Blockchain for anticorruption: Reality or hype? A study of the affordances and constraints of blockchain usage via empirical evidence from Thailand

Principal–agent theory

In corruption scholarship, the principal–agent theory is arguably the dominant framework for explaining why corrupt practices occur. Fundamentally, the theory attributes corruption to information asymmetry between the principals and the agents (Persson et al., 2013), illustrating how such disparities enable agents to pursue their self-interest based on rational-choice logic (Andersson and Bergman, 2008; Martinsson, 2021). At the bureaucratic level, the principals could be the leadership of a government or of a government department while officers of lower rank are the agents. At the societal level, members of the public are conceptualized as the principals, and public officials are the agents (Marquette and Peiffer, 2018).

According to the theory, principals delegate authority to agents to act in their interest. However, the principal–agent problem emerges when agents possess private information about a task. If an agent rationally calculates that the benefits of withholding this information outweigh the risks of detection, information asymmetry occurs. This prevents the principal from enforcing accountability, allowing the agent to diverge from the delegated mandate to pursue their own interests (Persson et al., 2013). For instance, public procurement officers gain in-depth market knowledge about supplies through routine interactions with vendors. If they perceive the risk of detection to be low, they may choose to abuse their position to extract rents. Senior executives, hindered by this information asymmetry, are unable to perfectly monitor their subordinates’ performance.

The prominence of principal–agent theory in recent decades gave rise to numerous institutional reforms, especially in developing countries. Most of these directed resources toward setting up accountability mechanisms (e.g., independent watchdog bodies, independent media, and conflict-of-interest regulations), whereas others aimed at promoting transparency in public administration through the adoption of ICTs. These reforms were specifically targeted at making corruption a high-risk and low-return business, thereby minimizing the opportunities and incentives for public officials (Prateeppornnarong, 2023).

The concept of transparency

By and large, transparency can be defined as “lifting the veil of secrecy” (Davis, 1998: 121) or “openness, clarity, or the capacity to be seen through” (Tamronglak, 2023: 117). Heald (2006) classifies transparency into two types and four directions based on the flow of information within an organization. The first type, vertical transparency, encompasses both upward and downward flows. Transparency upward involves hierarchical supervision where superiors (principals) monitor the conduct of subordinates (agents); a lack of such transparency often results in principal–agent problems. Conversely, transparency downward allows subordinates to observe the behavior of their superiors. The second type, horizontal transparency, consists of outward and inward flows. Transparency outwards enables organizational members to observe and learn from the external environment, whereas transparency inwards allows external actors to scrutinize the organization.

In modern societies and bureaucracies, ICT-mediated transparency, referred to as leveraging technology to see clearly through the window of an institution, is a popular approach for ensuring government efficiency and accountability (Meijer, 2009). Proponents argue that this form of transparency improves performance among public officials and serves as a deterrent against corruption. In addition, it provides the public with better information, thereby promoting the rationalization of society (Meijer, 2009). In contrast, critics argue that ICT-mediated transparency is unidirectional, structured, and decontextualized. O’Neill (2002) warned that this can erode societal trust and lead to the manipulation of truth, as officials – aware that their actions will be made public – may alter their behavior or records to appear favorable.

Despite inherent trade-offs, using technology to enhance transparency is, overall, a positive development. Furthermore, the adoption of ICT-mediated transparency is arguably essential for anticorruption efforts. First, the use of ICT heightens transparency in the public sector, promoting an open culture that serves the citizenry. Second, it empowers the people’s right to know, allowing them to scrutinize whether officials are discharging their duties properly and with integrity. Third, while some argue that ICT-mediated transparency erodes societal trust in governmental institutions, considering from a different angle, it can actually bolster the government’s reputation for being clean and honest. Finally, fears about distorted facts or security leaks can be managed by making sure that disclosed information serves public interest, and such disclosure will not jeopardize security and confidentiality (Tamronglak, 2023).

Blockchain solutionism: Affordances and constraints of blockchain

As noted, blockchain received significant attention in its early stages, but was subsequently viewed as overhyped – regarded merely as an attempt by techno-solutionists pushing for its adoption to solve “virtually non-existent problems” (Frederik, 2018 cited in Meyers and Keymolen, 2025: 789). In addition, utilizing ICT to foster transparency brings both benefits and challenges. Consequently, this research engages with the critiques of blockchain through the lens of techno-solutionism as well as technology affordances and constraints theory.

Techno-solutionism: A brief discussion of the concept: Prior to addressing techno-solutionism, it is essential to understand the concept of “solutionism.” As Sætra and Selinger explained,

Solutionism is a way of thinking about social problems. It is characterized by confidence in human reason and our capacity to find and implement numerous strategies for overcoming obstacles and capitalizing on opportunities, typically through courses of action that significantly alter social norms. (Sætra and Selinger, 2024: 12)

Coined by Morozov (2013), the term “technological solutionism,” or “techno-solutionism,” is an extension of the concept of “solutionism.” In essence, techno-solutionism assumes technologies or technology-driven approaches as the solution to social problems, reflecting the extent to which the arrival of new technology drives hopes and expectations for fixing existing problems (Meyers and Keymolen, 2025).

The primary critique of techno-solutionism is that applying technology to address complex social issues, such as corruption, is overly simplistic. It results in an excessive reduction of complexity, rendering the proposed solutions ineffective or inappropriate (Meyers and Keymolen, 2025). Sætra and Selinger raised a fundamental question in relation to the aforementioned critique: “Is technology being used to address social problems without requiring people to make significant behavioral changes?” (Sætra and Selinger, 2024: 13). Undoubtedly, the application of blockchain in government to solve public sector insufficiencies and transparency issues has been subject to similar criticism. By examining the adoption of blockchain in government through the lens of techno-solutionism, this research characterizes “blockchain solutionism” as an idealistic notion that blockchain technology serves as a solution to intricate sociopolitical and economic issues.

Blockchain solutionism depoliticizes social problems by treating corruption as a data error rather than a structural issue. It envisions a future where cryptographic consensus automates transparency, making corruption vanish from public administration. The next point concerns trust. Since it is usually claimed that data on a blockchain are immutable (see details in the next subsection), data integrity is high. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the data are truly authentic before it enters the blockchain system. Finally, critics argue that techno-solutionists tend to promote technology (in this case, blockchain) as a solution in search of a problem. This approach tries to shoehorn technology into a situation, rather than diagnosing the problem first and then designing a solution. Essentially, this gets the process back-to-front (Baquero, 2023; Hung, 2024; Meyers and Keymolen, 2025; Morozov, 2013; Sætra and Selinger, 2024).

Technology affordances and constraints theory: Aligning quite well with the tenets of techno-solutionism, technology affordances and constraints theory aims to present and describe the aspects of technology adoption in the context of social advancement. To grasp the material and sociopolitical dimensions of ICT, one must look to its affordances and constraints; doing so provides, as Majchrzak et al. (2016: 272) argued, an explanation for “how and why the ‘same’ is used or has different outcomes in different contexts.” Inspired by psychologist James Gibson’s concept of “affordance,” Majchrzak and Markus (2013) have propounded technology affordances and constraints theory to study the interactions between people, organizations, and ICT and to identify how people perceive utilities of a particular ICT as well as the consequences of such technology. Technology affordance refers to “potential action that individuals or organizations could do with a specific technology” while technology constraint focuses on “the way(s) in which the given actor is hindered from reaching a specific goal when using the selected technology” (Maragno et al., 2023: 3).

As for blockchain technology, the process begins when a transaction is requested. A block representing this transaction is created and broadcast to a peer-to-peer network of nodes. These nodes validate the block using a consensus mechanism, such as Proof of Work (PoW). Once the network confirms the legitimacy of the transaction, the block is added to the existing chain. Each new block includes a hash – a deterministic hexadecimal number – of the previous block. This links them together securely, forming the structure known as a “blockchain” (Ølnes et al., 2017).

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Figure 1.

How blockchain works.

As highlighted in the “Introduction,” DLT facilitates the peer-to-peer confirmation and approval of transactions, bypassing traditional intermediaries. This mechanism underscores transparency of data storage – the visibility of data on a blockchain network by stakeholders – as one of the technology affordances of blockchain; the distributed architecture ensures that every node can monitor transaction requests, while the collective validation process ensures that recording remains verifiable. Furthermore, the integration of cryptographic proofs (e.g., Proof of Work) and hashing functions provides transactional immutability – the inability to change or delete data once it has been written to the blockchain, safeguarding data against tampering. Theoretically, this transparency can mitigate information asymmetry within the principal–agent framework. Likewise, the immutability affordance reduces opportunities for bureaucratic opportunism, often fueled by informational uncertainty and asset specificity, by decentralizing data governance. Taken together, these affordances enhance auditability – the ability to monitor a blockchain system and track changes to data over time, allowing stakeholders to verify the provenance and historical integrity of all recorded transactions. All of these affordances, in turn, contribute to effectiveness of anticorruption.

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Figure 2.

The linkage between DLT in blockchain and the solving of corrupt practices.

Blockchain technology is generally classified into four main types: public, private, hybrid, and consortium. A public blockchain is permissionless, making it accessible to anyone wishing to execute a transaction. In contrast, a private blockchain is controlled by a single entity with restricted access; users require permission from a network administrator to join. The hybrid blockchain combines elements of both public and private chains to address their respective limitations. Typically, this model uses a public consensus mechanism for verification, while storing transaction data privately – accessible only to permitted users. Finally, a consortium blockchain is a permissioned network governed by multiple organizations (stakeholders), such as a banking community, rather than a single entity.

The following is a discussion of the technology affordances and constraints of blockchain, based on empirical evidence from available public sector use cases; noting that, until now, research specifically detailing the implementation of blockchain and its consequences for anti-corruption remains scarce.

One public service area plagued by corruption is land administration. Fraudulent transactions are largely due to a lack of transparency in processing, particularly the inaccessibility of credible land records. This opacity fosters opportunistic behavior and exacerbates the principal–agent problem (Kshetri, 2022). For instance, unaware landowners (the principals) can be exploited by corrupt officials (the agents) who take advantage of opaque land titling systems. In this context, blockchain can help principals monitor agents effectively; its immutable transaction histories and accessibility empower landowners to safeguard their property rights. Georgia presents a compelling case for the practical application of blockchain in land titling. The country conducted a trial in 2016 with remarkable results. By 2018, 1.5 million land titles were successfully published on the blockchain, restoring public confidence in national agencies (Shang and Price, 2019). Notably, this example highlights how DLT enhances both vertical and horizontal transparency.

As exemplified in the principal–agent theory subsection, public procurement is another aspect of the public sector that is particularly prone to corruption. Public sector corruption remains a pervasive issue in Latin America, particularly within procurement systems. A prime example occurred in Colombia regarding the School Meal Program (Programa de Alimentación Escolar: PAE). A 2017 investigation revealed that contractors purchased food intended for vulnerable children at four times the market price. This revelation came on the heels of a 2016 report showing that 32 million meals had gone undelivered. A recent collaboration between the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia has brought about the application of blockchain technology to tackle these challenges. The project increased real-time transaction visibility and decentralized authority, helping to resolve principal–agent problems and foster transparency (Parenti et al., 2022).

Chile’s experience also highlights blockchain affordances. Previously, traditional centralized databases in the country could be easily hacked or manipulated by third parties. This vulnerability, combined with a non-transparent organizational culture, fostered an environment ripe for the abuse of authority and graft. The use of blockchain technology, pioneered in 2018 by the National Energy Commission (CNE) under the Energía Abierta project, has transformed the landscape of information recording. Real-time, immutable energy data is now accessible to the public, making it significantly easier to audit compared with traditional databases (Parenti et al., 2022). Consistent with previous cases, the Chilean experience highlights how applying blockchain to the recording of energy data introduces critical technology affordances, namely, transparency, immutability, and auditability, to the management of the country’s energy sector.

On the contrary, framing DLT in blockchain as a cure-all is often dismissed as a techno-solutionist marketing hype. First and foremost, the prevailing narrative regarding the immutability of blockchain transactions has faced increasing scrutiny. While modifying recorded blockchain data requires approval from nodes, the system, however, is not immune to manipulation if a majority of nodes collude, a scenario known as a 51% attack (Baquero, 2023). In addition to the aforementioned points, observations have also been raised about the integrity of the data initially entered into the system. A scenario could exist where false information was deliberately input to facilitate corruption from the very outset. Viewed from a different angle, blockchain data is also vulnerable to tracing. Baquero (2023) warned that blockchain data faces the challenges of linkability and reversibility. The first challenge involves revealing the identities of transacting parties via behavioral analytics. The second refers to hackers reversing hashing or encryption to its original state, making the data visible to third parties. This observation on immutability shows that people still do not fully grasp blockchain adoption (Cagigas et al., 2023). Instead, people view blockchain merely as a technology that offers quick and easy solutions, a mindset that aligns with the critique of techno-solutionism (Morozov, 2013).

Blockchain can be subjected to misuse, which can take the form of unauthorized access or modification of information, data breaches, exfiltration, or software piracy. While permissioned blockchains (i.e., private and consortium chains) offer faster transaction speeds, their transparency is less guaranteed compared with permissionless (public) or hybrid blockchains. Furthermore, because permissioned networks are controlled by fewer authorities, they may be more susceptible to the potential risk of a 51% attack. In 2017, the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh implemented a private blockchain to enhance land administration. However, research indicates that while landowners are notified of changes to registration and deed records, they lack full control over their data. Furthermore, instances of poor data recording standards have been observed (Kshetri, 2022).

In China, blockchain adoption is driven by the belief that technology fuels modernization, serving as a catalyst for a competitive digital economy. This trajectory explicitly exemplifies the concept of techno-solutionism. However, regarding the application of blockchain in the agricultural sector, it appears that instead of enhancing data efficiency, the technology has been utilized primarily as a tool for state surveillance and monitoring (Hung, 2024). Recent research indicates that the growing use of blockchain technology in the agricultural sector aims to maximize state control over farmers’ livestock assets and data (Shen et al., 2023). The case of China exemplifies how blockchain can be misused (deviated from its original purposes); instead of providing affordances, it imposes constraints.

Aside from the points raised above, several additional constraints of blockchain also merit attention. According to research by Cheesman (2025) regarding Jordan’s experience in piloting blockchain for aid allocation to refugee women, significant constraints were identified. First, there was confusion among staff about the functionality of blockchain. Qualitative data revealed that while staff members praised blockchain as a futuristic technology, when questioned about its mechanics, they responded: “We don’t know; don’t ask me about blockchain.” Notably, this refusal to explain the technology occurred even with a staff member purported to be the group’s foremost blockchain expert. Second, there was an illusion surrounding the technology. Blockchain was viewed as a “magic technological object” capable of solving all problems, despite the fact that certain cited applications, such as cash disbursement, do not necessarily require blockchain solutions. In fact, case studies regarding Colombia’s procurement and Chile’s energy data consistently indicate that the awareness, knowledge, and skills of stakeholders involved in blockchain implementation remain one of the key constraints.

Finally, specific technological constraints are inherent to the operational mechanisms of permissionless and hybrid blockchains. While these two types of blockchains guarantee greater transparency in data storage compared with a private one, they face challenges regarding confidentiality and transaction speed. These limitations stem from their permissionless nature, which requires the involvement of numerous network nodes. Furthermore, prior to blockchain implementation, significant socioeconomic factors, including costs, governance, regulations, and data privacy, must be carefully considered (Cagigas et al., 2021; Kshetri, 2022; Semenzin et al., 2022).

Upon examining the actual experiences of blockchain from the above public sector use cases in a number of countries, it is evident that the affordances of blockchain (e.g., enhancing transparency) align with actual practical experiences, particularly when compared with traditional pre-blockchain methods. However, recognizing these affordances without a sufficient understanding of technology constraints has led to unrealistic expectations and claims. The actual implementation of blockchain brings about numerous challenges, as highlighted through a review of the aforementioned case studies. A critical issue is that in many countries, particularly in the Global South, blockchain adoption is often influenced by techno-solutionist perspectives, viewing the technology as a “quick fix” or “quick win.” This occurs even though structural reform would likely be a more effective solution; nevertheless, such reform is far more difficult to achieve due to the complex systemic elements involved, leading governments to resort solely to the introduction and application of new technology. In the context of developing countries, one observation is that blockchain adoption can serve, at the very least, as a tool for the government to signal political will in combating corruption, even if the technology’s practical worth is debatable.

Blockchain in Thailand

In Thailand, the adoption of e-services is generally claimed to have improved both efficiency and transparency of public service provision (Tengratanaprasert and Prateeppornnarong, 2021). Nevertheless, the efficacy of some e-services is also faced with practical challenges. Take e-GP as an example, although the system can suppress overt fraud like bid rigging, its institutional efficacy is contingent upon rigorous enforcement mechanisms (Rotchanakitumnuai, 2013). Illicit collusion remains a risk, that is, procurement officials may circumvent system controls by disclosing sensitive bid data to favored operators in exchange for financial inducements, thereby compromising the competitive integrity of the tendering process (Prateeppornnarong, 2023).

In 2019, the Ministry of Finance launched an initiative to promote the use of blockchain technology among its affiliated departments. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the ministry and several commercial banks paving the way for the application of blockchain. In collaboration with banks, a private blockchain has gradually been adopted at the Comptroller General’s Department having a remit to run the public procurement system, and the three other agencies discharging tax and revenue collection duties, namely, the Revenue Department, the Customs Department, and the Excise Department. Blockchain is applied to certain types of work of each aforementioned department. For example, at the Comptroller General’s Department, a blockchain is used for issuing electronic letter of guarantee (e-LG) in the public procurement system, making sure that the process is speedy, reducing a risk of forgery and corruption, while it is used at the Revenue Department for VAT refunds for tourists, enhancing the efficiency of the service and transparency. Noting that blockchain is introduced on a trial basis for the other two departments at this stage (Prateeppornnarong, 2023).

Design frame and approach

As blockchain has only recently been adopted in the Thai public sector, examining the adoption of such technology is an uncharted territory requiring suitable research design and approach. As a result, the design of this research complies with a qualitative methodology. The exploratory research design frame was applied as it is arguably useful for examining the topics with scant evidence-based literature from which one might develop hypotheses to test deductively. A phenomenological approach, emphasizing upon “studying lived experiences of various human phenomena” (Cilesiz, 2011: 493), was also adopted for examining how the relevant stakeholders make sense of their experiences with the use of blockchain as a phenomenon that is increasingly pervasive in modern society and is gradually being integrated into their daily work routines (Cilesiz, 2011).

Sampling and sample size

Criterion sampling was used as a main sampling technique to ensure that the samples are qualified for research participation. The criteria for selecting the sample group for this research consist of the following: (1) direct experience regarding blockchain or expertise regarding digital technology (focusing on blockchain). That is, participants must be individuals with positions and duties in supervising the agency’s blockchain usage, or be coordinators with stakeholders in the agency’s blockchain network, or be policymakers for the usage and governance of the agency’s blockchain, or be experts in applying digital technology, especially blockchain, to public administration; and (2) participants must have work experience in the agency for 3–5 years or more, in order to be able to understand the work context in government agencies and the use of technology to improve work conditions to a certain level. To ensure depth of insight, snowball sampling was also used to recruit the “hard-to-reach” participants meaning the very people who are knowledgeable about blockchain but may not already be in the limelight; for instance, back-office staff, from either the public or private sector, who are working behind the scenes to propel the implementation of blockchain within the Thai government (Bryman, 2012).

A total of 30 individuals were recruited for this research. The majority were officials responsible for the operational management of blockchain technology within the Comptroller General’s Department, the Revenue Department, the Customs Department, and the Excise Department. The remaining participants were experts from key agencies driving the Thai government’s digitalization policy, specifically the Digital Government Development Agency (DGA), the Electronic Transactions Development Agency (ETDA), and the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). In the recruitment process, the researcher approached relevant organizations through official permission letters outlining the criteria for participants regarding their experience and expertise. The backgrounds of the interviewees assigned by these organizations were verified as thoroughly as possible to ensure their ability to share genuine insights and perspectives on blockchain application. The snowball recruitment method utilizes referrals from existing participants and/or personal networks to reach potential subjects.

Data collection

This research has been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) COA No. 2022/0032, prior to data collection and the undertaking of the research fieldwork which took place between June and December 2022. The collection of primary data was carried out using a semi-structured interview. The interview was mainly centered on three components: the properties of blockchain and DLT, technology affordances and constraints of blockchain in government based on the participants’ hands-on experience, and the participants’ perspectives on how government agencies and their personnel should adapt themselves to the working environment where blockchain operates.

Regarding research ethics in the data collection and analysis process, it is important to note the high sensitivity of corruption-related issues. Therefore, when interpreting raw data and presenting the findings to readers, the researcher has edited wording that might be construed as implicating specific individuals or groups. The tone of the language has also been softened, avoiding definitive assertions regarding whether or how corruption actually occurred. These measures were taken to prevent potential litigation following the publication of the research findings.

Interviews were conducted through electronic means. The duration of interviews varied between 30 and 60 minutes. Each participant was informed of the objectives of the study and asked to give verbal consent prior to the interview. The interview was audio and video recorded. Nonetheless, all participants were assured of anonymity and confidentiality. For these reasons, the word “interview” and the number indicating which interviewee is being cited are used in this article. This study is not large-scale qualitative research; thus, the recorded interview data were manually transcribed into transcripts. Documents (e.g., official reports, research reports, rules and regulations) are of vital importance in undertaking research, documentary research was, therefore, adopted as another data collection approach for secondary data.

Data analysis

Thematic analysis was employed as the analytical technique for the contextual data collected for this research. This very technique involves data interpretation and coding where inductive reasoning, which is the process of going from specific details examined to broader categories of findings (Thomas, 2013), is applied.

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Figure 3.

The process of data analysis.

The data analysis process begins with the constant comparative method, which involves comparing raw data to determine the frequency with which specific details (e.g., ideas, pain points) are discussed. Pairing the data from in-depth interviews and document study is an essential part of this initial process of analysis. This approach not only establishes “data triangulation,” a methodological approach that mitigates the bias inherent in single-source data collection (e.g., the possibility that the civil servants interviewed inflated the utility of blockchain), but also ensures that interpretation of the findings and coding leading to theme identification are grounded in the data, not the researcher’s mind. All of this enhances the research’s credibility – or “validity,” in quantitative terms (Ahmed, 2024; Golafshani, 2003; Patton, 1999).

The data analysis proceeded through three distinct stages. First, open coding was employed to break down the raw data, meticulously marking up identifying details with initial keywords to capture the essence of distinct points. The process then moved to axial coding, which involved an iterative rereading of the initial codes. During this phase, the focus shifted to finding conceptual connections and commonalities, allowing the researchers to group scattered codes into coherent subcategories. The analysis culminated in selective coding, a high-level synthesis where refined categories were rigorously evaluated for thematic specificity and selected to represent the core themes of the research (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Thomas, 2013).

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Figure 4.

Example of thematic coding.

The coding process was conducted manually. While the core themes (see Figure 5) were informed by the research objectives, the subthemes were not preconceived; rather, they emerged inductively from the collected data, grounded in the participants’ experiences and viewpoints. To ensure the dependability (reliability) of the analysis, an inquiry audit was employed. This process involved external experts – specifically the research grant committee and full project reviewers – examining the analytic workflow to validate the emergence of the themes (Ahmed, 2024).

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Figure 5.

Themes of research findings.

Affordances of blockchain

Constraints of blockchain

Discussion

In light of the empirical findings of this research, it is apparent that DLT strengthens users’ confidence in the system, assuring them that the modification or alteration of critical data within the database network can be deterred when blockchain is adopted. Theoretically, this specific affordance reflects the technology’ s capability to resolve information asymmetry, which typically leads to the principal–agent problem. The findings also indicate that, comparatively, blockchain technology can establish both vertical and horizontal transparency more effectively than previously utilized e-government systems. This is primarily because blockchain mitigates the “ownership problem.” Ultimately, these points collectively support the argument that blockchain can help curb corruption in the public sector.

This research also highlights the operational and practical constraints of blockchain in government. Operationally, blockchain is not strictly immutable (Ølnes et al., 2017) and remains susceptible to linkability and reversibility attacks (Baquero, 2023). Besides, interview data suggests a high potential for systemic misuse, particularly in permissioned networks, which can be exploited for corrupt collusion or state surveillance. Practically, the findings also highlight issues related to cost-effectiveness, regulatory governance, security and confidentiality, and digital skills. These constraints align with findings from similar studies conducted globally (Cagigas et al., 2021). The research also points to a constraint specific to the Thai context, which is the data-hoarding organizational culture within the Thai public sector. There is a reluctance to share data due to concerns that doing so might diminish the organization’s significance.

Weighing the affordances and constraints of blockchain raises the broader question of whether governments should use it to combat corruption. The answer is multidimensional, depending largely on a country’s specific sociopolitical context. It should be noted that scholars and practitioners profoundly familiar with the issue of corruption universally concur that resolving this problem necessitates a focus on structural reform across economic, social, and political dimensions. Notwithstanding, such an undertaking often resembles an idealistic aspiration, particularly within the context of developing countries in the Global South. In Thailand, structurally resolving corruption and poverty has constituted a central campaign platform for nearly all political parties during general elections over the past three decades. Nevertheless, upon these parties’ ascension to power, structural anticorruption initiatives are consistently undermined by political compromises.

Considering this empirical reality, while this research steadfastly maintains that advocacy for structural reform must persist, it posits that technological interventions can effectively mitigate immediate challenges. Absent such measures, public sector corruption risks total neglect, which could ultimately exacerbate corrupt practices. Metaphorically, the application of blockchain technology to combat corruption is analogous to a physician managing a chronic disease that evades an immediate cure; symptomatic treatments must be administered to prevent further deterioration of the condition. However, given its inherent constraints, blockchain’s effectiveness relies heavily on its integration with other factors. Rushing its adoption in the public sector without strategic assessment risks wasting valuable resources. Establishing a robust legal and regulatory framework is crucial for effective governance; without it, the long-term delivery of blockchain-based public services may face significant challenges regarding the legality and validity of these actions. Finally, upskilling public officials in digitalization is an absolute necessity.

Most importantly, this research presents a critical lesson for countries grappling with systemic corruption. Blockchain can be weaponized as a performative façade generating unearned political legitimacy and creating an illusion of transparency while avoiding substantive reform. Conversely, even when genuine political will exists to enhance transparency, policymakers must ensure that adopting advanced technologies transcends superficial signaling. To safeguard against ineffective implementation, civil society organizations (CSOs) must serve as central partners alongside the public sector in overseeing blockchain’s deployment.