Abstract
Malcolm X’s appeal to the African Heads of State at the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting was necessary to strengthen the Pan-African bonds between Africans and African-Americans during that time. Following the anti-communism push in the post-WWII United States, many Black leaders disassociated with the anti-colonial movements in Africa and began to have a more domestic focus in their pursuit of freedom. While Malcolm X had consistently viewed the struggle of African-Americans as connected to the independence struggle of continental Africans, his 1964 appeal was a high mark. Through a comparative analysis of the speeches of the African Heads of State from this OAU summit, the author explores the way those leaders addressed the African-American, South African, and Palestinian struggles differently. Based on that study, the author concludes that Malcolm’s appeal to these leaders was necessary if the African-American problem was going to gain more attention from them.
Introduction
Malcolm X’s 1964 appeal to the African Heads of State was necessary to raise the priority of concern for the African American struggle. His campaign at the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting was a significant point in the history of Pan-Africanism. Scholars have described the term “Pan-Africanism” in many ways. For example, Timothy Murithi (2005) defines it as the perception of Africans in the diaspora and on the continent that they share a common goal; a feeling of unity and common purpose of Africans globally. Moreover, Pan-Africanism also includes a celebration of African-ness and an attempt to respond to the underdevelopment in Africa. Providing some additional nuance, Ronald Walters (1997) points out that some scholars make a distinction between pan-Africanism (lower-case “p”) which is a people-to-people approach of trans-Atlantic relations, and Pan-Africanism (with a capital “P”) which refers to political movements (pp. 42–43). Similar to the latter half of Walter’s definition, Rita Edozie (2015) states that Pan-Africanism, defined in a Black Studies context, is a brand of Black Nationalism that includes a worldview and a political movement aiming to unify continental Africans and those in the African diaspora (p. 284). Hakim Adi (2018) admits that the term Pan-Africanism has some vagueness; he affirms that it refers to the holistic emancipation of Africana people globally. He believes in a sense of unity along with purpose and with a common history, belief in an interconnected destiny of all people of African descent. Adi also asserts that there are two strands of Pan-Africanism: (1) One derives from the African diaspora during the trans-Atlantic enslavement of African people, and (2) more recently, a form of Pan-Africanism rose after 1945 in the anti-colonial struggle. Most relevant to this current study is this latter expression and the centrality of Africa in Pan-African discourse. As Adi states, “Pan-Africanism looks forward to a genuine united and independent Africa as the basis for the liberation of all Africans, both those on the continent and in the diaspora” (p. 3). Thus, there is a sense among different believers of Pan-Africanism that strengthening Africa should be a central focus among Africana people globally. While agreeing with Ahjamu Umi’s (2015) assertion that African Americans should not expect freedom while Africa remains subjugated, this author hopes to highlight a historical push to bring the plight of African Americans to a higher priority among continental Africans.
In 1964 Malcolm sought to place the concerns of African Americans on the agenda for the OAU. This paper will assess how Malcolm’s appeal was received in light of the priority African leaders gave to it compared to similar issues. The author will accomplish this by first looking at the state of Pan-Africanism a few decades leading up to the 1960s. Special attention will be given to the way in which the movement for Black freedom fluctuated in its practice of centering Africa in its pursuit of liberation. Following this, the author will give readers a history of Malcolm X and how Pan-Africanism was displayed throughout his life. Subsequently, an evaluation of his appeal to the African Heads of State at the 1964 OAU summit, the speeches given by the leaders, and the resolutions passed will be provided using the Pan-African method of analysis. Walters (1997) offers this approach and states that this form of study observes the relationships between peoples and nation states. He mentions five potential areas of inquiry about Pan-African relationships: (1) among African states, (2) among African states and African-origin states in the Diaspora, (3) among African states and African-origin peoples in the diaspora, (4) among African-origin states in the Diaspora and African origin communities in the Diaspora, and (5) among African origin communities in the Diaspora (p. 41). Focusing on the third area, this paper will look at the “degree of functional interaction” between African (Heads of) states and African Americans. Furthermore, as Walters suggests, another aim is to see whether the objectives of the contacts between these different communities were met (p. 45). After analyzing this relationship in the context of the 1964 OAU Summit meeting, the author will have made the case that Malcolm’s appeal for more urgent concern to be directed toward the plight of African Americans among African Heads of State was necessary.
Vacillating Between Pan-African and National Consciousness
The 1940s would eventually see a shift in the Black freedom movement from an international to a domestic framework. In the beginning of the decade many African Americans believed their struggle against Jim Crow was connected with the struggles for the liberation of African peoples globally. Due to a large influx of African students in the 1940s (and 1950s) into the United States, they were able to engage with African Americans more personally. Because of housing discrimination, these African students would live in neighborhoods with African American families. Africans were able to create ties with African Americans as they observed what life was like for their hosts and classmates. Some of these Africans would return to the continent as the first leaders of independent African nations (Blyden, 2019; Von Eschen, 1997). Daulatzai (2012) explains, however, that after WWII Black politics would no longer envision the Black freedom struggle through an anti-colonial lens. Prior to the war, there were few exceptions of prominent Black leaders who did not participate in the anti-colonial movement. This changed during the Cold War when it was declared that communism rather than Western colonialism was the most urgent threat to the Third World. Von Eschen (1997) provides a concise explanation: With the issuing of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the acceleration of domestic political repression, the terms of anticolonial politics began to change rapidly. Critiques of American foreign policy gave way to an acceptance of the Truman Doctrine and its claims that America was the legitimate leader of the ‘free world.’ The embrace of the Truman Doctrine by many African American leaders reshaped black American political and rhetorical strategies and fundamentally altered the terms of anti-colonialism (p. 97).
In essence, this new era of Black politics was characterized by many Black liberals beginning to have a different relationship to anti-colonialism and severing the African American civil rights struggle from anti-colonialism abroad. This transition was not adopted by everyone, however. In 1954 the Council on African Affairs (CAA) held a conference in New York that called for protests against the racism in South Africa (Blyden, 2019). Moreover, prior to Tanganyika’s national independence in 1961, African American leaders such as A. Philip Randolph, George McCray, and Maida Springer all played essential roles in the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Formed in 1954 by Julius Nyerere, TANU’s purpose was to fight for independence from British rule. Randolph, McCray, and Springer were all strong supporters of Tanganyika’s independence. Springer actually developed a political friendship with Bibi Titi Mohamed, who would become one of the most well-known TANU leaders when the country gained its independence (Geiger, 1997; Markle, 2017). Nevertheless, this nuance does not imply the illegitimacy of characterizing this era as representing a major shift in Black politics.
In the early 1960s, many African Americans would begin to jettison the continued domestic focus in Black politics, viewing it as limiting. Martin Luther King Jr.’s speech at the March on Washington reflected the orientation of Black politics that was popular during the early 1960s. In his speech, King argued that his dream was deeply rooted in the American Dream. He cited the Declaration of Independence and claimed that Black people were included in the promises of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Ultimately, he contended that the purpose of the march was to make those promises a reality for African Americans since that was not so at that time (King, 1986, pp. 217, 219). Citing ideals and documents of the nation as the basis for advancing African American freedom reflected the domestic scope of Black politics at the time. However, through the success of strong anti-colonial movements in Africa and the emergence of independent African states, Africans in the diaspora began to gain a stronger sense of ideological, cultural, and political connection to Africa. In fact, African Americans began to argue that independent African nations would help with their own liberation struggle in the United States (Essien-Udom, 1966; Lake, 1995; Von Eschen, 1997). Although there were still various opinions about the continent, what began to gain more traction was a militant nationalism that rejected America and turned to Africa. This Pan-African consciousness was not one-sided, but independent movements in African colonies and leaders of nationalist parties reached out to African Americans for support as well (Adeleke, 1998; Blyden, 2019; Meriwether, 2002). About 200 African Americans actually emigrated to Ghana beginning in 1957 to help strengthen the nation. These repatriates saw themselves as belonging to a wider African community that encompassed more than their national citizenship (Lake, 1995; Sherwood, 2011).
Malcolm X and Pan-Africanism
In the midst of all of these political shifts came a young man named Malcolm X who would try to reconnect those (political) links between African Americans and Africans. Important for grasping Malcolm’s understanding of Pan-Africanism is the fact that his father, Earl Little, was a Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) organizer. In fact, he and his wife, Louise Little, moved to Omaha, Nebraska to start a Garveyite outpost in 1921. Malcolm Little was born in 1925 into a family who had received frequent visits by Garvey himself (Adi & Sherwood, 2003; Edozie, 2015; Malcolm X & Haley, 1999; Marable, 2011). So deep was the Little’s commitment to Garvey that Earl Little co-wrote a letter to President Calvin Coolidge on June 8, 1927 to have Garvey released from prison (Marable, 2011). After the death of his father and the psychological deterioration of his mother, Malcolm would eventually live a criminal lifestyle and would, after a while, get arrested and sent to prison February 27, 1946 to August 7, 1952 (Carson, 1991; Malcolm X & Haley, 1999).
While in prison, Malcolm had converted to the Nation of Islam (NOI), and his public ministry would constantly reflect a Pan-African understanding of the world. Malcolm was responsible for much of the growth of the NOI between 1952 and 1964 (Collins & Bailey, 1998; DeCaro, 1998; Gomez, 2005; Malcolm X & Haley, 1999). He himself notes that the secret to the growth of the NOI was its emphasis on things African (Essien-Udom, 1966; Malcolm X & Haley, 1999). Although this view of the NOI has been challenged, it is evident that Malcolm did place an emphasis on things African throughout his public ministry (Austin, 2003). For example, Malcolm functioned as a co-chair of a welcoming committee who invited President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to New York in 1958 (Collins & Bailey, 1998). Additionally, in 1959 Malcolm gave a speech for an African Liberation Day event where he emphasized the unity of African people. In that same speech he argued that the reason so few Europeans could oppress so many African people is because of the disunity of those African people (Kendi, 2019). In mid-1959 Malcolm took a trip to the Middle East and North Africa to prepare for a visit there by Elijah Muhammad. While there he sought to make connections between African Americans and Africans, declaring that Africans were concerned with the condition of African Americans. According to Ibram Kendi, Malcolm was attempting to rebuild the Pan-Africanism of the Garvey movement (Carson, 1991; Kendi, 2019; Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Manning Marable contends that this Pan-African and internationalist outlook Malcolm held was reflected in the increasing number of references his sermons made to “events in Asia, Africa, and other Third World regions, and he emphasized the kinship black Americans had with non-Western dark humanity. . .” (Marable, 2011, pp. 120–121). Other examples include Malcolm’s meeting with Fidel Castro in 1960 and his acknowledgment in 1962 that Black people all over the world were uniting against their common enemy (Carson, 1991).
Moreover, Malcolm’s Pan-African politics would take more center stage after he left the NOI. Following his suspension at the end of 1963 for a comment he made about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Malcolm left the NOI in 1964 (Breitman, 1967; Malcolm X & Haley, 1999). Shortly after leaving the NOI Malcolm would make two long trips [the first from April 13, 1964 to May 21, 1964; the second from July 9, 1964 to November 24, 1964 (Sales, 1994, p. 100)] to the Middle East and Africa to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and also to create political connections for the Black liberation struggle (Malcolm X & Haley, 1999; Marable, 2011).
Malcolm founded the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) June 24, 1964. As an outcome of conversations Malcolm had with revolutionaries throughout the United States, he and Lynn Shifflet began leading meetings for this new organization. Along with the attempt to unite Afro-Americans in their fight against oppression with a “by any means necessary” ethic, it was Malcolm’s goal to link the OAAU with the OAU (Malcolm X, 2012; Sales, 1994). At the founding rally Malcolm told his audience that their intention was to “find out what it was our African brothers were doing to get results, so that you and I could study or benefit from their experiences.”(Malcolm X, 2012, p. 60). In this way, the OAAU was meant to unite Afro-American people under a Pan-African political vision. Less than a month later, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time, described Malcolm and the OAAU as a national security threat and aimed to destroy the new organization (Sales, 1994). This shows that the U.S. government recognized the potential power of this type of Pan-African unity that Malcolm was advocating. Moreover, due to some of the connections Malcolm was making, it became apparent that he had the potential to successfully link the Afro-Americans with continental Africans who had themselves began to make international coalitions.
The OAU Summit Meeting and Malcolm’s Appeal
African countries categorized in collectives such as the Brazzaville and Monrovia groups were able to come together on May 25, 1963, and have their Heads of State sign the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (Padelford, 1964). Many scholars have pointed out that the main emphasis of the Charter was to protect nation-state sovereignty (Grilli, 2020; Martin, 2013; McEachrane, 2020). Emperor Haile Selassie admitted this much in a speech reflecting on the document. He states, “Some of the great aims of the Charter include. . .the defence [sic] and preservation of their [Member-States’] sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. . .” (Selassie, 2011, p. 286). In addition to these things, there was a commitment to “non-inteference” in the internal affairs of the Member States and a responsibility to condemn subversive activities taking place in any of the States (OAU Charter, 1992).
The next year the new organization held a conference in Cairo, Egypt with meetings that lasted from July 17 to July 21st. Malcolm arrived in Cairo on July 12 and began working to obtain a pass so he could attend the conference. Although participants were required to be citizens of African countries, after lobbying with officials, Malcolm was given observer status and received a floor pass to attend (Mbughuni, 2014; Payne & Payne, 2020). Moreover, he was allowed to submit an eight-page memorandum delivered to the delegates on the first day of the conference.
In his memorandum, Malcolm stated that he was a representative of African Americans whose human rights were being trampled upon by the United States. He declared that African Americans are defenseless in a nation where racists murder them at will because they are of African descent (Malcolm X, 1965). Going further, he contended that as their brothers and sisters, the problem of African Americans and Africans are connected: “African problems are our problems and our problems are African problems” (Malcolm X, 1965, p. 73). According to Malcolm, the problems of continental Africans would never be solved until the problems of African Americans were solved; they could never gain full respect unless African Americans were respected also (Malcolm X, 1965, p. 75). Providing an example, he stated: Recently, three students from Kenya were mistaken for American Negroes and were brutally beaten by New York police. Shortly after that, two diplomats from Uganda were also beaten by the New York City police, who mistook them for American Negroes. If Africans are brutally beaten while only visiting in America, imagine the physical and psychological suffering received by your brothers and sisters who have lived there for over 300 years (Malcolm X, 1965, p. 74).
Thus far then, Malcolm was drawing from a Pan-African ideology that assumed that African people globally have a shared destiny. That is, the liberation of African people globally is interconnected. He then specified his request to these leaders.
Malcolm called on the African Heads of State to bring the African American problem before the United Nations. He anticipated two obstacles, however. The first issue is what he calls “American dollarism.” Malcolm stated that he hoped that his African brothers who had freed themselves from European colonialism were not subjecting themselves to the control of American dollarism. This referred to the pressure the United States could leverage against African nations through their ability to offer or discontinue foreign aid toward those countries (Malcolm X, 1965; Mbughuni, 2014; Rickford, 2003). The second obstacle was the recently passed civil rights bill that he declared as merely propaganda. As Stephen Tuck explains, Malcolm placed a lot of attention on the civil rights bill because of its power to improve the image of America for potential allies of African Americans in other countries. Malcolm’s assessment was well-founded because Assistant Secretary for Congressional relations, Robert E. Lee, believed that the best way to counter the influence Malcolm was having in Africa was to use civil rights legislation (Malcolm X, 1965; Tuck, 2015).
Malcolm then shifted to provide his claim with more legitimacy in the face of some apparent reluctance. He revealed that some African leaders present at the summit implied that they could not take on the problems of African Americans because they had enough of their own problems to deal with. Azaria Mbughuni understood this to mean that Malcolm faced a level of indifference among some African leaders (Malcolm X, 1965; Mbughuni, 2014). Whether this could be defined as indifference or prioritizing their immediate challenges is up for debate. Nevertheless, what one can say is that this response was a departure of one of the fundamental tenets of Pan-Africanism: an assumption of a common destiny. This may reflect what Adi meant when he argued that “After 1945, it can be said that Pan-Africanism returned home to the African continent in the sense that its focus was much more directed to the liberation and unification of the African continent” (Adi, 2018, 222). In agreement with Adi, Michael McEachrane (2020) adds that “after 1945 the core philosophy of the Pan-African Congresses 1900 to 1945 lost its political force. Pan-Africanism took a ‘continental turn’ and went from being race-based and broadly internationalist to mostly an African affair” (p. 239). Thus, Malcolm may have come across those whose view of Pan-Africanism was limited to (or at least prioritized) the continent. This analysis seems to have support from symbolism Malcolm invoked to counter that tendency. Malcolm cited the biblical narrative where Jesus teaches using a parable of a shepherd who went searching for his one lost sheep. Although this sheep was one out of the 100 sheep he cared for, he was willing to leave the 99, who were safe in his possession, to go in search of the lost one (Matthew 18:12–13). Appropriating this story for his Pan-African agenda, Malcolm responds to the leaders who sought to limit their Pan-Africanism to the continent by saying: “I must remind all of you that the good shepherd will leave ninety-nine sheep, who are safe at home, to go to the aid of the one who is lost and has fallen into the clutches of the imperialist wolf. We, in America, are your long-lost brothers and sisters and I am here only to remind you that our problems are your problems” (Malcolm X, 1965, p. 73). Here Malcolm couches one of his strongest challenges to Pan-Africanism that was merely continental in scope, with biblical imagery.
Malcolm would then intensify his argument by pointing to examples of appeals from the international community for the liberation of citizens of other nations. He directed his readers’ attention to the actions of the United States Supreme Court Justice, Arthur Goldberg, whom he says found legal grounds to threaten to bring Russia before the United Nations for violating the human rights of 5 million Russians. Malcolm then pivoted to ask the question “what makes our African brothers hesitate to bring the United States government before the United Nations and charge her with violating the human rights of 22 million African Americans” (Malcolm X, 1965, p. 75). In this way he tried to persuade African Heads of State that they should not limit their concerns to the continent.
Malcolm then pointed to the response given to the concerns of injustice in South Africa. He began by arguing that racism in South Africa differed from racism in America only in their method. Racism in South Africa manifests openly and directly as opposed to racism in America that manifested subtly and through cunning. He goes as far to say that the latter is worse because at least South Africa practices what it preaches; America is racist but pretends to be inclusive. He therefore concludes that if South Africa is violating the human rights of Black South Africans and is not treated as merely a domestic issue, then neither should the plight of African Americans (Malcolm X, 1965). Based on the examples above, the author agrees with Ruby M. and E.U. Essien-Udom who states that Malcolm’s appeal to the OAU was the first time an African American made an effort to have the African American problem treated as an African problem (Ruby & Essien-Udom, 1990, p. 253). In this appeal Malcolm argues that the problems of Africans and African Americans are interconnected and should be thus given the same level of priority. It is important, however, to take into account how these African leaders responded to Malcolm’s appeal (assuming they read it), and the priorities they express in their own words at the summit.
An Analysis of the Speeches at the OAU Summit
Taking a comparative approach to the concerns raised in the speeches of the African Heads of State at the 1964 summit justifies Malcolm’s call for a more expansive display of Pan-Africanism through prioritizing the African American struggle. Conference speakers reflected a general desire for unity among independent African states even though there was disagreement as to the speed and shape of that unity (Nasser, 1964; Padelford, 1964). For example, the Presidents of Tunisia and Dahomey both expressed a sense of concern for other groups of people outside of Africa. In fact, Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda argued that the strength of African independence was not determined solely by the freedom of those on the African continent, but also by the freedom of Black people anywhere in the world (Assembly of the heads of state and Government of O.A.U., 1964). Thus, Prime Minister Obote held to a Pan-African vision that believed continental Africans and those in the African diaspora had a common destiny.
One also finds a desire for a continentally exclusive form of Pan-Africanism. For example, President Ahmed Sekou Toure (1964) of the Republic of Guinea stated: “Another aspect is the adhesion of certain African States to extra-African bodies. This adhesion, offers these sister countries certain advantages but does it not also imply certain limitations and obligations which may sometimes conflict with the meaning of the Organization of African Unity?” (p. 72). President Toure is concerned that a connection with “extra-African bodies” would compromise the unity of the OAU. His use of the phrase “sister countries” makes it likely that the term “extra-African bodies” refers to nations outside of the African continent rather than a racial category. While there was difference of opinion to how African nations should relate to communities outside of Africa, there was one issue that they all seemed to be willing to rally around.
As part of the OAU’s commitment to anti-colonialism, many speakers condemned the South African government and called for measures to assist their brethren in achieving their freedom. While Nyerere had boycotted South Africa as early as 1963, Ahmed Yussuf Dualieh (1964), the Foreign Minister of Somalia, read a letter from Somalian President Adan Abdulla Osman who claimed that his nation was the first to sever economic relations with South Africa and declared it an enemy while apartheid existed. Furthermore, leaders from Libya, the Central African Republic, and Rwanda, all condemned the government of South Africa (Assembly of the heads of state and Government of O.A.U., 1964; Markle, 2017). Other leaders such as President Gamal Nasser of Egypt and President Ibrahim Abboud of the Sudan called for an (continued) economic boycott of South Africa (Assembly of the heads of state and Government of O.A.U., 1964). However, Prime Minister Milton Obote (1964) of Uganda concluded that appeals to the conscience of white people had proven ineffective and suggested that tactics that went beyond peaceful solutions were now necessary. These responses show a collective concern for the liberation of Black South Africans and a willingness to take strong measures to secure that freedom. At this point one may be tempted to surmise that while the South Africa issue was not relegated to a domestic issue, South Africa was a concern to these leaders because it was located on the continent of Africa. How did African leaders address issues concerning communities outside of Africa?
Some African leaders were willing to speak up for the cause of Palestinians in their speeches and call for similar measures to be applied on their behalf as those concerning communities in Africa. President Abboud (1964) explained that the Palestinians were driven out of their land and oppressed by the British and Zionists. Moreover, he declared his commitment to defend their cause. Similarly, the Algerian President, Ahmed Ben Bella (1964), advocated for the Palestinians by comparing their plight to that of Africans in South Africa. President Ben Bella argued that the Palestinian issue is an issue that should concern all of Africa because they were ousted from their land and replaced by the state of Israel, who supported nations like South Africa as they tried to boycott them. In effect, the President of Algeria was suggesting that the problems of the Palestinians were interconnected with the problems of Africans. Like Malcolm, President Ben Bella was essentially speaking for the Palestinians and saying “our problems are your problems.”
Some leaders relied on moral arguments to appeal for assistance for the Palestinian problem. President HabibBourguiba (1964) of Tunisia told listeners that there was a contradiction between the positions of some African states being anti-colonial while simultaneously supporting Israel; a state created on a colonial basis. He continued by contending “We believe that to draw a distinction between the struggle of the Palestinian people and that of the people of Rhodesia for instance, is opposed not only to logic but also to moral principles which constitute the foundation of our unity” (p. 58). In other words, to make a distinction between their commitments to the freedom of continental African people and communities outside of Africa is both illogical and immoral. Taking a similar approach, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dualieh (1964), argued that those in the OAU should not be so preoccupied with their own problems that they do not attend to the suffering of people outside of Africa. He then pointed to the Palestinians and asserted that their problem was no different than the problem in South Africa and their cries must not be ignored. Dualieh’s argument mirrored Malcolm’s appeal in that just as the shepherd should not be so preoccupied with the problems of the 99 sheep that he leaves the lost sheep to its fate, in the same manner, African Heads of State should not be so preoccupied with their own issues that they leave the Palestinians to fend for themselves. President Nkrumah (1964) also mentions concern for the Palestinians, albeit for the purpose of his own aim. He stated the problems of the Palestinians would only be solved with the backing of a United Government of Africa.
What should be evident at this point is that many African leaders (particularly those with a significant Arab/African population) strongly pressed the issue of the Palestinians. Two ideologies might help explain this phenomenon. The first is a concept that is described as Pan-Islamism. This refers to a belief that traces back to the early days of Islam and it consists of the notion of a solidarity between all Muslims globally. That is, all Muslims should rally behind a cause that affects any part of the global Muslim community. The modern expression of these principles arose in the latter half of the 19th century as a defensive strategy for Muslims enduring non-Muslim domination (Esposito, 2003; Landau, 1995b, 2016).
Similarly, the idea of Pan-Arabism is a perspective that developed after the First World War and refers to a transnational allegiance among all Arab peoples globally (Landau, 1995a; Woolbert, 1938). As early as 1938, the function of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism were connected to the problems faced by the Arab Palestinians (Woolbert, 1938). Moreover, it was the 1955 Bandung Conference where the convergence of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism, and concerns for Palestinian liberation encountered and joined with Pan-Africanism. Anti-colonial leaders from Asia and Pan-Africanists from North Africa met and discussed, among other things, colonialism in Palestine. The leaders from both continents were very sympathetic to the Palestinian problem and provided moral support (Appadorai, 1955; Lubin, 2007). These factors may explain the leaders’ passionate advocacy for Palestinians at the OAU summit in 1964. They supported them by highlighting a common interest and moral consistency. These responses, however, can be juxtaposed to the level of attention and response to the concerns of African Americans.
When the speakers addressed the condition of African Americans, the most common sentiment was one of celebration for the current progress being made by the United States government. President Nasser (1964) stated that the recently passed Civil Rights Bill was a promising sign. He added that “While we look forward with interest to its implementation, it is only fair that we should hail its promulgation” (p. 12). Though there is an acknowledgment that full celebration must wait until the bill is enforced, Nasser nevertheless believed that the mere passing of the bill should have received some commendation. President Toure (1964) described the new bill as a great victory for colored people struggling for equality in America. Moreover, President Abboud (1964) claims that the OAU had contributed to the fight for rights for Africans in the United States. Similar to previous speakers mentioned, he states that he looks forward to the implementation of the bill. One can only speculate what Abboud is referring to when he speaks about contributions provided by the OAU to African Americans, but what should be noted is that he referred to African Americans as “Africans.” In contrast to the “colored” designation used by Toure, Abboud used terminology that recognizes the oneness of Africans and African Americans. He also announced that he would be observing the implementation of the bill. However, the only direct challenge to the United States comes from President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. While Kenyatta (1964) never explicitly mentions African Americans nor the bill, he celebrates the absence of racial policies in Africa and applauds the continent’s commitment to the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of human rights; then he states that they have not had to pass a law on race discrimination. Going further he argued “the United States of America might like to learn something from Africa in this field” (p. 26). The discussion about race, human rights, and the passing of a law places the author on firm ground when he asserts that Kenyatta is critiquing the treatment of African Americans in the United States. Furthermore, he challenges the notion of USA superiority by contending that they should learn how to treat racial minorities from Africa. In contrast to concerns about South Africa and Palestinians, the African Heads of State gave very subdued responses to the plight of African Americans. In fact, most responses assumed that the United States is solving the problem. Seth Markle (2017) agreed when he stated “Judging from some of the comments made by African delegates, it appears that the OAU’s position of neutrality was a combination of their belief in racial progress in the United States and a conception of pan-Africanism as strictly a continental movement” (p. 31). Kenyatta seems to offer the strongest support for the African American cause without even mentioning them. However, one must take note that there were no condemnations of the United States, no calls for a boycott against the country, and no suggestion that African Americans needed tactics that went beyond peaceful approaches. The differences in these leaders’ responses to South Africa, Palestinians, and African Americans are striking.
There is also a noticeable difference in how the African American issue is handled in the resolutions affirmed by leaders at this OAU meeting compared to the South African concern. Regarding South Africa, resolution five condemned apartheid and called for numerous sanctions to be implemented against the country. One such sanction was the refusal to allow planes from South Africa to fly over territories of member states. Furthermore, resolution six called for the release of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Mangalisso Sobukwe and all other Nationalists the South African government had imprisoned arbitrarily (Organization of African Unity Secretariat, 1964). Thus, strong measures are taken to combat the condition of Black South Africans.
Contrarily, a strong effort had to be made to simply have the African American problem addressed in the resolutions. Although President Julius Nyerere surprisingly said nothing about the African American problem in his speech, he and Abdulrahman Babu from Tanganyika pushed for a resolution when Malcolm became discouraged. Nyerere’s silence may have been surprising based on his record of diaspora-inclusive Pan-Africanism. He had criticized racism in the United States in 1963 and highlighted commonalities between the Civil Rights Movement and the anti-colonial movement in Tanganyika. Nevertheless, having developed a close diplomatic friendship with President Kennedy, he believed the race problem was being solved in the U.S. Because Babu prodded him so much, Nyerere lobbied other African Heads of State to pass the resolution on behalf of African Americans (Malcolm X, 1965; Markle, 2017; Mbughuni, 2014; Nyerere, 1964). As a result, resolution 15 declared satisfaction with the passing of the Civil Rights Act but disturbance toward the continued presence of racial oppression of “Negro citizens.” The resolution then urges the United States to strengthen their efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination (Organization of African Unity Secretariat, 1964). Like as in the approach in the speeches, the resolution celebrates the passing of the bill while encouraging the USA to solve the problem of racism in their country. Although the resolution suggests that the leaders were disturbed by the racism faced by “Negro citizens,” it did not condemn the United States nor call for any sanctions to be directed toward them.
Assessment of Success of Malcolm’s Objectives
According to the Pan-African method of analysis one must determine whether the objectives of Malcolm’s appeal were met. First however, the reader must consider Malcolm’s own opinion about the results of the conference. In an interview following the summit, Malcolm admits to having some obstacles with being admitted to the conference, but he does not give any details (Malcolm X, 1965). Furthermore, he explains that he felt that the African Heads of State were “as much responsible for us [African Americans] as they were responsible for the people right here on the continent” (p. 80). He reveals that this sense of responsibility was challenging to the African leaders in part because United States agents had convinced them that African Americans did not identify with Africa. However, he says he was happy about the resolution and felt that it was good. Malcolm also stated that several African leaders promised to support the effort to bring the problem faced by African Americans before the United Nations during the next session of the U.N (Malcolm X, 1965). He concluded that “I am very, very happy over the whole result of my trip here” (p. 84).
Malcolm’s assessment notwithstanding, he did accomplish other important objectives even if it seems to have received less than his publicly stated aims. This view must be tempered by the reality that apparently the United States government was worried about what Malcolm could potentially achieve. The FBI and CIA began to intensify their surveillance and counterintelligence against Malcolm when they realized that his plan was to bring the United States before the United Nations. Thus, reports of Malcolm’s failure at the OAU were part of the U.S. government’s attempt to discredit him (Mbughuni, 2014; Payne & Payne, 2020). In fact, Malcolm suspiciously became violently sick while at the summit and had to have his stomach pumped at a hospital. He believed he was poisoned by Western agents (Carew, 1994; Rickford, 2003).
This response by the U.S. government is quite curious since the U.N. placed sanctions on South Africa which had very little impact. If these sanctions were often ignored regarding a relatively small state, what impact could sanctions have against a superpower like the United States (Sales, 1994)? Furthermore, the United States was a major funder and host of the U.N. They had the power to block any issue raised or action taken to embarrass them. William Sales (1994) explains succinctly: “Malcolm’s desire to use international forums to check U.S. repression of the Black Liberation movement was not easily realizable. Many African states were in no position to confront the United States in international forums concerning its treatment of African Americans” (p. 143). These factors lead one to the question: faced with such an apparently impossible task, what made Malcolm believe that this strategy would work? The answer to this question may be in the other objectives Malcolm achieved.
Developments After the 1964 OAU Meeting
While it seems that no African leader assisted in charging the United States for human rights violations at the United Nations, Malcolm successfully linked continental African people with the African American struggle. Sales argues that the questions that were first articulated by Malcolm in his last year of life were taken up by the Black movement in the subsequent years (Sales, 1994). His example of Pan-Africanism, particularly the close relationship he developed with Babu and Tanzania, was followed by other African Americans. In fact, after 1966 Tanzania became known as the “Mecca” of Pan-Africanism. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) would in some ways become the bearer of his legacy (Babu, 2002; Bedasse, 2017; Markle, 2017). Having become deeply influenced by his teachings, SNCC activists would not only send representatives to the OAU meeting in 1965 and 1967, they also were given the opportunity to speak at a U.N. approved seminar proposed by Nyerere in 1967. Following Malcolm’s strategy, SNCC representatives compared the Black freedom struggle in the U.S. to the anti-aparthied struggle in South Africa. Furthermore, like Malcolm, they also sought to create a program to send African Americans who had technical skills and could assist with the nation’s development to Tanzania (Carmichael, 2007; Carmichael & Thelwell, 2003; Forman, 1972; Joseph, 2020; Markle, 2017; Sales, 1994; Street, 2012).
Along with strengthening the ties between Africans and African Americans, Malcolm also helped broaden the Pan-Africanism of the African leaders (Mbughuni, 2014; Rickford, 2003). For example, the resolution Malcolm had passed was “the first time thirty four independent African nations spoke up in support of African Americans as a group” (Rickford, 2003, p. 178). Also, Afro-Asian critics pointed out the hypocrisy of the United States based on their involvement in Congo, as Malcolm had encouraged. Kojo Botsio of Ghana argued that the U.S. had no more right to invade Congo than Ghana had to invade the U.S. South on behalf of African Americans (Gaines, 2006; Sales, 1994). In this way Malcolm’s achievement in Pan-African history was to reconnect Africans and African Americans in their political struggles; maybe this was his realistic intention.
OAU and Pan-Africanism after the 1964 Summit
Following the 1964 OAU Summit meeting, old patterns continued and Pan-Africanism progressively weakened. Maintaining the emphasis on the protection of nation-states, the OAU made a declaration in 1966 agreeing that members would not allow any press or radio campaigns targeting member-states of the organization. Nor would they tolerate subversion in their countries directed toward a member state (Declaration on the Problem of Subversion, 1992). Again in 1969, the OAU made a prohibition against attacks on member-states through arms, press, or the radio (Convertion Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1992). There was also continued support by the organization for the South African struggle. At the Third Session of the OAU in 1966, Emperor Selassie (2011) argued that as “long as apartheid is practiced in South Africa, Africa will have to continue to intensify her opposition until that scourge is totally annihilated from our continent” (p. 290). Other statements of support were announced by the OAU in 1976, 1982, and in 1990 (African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1992; Resolution on Non-recognition of South African Bantustans, 1992; Resolution on the Root-Causes of the African Refugee Problem, 1992). There was also support for Palestine in 1982 by an affirmation of the states’ duty to eliminate Zionism (African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1992). Beyond the OAU, African nationalist leader Thomas Sankara advocated for Palestine on numerous occasions in 1984, 1986, and 1988 (Sankara, 2020).
The marginalization of the diaspora continued among African leaders though. Although Tanzania remained central to Pan-African politics in the years following its initial collaboration with SNCC and other Africans from the diaspora, it also is where the display of Pan-Africanism continued to suffer from nation-state politics. Tanzania displayed numerous bonafides of Pan-Africanism that included becoming the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee in 1963 and Nyerere’s 1967 Arusha Declaration that expressed Tanzania’s intention to cooperate with liberation struggles throughout the whole continent. This commitment was not merely rhetoric; Nyerere hosted many armed liberation groups (Bedasse, 2017; Gwekwerere, 2020; Markle, 2017). Regarding the diaspora, Nyerere’s Tanzania allowed African Americans to live in the country; it became a safe haven for some African Americans to escape U.S. prosecution. Moreover, he allowed Caribbeans to work in the country and it was a West Indian who helped Nyerere draft the TANU constitution (Bedasse, 2017).
The developments surrounding the Sixth Pan-African Congress, however, signaled the solidification of the dominance of the nation-state focus and the exclusion of the diaspora from continental Pan-Africanism. This was ironic because the first steps to organize the Congress took place in Bermuda in 1969 at a Black Power Conference. Furthermore, it was on that same island in 1971 that the decision was made to hold the Congress in Tanzania. The official call for the sixth Congress was made in 1973 by a group in Jamaica that included C.L.R. James. These organizers desired to form a “people’s Congress” that was distinct from a meeting of African Heads of State. However, when governments in the Caribbean and Africa realized that they would not be exempt from critique, they began to be suspicious. Governments from the Caribbean began to write complaints to Tanzania and informed President Nyerere that if progressive voices from the Caribbean were allowed to speak and embarrass their governments at the Congress they would no longer participate. It was then decided that non-governmental organizations (which were largely from the diaspora) would not have a voice at the Congress. As a result, many decided to boycott the Congress and James resigned as a sponsor (Markle, 2017; Worrell, 2020).
On the ground in Tanzania there were continental and diaspora tensions as well. Although the state welcomed diasporic Africans, some Tanzanians were concerned that the presence of diverse expressions of African American culture and politics would negatively affect their nation. Moreover, there was suspicion that some diasporic Africans may have been working for the CIA and this caused tensions as well. With the arrest and detainment of a group of African Americans by Tanzanian police under the suspicion of subversive activities, many African Americans left the country (Bedasse, 2017). Capturing the context of the disillusionment many diasporic Africans felt in this era, Markle (2017) contends: With their influential role dating back to the movements’ emergence in the late nineteenth century, African American and West Indians were operating along its margins in the decolonization era. The emergence of the OAU as the primary pan-Africanist institution drove a statist definition of pan-Africanism, while independent states such as Tanzania positioned themselves as major players in shaping a politics specific to continental issues. Decolonization led Africa to become the geopolitical locus of state power and anticolonial struggle, leaving many in the diaspora to ponder where they stood (p. 142).
Markle is touching on a perception of alienation and rejection that suggests that Malcolm’s Appeal was necessary if one would want to see a diaspora-inclusive form of Pan-Africanism sustained on the continent. This opens a question about the contemporary relevance of a transnational, diaspora-inclusive strand of Pan-Africanism like Malcolm promoted.
In 2001 the former OAU was transformed into the African Union. Because this organization has inherited the emphasis on the protection of the nation-state, it does not seem that a 21st century repeat of Malcolm X’s Appeal would be a productive pursuit (Kufuor, 2005; Muiu, 2020). This does not mean that Pan-Africanism is irrelevant to the current context. Tavengwa Gwekwerere (2020) points out the need for reeducating Africans of the significance of Pan-Africanism to the past anti-colonial struggles in Africa. He goes as far to say that the liberation of southern Africa from colonial rule is hard to imagine without both the idea and the movement of Pan-Africanism. However, it is not only historical precedent that makes Pan-Africanism worth considering for the contemporary world. Muiu (2020) points out that the lack of unity among African states makes them more vulnerable to exploitation. This is because Africa is underpopulated, and its population is scattered across the continent. Consequently, Muiu contends that African countries are unable to provide the type of resources that could empower their citizens. For example, the end of apartheid in South Africa, according to Muiu, simply freed foreign capitalists to exploit the rest of the continent. However, much of the vulturous and neo-colonial policies that are perpetuated based on the need of European and American aid would be eliminated if Africa would become politically united under the vision of Pan-Africanism figures like Malcolm X and Nkrumah had in mind (Gwekwerere, 2020). It may be more realistic for this form of Pan-Africanism to arise from the grassroots. Learning from the Sixth Pan-African Congress, a “people’s focused” Pan-Africanism that is not hindered by commitments to separate African nation-states may be promising for the future.
Conclusion
This paper set out to show that it was necessary for Malcolm to appeal for a more urgent response by African Heads of State to the condition of African Americans. It was demonstrated that although the Pan-African notion of a united destiny was forged among Africans in the diaspora, after 1945 there was a tendency to focus on a type of continental Pan-Africanism. This also included a decoupling of the struggles by African Americans based on the focus on anti-communism. Malcolm X emerged during this milieu as an unwavering voice discursively linking the destinies of African Americans to Africans. After leaving the NOI, he was able to strive more directly to link the struggle of African Americans with Africans through the appeal to the OAU. Although Malcolm was the only diaspora African allowed to attend the 1964 conference, he faced some apathy among some African leaders. Moreover, he countered their sense of continentally exclusive Pan-Africanism by declaring that African Americans were their long-lost siblings. In this way he argued that these leaders were just as responsible to assist the African American struggle as they were to help the anti-colonial struggle in different areas on their continent. Although his aim to charge the United States at the U.N. was not successful, Malcolm did rebuild or strengthen a “Pan-African bridge” between Africans and African Americans that had been compromised by colonial politics.
Recognizing the limitations of the newly independent nations, an exploration of the assistance continental Africans have contributed to the African American struggle seems to be an understudied topic. There are numerous instances of individual Africans, such as students, who became involved in certain movements to improve the lives of Black people in America, but there is still need for a detailed study that traces these and more significant acts of Pan-Africanism directed toward African Americans from Africans. Such a study would provide more nuance to the post-1945 expression of Pan-Africanism. Furthermore, it would advance the aim to have a more complete story of the way in which African people have collectively worked together for their mutual benefit.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
