The Rise and Fall of the Confucian Long Peace: A New Dataset for Analyzing Regional Conflict Management in East Asia (1598

Abstract

Building on previous studies of the Long Confucian Peace, this article presents a novel dataset addressing questions about the long Confucian peace among China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam that existed from a newly defined period of 1598–1894. The dataset, referred to as the Long Confucian Peace Dataset (LCPD), fills gaps in the existing literature on this topic. It is described along with coding rules for the development of peace and conflict indexes. The dataset is used in an application that showcases various features of the peace, including the ebbs and flows of conflict and peace through four periods in the chronology. The analyses demonstrate how states with shared values navigated and managed relations across East Asia. These relations were often tenuous and grounded in shared interests rather than a spirit of communal cooperation. The article concludes with a discussion of a long-term research agenda, including analyses of similarities and differences between the LCPD and MIDs-based datasets on the democratic peace.

Keywords

Confucian long peace dataset negative peace positive peace regional systems shared interests shared values transactional peace

Introduction

This article presents a new dataset of peace and conflict events spanning the three-century long Confucian peace from 1598 to 1894 among China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Referred to as the Long Confucian Peace Dataset (LCPD), it also includes the Ryūkyū Kingdom as a sub-case.¹ Intuitively, the Confucian peace phenomenon confounds regional peace and conflict expectations. Kelly (2012, 422) notes that “an inexplicable Confucian Long Peace is a frustrating finding.” How often do we see peace break out for three centuries among a few well-organized states after many of them had just fielded hundreds of thousands of troops in battle against each other? Did the peace really happen? If so, how? Students of conflict resolution can learn valuable lessons from this article. It presents a new dataset and periodization correcting Euro- and Sino-centric biases in the general IR literature and in Asian studies.

Including validating literature on the Confucian peace, this article substantiates a long-forgotten statistical finding by Lewis Fry Richardson (1960), who found only a weak relationship between shared religion and peace except for Confucianism. Although Richardson’s emphasis on Confucianism’s positive association with peace offers a unique perspective, it surprisingly did not gain significant traction within the broader academic community. Our dataset aims to address this gap by building on previous research in East Asian international relations, further exploring the relationship between Confucianism, peace and conflict (Kang, 2012; Kang et al. 2019; Kang et al. 2016; Kelly 2012; Phillips 2018). Existing datasets examine different periods with a Sino-centric focus on a period defined as Early Modern East Asia (Kang et al. 2016, 2019), omitting several important cases. They deal only with a subset of the Confucian states (Kang et al. 2016, 2019), and mostly with those events related to conflict and war (Kang et al. 2016). The 2016 Kang et al. study examines the number of conflict related events associated with China and Korea between 1368 and 1841. They find evidence for a Confucian Long Peace in their study, noting “a remarkable peacefulness among these nations during this period” (2016, 772).

They also report evidence for some important distinctions between Westphalian systems and the East Asian Confucian hierarchical system. The 2019 Kang et al. study focuses on the relationship between Vietnam and China between 1365 and 1841 and also examines peaceful relations in the form of tributary missions from Vietnam to China during this period, providing a larger context for the nature of the Confucian Long Peace in East Asia. Kelly’s (2012) comparative process-tracing analysis documents the Long Peace, showing that the pre-Western Confucian-Qing system–compared to classical Greece, Western Christendom, and the modern Arab state system–was characterized by cultural peace in 194 out of the 195 years examined. These studies provide evidence for the type of conflict and diplomatic relations that existed among the states but offer a less comprehensive understanding of the key features of the Confucian Long Peace. A more complete understanding of the Long Peace entails a regional based analysis of conflict and peace events among all the Confucian states.

The gaps in the literature are addressed in this new Long Confucian Peace Dataset (LCPD) by including all Confucian states and by defining the period from the first to last major wars between them (1598–1894). The LCPD reveals distinct types of conflict and cooperation between Confucian and non-Confucian states, and within those states. It captures a broader pattern of the ebbs and flows associated with the establishment and breakdown of peaceful systems as well as providing insights about why it endured and eventually fell. Further, analyses using the LCPD open a window on the dynamics of peace and conflict outside the European context.

Applying LCPD to East Asian international relations from 1598 to 1894, this article shows that the Long Peace consisted of a lack of violent conflict among the Confucian states but did not preclude conflict or war with non-Confucian states. Nor did it preclude intrastate conflict such as rebellions, a type of conflict overlooked in previous studies. Beyond providing a new database and periodization, we also offer preliminary explanations for the patterns it reveals.

The four East Asian nations we examine shared a Confucian value system that stood in opposition to non-Confucian states existing lower in the Confucian regional order hierarchy. Confucian values also impacted East Asian history differently over time. Late Confucian values and traditions provided a familiar playbook for reconstructing domestic and international politics (Gardner 2007). The Confucian states treated each other more positively than did non-Confucian states. This distinction both enabled and constrained decisions that led to open conflict.

The question of why the peace lasted for centuries, going well beyond typical cycles of war and peace in the region, stands at the forefront of the LCPD analyses. The longevity can be understood from an assortment of diplomatic ventures accompanied by strong attempts to manage conflicts between Confucian states, while excluding non-Confucian states. As will be documented in our application, efforts were made to prolong peace, particularly at critical junctures when relations devolved to a degree that could subvert norms and peace.

Built upon Confucian principles, conflict management repertoires developed by these states were decisive under unique historical and regional circumstances. Confucianism, derived from Confucius’s teachings (551–479 BC), emphasizes a hierarchical social order, legitimate state rule under mandate from heaven, and patriarchal responsibility guiding both family and state structures. This philosophy extended to political governance, advocating for a ruler-subject relationship mirroring the father-son dynamic and aiming for a benevolent rule that fosters prosperity (Lai 2018; Taylor and Arbuckle 1995; Zhou 2009).

This belief system transcended ethnic boundaries, becoming a universal value system. Although the circumstances were different, all the states included in our dataset adopted Confucianism (Chan 2017; Haboush 1991; Harootunian 2019; Kim 2012; Kye 2010; Lee 1984; Marcure 1985; McNally 2016; Ng 2019; Tu 1996; Whitmore 1984, 2023). This adoption impacted their foreign policy behavior in the way they were treated by other states, how they behaved domestically, and in their international relations. These states therefore form the universe of Confucian polities and encompass all actors in the Confucian regional system.

Four key contributions made by this article are: a new events dataset, coding conflict and peace, a more precise rendering of three peace concepts, and a periodization of the Long Peace that yields new insights about the meaning of conflict and peace. The article is organized around these and other contributions. First, we discuss how the chronology of events is framed. Second, we describe the conflict and peace indexes. Third, the rules for coding are described along with sources. We then turn to an application that demonstrates the value of the dataset including the conflict and peace indexes and the periodization. The article concludes with a discussion of the larger research agenda to which the LCDP can contribute.

Framing the Chronology

This work goes beyond previous studies, dividing the Confucian Peace from 1598 to 1894 into four periods. Our examination begins with the failure of Japan’s invasions of Korea and armed conflict with China in 1598 and ending in 1894 with the start of the First Sino-Japanese War. In contrast to Western and Sinocentric conceptions of the Confucian Long Peace, we chose the year of 1598 as the start of the long peace rather than 1644 or 1368, when the Qing or Ming dynasties were established. Likewise, we select 1894 as the end year rather than 1841 when Great Britain defeated China in the First Opium War.

Our reasoning is based on three observations: (1) an East Asia regional perspective offers a better lens than either the Sino- or Eurocentric world views; (2) the Confucian Long Peace began when these actors stopped fighting with each other in 1598; and (3) the Long Peace ended only when Confucian states resumed engaging in armed conflict in 1894. Rather than relying on historical periodization related to Early Modernism, we situate our dataset in terms of the presence of peace and conflict events derived from the historical period that captures the Confucian Long Peace —a long period of no direct conflict between Confucian states.

Earlier periodization overlooked the major war between the Ming, Korea and Japan (1592–1598) that effectively changed the character of the regional order that came before. By situating the study after this war, we are better able to analyze and control time and relational differences among the states in the LCPD. The Confucian peace is therefore understood in a larger East Asia context: this Peace did not begin when the Qing Dynasty was established in Beijing in 1644, which is a Sinocentric definition of the period (see e.g., Kang et al. 2016; Kelly 2012), but when the last major war between Confucian states concluded in 1598.

We identify the end of this period as 1894, when Japan and China went to war over control of Korea. Previous studies argue that the conclusion of the long peace occurred in 1842, the year China signed a peace treaty with Great Britain after losing the First Opium War (see Kang et al. 2016; Kelly 2012). We disagree. The Confucian regional order continued among the Confucian states until the close of the nineteenth century: the Long Confucian Peace can only end when Confucian states, not foreign actors, engage or re-engage in violence with one another. It would seem therefore that the Long Peace began between China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, when these Confucian states halted armed conflict with one another and ended when they reentered military conflict with each other. This regional view more completely defines the scope of the Confucian Long Peace, which was a peace among Confucian states rather than a period that lacked international or intrastate conflict.

Moreover, the choice of the year 1842 as the end of the Peace era emphasizes the role of Western intervention and the First Opium War as the causes for the breakdown of the peace. China’s diminished status and the encroachment of Western countries did cause friction and ultimately enabled some actors to take advantage of instability. However, Western countries had been present in the region from the beginning of our period, having established a permanent presence through state-sponsored colonizing endeavors at the start of the sixteenth century. Furthermore, the Qing dynasty responded with policies designed to combat western arming, instigating a second war in 1860 to ward off outsiders. Rejecting earlier theses that the Confucian peace ended with a diminished China (Sinocentric) and Western intrusion (Eurocentric), the LCPD more accurately situates peace and conflict among the Confucian states themselves. The Confucian system ended when these states either willingly or forcefully abandoned it.²

Conflict and Peace Indexes

The Conflict and Peace Indexes classify conflict and peace events in the dataset involving the Confucian states. The conflict index distinguishes among three types of conflict events: conflicts among the Confucian states, such as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 (Jansen 1989); conflicts with neighbors or foreign actors, for instance, the Sino-Russian Border Conflicts (Palais 1996); and intrastate conflict, or conflicts occurring within Confucian states, such as the Second Trinh-Nguyen Civil War in Vietnam 1770–1860 (Kiernan 2019) or revolts in Japan, for example the Battle of Sekigahara, fought between the forces of Mitsunari Ikeda and Tokugawa Ieyasu (Hall 1991).

The peace index distinguishes three types of peace. Negative peace is characterized by a lack of violence such as tariff conventions where settlements are forced on one party and accepted by the other. An example of this type of event is China’s Canton System in 1757, when Guangzhou became the only Chinese port open to foreign trade, or the unequal treaties, such as the Tokugawa shogunate’s various tariff conventions with western powers (Matsuyama 2018). Negative peace events typically do not consist of military fights or threats but may be regarded as low-level conflicts.

The second type of peace is referred to as transactional peace. It is based on shared interests or instances where parties cooperate for mutual gain, such as the establishment of mutually recognized borders as in the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 between the Qing and Russian Empires (Paine 2003). This could be construed as everyday exchanges of goods and services among citizens or representatives of the respective countries, who are often members of the same alliance.

A third type of peace is referred to as positive peace or instances of communal peace established through structural cooperation, such as when the Nguyen Lords of Vietnam approached China in 1598 as a strategic partner to allow Chinese merchants active participation in trading activities in South Vietnam and to permanently settle in Hoi An (Xuyen 2021). Another example of communal peace occurred when Japan voluntarily signing of the Geneva Convention in 1886 (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 1864; Galtung 1964, 1969, 1996). Positive peace is distinguished from transactional peace more in degree than kind. States attempt to integrate and harmonize their policies, emphasizing their long-term interests and shared identities.

These categories can be construed as moving from conflict-managing to a more conflict-resolving type of peace (see also Fry’s [2006] distinction between internally and externally peaceful societies). Events that occurred during the Confucian peace can be located within one or more of these categories, although two or more categories may occur in relationships over time. Further examples of events in each of the conflict and peace categories are shown with sources in the online supplement.

Our conflict and peace categories were developed in the context of recent analyses of peace datasets,³ and they resemble the Diehl et al. (2021) Peace Scale Indicators. Their continuum includes severe rivalry, lesser rivalry, negative peace, warm peace, and positive peace. The Diehl et al. focus on rivalries in the modern world differs from our concentration on conflict among a sub-set of like-minded nations in the pre-modern era. Their 115-year dataset (1900–2015) includes 2631 different state relationships in the international system, but the considerable heterogeneity of dyadic actors makes an analysis by parties very complex. Due to our more homogenous grouping of states, the LCPD dataset is better able to measure the ebbs and flows of conflict severity in the regional system of historic East Asia. Our interest in the presence or absence of conflict among four nations, or six pairs of actors, gears us in the direction of questions about when and where conflicts occurred.

The Diehl et al. (2021) peace categories bear a stronger resemblance to our categories. Their negative peace also emphasizes a lack of violence but acknowledges that these states prepare for possible wars with neighbors by maintaining and improving their capacity. However, their warm peace is closer to positive peace than to our category of transactional peace. They include an emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution, or the “unthinkability” of war, which is part of our definition of positive peace. Our emphasis instead is on normal transactions between states and their citizens. The Diehl et al. (2021) category of security communities is likewise similar to our positive peace category. Both highlight the importance of shared communal values and shared identities, structural cooperation, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.⁴

The Peace Scale Indicators were applied as well to Asian peace by Hoffman et al. (2018). Analyzing Asian countries during the same period as Diehl et al. (2021) (1900–2015), they found that relationships among pairs of Asian states were coded mostly as negative peace, particularly from 1950. Very few relationships were coded in the positive peace categories. Although relationships have become more peaceful over time, these were in the direction of negative rather than positive peace. Further, they note that the more recently devised ASEAN state system has been slower to move toward a greater integration as in Europe. Also of interest is their analysis of transition points in the dataset. This is similar to our analysis of transitional periods of the LCPD. A difference however is between their focus on transitions to enhanced peace and our focus on transitions that move in either more conflictual or more peaceful directions. We turn now to a description of the kinds of events included and coded in the LCPD.

Coding Events

The LCPD is divided into two events datasets covering the period of 1598–1894 (see the online supplement for the full data). One is designed to capture conflict, the other captures peace events among the four “Confucian” states of East Asia (Ming/Qing China, Tokugawa Japan, Joseon Korea, and Vietnam), as well as their relations with non-Confucian states. While the Ryūkyū Kingdom should be considered a Confucian state, we designate it as a sub-case due to its minor influence on the Confucian Order compared to the outsized role of her Confucian counterparts, the limited peaceful and conflictual interactions Ryūkyū had in East Asia with regional and foreign actors, and disagreements over her independence from Japan.

The events in each dataset are presented in chronological order and coded on a yearly basis. Many events span multiple years, such as the length of a war. In total, the LCPD identifies 552 instances of conflict and 697 instances of peace across the period. They shed light on the type of conflict and cooperation that existed during the Long Confucian Peace.

In our selection of the events to include in the dataset, we triangulated the sources. That is, we selected events that could be verified by two or three sources. For this reason, we took as given that these events happened as long as we were able to validate events between multiple published mainstream historical works. Since we were collecting event data, we focused our investigation on populating our dataset with historical events that would be added either to the conflict (e.g., a war between Confucian States, outsiders, a large rebellion) or peace datasets (e.g., diplomatic engagement, tributary relations). All events were treated as one-time yearly events in the set (as mentioned, for multiple years, we repeated the event to its conclusion, such as a war spanning multiple years). In creating this dataset, therefore, we collected and categorized them either as peace or conflict event types. To this end, and when available, we cross-referenced events between both primary and secondary sources, as well as translated archival records that have been digitized. Most events in the dataset are well-documented, secondary sources—such as scholarly historical works covering the period—proved vital.

The events include wars, other conflicts short of war, major rebellions, peace treaties, tribute missions to the Confucian states, trade policy between major states, and other agreements that have been the subject of historical attention. We focused on those events that could influence the foreign policy behavior of each state. Domestic issues such as localized revolts, internal market regulations, or economic decisions outside the purview of trade policy were not coded. The coding was performed in two stages. First, we distinguished between conflict and peace events, and second, we decided which of the three classifications in each index best captured the type of conflict or peace.

Coding Reliability

To ensure that the events were coded accurately, we conducted blind reliability testing on the event codes across the four periods under investigation. Twenty events, five divided by our four periods, were randomly selected from the conflict and peace indexes and subjected to independent coding by the four authors. The authors agreed on 84 percent of all codes. For conflict indicators, the authors agreed 87 percent of the time, with only 8 disagreements. For the peace index, the authors agreed 78 percent of the time, with 15 disagreements. This may have been due to the more variegated structure of the peace index; peaceful events may be more difficult to define than conflict events. The conflict index consisted of binary decisions (conflict happened or not), increasing the chances for agreement. For a full accounting of the events that were randomly chosen and the scores each author gave see the online supplement.

We engaged in discussion to determine the sources of disagreement. For example, all the tribute missions were initially coded as instances of negative peace, due to the assumed coercive features of China’s tributary system. Upon further review of available literature, we understood that tribute missions were not simply trade missions to China, but had many different functions, including providing avenues for diplomacy and the transfer of messages between states (Kang 2020; Womack 2012; Zhao 2013). Most of the region participated in this Sinocentric system, with China regulating access to tribute and enforcing rules on those that it could (MacKay 2015).

However, this system served constituent purposes as well. There were several achievements by Confucian participants to increase the number of tribute missions-–such as Japan through its go-between in Ryūkyū—to maximize trade and diplomatic contact with China (Sakai, 1964). The broad benefits of these missions led us therefore to code tribute interactions as transactional peace events born out of parties cooperating for mutual gains more than coercive means. The same logic drove our coding of a variety of trade treaties with European powers at the end of the period. These events were instances of activity based on shared interests in preventing conflict. The LCPD application below identifies specific patterns that capture the varied relations between and within the Confucian states as well as with outsiders.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 and those in the online supplement (C1–CA8) report descriptive statistics for the pooled dataset, each individual country, and each of the four periods of the Long Peace. As mentioned above, periods were determined by the changing trends of negative and positive peace. Our dataset has a total of 1932 conflict and peace events. Event years can encompass the same event over multiple years, which means that not all observations are separate events. We took an approach similar to that used in previous datasets,⁵ and coded each event as either 1 or 0, depending on whether it occurred in each specific year. Larger means reported in the tables indicate more events in that category. The standard deviations indicate the dispersion of the data points along our time series; larger SDs suggest higher dispersion from the mean value while smaller SDs indicate values closer to the mean.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics for all Countries.

Type of Conflict and Peace	N	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Confucian conflict	1,932	1	.013	.115
Neighbor/Foreign conflict	1,932	1	.103	.304
Internal conflict	1,932	1	.169	.375
Negative peace	1,932	1	.039	.194
Transactional peace	1,932	1	.314	.464
Positive peace	1,932	1	.008	.088

The distribution of events across our categories of peace and conflict are not even. Transactional peace events, with a mean of 0.313, are the most common type of event in the LCPD dataset. This is followed by internal conflict events (0.169) and neighbor (non-Confucian) conflict events (0.103). Negative peace events are relatively uncommon, but a striking piece of evidence comes from the two most infrequent types of events. Unsurprisingly, Confucian Conflict (that is, conflict between the Confucian states) events exhibit one of the lowest frequencies in the set (0.013). However, positive peace events have the lowest frequency (0.008). The Confucian Peace can be described as a period with little evidence of positive peace.⁶ We provide brief discussions of the descriptive statistics by country and period in Tables C1–C8.

Application of the LCPD

The dataset is used in an application to explore whether a Long Peace could be empirically observed and to discover the type of peace that existed in East Asia during that period. This application documents an interplay between conflict and peace as events unfolded across four periods of the Long Peace. Consistent with an enhanced case study approach that imposes concepts on descriptive case material (Diehl et al. 2024; Druckman 2005), the distinction between conflict and peace concepts enhances our understanding of what happened during the Confucian Long Peace. We ask whether the long peace was sustained by an absence of violence among the four Confucian states, by transactions, or by a shared communal cooperation. The results shed light on the importance of a shared value system for maintaining peaceful relations among nations.

We analyze the general trends in the conflict and peace indexes across the centuries. The dataset is then divided into four periods: reconstruction of the Confucian Order (1598–1677), a period of high peace (1678–1769), deconstruction of the order (1770–1860), and collapse (1861–1894). The insights gained from these analyses inform an agenda for research to be discussed below.

Results

The results are presented in this section in three parts: general trends, trends in types of peace and conflict, and trends that occurred in each of four periods through the chronology.

General Trends

Figure 1 is a summary of conflict and peace in East Asia from 1598 to 1894, using information from the datasets we have compiled. The two curves are loess regression lines (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) based on a nonparametric technique to reveal trends and cycles (see Cleveland and Devlin 1988). It shows a general trend –the ebbs and flows—between peace events and instances of conflict.⁷

The Confucian peace is analyzed in four periods shown sequentially from left to right. The first period shows that a stream of conflict events was dominant. The second period is dominated by cooperation, with the peace stream emerging at a time when the conflict stream is diminishing. The third period reveals flattening and converging timelines of peace and conflict, which indicate either stability or stagnation including an inability to contend with major disruptions. The fourth period appears to show peace on the rise again. However, the period was characterized by negative and transactional peace, absent positive peace events. The transforming environment of negative peace signals appeasement and the road to a new conflict environment rather than a renewed era of cooperation. The rise in peace events seen in the fourth period demonstrates a desire by these actors to avoid or end conflicts (negative peace/transactional peace), tantamount to appeasement to rescue a failing order.

Trends in Types of Conflict and Peace

The trends in Figure 1 are disaggregated by types and periods. The breakdown of conflict and peace into types are shown in Tables 2 and 3. As alluded to above in the descriptive statistics section, the four actors—China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam—engaged mostly in internal conflicts (60 percent of the total conflicts), followed by conflicts with non-Confucian neighbors or foreign powers (36 percent) and a small number of Confucian conflicts at 4 percent (see Table 2). In broader terms, the long peace was characterized by these actors’ attempts to build internal legitimization and solidify power at home while contending with hostile forces on their borders and periphery. Conflict among the Confucian states was limited, and what became the Long Peace was a tenuous peace resulting from a devastating conflict between China, Korea, and Japan, which supplanted the political and regional order that had existed among them previously.⁸

Table 2.

Conflict Cases.

Type of Conflict	Number of Events	Percentage
Confucian conflict	22	4
Neighbor/Foreign power conflict	199	36
Internal conflict	326	60

Table 3.

Peace Cases.

Type of Cooperation	Number of Events	Percentage
Negative peace: Interest based cooperation	72	11
Transactional peace: Shared interest-based cooperation	605	87
Positive peace: Shared communal cooperation	15	2

Table 3 shows that most peace events (87 percent) were transactional, based on shared interests, with only a few motivated by negative peace characterized by self-centered cooperation (11 percent) and by shared communal cooperation (2 percent). Thus, peace was not based on a shared communal sense of cooperation, but instead on shared interests. Additionally, instances of coercion were relatively low, suggesting that the peace was based on the specific interests of each state, which, in the Confucian cluster, were informed by Confucian concepts of a hierarchical based regionalism. In the following sections, we will examine temporal effects on the conflict and peace indexes. These data suggest that East Asian regional politics during the Long Peace was interest-based and conflictual. The long peace was not shaped by mutual cooperation, but rather driven by the shared interests of managing conflict and promoting peace. It was conflictual regarding targets of violence from outside that cluster but occurring within the East Asian region.

Conflict and Peace by Period

Tables 4 and 5 show the frequency of conflict and peace events for each of the four periods respectively. Note that periods were defined after we visualized the trends of peace and conflict in our dataset. Our periods were defined by ebb and flow of peace or conflict events.

Table 4.

Conflict by Period.

Periods	Confucius Conflict (1)	Neighbor/Foreign Conflict (2)	Internal Conflict (3)
Period 1: Reconstruction of the confucian order 1598–1677	15	60	153
Period 2: High confucian peace 1678 to 1769	0	54	18
Period 3: Deconstruction of the new confucian order 1770–1860	4	63	121
Period 4: Collapse of the confucian peace 1861–1894	3	22	34

Table 5.

Peace by Period.

Periods/Categories	Negative Peace: Interest Based (1)	Transactional Peace: Shared Interest (2)	Positive Peace: Communal Cooperation (3)
Period 1: Reconstruction of the confucian order 1598–1677	13	82	8
Period 2: High confucian peace 1678 to 1769	17	275	4
Period 3: Deconstruction of the new confucian order 1770–1860	18	164	0
Period 4: Collapse of the confucian peace 1861–1894	24	85	2

Patterns by Period

As shown in Figure 1 above, the two curves demonstrate an inverse relationship between conflict and peace events, where lower peace events correspond to higher instances of conflict. Digging deeper into the periods reveals a more nuanced picture of East Asian regional politics in this time period. Tables 4 and 5 display conflict and peace events respectively by period. When viewed together, Tables 4 and 5 show a negative correlation between peace and conflict higher in the first period of 1598–1677 (−0.57) and the fourth period of 1861–1894 (−0.49) than in the second period 1678–1769 (−0.34) and the third period of 1770–1860 (−0.46). This disaggregation of different types of peace and conflict events tells a story about a changing, not stagnate, regional order. This order is characterized by a transition from conflict to peace, followed by upheaval, and ending with less conflict overall as the old order is rejected, and a new order is adopted.

Results based on the four periods can be further understood in terms of the historical context. The Japanese invasion and the war between Japan on the one side and China and Korea on the other ended in 1598, leaving a power vacuum in East Asia that mortally wounded the Ming dynasty and contributed to the rise of the Qing (see Lee 2017; Turnbull 2002). New political realities forced the four Confucian states to reconstitute the regional system and strengthen their power at home. Under the leadership of Kangxi, the forming Qing dynasty embraced Confucianism as a means of restoring China’s legitimacy at home and abroad (Lee 2017). Korea sought its own identity and was forced to accept China’s regional status. Diplomatic relations between Korea and other states resumed toward the end of this period.

Japan stabilized internal affairs through the creation of an internal and external Confucian-based hierarchical system, which situated the Tokugawa Shōgun at the top. Though Confucianism was not new to Japan by 1598, the period saw the zenith of the influence of Confucian philosophy on the state, which would permeate and penetrate the society like no other earlier period (Paramore 2012). Vietnam was engulfed in civil war brought about by family rivalries and conflict with her neighbors, which was ameliorated to some extent by the end of the period. These contextual factors interacted with Confucian practices of conflict management among the states, laying the foundation for peace to come in later years. Our historical interpretations for each period are based on patterns shown in the LCPD datasets. The following is an overview of the transitions that occurred from one period to another.⁹

Reflected in Figure 1 and Tables 4 through 5 above, Period 1 and the transitional years into Period 2 of the Confucian long peace indicate a conflictual regional environment. Period 2 and the transitional years prior to Period 3 reflect more cooperative environments, where trade and development were the primary concerns. During these years, a “High Confucian Peace” was achieved, where regional actors operated within a shared framework of values that facilitated communication, trade, and diplomatic relations. These more stabilized and peaceable relations among Confucian states promoted region-wide benefits and an equitable distribution of those benefits. While the Long Peace was not driven by communal interests, and actors engaged one another out of self-interest, the second period is characterized by more peaceful relations. States interacted and traded with one another more regularly than previously. The formula of relations, characterized by trade and hierarchy and framed within Confucian normative repertoires, established a set of relations among the four states contributing to a more peaceful Asia.

Period 3 and the transitional years to Period 4 reflect the developing and changing relations of a system undergoing transformation. This is shown by the flattening of the curve in Period 3, which is emblematic of a changing regional environment and the transactional peace it encourages. The stagnating conflict during Period 3 was punctuated by conflict events with foreign actors along with Confucian policies that failed to arrest the descent of regional relations despite convergence on a common set of values. States suffered more internal crises, as well, which were exacerbated by stagnating economies due to constrained foreign trade and diplomatic relations. The system that provided Asia with stability in Period 2 started to devolve into a more conflictual environment. Cooperation, trade, and diplomacy still occurred, but the lack of cooperation and limited the ability of Confucian states to react to international events beyond their control. This transformation ushered in the collapse of the Confucian order. Period 3 is therefore identified as the “Deconstruction of the New Confucian Order.”

As attempts were made to rescue the decline of the Confucian system in Period 4, as shown in the dramatic increase of negative and transactional peace events in Table 5, a new set of changing regional system dynamics emerged. The sizable increase in peace events signal appeasement on the part of the Qing Dynasty (and others) in their desperate attempts to mediate the decline of the regional order—actions that were too little and too late. Rather than transforming into a renewed period of cooperation, a new conflict environment emerged in Period 4, bookending the Confucian peace with the First Sino-Japanese war in 1894. The end occurred partly because the shared values that established rules and norms for diplomacy broke down in Period 3. The Qing dynasty along with Korea, Japan, and Vietnam failed to rise to the challenge of European imperialism. The end of the Confucian peace can be regarded as a paradigmatic shift in regional values, the formulation of new modes of governance, new institutions, and new means of conflict management. The end of the long Confucian peace was the end of pre-modern Confucian relations across East Asia and the beginning of what is familiar about East Asia today.

The results of this application provide a nuanced understanding of Confucian peace by distinguishing between types of conflict and peace and dividing the chronology into periods. Relational dynamics among the Confucian nation states can be observed through the lens of transitions from one period to another, an approach that was not taken in previous datasets that examined this topic. Conflict events occurred throughout each period but were directed toward internal and foreign encounters. The largest number of foreign and neighboring conflicts happened in the first two periods (1598–1677 and 1678–1769). These East Asian Confucian states were reconstituting themselves during the first period and seeking new targets of expansion outside the Confucian orbit in the second period. From the second period on, neighbor wars decreased amid Western encroachment. Internal conflict existed throughout the Confucian long peace, peaking in the first period, subsiding in the second period, and resurging in the final two periods reflecting the greater instability of the system.

Contributing to studies of conflict resolution, this application shows that communal cooperation, regarded as the strongest manifestation of positive peace, was infrequent throughout the long peace. Instead, our events dataset shows that peace was mostly interest based, though Confucian repertoires acted as the common diplomatic and general foreign policy language. The largest number of positive peace events occurred during Period 1, whereas the largest number of negative peace events occurred during Period 4. Transactional peace occurs throughout the periods, but these events peaked in Period 2. This clarifies that negative peace events increased considerably during the final period as conflict between Confucian states broke out. The movement away from positive toward negative peace in Periods 3 and 4 reflects a transforming regional system devolving into conflict, not a Confucian order moving toward greater positive peace. This indicates a breakdown of Confucian institutions meant to manage conflict or the collapse of the Confucian Peace. Using he LCPD, particularly utilizing the different categories of conflict and peace, scholars can more fully tackle how institutional breakdown can lead to conflict, or how pressures from outside or within change the behavior of states.

Discussion

This application provides empirical support for a Confucian long peace and offers an example of how the LCPD can assist in the examination of trends in conflict and peace. The dataset shows that Confucian norms, defined by shared values and rituals, were the glue for sustaining non-violence. Additionally, the LCPD further develops a regional approach to the study of conflict and peace which allows for a fuller understanding of factors that led to the longevity and decline of the Confucian Long Peace. The events data analyses suggest that a peace facilitated by shared values can lead to a sustained, though perhaps not cooperative, peace among non-Western, non-democratic countries. To the extent that shared values contributed to peace, it provided a common language and community that made armed conflict among Confucian states taboo. This led to peaceable relations among these states. However, failure to embed peace through communal and cooperative repertoires contributed to its downfall.

The relatively few positive peace events in the dataset parallels the peace scale data from twentiethth/twenty-first century Asian states presented by Hoffman et al. (2018). The LCPD shows only two percent of events coded in the shared communal cooperation category; the peace scale data show no relationships coded in the security community category during the 115-year period captured by their dataset. The lack of positive peace during the Long Peace may reflect a trend prevalent on the Asian continent. However, the preponderance of negative peace relationships in their dataset contrasts with the prevalence of transactional peace events in the LCPD. This suggests a higher level of cooperation among the Confucian states during the Long Peace than among Asian states more generally during the centuries to follow. The reason for this difference may reside in Confucian norms but this remains a question for further investigation.¹⁰

Further, our application has parallels to the debate surrounding Democratic Peace Theory. During the Confucian peace period, there was a primary power that was either central to the promotion and maintenance of the regional order or to its establishment (Harootunian, 2019; Kang, 2012, 2020; Wang, 2013). This order existed and endured without the primary power forcing its will on the others, which suggests that the shared-value system that propped up the order was inclusive and acceptable to all members of it (Ikenberry 2001). We discuss projects that compare the Confucian and Democratic peace in the section to follow.

A Long-Term Research Agenda

This application of the LCPD provides a springboard for further examinations of both the Confucian Long Peace and the ebbs and flows of peace and conflict more generally.¹¹ Future studies can examine how different types of peace or conflict events affected state behavior, including the propensity to go to war or support the established system. Indeed, we make note of how the longevity of the system in East Asia at this time was based on Confucian systems and ideals of government, but that this was not necessarily a fair regional order. This article provides a few explanations about how and why the system lasted for 300 years. Other scholars could expand this investigation to better understand how the composite parts of the regional system in Asia contributed to attempts made to buck or support the system. Was this a peace due to lack of military capacity, a lack of governmental legitimacy, or a cultural peace? LCPD scratches the surface of these questions that could reveal other insights into state behavior. These include the relationship between norms and self-interest (see note 10) and distinctions between Confucian and non-Confucian Asian states following our discussion of the Hoffman et al. (2018) research.

The LCPD also has implications for an evolving theory of conflict transformation. Following Reimer and Schmitz (2021), our concepts serve as a framework for multi-level analysis. Their case presentations illustrate diverse paths to transformative change toward positive peace. Our coding of events in terms of the peace concepts shows how micro-level processes involving conflict and cooperation push regional systems from one to another state of peace. Following Druckman and Wood (2023), we provide pathways toward theory development by demonstrating an interplay between relations among like-minded neighboring countries and the regional system within which they co-exist.

Along similar lines, the events data provided by the LCPD can be used to develop process traces for each of the four Confucian nations. The paths would show the ebbs and flows of conflict and peace (positive and negative) for each nation through the centuries of the long peace. For example, the U-shaped trends for peace and conflict in Japan contrast sharply with the alternating peaks and valleys observed for Korea. This kind of comparative analysis would reveal how each nation contributed to the aggregate trends shown in the analyses reported in our application. It is an example of scaling up from nations to the region. Another analysis would focus horizontally on relationships among the four nations. The conflict events in the LCPD can be used to calculate reaction functions showing how each nation responded to another nation’s escalatory moves (see Pruitt and Nowak 2014). These bilateral nation functions can then be aggregated for depicting systemic or regional processes. They would take us a step closer to developing a multi-level theory of long-term peace.

Process tracing can also better illuminate the influence of the Ryūkyū Kingdom on the Confucian Order. The LCPD tracks the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s involvement in peace and conflict events in the region from 1598 to 1894 compared to those of her Confucian counterparts, China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. However, the extent of the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s impact on peace and conflict interactions in East Asia can be better understood with process tracing. For example, what role did the Ryūkyū Kingdom play in the region when interacting with foreign actors? Did Ryūkyū shape regional politics more than the LCPD can capture? A process tracing approach can also discern the degree of the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s independence from Japan, which could elevate this country to a stand-alone case in the data set.

Although our application does not connect the Confucian Peace with the democratic peace, several parallels are apparent. Both types of peace are characterized by a tripod of features: shared values, trade, and membership in IOs and regional organizations. Further research might seek to compare the two types of peace to better understand the similarities and differences between them.

The democratic peace has received considerably more attention than the Confucian peace. The statistical democratic peace literature has evolved since Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) measures were introduced by the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small 1972; Small and Singer 1982). Maoz et al. (2019) make evident the progress made in refining concepts, increasing precision in measurement, distinguishing among units of analysis (monadic, dyadic, and multiparty), and instituting statistical controls. In contrast, the LCPD is an original dataset comparable in some ways to the early years of the COW project (see also Gibler et al. 2016). It is a first attempt to document events that occurred in another historical long peace. Further research on this dataset will benefit from the conceptual and statistical progress made on the MIDs datasets.

In addition to refinement of the LCPD, comparative research would reveal similarities and differences between the two types of peace. Regarding similarities, both are characterized by negative peace or reduced violence and increased trade relations. A question of interest is why positive peace only emerged sporadically in the two types of datasets. By applying our positive peace codes to the most recent version of MIDs, we could discover periods during the democratic peace where shared communities were in the ascendency. Another question of interest concerns the role of values in the two types of peace. It would be interesting to learn how indicators of values were expressed during these periods. These analyses would shed light on how the democratic and Confucian themes provided common identities that sustained the peace.

Regarding differences, the LCPD is a peace among authoritarian nations in East Asia from the 16th through nineteenth centuries (overlap occurs during the nineteenth century). Further, the Confucian peace terminated somewhat abruptly in the latter part of the nineteenth Century. The democratic peace has continued without major lapses from the early nineteenth century to the present. Two projects are suggested. Building on turning points research (Druckman 2001), interrupted time series analyses could examine the build-up and shake down of crises in both datasets. Of particular interest is the question of why the peace fractured in one but not the other type of peace. Another project could examine the course of trade and diplomatic relations among the Confucian and democratic nations in the respective datasets. The trade events indicators developed for the LCPD can be applied to recent MIDs datasets for relatively direct comparison. This set of projects would go some way toward increasing our understanding of how a long peace unfolds. They would contribute to theories of peace.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - The Rise and Fall of the Confucian Long Peace: A New Dataset for Analyzing Regional Conflict Management in East Asia (1598–1894)

Supplemental Material for The Rise and Fall of the Confucian Long Peace: A New Dataset for Analyzing Regional Conflict Management in East Asia (1598–1894) by Michael Gigante, Joshua Stone, Daniel Druckman, and Ming Wan in Journal of Conflict Resolution

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - The Rise and Fall of the Confucian Long Peace: A New Dataset for Analyzing Regional Conflict Management in East Asia (1598–1894)

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Michael John Gigante

Joshua Stone

Data Availability Statement

The data and appendices supporting this study are hosted on Harvard Dataverse. To access these files directly, please refer to the link found in the document for access. The data is freely available for use in non-profit research-related work without any conditions. Users are required to cite all authors listed above when using the dataset, in part or in whole.*

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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