over the victimization of Rohingya Muslims and Muslims in the Middle East (IS, 2016b). So, this proxy humiliation prompted violent actions, and, as such, the feeling of victimization or humiliation acted as a catalyst in Bangladesh.

Disillusionment with the state and society

Just as youths feel victimized globally, they have also become frustrated with the state and society they are living in. The current regime has been going through a kind of legitimacy crisis in the sense that 154 out of 300 parliamentary seats were uncontested in 2014, and the following 2018 election, in which the ruling coalition gets 96% of the seats in parliament, was also termed farcical by the opposition. Interviewee no. 25 said that both rich and poor people feel less privileged if their right to vote is restricted [29 March 2018]. The diplomats of the EU and 10 countries including the US and UK expressed their fear that the Digital Security Act 2018 ‘would suppress freedom of expression in multiple ways’ (The Daily Star, 2018). This has been reflected in the 2018 and 2020 World Press Freedom Indexes, where Bangladesh is ranked 146th and 151st out of 180. Interviewee no. 25 said that the political environment in Bangladesh is suffocating, where a citizen is not allowed to exercise his political rights [29 March 2018] while interviewee no. 34 expressed his opinion that

There is no right to talk, and to write. Why the countries like Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq are now in such a condition? It is because they didn’t have any freedom. If the people are let to speak out and to write, the country will face fewer problems. The politics of our country is going to the point of no return due to politics. Extremism are growing due to these kinds of frustration. [25 June 2018]

Not only attacks on freedom of expression but also other human rights violations were reported. The government has killed the protestors in crossfire, arrested them, and driven them away in various other ways [interviewee no. 33, 4 June 2018]. Several statistics clearly show the situation of Bangladesh. According to the rights organization Odhikar, at least 408 individuals were subjected to enforced disappearance between January 2009 and November 2017. Nearly 2000 people became victims to extrajudicial killing between 2001 and February 2017 in the name of the ‘crossfire’ and ‘gunfight’ (Mostofa and Doyle, 2019). Interviewee no. 29 said that youths see that law-enforcing agencies have failed to establish the rule of justice. So, they think that they have to establish Islamic rule to ensure justice in society. This society has become rotten, so we cannot expect justice from a rotten society [18 June 2018]. In such an anarchic situation, militancy finds a convenient environment to thrive in. While this is the political situation in Bangladesh,⁵ Bangladesh ranks 139th out of 188 countries according to the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index. Interviewee no. 27 explained that social discrimination is growing rapidly in Bangladesh. The ruling class has access to earning money in illegal ways. The rich people are becoming richer, while the middle-class people are neither becoming richer, nor can they reduce their lifestyles. When a university student sees that his friend’s father has an abundance of wealth, he feels frustrated with the fact that he gets nothing in this world. As a result, he feels attracted toward religious practices, so that he can get more comfort in the life hereafter [22 April 2018]. So, according to him, income inequality has become a source of youth frustration, which has led them to resort to religion and find comforts in it. While interviewee no. 23 focuses on lack of equal opportunity for madrassa students, interviewee no. 5 stresses the lack of cultural and entertainment opportunities [14 December 2017]. So, it appears that youths are also frustrated with the state and society, which drives them to resort to the path of extremism.

Personal distresses

A range of studies have upheld the view that personal distresses or crises lead to militancy (Pedahzur, 2005; Riaz and Parvez, 2018; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). These personal crises vary from person to person. A source interviewee, no. 29, shared a story of a young extremist who joined the militants due to personal frustration. His father inherited huge areas of land from his ancestors. His uncles forcibly grabbed his father’s land. This made him frustrated. The powerful members of society also favoured his uncles. So, he joined Shibir (student organization of Jama’at-e-Islami) with a view to establishing justice. But when he saw that Shibir did not do anything directly to undo what was done to him, he became involved with more radical groups [18 May 2018]. Interviewee no. 14 shared a story of another extremist named Omi. He said,

I talked to Omi. He was arrested in March 2017. His father was a major in the Army. He noticed that his father used to lie to his boss. He is at home, and he is telling his boss that he is outside. Omi’s parents used to quarrel. He did not have a friendly relationship with his parents. So, he could not accept this behaviour. [28 December 2017]

Interviewee no. 4 shared another story that frustrations may arise from different reasons. The data shows that these frustrations include failure in love relationships and dysfunctional families where the lack of a good relationship between parents and parent’s uses of lies and bribery distress the young [12 December 2017]. Interviewee no. 6 told another story that Nibras, an IS soldier, had a break-up with his girlfriend and his family experienced a financial breakdown. He became involved with militancy from such frustrations [14 December 2017]. So, frustrations of different kinds may affect youths, and almost every youth has a story which is sometimes unique to a particular extremist that leads him to choose the way of extremism.

The idea of the apocalyptic Caliphate

Terrorist organizations nowadays are very prompt to use apocalyptic ideas to pursue their goals. IS under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed a new worldwide Caliphate in Iraq and Syria on 29 June 2014 based on apocalyptic pronouncements (De-Graaff, 2016; Mostofa and Doyle, 2019; Mostofa and Ware, 2019). IS’s declaration was the following:

O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership. It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. It is a Khilafah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi (North African), American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers by His grace, loving each other for the sake of Allah, standing in a single trench, defending and guarding each other, and sacrificing themselves for one another. Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal, in one pavilion, enjoying this blessing, the blessing of faithful brotherhood. If kings were to taste this blessing, they would abandon their kingdoms and fight over this grace. So all praise and thanks are due to Allah. (IS, 2014)

With this proclamation, IS aroused a sense of pride among many Muslims across the world and claimed to put an end to humiliation and deprivation. According to De-Graaf (2016), IS was successful in gaining a large number of recruits from across the world because of its apocalyptic appeal. The apocalyptic storyline gained prominence after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Filiu, 2011). With the same line, McCants (2015) contends that continuous turmoil in the Middle East due to foreign invasion and the Arab Spring led IS to resort to apocalyptic ideas to draw not only Middle Eastern Muslims but also foreign fighters. Doomsday narratives are propagated by IS and AQ in most issues of Azan, Dabiq and Rumiyah.⁶ On the other hand, post bin Laden, AQ’s appeal has also become global, with the ambition of establishing a transnational Caliphate (AQIS, 2014). This message was globalized by Anwar Al Awlaki, a Yemani-American AQ leader, and he claimed that the Islamic Caliphate would be restored by 2024 (Awlaki, 2018). This was described by Olivier Roy as ‘New Ummah’ (Roy, 2004). Many respondents stressed the idea that this idea of the Caliphate resonated with the Bangladeshi youths. When IS declared its global Caliphate, many youths thought that this was a good opportunity to establish justice by restoring Islam [interview 13, 25 December 2017]. Another respondent contends that ‘the idea of global caliphate attracted the attention of a group of young people because youths believe that capitalism exploited them. So, they found this global caliphate as a suitable alternative to capitalism and imperialism’ [interview 16, 31 December 2017]. This is how the idea of the global Caliphate attracted youths and provided aggrieved and frustrated youths with the expectation of honour, belonging and justice.

Conclusion

The socio-demographic profile of Islamist militants in Bangladesh suggests that the current wave of militancy is qualitatively different from previous outbreaks. Compared to previous militant bodies, these militant organizations like AAI and Neo-JMB maintain external linkages and use cyber space for radicalization. They mainly target urban male students from secular schools, colleges and universities. The majority of them belong to the middle and upper classes. These youths mostly lack religious education, and often come from broken and malfunctioning families. This wave of militancy is still male dominated, but women are increasingly gravitating to militancy. IS-affiliated group Neo-JMB has clearly outnumbered other terrorist organizations in Bangladesh. IS was so successful in recruiting a large number of youths because its educated, tech-savvy youths felt humiliated and victimized due to the continuous propaganda of Muslim persecution in Myanmar, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq promoted by the terrorist organizations. This feeling was manipulated through the Islamic concept of brotherhood. Furthermore, the local regimes also fail to provide them with a dreamed-of welfare state, rather they create conditions for injustice. This process was accelerated when they suffered a severe loss in their personal lives. Capitalizing on their vulnerabilities, the apocalyptic Caliphate gave frustrated and aggrieved youths identity, a sense of belonging and honour, and perceived justice.

With respect to which groups in society have been targeted for killing and why, it has been found that secular bloggers, publishers, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Sufis, Shias, LGBT workers and foreigners have all been targeted at the various times. Bangladesh AQ and AAI followers target those who act, write or help promote ‘un-Islamic’ activities in Bangladesh. On the other hand, IS-affiliated Neo-JMB targets both Shias and Sufis within Islam due to their alleged deviation from what they consider to be ‘pure’ Islam, and Europeans and their allies because of their war against Islam. The old JMB continues to target Sufis. It is yet to become clear what the impact of Covid-19 will be in Bangladesh.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Shafi Md Mostofa

Notes

Author biography

Shafi Md Mostofa is an Assistant Professor of World Religions and Culture (with special interests in Political Islam in Bangladesh) at Dhaka University’s Faculty of Arts and an Adjunct Lecturer of the University of New England, Australia. His publications have appeared (or are forthcoming) with Routledge, Springer, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Palgrave Macmillan; Wiley and Blackwell; and the journals: Politics and Religion, Politics and Policy, Perspectives on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Terrorist Analyses, and Peace and Conflict Review.

References

Adorno

Frenkel-Brunswick

Levinson

, et al. (1950) The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Agnew

(2010) A general strain theory of terrorism. Theoretical Criminology 14(2): 131–153.

Ahmed

(2009) Interface of political opportunism and Islamic extremism in Bangladesh: Rhetorical identification in government response. Communication Studies 60(1): 82–96.

Akhter

(2010) Trends in militancy in Bangladesh. In: Farooq

(ed.) Trends in Militancy in Bangladesh: Possible Responses. Dhaka: Bangladesh Enterprise Institute.

Alam

(2008) The Genesis of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh. Georgia: Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University Atlanta. Available at: http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/AlamNY08meeting.pdf (accessed 22 November 2018).

Al-Hanif

SAI

(2015) Interview with the Amir of the Khilafah’s soldiers in Bengal. Dabiq 14.

Alif

(2019) Most of 300 militants out on bail are hiding. Dhaka Tribune, 2 June. Available at: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/dhaka/2019/06/02/rab-dg-most-militants-on-bail-are-at-large (accessed December 2019).

AQIS (2014) From the editor. Resurgence 1.

Awan

(2008) Antecedents of Islamic political radicalism among Muslim communities in Europe. Political Science & Politics 41: 13–17.

10.

Awlaki

(2018) Khilafah back before 2024 (Inshallah). Available at: https://www.ummah.com/forum/forum/islam/general-islamic-topics/241904-khilafah-back-before-2024-inshallah (accessed 8 May 2018).

11.

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (2011) The state of terrorism in Bangladesh: 2009–2010. Available at: http://bei-bd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-State-of-Terrorism-in-Bangladesh-2010-2011.pdf (accessed 22 July 2018).

12.

Barkat

(2016a) Political economy of fundamentalism and fundamentalist extremism in Bangladesh. In: Paper presented at Noakhali Regional Seminar, 12 May, Noakhali, Bangladesh.

13.

Barkat

(2016b) Political economy of religion-based extremism in Bangladesh: When in a Unitarian imperialism: External causes overrides internal causes. In: Paper presented at the international conference on ‘secularism, democracy and gender parity in South Asia’, 29 October, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

14.

Barkat

(2018) Fundamentalism in Bangladesh (Political Economy of Extremism: Internal and External Forces). Dhaka: Mukto Buddhi Prokashona.

15.

BBC News (2017) Sylhet blasts kill six amid Bangladesh militant raid. BBC News, 26 March. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39394487 (accessed 10 May 2019).

16.

Bjørgo

(2004) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London: Routledge.

17.

Borum

(2011) Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science theories. Journal of Strategic Security 4(4): 7–36.

18.

Borum

(2017) The etiology of radicalization. In: LaFree

Freilich

(eds) The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism. London: Routledge.

19.

Brynjar

Skjølberg

(2004) Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature. Oslo: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, p.4.

20.

Burnham

Anderson

(2004) Multimodel inference: Understanding AIC and BIC in model selection. Sociological Methods & Research 33: 261–304.

21.

Crenshaw

(1981) The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics 13(4): 379–399.

22.

Datta

(2007) Islamic militancy in Bangladesh: The threat from within. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30(1): 145–170.

23.

De-Graaff

(2016) IS and its predecessors: Violent extremism in historical perspective. Perspectives on Terrorism 10(5): 96–103.

24.

Denoeux

Carter

(2009) Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. Washington, DC: USAID.

25.

DeVotta

Timberman

(2012) Violent extremism and insurgency in Bangladesh: A risk assessment. Washington Post. Available at: http://mason.gmu.edu/~emcglinc/CAR_Regional_VEI%20Assessment.pdf (accessed 20 June 2020).

26.

Filiu

(2011) Apocalypse in Islam. Berkeley: University of California Press.

27.

Ganguly

(2006) The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. Washington, DC: United States Institutes of Peace.

28.

Gibson

Rafter

(2006) Criminal Man (ed Lombroso

). Durham: Duke University Press, pp.129–131.

29.

Griffiths

Hasan

(2015) Playing with fire: Islamism and politics in Bangladesh. Asian Journal of Political Science 23(2): 226–241.

30.

Hafez

Mullins

(2015) The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of empirical approaches to homegrown extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38(11): 958–975.

31.

Hasan

(2017) 82% Extremist inspired by social media propaganda. The Prothom Alo. Available at: http://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/article/1115962/ (accessed 22 April 2020).

32.

Hasan

(2020) Islam and Politics in Bangladesh. Singapore: Springer.

33.

Hasan

(2015) Rising extremism in Bangladesh: A voyage towards uncertainty. Journal of South Asian Studies 3(2): 143–153.

34.

International Crisis Group (2018) Countering Jihadist militancy in Bangladesh, 28 February. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/295-countering-jihadist-militancy-bangladesh (accessed 12 November 2018).

35.

IS (2014) Khilafah declared. Dabiq 1.

36.

IS (2016a) Operations in Bengal. Rumiyah 2.

37.

IS (2016b) To the Knights of the Caliphate in Bengal – Wilāyat al-Raqqah.

38.

Islam

(2011) Political violence in Bangladesh. In: Riaz

Fair

(eds) Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. New York: Routledge.

39.

JeI (2016) Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’s view on militancy, terrorism and ongoing anarchy, 28 August. Available at: https://jamaat-e-islami.org/en/article-details.php?category=44&article=110 (accessed 28 February 2021).

40.

Juergensmeyer

(2000) Terror in the Mind of God. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

41.

Khan

(2011) Islamist militancy in Bangladesh: Why it failed to take root. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6: 51–64.

42.

Khosrokhavar

(2005) Suicide Bombers. London: Pluto Press.

43.

Kruglanski

Gelfand

Bélanger

, et al. (2014) The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism. Political Psychology 35: 69–93.

44.

Lezak

(ed.) (1995) Neuropsychological Assessment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

45.

Lindner

(2001) The psychology of humiliation. Available at: ExplanationPublisherDissertation.pdf (humiliationstudies.org) (accessed 10 July 2010).

46.

Lindner

(2006) Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict. Westport: Praeger Security International.

47.

McCants

(2015) The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. New York: St Martins Press, p.48, 164, 238.

48.

Matthew

(2012) What causes radicalisation? Main lines of consensus in recent research. Radicalization Research. Available at: https://www.radicalisationresearch.org/guides/francis-2012-causes-2/ (accessed 26 April 2020).

49.

Minichiello

Aroni

Timewell

, et al. (1990) In-Depth Interviewing: Researching People. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

50.

Momen

Begum

(2006) Acts of terrorism in Bangladesh: A general assessment. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 3(6): 850–856.

51.

Mostofa

(2019) A study of Al-Qaeda’s propaganda narratives in Bangladesh. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11(2): 15–19.

52.

Mostofa

(2020a) Islam and Politics in Bangladesh: The Followers of Ummah (ed Hasan

). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.95–96.

53.

Mostofa

(2020b) Key drivers of female radicalisation in Bangladesh. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 12(4): 27–31.

54.

Mostofa

(2020c) Islamist cyber-radicalization in Bangladesh during COVID-19, the Australian outlook. Australian Institute of International Affairs. Available at: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/cyber-radicalisation-bangladesh/ (accessed 12 December 2020).

55.

Mostofa

(2020d) Bangladesh’s ambiguity on religion has been expensive for the country. The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/bangladeshs-ambiguity-on-religion-has-been-expensive-for-the-country/ (accessed 13 December 2020).

56.

Mostofa

(2020e) What does Covid-19 mean for terrorism in Bangladesh? The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-does-covid-19-mean-for-terrorism-in-bangladesh/ (accessed 12 December 2020).

57.

Mostofa

(2021) Jamaat-e-Islami and Trust-Building in Bangladesh, Politics and Policy. New Jersey: Wiley and Blackwell.

58.

Mostofa

Doyle

(2019) Profiles of Islamist militants in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism 13(5): 112–129.

59.

Mostofa

Subedi

(2020) Rise of competitive authoritarianism in Bangladesh. Politics and Religion. Epub ahead of print 13 July 2020. DOI: 10.1017/S1755048320000401.

60.

Mostofa

Ware

(2019) Development of Daesh’s ideology. Peace and Security Review 8(18): 12–22.

61.

Parvez

(2019) The Khilafah’s soldiers in Bengal: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and their violence justification narratives in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism 13(5): 22–38.

62.

Pearce

Macmillan

(1977) Police negotiations: A new role for the community psychiatrist. Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 2: 171–175.

63.

Pedahzur

(2005) Suicide Terrorism. Malden: Polity.

64.

Pettit

(1997) The developmental course of violence and aggression: Mechanisms of family and peer influence. Psychiatric Clinics of North America 20: 283–299.

65.

Post

(1998) Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces. In: Reich

(ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

66.

Quamruzzaman

(2010) The Militia movement in Bangladesh: Ideology, motivation, mobilization, organization, and ritual. Master of Arts Dissertation, Queen’s University, Canada.

67.

Rahman

(2016) The forms and ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. Journal for Deradicalization 7: 81–82.

68.

Ramesh

(2007) Bangladesh executes six Islamic militants. The Guardian, 30 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/30/bangladesh (accessed 24 April 2020).

69.

Riaz

(2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web. London: Routledge.

70.

Riaz

(2016) Who are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist militants’? Perspectives on Terrorism 10(1): 2–18.

71.

Riaz

(2017) Understanding the drivers of militancy and pathways of militants. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/30223587/Understanding_the_Drivers_of_Militancy_and_Pathways_of_Militants (accessed 26 April 2020).

72.

Riaz

Fair

(2011) Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. London: Routledge.

73.

Riaz

Parvez

(2018) Bangladeshi militants: What do we know? Terrorism and Political Violence 30(6): 944–961.

74.

Robinson

(2002) Islam and the west: Clash of civilisations? Asian Affairs 3(3): 307–320.

75.

Romero

(2007) The different faces of Islamic terrorism. International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie 17: 443–458.

76.

Roy

(2004) Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Umma. London: Hurst.

77.

Sageman

(2004) Understanding Terrorist Network. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

78.

Schmid

(ed.) (2013) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London and New York: Routledge, pp.502–507.

79.

Shamim

(2020) The blame game goes on. The Daily Star. Available at: http://archive.thedailystar.net/magazine/2004/03/02/coverstory.htm (accessed 29 April 2020).

80.

Site Intelligence Group (2019) Ansar al-Islam Bangladesh: Lists categories of potential targets for killing. Available at: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/jihadist-news/ansar-al-islam-bangladesh-lists-categories-of-potential-targets-for-killing.html (accessed 12 May 2019).

81.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (2020a) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B). Available at: https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm (accessed 21 April 2020).

82.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (2020b) Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB). Available at: https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm (accessed 20 April 2020).

83.

Sprinzak

(1995) Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization. Terrorism and Political Violence 7: 17–43.

84.

Sultan

(2015) The emergence of JMB with Salafi indoctrinated people. The Daily Prothom Alo. Available at: http://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/article/936523 (accessed 1 April 2020).

85.

Sultan

(2020) Rise of militancy: Part 1. The Daily Prothom Alo. Available at: http://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/114967/Rooted-in-mujahids-returning-from-Afghanistan (accessed 25 March 2020).

86.

The Daily Star (2016) Pir killed in northern Bangladesh district of Rajshahi. Available at: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:w-BL8fjpZxQJ; https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/pir-killed-rajshahi-1220338+&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=bd (accessed 21 April 2020).

87.

The Daily Star (2018) Digital security act: Freedom of expression to get hurt. Available at: https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/digital-security-act-2018-freedom-expression-get-hurt-1553488 (accessed 28 April 2020).

88.

The Daily Star (2019) Huji now raising funds through robbery, 5 March. Available at: https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/harkat-ul-jihad-bangladesh-now-raising-funds-through-robbery-db-1710664 (accessed 24 April 2020).

89.

The Guardian (2015) Two sentenced to death for Bangladesh blogger murder, 31 December. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/31/two-sentenced-death-bangladesh-blogger-ahmed-rajib-haider (accessed 12 March 2020).

90.

Tripathi

(2015) Profiling non-state armed militant groups of Bangladesh. Himalayan and Central Asian Studies 19(1/2): 119.

91.

Veldhuis

Staun

(2009) Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

92.

Victoroff

(2005) The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(1): 3–42.